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Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
l'
AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

The plaintiffs provide their supplemental brief in opposition to the defendants.' pending
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"
"dispositive motions as follows:
A. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION BASED UPON THE
DEFENDANTS' FRAUD IN LIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION FOR DAMAGES AND
RELIEF CONSISTENT WITH I.C. § 18-7803, JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, ESTOPPEL, ETC.
The claims of fraud, abuse of process, judicial estoppel, violations arising from the Idaho
Racketeering Statutes, advanced by the plaintiffs prevent the defendants from asserting Res Judicata
relating to the prior proceedings. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 537, Fraud or Collusion provides:
Fraud by a party will not undermine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the
fraud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine ofres
of res
of his or her
judicata will not shield a blameworthy defendant from the consequences ofhis
own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be invoked to
sustain fraud, and a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a
basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
The claims relating to abuse of process, estoppel, violations of the Idaho Racketeering
Statutes, have never been addressed by any prior proceedings. These claims relate to the wrongful
of the defendants in obtaining the judgment based upon their misrepresentations and fraud
practices ofthe
of any
in obtaining ajudgment. The individual Taylors in their deposition testimony establish a lack ofany
cognizable legal interest in the trust. The alleged beneficiaries testified they were not going to obtain
of the deposition ofReed
of Reed J. Taylor) (74, 75 of
the
any money from the litigation (pp. 132, 133, 134, ofthe
ofthe
deposition of Dallan
D all an Taylor). The trust was liquidated and all cash was disbursed to the Settlement
Agreement (36,37 ofthe
of the deposition ofR. John Taylor). The trust corpus was distributed to the only
beneficiaries that existed, after the settlement agreement was reached among the various family
members. The individual Taylors, Reed, Dallan, and R. John, did not take any proceeds, and
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judicially admitted their mother was the "sole beneficiary of the trust".
"The party asserting a claim of fraud on the court must establish that an unconscionable plan
or scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision and that such acts prevented the
losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense." 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 728
(2006). In the present case the plaintiffs are specifically praying for damages as a result of the
wrongful conduct of the defendants. The Idaho Racketeering Statute provides a remedy for the
wrongful conduct of the defendants. The court may enter an Order divesting the defendants of any
interest, direct or indirect, in the real property consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and
specifically section 18-7805 (c) (d)( 1). The plaintiffs' claims for damages became viablt: only upon
of the defendants in the prior proceeding. The re(;ord before
the completion ofthe wrongful conduct ofthe
this court contains evidence demonstrating the true status of the Taylors.
All the named defendants acted in unison in providing the district court with verified
pleadings, and/or executed pleadings which represented the status of the Taylors as beneficiaries.
There is abundant evidence in the record that establishes that such was not the case. Their own
admissions both under oath and/or through admissions to the court establish the falsehood. A person
is subject to liability if he or she does a tortuous act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1977),

Highland

Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 341, 986 P.2d 996 (1999).
The plaintiffs have plead claims asserting judicial estoppel, and estoppel generally.
of judicial estoppel. Idaho Law provides that a
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine ofjudicial
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
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a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means ofsworn
of sworn
litigant who obtains ajudgment,
statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony,
to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject
matter. Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. The policies underlYlngjudicial
of the orderly administration ofjustice
ofjustice and regard for the dignity
estoppel are general considerations ofthe
ofjudicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose
ofjudicial
with the courts. Heinz v. Bauer, ID-ROI28.004 (S.C. 2008 No. 33579), Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho
87,277 P.2d 561 (1954).
of Thomas Maile Part III provides attachment from the Idaho Supreme Court
The Affidavit ofThomas
matter captioned Taylor v. Maile et. al. The Supreme Court has recently denied a motion to augment
the record filed by the Appellants-Cross Respondents (plaintiffs herein). The requested motion to
augment contained the transcript from the hearing dated May 2, 2005, before the Honorable Judge
Beiter. The transcript is part of the record before this court, and it is asserted by the plaintiffs too
contain additional admissions by R. John Taylor, once again under oath indicating the his mother
is the beneficiary ofthe trust. This evidence as well as the prior sworn testimony ofR. John Taylor,
the deposition testimony above alleged, support the allegations of fraud alleged by the plaintiffs as
well as other claims set forth in the amended complaint.
Jurisdiction is "the legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that binds the parties
to any matter properly brought before it." Black's Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
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-'
judicial jurisdiction). A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court
matter jurisdiction is the indispensable
without jurisdiction ofthe subject matter are a nUllity.
nullity. Subject matterjurisdiction
foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to act.
jurisdiction by the court over the subject matter. A void
ofjurisdiction
A judgment is void, when there is a want of
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. No rights are acquired or divested by it. It neither binds nor
bars anyone, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless.
50 C.1.S.
C.J.S. Judgments § 532, provides:

§ 532. Fraud, collusion, or perjury
of fraud where the fraud goes
A judgment may be collaterally attacked on the ground offraud
to the jurisdiction of the court. Where the fraud alleged was inherent in the cause of
action, or in the character or procurement of the instrument sued on, it does not
furnish a legitimate ground for impeaching the judgment in a collateral proceeding;
and, as a broad general rule, where the court has jurisdiction, it is not permissible for
a party or privy to attack a judgment in a collateral proceeding because of fraud, such
a judgment being voidable only, and not void.
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the record or
goes to the method of
acquiringjurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment may be attacked
ofacquiringjurisdiction.
collaterally where fraud has been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment,
or on the party against whom the judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from

having a fair opportunity to present his case.
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks on
judgments is defined as fraud which is collateral to the issues tried in the case where
the judgment is rendered.
A judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction over subject matter is void. Andre v.
Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355, 1361 (1984). See generally 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
1236 (1969). Purported judgments entered by a court without jurisdiction over the subjt:ct
subj{:ct matter
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are void and as such are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states
under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Restatement of Judgments,
ID-081S.098 (C.A. 2008).
§ 7 (1942)), State V. Annstrong, ID-0815.098

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient claims to withstand the defendants' motions for
summary judgment. The underlying judgment in Taylor v. Maile, has been produced as a result of

fraud and misrepresentations. The record contains ample evidence demonstrating actionable claims
against the defendants. The defendants' motions must be denied in their entirety.
Dated this

-'1-

day of January, 2009.

!J/J

~

MAI~.,
THOMAS G. MAI~.,
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire
Investments LLC and pro se
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By RIC NELSON
DEPUTY
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6
7

CONNIE W. TAYLOR

CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

8

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9
10
11
12

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
limited liability.
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

13

Plaintiffs,

14

I

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
NON·OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR STAY

15

VS,

16

f/k/a CONNIE
CONNIE WRlGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN TA
YLOR,

17

an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a

18

19
20
21

22

partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON TN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

Defendants.

23

COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust,
Trust l John Taylor and

24

ofrecord
DaHan Taylor, by and through their attorney of
record and hereby notify the court and counsel that

25
26

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION

1
LAW OF'F'ICE:5 OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWIS,.ON, 10AI-I0
10Al-i0 S3·501
a3·501
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Defendants' counsel is not available to attend the Motion for Stay hearing Mr. Maile has scheduled
for January 27, 2009, but do not oppose entry of a stay in this matter pending the ruling of the
1

Supreme Court in the Taylor v. iV/aile,
i\1aile, Supreme Court Docket No. 33781.

2
3

Defendants believe it would be best that trial NOT be scheduled in this matter at this time.

4

There is no way of
predicting when a decision from the Supreme Court will be received and it would
ofpredicting

5

not be in the interest of judicial efficiency to schedule a trial date which would trigger many

6

deadlines.

7
8

DATED this

B~ay of January, 2009.
.~_••.."EY

9

~

10

__
____ ___________
_
Conrue W. Taylor, a member of the firm.
Attorneys for Defendants.

By~~~
-=~~~_ _~
By~~~_-==---:::::::..,,,,----

11

12

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

14

15
16
17

18

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2009 I caused to be se:rved a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addr~~ssed to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

21
22

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

~

o
o

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101
10
1 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

o

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
OvernlO'ht Mail
(FAX) (208) 385-5384

.
r w. TaYlo~ rl~
rI~

~....:::::::;;;:-_
~:2~'-
~~--~:2~'-

23
24

onnie W.
...
Attorney for DefeL~/

25

26

u.s. Mail

D

o

19
20

o

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION

2
I.AW
I..AW

OFFIC~S
OFFIC~S

01"

CLARK AND FEENEY
I.E:WISTON,
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01/20/2009 12:48 FAX

2083855384 1

[4J 002/004

lIIOFFA'IT THOMAS

,

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFA
IT, THOMAS, BARREIT,
MOFFA'IT,
BARRE'IT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306

~IAN :: 0 2009
N,·W,1J1RAO, Clerk.
J. DAVID N.·W,1J1RAO,
By KATHY J. BIEHL
DEPUTy

Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR STAY

Plaintiffs,
vs.
YLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR,
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN

T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR STAY-l

Client: 11 00037.1
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01/20/2009 12:48 FAX

2083855384 1

141 003/004
I4l

MOFFATT THOMAS

COME NOW the defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and
Paul T. Clark, by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby notify the court and counsel
that they do not oppose entry of a stay in this matter pending the ruling ofthe Idaho Supreme
Court in Taylor v. Maile, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33781.
this,;z C~Iday of January, 2009.
DATED this,;l
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

JA"~._f'
~ V; JA"~._f'

1_

S{PrusynskI - O~rm
Mark SiPrusynskI
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR STAY - 2
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11/20/2009 12:48 FAX
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MOFFATT THOMAS

[4J
I4J 004/004

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2 C,bf
C,b( day of January, 2009, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR STAY to
be served by the method indiCated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA w OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
380 W. State St.
S1.
Eagle, ID
ill 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(~acsimile
(~acsimile

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ill
ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 386-5055

(v{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR STAY - 3

CUenl:901718.1
CUent:001718.1
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CONNIEW.TAYLOR
CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, Dallan
DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust
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NAVAfU~O, Clerk
J. DAVID NAVAfU~O,
flANDAU.
By J. P1ANDAU.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST
ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

II

9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 07 23232

12

Plaintiffs,
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
f/k1a CON1\lIE
CON1\l"IE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.

21
22

STATE OF IDAHO

23

County of Nez Perce

)
) ss.
)

24

25

AFFIDA
VIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR
AFFIDAVIT
26
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEf:NEY
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LEWISTON. IDAHO 83'301
LEWISTON,

CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
ofldaho and a member of
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofIdaho
1

Dallan Taylor and Theodore Johnson
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan
2

Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal

3

knowledge.

4

5

2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Supreme Court's latest

6

Opinion in Taylor v. Maile, Docket No. 33781.

7

3. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling and granted costs to Taylors.

8

/ .. ~tli

DATED this _./_ day of February, 20
9
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

13
14

day of February, 2009.
/1

15

;i {; / ) )

i{{74 C )(f II.)

Notary Public in and fo~ the State of Idaho.
Residing at I
Ii'i U.,~
therein.
U.·~ <.J1J2/
<-;{1J2/
My commission expir~s:
expir~s: ''':.'-;;'/12 l..(
i..( / lc
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

2
3
4

5
6

7

8

9

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616
Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

"
D
D
D

,t'iq'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
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Ie W. Taylor
ttorney for Defendants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33781
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and)
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsPlaintiffs-Counterdefendants
Respondents, Cross-Appellants,

)

)
)

v.
~

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS)
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and)
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
)

Boise, November 2008 Term

)

Defendants-CounterclaimantsDefendants-Counterclaimants
)
Appellants-Cross-Respondents,
)
-------------------------------------------------------))
------------------------------------------------------
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE)
TRUST,
)
Plaintiff-CounterdefendantPlaintiff-Counterdefendant
)
Respondent-Cross-Appellant,
)

2009 Opinion No. 15
Filed: January 30, 2009
Stephen W. Kenyon,

CI{~rk

))

v.
~

)

THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN)
MAILE,
husband
and
wife,
and )
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
)
)

Defendants-CounterciaimantsDefendants-Counterclaimants
Appellants-Cross Respondents.

)
)

--------------)
------------------------------)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofIdaho, Ada
County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge.
District court order granting summary judgment, affinned.
Dennis M. Charney, Eagle and Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile, Eagle, for
appellants. Dennis M. Charney argued.
Clark & Feeney, Lewiston, for respondents. Connie Wright Taylor argued.

1

EXHIIBIT

A

000865

BURDICK, Justice
This case concerns an appeal by Thomas Maile IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real
Estate Company, and Berkshire Investments, LLC (collectively the Mailes) from a district court
order granting summary judgment to Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and L. John Taylor
(collectively the Taylors).

The Taylors cross-appeal the district court's order denying their

request for attorney fees. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case has been the subject of a previous appeal.

In Taylor v. lMaile, this Court

summarized the facts underlying the lawsuit as follows:
Thomas G. Maile, IV, is licensed in Idaho as both an attorney and a real estate
broker. He provided legal representation to [Theodore L.] Johnson for many
years, including advising him on the creation and administration of the [Theodore
L. Johnson Revocable] Trust. The Trust owned approximately forty acres of
property near Eagle, Idaho. In May of 2002 a third party offered to buy the fOfty
forty
acres for approximately $400,000. Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson to reject this
offer, and he did in fact reject it. Two months later, on July 22, Thomas and
Colleen Maile submitted an earnest money agreement to purchase the property
from the Trust on terms and for a price similar to the rejected offer. Mr. Johnson
accepted the offer and executed the agreement on behalf of the Trust on July 25.
Mr. Johnson died before the sale transaction could be closed. Approximately a
week after Mr. Johnson's death, the successor trustees, Beth Rogers and Andrew
Rogers, closed the sale. The Mailes had formed Berkshire Investments, LLC, and
assigned their contract rights to that entity, with the approval of Beth Rogers. The
Rogers executed the warranty deed conveying the 40 acres to Berkshire over the
objections of the Taylors, who are residual beneficiaries of the Trust. The record
does not disclose whether the Rogers conducted any inquiry regarding the
circumstances of the sale or the basis for the Taylors' objections, or whether the
purchase price was at or near fair market value. The Rogers were not only co
cotrustees of the Trust, but also beneficiaries of the Trust. . .. The Trust took a deed
of trust on the property to secure payment of the bulk of the purchase price.
Berkshire paid the balance of the purchase price and obtained a release of the trust
deed in January of2004.
142 Idaho 253, 255, 127 P.3d 156, 158 (2005) (Taylor I).
On January 23, 2004, the Taylors (as beneficiaries) filed a complaint against the Mailes,
alleging breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence against Mr. Maile in his capacity
as both realtorlbroker and attorney. The Taylors also sought damages and/or rescission of the
land sale. The Mailes moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted their motion
based on the Taylors' lack of standing. The Taylors appealed the dismissal, leading to this
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Court's decision in Taylor I affinning the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claims, but
reversing and remanding "the dismissal of the professional negligence claim.
While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the beneficiaries of the Trust executed
the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer) in June 2004.

In the

Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Taylors, disclaimed any interest in the lawsuit
against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust property in
favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed to an immediate distribution to beneficiaries, the
Rogers resigned as trustees, the named successor trustee declined to serve as trustee, and the
beneficiaries nominated and appointed the Taylors as trustees.
In December 2005, this Court issued its opinion in Taylor I. In response, on March 9,
2006, the district court allowed the Taylors to amend their complaint to comply with the Taylor I
decision.

Two months later, the district court granted the Taylors' motion for summary

judgment on the remaining professional negligence claim. On June 7, 2006, the court entered
judgment on that claim, quieting title to the Linder Road property in the Trust and dismissing the
Mailes' counterclaims and defenses.

On July 21, 2006, the court amended the judgment to

clarify that the property is in a constructive trust, that Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the
purchase price, and that the Mailes' counterclaim for unjust enrichment was the only remaining
issue. That same day, the court also entered a decision denying the Mailes' motion for rule 54(b)
certification and found the land sale contract void.
In October 2006, the district court held a bench trial on the single remaining issue of
unjust enrichment. After hearing two days of evidence, it denied the Mailes' claim for unjust

enrichment, finding that the money the Mailes had expended on developing the property did not
increase the value of the property.

The Mailes then moved for reconsideration and sought

prejudgment interest on the monies paid to the Trust. The district court denied this motion on
prejUdgment
April 4, 2007. The district court also denied the Taylors' request for attorney

f(~es.

Both parties

appeal from the district court's judgments.

II. ANALYSIS
The Mailes assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Taylors' claims
because the Taylors lacked standing and because their claims were moot.

The Mailes also

contend that the district court erred in granting the Taylors' motion for summary judgment as to
the remaining negligence claim. In addition, the Mailes argue that the district court erred by
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denying their motion for an award of prejudgment interest. On cross-appeal, the Taylors assert
that the district court erred by denying their motion for attorney fees.
A. The Taylors had standing to pursue their claims.

The Mailes argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Disclaimer
divested the Taylors of standing to pursue their claims and made the issue moot. We disagree.
We exercise free review over questions of jurisdiction, and such questions must be
addressed prior to reaching the merits ofan appeal. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 144--45, 158
P.3d 305, 307-08 (2007). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d
before reaching the merits of the case." Young v. City ofKetchum,

1157, 1159 (2002). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated."

Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641,

778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). To satisfy the requirement of standing, "litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id.
The Taylors argue their standing was established by Taylor I, making it the "law of the
case," and that the Disclaimer did nothing to alter the decision. The "law of the case" doctrine
provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a
principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
of Idaho, NA.,
N.A., 110 Idaho 15,21,713 P.2d 1374,
subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho,
Coop .. Inc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 591 P.2d 196,
1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop.,

197 (1979»). The "law of the case" doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal
of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. Bouten Constr.
Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751,757 (1999).

In Taylor I, this Court determined that the Taylors had standing to pursue their claims as
real parties in interest.

142 Idaho 253, 257-58, 127 P.3d 156, 160-61 (2005). Initially, the

district court dismissed the Taylors' complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 17(a). On appeal, this Court
determined that the Taylors were real parties in interest, as required by this mle, because they
would be entitled to the benefits of the action if it were successful. Id. at 258, 127 P.3d at 161.
Additionally, the Court determined that the Taylors could proceed with their negligence claim
against the Mailes "for aiding the trustees in disposing of trust property in violation of their
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fiduciary responsibilities and receiving the property with knowledge of the same." ld.
Id. at 261,
127 P.3d at 164. We found the cause of action could be maintained against the trustees and/or
the Mailes, and if the trustees refused to act, the Taylors could seek a constructive tIUst against
theMailes.Id.
theMailes.ld. Therefore, under the "law of the case" doctrine, both the issue of whether the
Taylors were real parties in interest and whether they could maintain an action against the Mailes
without joining the trustees were before this Court. Thus, the principles articulated in Taylor 1
were necessary to the Court's decision.
Nonetheless, the Mailes assert that the procedural posture of the prior appeal--coming to
the Court from an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)
l2(b)(6) motion-and the Taylors' execution of the Disclaimer after
case)' doctrine
the district court granted their motion to dismiss make the "law of the case~'
inapplicable. The Mailes are correct that the Disclaimer could not have been raised in the prior
appeal. The Disclaimer was executed by various beneficiaries in June 2004, which was after the
district court granted the motion to dismiss that predicated the first appeal in Taylor I. As such,
the Disclaimer was not part of the record during the first appeal and the Mailes' argmnent that
the Taylors now lack standing because of this document could not have been raised during the

I. We should thus reexamine the Taylors' standing.
course of Taylor 1.
Although the Taylors executed the Disclaimer with the trustees, it does not divest them of
standing. The Mailes argue that the Taylors, as beneficiaries, were required to pursue their

I, this Court announced the principle
action against the trustees. However, in deciding Taylor 1,
that beneficiaries could maintain a cause of action against the trustee, a third party, or both where
property with knowledge that the transfer is in violation of the
the third party receives trust properly

!d. at 260-61, 127 P.3d at 163-64. While this Court was unable to
trustee's fiduciary duty. ld.

I, the principles announced in that decision are still the
consider the Disclaimer during Taylor 1,
law of Idaho. Therefore, we hold that the Taylors had standing to maintain suit against the
Mailes and were not required to join the Rogers.
Next, the Mailes argue that the Disclaimer made the suit moot because it worked to
terminate the purpose of the Trust and to disburse all assets to the beneficiaries. "An issue
becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being
concluded through judicial decree of specific relief."

Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise

Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005). Mootness applies when an
appellant lacks a legal interest in the outcome. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069,
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1072 (2004). Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any
relief. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004).
In the Disclaimer, the Taylors specifically reserved their ownership interest in the lawsuit
against the Mailes.

Therefore, they have a legal interest in the outcome of the case and a

favorable decision will result in relief in the form of title to the Linder Road property. Moreover,
under Idaho law, a chose in action is an asset. See Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 219, 205 P.2d
495, 498 (1949). Here, the current action is an asset that remained in the Trust, so the Disclaimer
did not work to terminate the Trust. Thus, the Taylors' lawsuit is not moot and they have
standing to pursue this claim against the Mailes.
B. Summary judgment was proper.

The Mai1es next contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the
Taylors on the remaining claim of negligence. They assert that Beth Rogers was not acting
under a conflict of interest, but even if she were, she acted reasonably and prudently. They also
maintain that Johnson, as the original trustee, acted reasonably and prudently in his d.ecision to
sell the property to the Mailes, and the Rogers acted reasonably in carrying out his decision.
When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court applies the same
standard used by the district court. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307,
160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and
discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); see also

I.R.C.P. 56(c). "In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all
reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party
ofKellogg
Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., 135 Idaho 239, 243,
opposing the motion." City of

16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000). If no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, "then all that remains
is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175,923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996).

judgment to the Taylors, the district court noted that
In its order granting summary jUdgment
following Taylor I only a single cause of action remained-whether the Mailes had aided the
trustees in breaching their fiduciary duty by receiving the property with knowledge that the sale
was not approved by the court under I.c. § 68-108(b). It then held that, as a matter of law, Beth
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Rogers had a conflict of interest because she was both a trustee and a beneficiary. The lower
court also found that a trustee's power to close a land sale was subject to judici.al oversight
propl;!rty was not
pursuant to I.C. § 68-1 08(b) and Taylor 1. Since the sale of the Linder Road propl~rty
approved by a court, the trial court found the contract for the sale of the property was void.
Finally, the district court found that the Mailes had actual knowledge that Beth Rogers needed to
receive court approval prior to closing the sale.
The Supreme Court exercises free review over issues of statutory interpretation. Big Sky

Paramedics, LLC v. Sagle Fire Dist., 140 Idaho 435, 436, 95 P.3d 53, 54 (2004). The Mailes
argue that the Idaho Code provides a "reasonable prudence exception" to the requirement of
court authorization under I.C. § 68-108(b). However, to accept the Mailes' argument it would be
necessary for court authorization under I.C. § 68-108 to be the nonnal modus operandi and
"reasonable prudence" under I.e. § 68-106 to be an exception.

Instead, under the Unifonn

Trustees' Powers Act, as adopted in Idaho Code Title 68, a trustee needs only to act with
reasonable prudence in most situations and court authorization is the exception. Idaho Code §
68-1 06(
a) provides:
06(a)
From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of the assets of the trust,
a trustee has the power to perform, without court authorization, every act which a
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust including but not limited
to the powers specified in subsection (c).
Thus, under normal circumstances, a trustee can exercise her powers as trustee without court
authorization if such actions are reasonable and prudent.
Nonetheless, Idaho Code § 68-108(b) sets out limits on this power and provides, in
pertinent part:
If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of
another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be exercised
c)(1), (4), (6),
only by court authorization, except as provided in sections 68-1 06(
06(c)(1),
(18), and (24) upon petition of the trustee.
Consequently, the plain, unambiguous language of the Unifonn Trustees' Powers Act
provides that even if a trustee's actions are reasonable and prudent, if a conflict of interest exists,
the court must authorize the action before the trustee can exercise that power. This ineludes
indudes the
power to close a real estate sale under I.C. § 68-106(c)(7). Taylor I, 142 Idaho 253, 259, 127
P.3d 156, 162 ("Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a conflict in the
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exercise of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale of real property, 'the power may be
exercised only by court authorization .... '" (citing I.e. § 68-108(b))).
Here, there are no issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Beth Rogers
did not seek court approval before closing the sale of the Linder Road property. It is also
uncontroverted that she had a conflict of interest because of her role as both trustee to the Trust
and beneficiary under the Trust. As a trustee, she owed the beneficiaries a duty of loyalty.

Taylor I, 142 Idaho at 260, 127 P.3d at 163 (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 969,
842 P.2d 299, 305 (Ct. App. 1992)).

As a direct beneficiary, Rogers was entitled to an

immediate distribution of the monies paid by the Mailes. However, the income and residual
beneficiaries had an interest in seeing that the value of the property held in the trust increased.

See Taylor I, 142 Idaho at 259, 127 P.3d at 162 (noting that theMailes.briefing on appeal
indicated various classes of beneficiaries with different interests). As such, it was necessary for
Beth Rogers to receive court approval before closing the sale.
Moreover, it is also uncontroverted that the Mailes had knowledge of this conflict
eonflict of
interest. Thomas Maile, acting as Theodore lohnson's attorney, drafted the Trust that created the
various classes of beneficiaries and named Beth Rogers as a successor trustee. See ld. at 259,
127 P.3d at 162. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
C. Prejudgment interest was properly denied.

The Mailes also argue that the district court erred by not awarding prejudgment interest
on all the money paid to the Trust from September 2002 until 1anuary 2004. They contend that
pursuant to I.e. § 28-22-104(1), (2), (4), and (5), they are entitled to an award of prejudgment
interest. The Taylors maintain that the Mailes are not entitled to prejudgment interest under
equitable principles or pursuant to

I.e. § 28-22-104.

In its order denying the Mailes' claim for

prejudgment interest, the district court stated:

I.e. § 28-22-104 . . . to an award of
[The Mailes] are not entitled under I.e.
prejudgment interest. The $400,000 does not constitute money due by express
contract, or money after the same becomes due, or money lent, or money due on
the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the balance is ascertained, or
money due upon open accounts after three months from the date of the last
item....
item
.... Nor did the [Taylors] retain the money without the express or implied
consent of the [Mailes].
The Court finds that the [Mailes] are not entitled to pre-judgment interest under
§ 28-22-104.
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This Court reviews the award or denial of prej udgment interest for an abuse of discretion.
Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). A three factor test is used to
prove an abuse of discretion: "(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of this diseretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. Idaho Code § 28~
22-104(1) provides:
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest,
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (l2¢) on the hundred by the year on:
1. Money due by express contract.
2. Money after the same becomes due.
3. Money lent.
4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable
time without the owner's consent, express or implied.
5. Money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the
balance is ascertained.
6. Money due upon open accounts after three (3) months from the date of
the last item.
The district court correctly found and stated the applicable legal standards and therefore
did not abuse its discretion. It acted with the boundaries of its discretion .and consistently with
the applicable legal standards by examining each factor of I.C. § 28-22-104(1)
28~22-1 04(1) as it applied to
this case. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of prejudgment interest.

D. Attorney fees were properly denied.
cross~appeal the district court's denial of their request for attorney fees.
The Taylors cross-appeal

They maintain that they are entitled to attorney fees under the Earnest Money Agreement. The
Mailes assert the Taylors are not entitled to attorney fees because they are not parties to the
contract.
An award of attorney fees is "within the discretion of the trial court and subject to review
for an abuse of discretion." Ransom v. Topaz Mktg..
Mktg .. L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4
(2006). Whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies is a question of law over which we
exercise free review. ld. at 644, 152 P.3d at 5. In addition, attorney fees may be awarded when
provided for by contract. I.R.C.P.54(e)(l).
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The district court properly denied the Taylors' motion for attorney fees.
determined that the Taylors could not receive attorney fees pursuant to

I.e.

The court

§ 12-120(3) because

the Earnest Money Agreement was between the Trust and the Mailes and, therefore, the Taylors
were not a party to the transaction. Finally, the district court declined to award attorney fees
pursuant to

I.e.

§ 12-121 because it found the Mailes had not pursued their claims frivolously,

unreasonably, or without foundation. We affirm the district court.
The parties have argued the same basis for attorney fees in this appeal. For the same
reasons we affirmed the district court, we deny attorney fees on appeal. .

VI. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the Taylors' claims, the Taylors had
standing to pursue their claims, and the Taylors' claims are not moot. In light of our holdings,
we affirm the district court order granting the Taylors' motion for summary judgment on the
beneficiary claims and the court's denial of the Taylors' request for attorney fees. We decline to
award attorney fees on appeal. Costs to Taylors.
Justices J. JONES, TROUT, PRO TEM and KIDWELL, PRO TEM, CONCUR.
Chief Justice EISMANN, specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write only to point out an issue that was not raised in
this case. Theodore Johnson, as trustee, entered into a real estate contract agreeing to sell forty
acres of trust property to the Mailes. AfterJohnsondied,BethRogers and Andrew Rogers, as
successor trustees, closed the sale. Summary judgment was granted upon the ground that Beth
Rogers had a conflict of interest that required court approval before she could clos(;:
c1os(;: the sale.

Based upon that lack of court approval, the district court set aside the entire transaction. There
has not been any determination that Johnson breached his fiduciary duty by entering into the sale
contract. The Mailes have not argued on appeal that the appropriate remedy for closing the sale
without court approval would be to set aside only the closing, rather than also setting aside the
contract of sale. Thus, we have not addressed the appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation
of Idaho Code § 68-1 08(b).
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TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
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provide this Supplemental Memorandum Brief In Response to Supreme Court Opinion filed
February 4, 2009 and as additional argument in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgement/Motion to Dismiss as follows:

ADDITIONAL FACTS AND SUPPLEMENTAL STATUS OF THE RECORD
The Plaintiffs' further incorporate their Memorandum Briefin
Brief in Support ofPlaintiffs'
of Plaintiffs ' Motion
to Compel & Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Motion to Compel filed October 20, 2008 as if
set forth in full herein both as to the facts and the law set forth therein. The Taylors have filed an
Affidavit with the attached Idaho Supreme Court case captioned Taylor vs Maile. The opinion
relates to a portion ofthe issues surrounding standing and provides that the individual Taylors had
standing to pursue their claim based upon the disclaimer of interest wherein they did not disclaim
an interest in the litigation. The Supreme Court, however, did not address or specify that the Taylors
were or were not beneficiaries after the Settlement and Disclaimer Agreement.

The court

proceedings in Taylor vs Maile had as it central issue the standing or the beneficiary status of the
Taylors as it allegedly affected the Taylors' claim of being deprived notice of the sale of the real
ofinterest.
property by a successor trustee who had a conflict of
interest. Consequently, the issue oftheir
of their status
as beneficiaries has never been adjudicated and is central to the issue of their active
If the
misrepresentation before the District Court in maintaining their alleged status as btmeficiaries. Ifthe
Taylors were, in fact, beneficiaries they alone were the only ones could have complained about being
ofcourt
court approval in 2002 when the property was sold in violation ofI.C. 68-108. However,
deprived of
if as they represented to the probate court, they were no longer beneficiaries as of 2004 and their
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mother was the sole beneficiary, they no longer had a legitimate interest to complain that they were
deprived notice affecting the trust in which they had no interest in after the Disclaimer & Settlement
Agreement as verified by them under oath.
Their active misrepresentation to the District Court and the Idaho Supreme Court by asserting
that they were "residual beneficiaries" is a central element that has never been litigated in any prior
litigation. It was solely as a result of
their abuse of
process, fraud, and misrepresentation 10 the court
oftheir
ofprocess,
system that they were able to achieve an order rescinding the real estate closing and restoring the
property to the trust. Without their active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would not
have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum Decision and Order,
on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K), establishes that the
trustee of the trust acting on behalf of the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of
the trustee, leading up to the closing and acts subsequent to the closing, established that the trust
could not have the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to the trust.
The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. That judicial detennination never was
appealed by the Taylors. The only possible way for the Linder property to be restored to the trust
was for the Taylors to continue to perpetrate the misrepresentation that they had in interest as
ofthe
oftheir
beneficiaries of
the trust. The issue of
their classification as beneficiaries has not been litigated nor
ofmisrepresentation
misrepresentation been litigated. The Supreme Court was provided by the Taylors'
has the issue of
ofrecord
counsel of
record with a copy ofthe complaint in the current action (Affidavit ofThomas
of Thomas Maile Part
4-Exhibit Z ). The Supreme Court in its recent decision is silent on the issues of the Taylors
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misrepresentations and their status as beneficiaries of the trust.
As stated, there are five factors required for collateral estoppel to bar re-litigation of an issue
decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity

Ticor, supra,
with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. The Tilcor,
case, actually dealt with "issue preclusion", which is also referred to as collateral estoppel. The
plaintiffs provided the Supreme Court with a motion to augment the record to demonstrate the

inconsistent prior sworn testimony of John Taylor before the probate court, however, the Supreme
Court chose not to allow the record to be augmented. The issues of frauds, false prdense, and
perjury have never been claims or issues presented in prior litigation. The issue involving the

misrepresentations of the Taylors as beneficiaries in 2006, has never been decided, and the reading
of the Idaho Supreme Court Decision demonstrates that point. The Supreme Court's Decision does
ofthe
not address, nor decide the issue of the Taylors' misrepresented status as beneficiaries.

of collateral estoppel is missing in the present matter
matter,. Case law has held
A critical component ofcollateral
that the issue was actually decided in the previous litigation and that issue was necessary to the prior
P .3d 1141, 1144 (2007). Were the Taylors
judgment. Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 885, 173 P.3d
beneficiaries in 2006 as they verified in their pleadings? Their misrepresentation under oath

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SUPREME COURT
OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2009 - Pg 4

000878

purportedly gave them a basis to contest the lack of
court approval ofthe real estate closing pursuant
ofcourt

e. 68-106, which resulted in the sale be voided. But for their petjury there would not have been
to I.
I.e.
a voided real estate transaction. Once again the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled that the trust
itself could not rescind the transaction. The issue of the Taylors status as alleged benefieiaries was
not decided nor was it necessary to the judgment affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Consequently, there is no defense of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata available to the
defendants.
The Plaintiffs herein have asserted a variety of claims and one only needs to examine the
Idaho Racketeering Statute to determine that in the present case there can be no

defensl~

based on

res judicata since the Plaintiffs were not at any point in time damaged by Taylors misrepre:sentations
until a Judgment was entered based upon the fraud perpetrated by the Taylors and their attorneys
verifying under oath to be residual beneficiaries. Without a resulting damage, there could be no
cause of action that could exist. A cause of action arising under the Idaho Racketeering Act
explicitly contains language that precludes the current Defendants argument of res judicata. The
language under I.e. sections 18-7803 and 18-704 clearly provides that a claim only arises as a result
of activity amounting to the specific statutory criminal activity that is precisely allege:d to have
occurred in the present matter. Specifically the Statutes provide:
18-7803 DEFINITIONS.
As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or
indictable under the following sections of the Idaho Code or which are equivale:nt
acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any other
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jurisdiction:
(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial transaction
card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18-3101,
18-3124,18-3125,18-3126,18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code);
(17) Perjury (sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code);
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly
or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has
participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the
proceeds derived from the investment or use thereofin
thereof in the acquisition ofany
of any inter,est
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in
order to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise or real property
It is the very actions of the defendants that gives rise to the claims and the trier of fact must

determine if the defendants' wrongful conduct is actionable under Idaho Code 18-7803 et. seq.
There is no doubt that collectively the defendants entered into a contingent fee agreement (See
Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 exhibit "W"), thereby creating an enterprise pursuant to LC.18
LC.187803(c) to share in the proceeds of the litigation, thereby subjecting themselves to the components
ofthe
of
the Idaho Racketeering Statute. In addition, the Plaintiffs have alleged judicial estoppel as a cause

of action against the Defendants. Judicial estoppel clearly applies in this matter as the Plaintiffs
herein were deprived of their real property as a result of statements made under oath by the Taylors
which ultimately contradicted their verified pleadings in January 2006. The Plaintiffs brought the
facts surrounding the misrepresentation to the Idaho Supreme Court in their briefing as thl~y
thl:!y alleged
that the Taylors had insufficient standing as beneficiaries to rescind the transaction as the Taylors
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acknowledged under oath that they were no longer beneficiaries and that their mother was the sole
beneficiary. Plaintiffs had a right to have that determined as an issue of standing. Standing is an
issue that can be raised at any time at either the District Court level or at the appellate llevel. The
Plaintiffs legitimately raised that issue and the Idaho Supreme Court chose not to address that issue
and that issue remains unresolved to this date.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION AS FRAUD HAS BEEN
ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE PLAINTIFFS ACTED WITH DUE DILIGENCE.
The case of Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994)
provides the standard for the court to apply regarding the allegations of fraud in light of a defense
of res judicata. The Shirey, court stated:
The law in Idaho is that an action for relief on the grounds of fraud will not be
"deemed to have accrued until discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the fads
constituting the fraud." I.C. § 5-218(4). ""[A]ctual
[A]ctual knowledgeoffraud will be inferred
if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due
diligence." Kawai Farms v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d 1322, 1326
(1992), quoting Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828,
829 (1973). More specific to the facts of this case, before a claim of fraud can be
dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment based on res judicata, a court must first
summaryjudgment
answer the question of whether there is more than one conclusion as to whether the

party alleging the fraud has exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud. Id. See
also Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437,849 P.2d 107,
110 (1993).
The plaintiffs brought to the attention ofthe court in the prior proceeding in their briefing that
the defendants collectively misrepresented under oath the Taylors' status as beneficiaries as set forth
in their verified amended complaint filed in January 2006. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4,
Appeal). The legal premise was the Taylors lacked standing
Opening Brief, Reply Brief, Notice of
ofAppeal).
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to set aside the real estate closing as beneficiaries of the trust, as they had admitted und,er oath that
they were no longer beneficiaries of
the trust as a result of the Settlement & Disclaimer Agreement.
ofthe
The Taylors changed their testimony from one court to another, to fit what appeared to be necessary
at the time. By briefing this very point, the plaintiffs acted with "due diligence" after discovering the
fraud which was perpetrated upon the district court. The plaintiffs relied upon establish(~d
establish(~d case law
in Idaho that standing could be raised at any stage oflitigation including appeal. The Supreme Court
in its recent determination, did not rule that the Taylors remained beneficiaries after the;: execution
of the Settlement & Disclaimer Agreement. The Supreme Court did determine the Taylors had
standing as they "reserved their ownership" in the litigation. The only way the real esta.te closing
could have been set aside was for a beneficiary to assert the protection ofLC. 68-108. The Taylors
misrepresented their status as beneficiaries in January 2006 which resulted in the district court
entering the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim", filed June 5, 2006.
The Notice of Appeal filed December 21, 2006, and the subsequent briefing provides proof
that the plaintiffs acted with due diligence in attempting to bring to the attention ofthe judicially that
the Taylors acted improperly in asserting their status as beneficiaries in light of the Settlement &
Disclaimer Agreement. A court must first answer the question of whether there is more than one
conclusion as to whether the party alleging the fraud has exercised due diligence in discovering the
fraud in light of the principl e of
res judicata. If there are no questions of material fact, the question
ofres
is one oflaw. If
there is conflicting evidence as to when a fact was known or reasonably should have
Ifthere
been known, it is a question of fact. If there is a question of material fact as to whether plaintiffs
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should have reasonably discovered the fraud upon the court the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply. Kawai Fanns v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 826 P.2d 1322 (1992). Ifthe court finds thatthere
exists more than one conclusion that such party exercised due diligence, then a material question

of fact exists precluding a granting of summary judgment. Hall v. Forsloff, 124 Idaho 771, 864
P .2d 609 (S.C.1993). The plaintiffs relied justifiably upon their ability to brieftht:
brief tht: issue ofstanding
of standing
P.2d
before the appellate court as a proper avenue to detennine if the fraudulent behavior defeated the
Taylors' standing. The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of Taylors as beneficiaries but
instead chose to hold that they had standing in "ownership interest in the lawsuit". But £:>r Taylors
misrepresentation concerning their status in 2006 as beneficiaries, I.c. 68-108 would not have been
available to set aside the closing of the real estate transaction. The plaintiffs filed their Notice of
Appeal approximately 6 months after the entry of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims". Such
timing by the plaintiffs should be well within any standard for acting with due diligence.,
I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. 60(b) also recognizes the district court's authority to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment on the basis of equity. Compton v. Compton, 101 Id. 334, 612
P.2d 1175, 1181 n. 1 (1980). There is no express time limit for an independent action to
tOi relieve a
party from judgment. Id., 101 Idaho at 334,612 P.2d at 1181. The power of the courts to entertain
such an action is inherent, and is not, therefore, subject to the time limitations imposed by I.R.c.P.
LR.C.P.
60(b). Id.; see also Gregory v. Hancock, 81 Idaho 221, 227, 340 P.2d 108, 111 (1959). The
independent action must, however, be brought within a "reasonable time". Davis v. Parrish, 131
Idaho 595 at 597,961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998); Compton, 101 Idaho at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181 (citing
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Gregory, 81 Idaho at 227,340 P.2d at 112)).
The plaintiffs' complaint has requested that the title be set aside based upon the defendants'
fraud and the title be quieted in the name ofBerkshire
of Berkshire Investments LLC. The detennination whether
an independent action was brought within a reasonable time is ordinarily a question of fact to be
resolved by the trier of fact. Davis, 131 Idaho at 597,961 P.2d at 1200 citing Thiel v. Stradley, 118
Idaho 86, 88, 794 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990), Wallerv. State (S.C. 2008 ID-0826.l21). By analogy the
of what constitutes a reasonable time should apply to the doctrine ofres
of res judicata
same determination ofwhat
relating to the plaintiffs' due diligence in discovering and acting upon the fraud committed by the
defendants.
Furthermore, LR.C.P. 60(b) specifically preserves the following three means of attacking a
final judgment: (1 ) to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from judgment, .... and (3)
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,612 P.2d
1175 (1980) Id. at 333-34,612 P.2d at 1180-81. Claims brought under LR.C.P. 60(b) are not barred
by res judicata because they are one ofthe
of the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." Davis
v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 599, 961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998). Pursuant to Rule 60(b), intrinsic or
extrinsic fraud makes no difference in the court's analysis.
The plaintiffs herein acted within a reasonable period of time in filing the present matter.
The Complaint was filed on December 31,2007. The action was filed while the appeal was pending.
The gravamen of the complaint clearly is centered upon the "fraud upon the court" committed
of the fraud, false pretenses, peIjury,
petjury, is amply set forth
collectively by the defendants. The evidence ofthe
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.......

in the record. The following illustrates the overwhelming evidence ofthe actionable miseonduct by
the Defendants.
1.

2.

3.

4.

ofthe Settlement Agreement, the alleged beneficiaries testified they were
After the execution ofthe
not going to obtain any money from the litigation (pp. 132, 133, 134, of the deposition of
Reed J. Taylor) ( 74, 75 ofthe deposition of Dallan Taylor).
The trust was liquidated and all cash was disbursed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement
The trust corpus was distributed to the only beneficiaries that existed, after the settlement
agreement was reached among the various family members. The individual TayJlors,
Tayllors, Reed,
Dallan, and R. John, did not take any proceeds, and judicially admitted thdr mother was the
"sole beneficiary ofthe trust". (36,37 ofthe deposition ofR. John Taylor).
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th
2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate
court, on page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining
beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity
Agreement". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit I).
A portion of the hearing before the Probate Court wherein John Taylor testi1ied in the
hearing before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 provides:
page 14, In 4:
to serve?

Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want

A. Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought
6
it was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim.
During that same hearing counsel for the Taylors provided in his closing argument

before Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 provided:
page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based
upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the
Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement,
have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding.
Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the proeeeding"
proeeeding .
5.

Page 1 ofthe
of the Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are
residents ofNez
of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident ofAda
of Ada County Idaho. All
ofthe
of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe
of the Theodore L Johnson Trust.
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6.

7.

The Taylors fi1ed
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 2006, and stated
"Comes Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereinafter referred to as "the
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"). (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Par 2).
The Taylors filed their Memorandum Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment on February 9, 2006, and stated "The Plaintiff Beneficiaries seek summary
judgment against the defendants on their constructive trust claim and an order quieting tilt!
tiltl
in the Linder Road property to them". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Par 2).
There are ample material facts in dispute to warrant a jury determination under these facts.

of the defendants and can not
Neither Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel have application as to any ofthe
be a bar to the present proceedings
proceedings....
A. THE RULE OF PRIVY RELATING TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE ATTORNEYS WHO PERPETRATED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
The lawyers have argued that res judicata bars the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims since
they were the attorneys of record in the prior litigation. Such is not established Law in Idaho.
of ultimate fact has once been dett:rmined by
Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue ofultimate
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit. Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 709, 859 A.2d 533 (2004), see also
1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27, comment (a) (1982) ("rule ofissue
of issue preclusion is operative

where the second action is between the same persons who were parties to

tht~

prior action"); 1

Restatement (Second), supra, § 34 (3) ("person who is not a party to an action is not bound by ...
the rules of
res judicata"). See Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan
ofres
Investors, LP, 97 Conn. App. 541, 562, 905 A.2d 1214, (2006). The Suffield, supra, mattt::rinvolved
defendant attorneys who were the attorneys of record for defendants in the prior proceeding. The
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of res judicata to defeat the plaintiffs' subsequent suit.
Connecticut Court did not allow the doctrine ofres
of Co nt' I Sav. Ass'n v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d829 (Tex. App.1991),
App.l991), which held that under
Seethe case ofCont'I
Texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an
attorney and his or her client. There is no showing by the defendants that privy is established by
their mere representation of clients. They actively participated in the misrepresentations with their
clients and equally committed false pretenses, fraud, and aided in the peIjury,
petjury, when in truth and in
fact they prepared pleadings which were signed by their clients under oath affirming that the sole
beneficiary was Helen Taylor not their clients.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient claims to withstand the defendants' motions for
summary judgment/motion to dismiss. The recent Supreme Court Decision in Taylor v. Maile, does
not establish there was an adjudication of facts and/or law that give rise to the application of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. The defendants' motions must be denied in their entirety.
Dated this 12th day of February, 2009.

G.
Attorney for Col
. e and Berkshire
Investments LLC and pro se
J. J.J.''-'lYJ.r>.S

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 12th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO
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SUPREME COURT OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2009, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS
MAILE PART FOUR, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

(X)
(
)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(X)
(
)
()
(
)
()
(
)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. AILE, .,
Attorney for Co
aile and Berkshire
Investments LLC and pro se
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::m ;~F~iC,

THOMAS G. MAILE, N
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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-
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N~VAF'"O, CII!rk
CII!ric
J. DAVID N~VAF'"O,
~ANO~LL
By J, ~ANO~LL

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile

OfI'1JTY
OfI'lJTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS
PART FOUR

l'~AILE

Plaintiffs,
v.
£!k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £IkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
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1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch
BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
of this matter.

2.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "w" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion for Fees and Costs with the attached Contingent Fee Agreement
between the attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and the Taylors and the same is made a part
hereof as if set forth in full herein.

3.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "X" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants Opening Brief
before the Idaho Supreme Court filed September 19, 2007 (excluding the attachments).

4.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "Y" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants/Respondents
Reply Briefbefore the Idaho Supreme Court filed November 14, 2007 (excluding the
attachments).

5.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "z" is a true and correct copy of the Respond{mts/Cross
Respond{mts/CrossAppellants Affidavit in Support for Motion for Sanctions filed before the Idaho Supreme

Court on January 17, 2008 (excluding the attachment which was the original complaint in
the current case which part of the record herein).
6.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "AA" and incorporated herein by reference as if set fi)rth in
full herein are a true and correct copies of pages as 5, 6, 7, 11,12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19,20,
21,22,23,24, ofthe deposition of Helen Taylor, taken on October 3,2008, taken in the
above captioned matter.
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7.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "BB" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants'
Appel1ants' Notice
of Appeal filed on December 21, 2006.
DATED thisL Uday of February, 2009.

~.,.......~...,-pro

se and
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
.

/0

SUBSCRIDED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
day of February, 2009.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

_.,_-4

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014

.......
--.";>~,.~-,,~,..
_
,_.,....
~--&
......._
_.";>~,.~-"'~,...........
........~:1--:
~:1'": .......
_,"

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART FOUR - Pg 3

000891

1
2

3
4

AUL THOMAS CLARK
ONNIE W. TAYLOR
LARK and FEENEY
ttomeys for Plaintiffs
1229 Main Street
. O. Drawer 285
ewiston, Idaho 83501
elephone: (208)743-9516
SB No. 4837

5
6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

7
8

ED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
nd R. JOHN TAYLOR,

9

10

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

11

vs.

12

HOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
AILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
AILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
d BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

13
14
15

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
FEES AND COSTS

16
)

17
18
19

1

HEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )

RUST,
Plaintiff,

20
21

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
22 MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
23
Defendants.
24

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

25
26 AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

I
c:)FF1CES OF
LAW c:)FFICES

EXHIBIT "W"

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO .93501
,93501
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/

'-'
)
) ss.
)

TATE OF IDAHO

1

2

ounty of Nez Perce

CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofIdaho, and one of the
ttorneys
ttomeys for the Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter. The information contained here:in is of my

wn personal knowledge.
2. Clark and Feeney's representation of the Plaintiffs in this matter initially began as an
ourly billing with payment expected on a monthly basis. When monthly payments wen~
wen! not made,
t was converted to a contingent fee agreement. I am attaching a true and correct copy of the

10

11
12

ollowing documents:

a.

July 9, 2003 letter from Connie Taylor to Beth Rogers enclosing a standard

13

fee agreement, which was Exhibit No. 32 to the ex parte deposition Thomas

14

Maile conducted of Beth Rogers.

15

b.
h.

16
DATED this

17

Contingent fee agreement date

L'-II] day of July, 2006.

.,r
r

ril 15,2006.

18
19
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me

20

thiS,~ day of July, 2006"

/

)

21

22

23

Not~ Public i~ an~ for the State of Idaho..
Idaho ..
(J;)-1.
therem.
Resldmg at CLw;
{Lw; S
SaD/I.
,/~/l:(('(C,L
My commission expires:

(e,L

24

25
26 AFFJDA VIT OF COUNSEL

2
LAW ()FFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO EI3501
000893

CERTIFICATE OF
OF SERVICE
SERVICE
CERTIFICATE

t11h
111h

II HEREBY
,,_
HEREBY CERTIFY
CERTIFYthat
that on
on the
the _'_
_'_
_ day
day of
ofJuly,
July, 2006,
2006, II caused
caused to
to h~
h~ served
served aa true
true and
and
11 orrect
ofthe
above document
document by
bythe
themethod
method indicated
indicated below,
below, and
and addressed
addressed to
to the
the following:
following:
orrect copy
copy of
the above
22

3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10

Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State
Eagle, ID 83616

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

~ ..

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

0

Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouster
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83702

b
[J

~

Dennis Charney
951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail

0

11

~

12

Connie . Taylor
Attorney for Plaintiff

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

3
LAW OFFiCES
OFFICES OF
OF
LAW

CLARK AND
AND FEENEY
FEENEY
CLARK
LEWISTON. IDAHO
IDAHO 8::1501
8:9501000894
LEWISTON.

LAW OF"F"ICES
OF"F'ICES OF"

CLARK AND FEENEY

RON T. BLEWETT
PAUL THOMAS CLARK
THOMAS W. F"EENEY
F'EENEY
SCOTT D. GALLINA "*
.JONATHAN D. HALLY
RUBE G • .JUNES.
DOUGLAS L. MUSHLITZ
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN
CONNIE TAYLOR
U
TAYLOR"*
TINA L.KERNAN*_
L.KERNAN."

TH E TRAIN STATION. SUITE 106

"*

1229 MAIN STREET

TELEPHONE
(208) 743-9 516
(800) 865-9516
865·9516

P. O. ORAWER 285

FAX

LEWISTON. IDAHO
IOAHO 83501

(20e)7~-9160
(208)7~-9160

cflaw@lewiston.com

*UCENSED IN W"SHINGTON .. OREGON ONLY
*.LICENSI:D IN .DAHO ,. W"SHlfIIOTON
W"SH.fII0TON

July 9, 2003
Beth Rogers
Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson
Revocable Trust Agreement
10816 Jay Road
Boise, ID 83714
Re:

Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust

Dear Beth:
I am enclosing an original and one copy of Clark and Feeney's standard Fee Agreement setting
forth the terms and conditions of our representation of you relating to the Theodore L. Johnson
carefully, and if it meets with your approval,
Revocable Trust. Please read the Agreement over very carefu]]y,
please sign the original and return it to Clark and Feeney. The copy is for your file. Please note that
we are required by law to have an agreement on file in a]]
aJl cases we undertake.
I am also enclosing the original Complaint that I have drafted p~rsuant to our discussions last
ifyou
Sunday. I would appreciate it if
you would sign the Complaint before a Notary Public and return it
to Stacey as quickly as possible, as I do want to be sure that this Complaint is filed before July 22,
2003, if Mr. Maile does not give us a written waiver of the one year statute oflimitations he drafted
into the earnest money agreement for the purchase of Ted's property.
ca]] if you have any questions. I will be checking in with my office periodica]]y
Please call
periodically while I am
out of town, but if there is something urgent you can leave a-voice mail message on my ce:ll phone. I
wi]] be able to check my messages from a landline.
don't have cell phone coverage at the ranch, but I will
SiIlcetejJyours,
SiIlcetelyyours,

-,tt( CC____________
y' ·1L(
(,L ___________
and-FEENEY
...... and.FEENEY
.......
, CLARK
,

I

Conme W. Taylor
B-1: Conrue

CWT:st
Enclosures
cc:
Garth Fisher w/enc.
Dallan Taylor w/enc.

m.

EXHIBIT NO. 2bi.
16:.4££5>
DATE
B- ! t 7CH
3:H
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BURNHAM, HABEL ..
BURNHAM.
ASSOCIATES.
ASSOCIATES, INC.

-

CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, individually and as trustees
of the Theodore Johnson Trust (hereinafter referred to as "client") does hereby employ and retain the
ofthe
. law finn of Clark and Feeney (hereinafter referred to as "attorneys") to render legal services on
behalf of Taylors and THE THEODORE JOHNSON TRUST for a lawsuit against THOMAS
MAILE IV ET AL.
Said attorneys shall have the power and authority to bring suit or such other legal action(s)
at such times as they shall think proper to enforce or collect the above mentioned claim.

In consideration for the services perfonned and to be perfonned by said attorneys, the client
(33.113 %) of any
does hereby agree to pay a contingent fee of Thirty-three and one-third Percent (33.1/3
settlement, verdict, judgment or recovery, including recovery of any amount as attorneys fees,
obtained in such matter.

Our right to the fee described above may be enforced by us against the

df~fendant(s)
df~fendant(s)

independent of any right you may have to enforce collection of your share of the Gross
Recovery. The purpose of the foregoing provision is to grant an ownership interest in the
Gross Recovery that is created by our efforts so that you do not acquire any ownership interest
in our share of the Gross Recovery. Nothing herein shall be construed to

re~sult

in an

assignment of income by you to us; as such, our share of the Gross Recovery may not be
includable in your income for tax purposes. Further, our interest in the Gross Recovery shall
be in addition to any rights granted by the attorney lien statute set forth in Idaho Code Section
3-205. Also, it is agreed that our interest in the Gross Recovery shall be in compliance with
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Rule 1.8U) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
pay attorney fees or costs shall not affect this
Any requirement by the Court that another party
partypay
Agreement, except that the fee paid to the attorneys shall be the greater of such fee award collected
or the applicable percentage of the total recovery including the fee award. Any court awarded
attorneys fees in discovery or other such interlocutory disputes shall be the property ofthe attorney.
In addition to said attorney's fees the client agrees to pay all out-of-pocket expenses incurred

limited to court costs,
in the investigation and litigation of this claim, including but not necessarily iimited
fees of court reporters, polygraph examination costs, deposition costs, charges for service of all
papers, (including subpoenas), witness fees and expenses, and reports, including reports of experts
and investigators, long distance phone charges, travel costs, and copying charges. All such expenses
shall be payable regardless of the outcome of the matter for which the attorneys are rc~tained. The
client agrees to advance to said attorneys at their discretion such sums as may be necessary for the
payment of said expenses.
The client agrees that associate counsel may be employed at the discretion of the attorneys
and that any attorney so employed may be designated to appear on the client's behalf or undertake
representation in this matter.
It is agreed that no settlement shall be made in this matter without the consent of all parties

hereto.
reasonablt~ notice.
It is agreed that the attorneys may withdraw at any time upon giving reasonabll~

It is agreed that said attorneys shall have a lien upon our cause of action and the proceeds

thereof as set forth in Idaho Code Section 3-205, which provides as follows:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counsdors at law
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is left to the agreement, express or implied, ofthe parties, which is not restrained by
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment
in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof
in whosoever hands they may come; and
thereofin
cannot be affected by any settlement between parties before or after judgment..
The client does hereby bind his heirs, executors, personal representatives, legal
representatives, and assigns to the terms and conditions set forth herein.
I have read the above contract and fully understand it.

d&£

_&_/_iday of --=~,~'-""-"'-'--------_:,2005.
Dated on this _&_/_iday
~~,~~~-------------

.'

.....
-....

,~
'~

DALLAN TAnOR

R.JOHNTAYLOR
I agree to comply with the terms of this agreement; to evaluate this claim,

dl~termine

its

merits, and thereafter use my best efforts and professional skill with regard to this claim; ;and to make
an accounting for all monies received from or on behalf of the client.
_ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--',
-', 2005.
Dated this __

Connie W. Taylor
Clark and Feeney
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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-'parties, which is notrestrained by
is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties,which
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment
thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and
in hi s client's favor and the proceeds thereofin
cannot be affected by any settlement between parties before or after judgment.

The client does hereby bind his heirs, executors, personal representatives, legal
representatives, and assigns to the terms and conditions set forth herein.
~tand it.
I have read the above contract and zr~tand

Dated on this

).5
P

I__,,2005.
~,---,-I
2005.

day of

I agree to comply. with the tenns of thIS agreement; to e a ate this claim, detennine its
merits, and thereafter use my best efforts and professional skill with regard to this claim; and to make
an accounting for all monies received
Dated this

0

is day of _ _-#---+It,.4~_~--+ 2005.
+---H"r4'--'-_-r---+'

onnie W. Taylor
Clark and Feeney
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
3
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
REED TAYLOR, DALlAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

Supreme Court Docket No. 33781
District Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge presiding

Attorney for Appellants

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
Dennis M. Charney
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive
Eagle, Idaho 83616

Attorney for Respondents

Connie W. Taylor
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This present matter is an appeal by Appellants, Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Maile,

husband and wife, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C. (hereinafter refel1'ed to as "Appellant8") from
the Summary Judgment and resulting Judgments entered by the lower court voiding a real estate
011 September 16,2002. The transaction involved the TIleodore L. Johnson
transaction which closed on

Revocable Trust as seller (hereinafter refel1'ed to as the "Trust") and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C.,
as buyer. The Honorable Ronald Wilper, District Judge ofthe
of the Fourth Judicial District, granted the
Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylor) motion for summary
individual beneficiaries' (Reed Taylor, DaHan
judgment on May 15,2006. The district court held that the successor TlUstee's, Beth Rogers, dual
COUlt
role as TlUstee and beneficiary created a conflict of interest as a matter of law, and that comt
approval of the sales transaction was required under Idaho Code Section 68-1 08(b) regardless of
fUlther regardless if
whether or not the successor TlUstee acted in a reasonably plUdent manner, and fmther
there existed exceptions to COUlt approval. (R., Vol. II, pp. 284-85.)
B.

Course of Proceedings

This Honorable COUlt has previously considered celtain aspects ofthis litigation in the case
captioned Taylor v. Maile, Docket No. 30817. After the appeal was filed by the Taylors in Case
r,p. 5.)
No. 30817, the Trust filed its complaint and demand for jury trial on July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I,p.
. On October 20, 2004, the Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Demand
for Jury TriaVMotion for Summary Judgment relating to the Trust's complaint. (R." Vol. I, p. 63.)
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By way of that motion, the Appellants argued that the complaint filed by the Trust should be
COUlt appointment to make them
dismissed because the Taylors had not received the required comt
successor trustees, pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107 and, as a result, had no
authority to file suit on behalf ofthe Trust. The Taylors initially denied any court appointment was
of Exhibits (hereafter refelTed to
necessary for their appointment as successor trustees. (Celtificate ofExhibits
as C.E.) C.E. #11 exhibit "A.") Then, after receiving the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the: Taylors
obtained an ex parte order from the probate cOUli on November 17, 2004, appointing them as
successor trustees, retroactive to June 10,2004. (C.E. #39 exhibit "a" to exhibit "A.")
On February 28,2005, the Appellants filed appropriate pleadings before the probate court
requesting that the ex parte Order dated November 17,2004, be set aside. (C.E.
(C.B. #39 exhibit "C.")
In the probate cOUli
comi proceeding, the parties provided extensive briefing regarding the ex parte order
entered on November 17, 2004. (C.E. #40 exhibits "A" thru "F.") On April 18, 2005, the probate
cOUli voided the ex parte Order. (C.E. #39 exhibit "D.") Then, on May 2, 2005, the probate court
entered another order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor, and DaHan J. Taylor as successor
trustees of the Trust. (C.E. #39 exhibit "E.")
Subsequently, the district court entered its order granting in part and denying in part the
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment. The district COUlt allowed the Trust
TlUSt
trustees received the required appointment by the probate
to amend its complaint after the successor tmstees
court and denied the Appellants' motion regarding that issue oflaw. The district court also held that
the Respondents had waived their rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract as
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_.
valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is waived."
(R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12,20-22.)
The Respondents then moved for sununary judgment regarding the AppeHants' Counter
Counterclaim. (R., Vol. I, p. 84.) The court granted the motion, in part, ruling that the Appellants were
entitled to pursue p011ions
p0l1ions oftheir
of their counter-claim, to wit: tortious interference with contract claims,
equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and their claim alleging a fi.'audulent transfer. (R., Vol. II, p. 244.)
On December 23, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision on the first appeal
brought by the individual Taylors. (R., Vol. II, p. 227.) The individual Taylors filed their Amended
Complaint on March 9, 2006, alleging "all of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (R., Vol. II, p. 260.) On March 21,2006, the Appellants filed their
Answer and Counter-claim Re: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries incorporating all
prior verified answers and counter-claims previously of record. (R., Vol. II, p. 270.)
On February 13, 2006, the individual Taylors moved for summary judgment as to the
Amended Complaint, which the Court granted. (R., Vol. II, pp. 255, 281.) Subsequent motions and
ultimately a number of Judgments were entered precipitated by the Order granting the individual
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.
C.

Statement of Facts
Theodore L. Johnson created a Trust in 1997 and at the time transferred a fOl1y-acre parcel

(hereinafter referred to as the "Propelty") into the Trust. Thomas Maile acted as his attomey in the
preparation of that Trust instrument. (C.B.
(C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit "2").
H2') There was no additional
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involvement between Mr. Jolmson and Mr. Maile until May 2002, when Mr. Jolmson recdved an
offer from Franz Witte to purchase the property for $400,000.00. Mr. Johnson retained Mr. Maile to
(C.E. # 11). At the time Mr. Johnson received the offer, he had not
represent him in the transaction (C.B.
(C.E. #5 dep. Beth Rogers, pp. 19-22, and exhibit 23
determined ifhe wanted to sell the property. (C.B.
p.2).
1'.2).
of a potential sale, Mr. Maile contacted
In order to understand the possible tax ramifications ofa

Mr. Jolmson's accountant to explore those issues. (C.E. #11). She provided a letter outlining
potential tax issues and Mr. Maile gave that letter to Mr. Jolmson. (C.E. 5 dep. Rogers Pl'. 24-26
exhibit 5). The accountant noted in her letter that she knew of another 40 acres sold in 1996 for a
larger sum and wondered if the prope11ies were comparable. The accountant was not qualified nor
experienced in real estate valuations. (C.E. #79 Hetherington's dep. pp. 8,9, 17, 18, 19,20).

On May 29, 2002, Mr. Maile provided a letter to Mr. Johnson advising of the possibility of
submitting a counter-offer to the purchaser to help detelmine the market value of the property. On
June 4, 2002, Mr. Maile provided a letter to Mr. Witte, the potential purchaser, on behalf of
Mr. Johnson, in an attempt to determine if Mr. Witte would increase his price without committing

to a counter-offer. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit 7).
Mr. Witte refused to increase his offer to purchase and indicated he had de.termine:d a fair
price by researching recent purchase prices of comparable land in the area. This lett,:r
lett(:r was provided
to Mr. Johnson. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit 6). The last letter received from the potential
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purchaser, Mr. Witte, indicated that his offer to purchase the propelty expired on June 20,2002.
dep. Rogers p. 92).
Mr. Johnson decided not to sell to Mr. Witte. (C.E. #5 del'.
Mr. Maile provided Mr. Johnson a bill for his services. Mr. Johnson paid in full, and the
dep. Rogers Pl'.
pp. 27,28, exhibit 8.) Relating
representation was concluded by July 1,2002. (C.E. #5 del'.
to the real estate offer, no additional services were provided to the Trust and/or Mr. Jolmson after
the date of Mr. Witte's letter establishing that his offer was withdrawn as of June 20, 2002. (C.E.
#11).
Some time in the first part of July 2002 and after the withdrawal of the offer by Mr. Witte,
Mr. Johnson retained a local licensed appraiser, Knife, Janos and Associates, to detennine the fair
the property. (C.E. #5 dep.
pp. 28-31 exhibit 9). The appraisal firm of
market value of
ofthe
del'. Beth Rogers Pl'.
Knife, Janos and Associates provided their appraisal report on July 17, 2002. The property was
valued at $400,000.00.
A few days later, Mr. Johnson appeared at Mr. Maile's office with a proposal to sell the
propelty to Mr. Maile for the appraised price of$400,000.00. When Mr. Maile was approached
approaGhed by
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson he could have an independent attorney to advise

tlu'oughout the transaction. Mr. JolUlson
Jolmson replied that he trusted Mr. Maile with the drafting of the
agreement. (C.E. #11
pp.l04-105).
# 11 pp.2-3) (C.E. #49 dep.
del'. Maile pp.l
04-105). Mr. Maile thereafter prepared an
earnest money agreement containing the terms requested by Mr. Johnson.
JoOOson. Mr. and Mrs. Maile
executed the agreement. On July 25, 2002, Mr. Maile met Mr. Johnson
Jolmson at his home and again
explained that he could retain independent counsel regarding the transaction. Again Mr. Johnson
APPELLANTS~ OPENING BRIEF - 5
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indicated he did not want to do so and executed the earnest money agreement making a modification
pp.120"21). The real estate contract provided that the
on the addendum. (C.E. #49 dep. Maile pp.120"2l).
eXt~cuted, whereby
buyers had the right to assign their interests, and thereafter an assignment was eXt~cuted,

Berkshire Investments, LLC was the agreed-to buyer. The written contract provided that Mr. Maile
occun'ed on September 16,
could not represent the interests of the seller. The real estate closing occun-ed
2002.
In August 2002, Mr. Jolmson, was hospitalized with a heart attack. Beth Rogers, designated

of earnest money agreement designating
successor trustee under the Trust, executed the assignment ofearnest
Berkshire Investments as the purchaser. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers pp. 43, 44). In mid-August 2002, the
Mrs. Rogers prudently took the appraisal and the real estate forms for a review by an independent
attorney in Boise, Idaho. Independent counsel reviewed the contract, assignment, appraisal and
of trust. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers pp. 44
44provided some minor proposed changes to the proposed deed oftrust.
49).
No other family members other than Beth and Andy Rogers were involved in the
management ofthe Trust property. In fact, neither Reed Taylor nor John Taylor had seen their uncle
for approximately 12 years. During the period of time prior to the closing, the Rogers were in
constant contact with Mr. Johnson and advised Mr. Johnson of the meeting with thdr independent
counsel. Mr. Jo1mson received the input from independent counsel and continued to SUppOlt his
(C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp.l5" 48-52). Even
decision to sell the real estate for the appraised value. (C.B.
before the executed real estate contract, Beth Rogers was involved with her uncle, Mr. Johnson, and
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other family members, discussing the independent real estate appraisal establishing the fair market
value of $400,000. (C.E. #38 dep Rogers p. 23; C.E.
C.B. #5 p.p. 33·34).
Unfortunately, Mr. 10hnson
Johnson died on September 14, 2002, one day before the scheduled
closing. Consistent with the agreement, Berkshire Investments paid the Trust $100,000.00 for the
down payment. The remaining balance of$300,000.00 was secured with a promissory note and deed
of trust. Reed Taylor, a beneficiary, attended the funeral of Mr. Johnson and was informed of the
pending real estate transaction involving Berkshire Investments. He was dissatisfied with the
purchase price. (C.E. #79 dep Reed Taylor pp. 32.
32, 34 ). A few weeks after Mr. Jolmson's funeral,
Reed Taylor, nephew of
Mr. Johnson, stmted
ofMr.
stalted negotiations with the Rogers to acquire Mr. Johnson's
home place. (C.E. #79 exhibit "A" dep Reed Taylor pp. 16,
16. 17). During this time,
time. the Taylors
complained to Beth Rogers about the inadequacy of the price
pi'ice paid for the property acquired by
Berkshire Investments. (C.E. #79 exhibit "C" dep D. Taylor pp.15B 16).
In the spring of2003, the individual Taylors continued objecting to the propel1y's sale and
advised Beth Rogers not to accept any additional payment from the Appellants. (C.E. #5 dep
pp.57-58). During 2003, the Taylors were aware that Berkshire Investments was attempting
Rogers pp.57·58).
to refinance the propel1y. (C.E. #79 dep D. Taylor pp. 60,1). In July 2003, the Taylors requested
Beth Rogers pursue legal action against the Mailes. Mrs. Rogers informed the Taylors that the Trust
was not interested in pursuing litigation and cashed the check in the amount of $32,357.00,
atmuaI payment from Berkshire Investments. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp.57-58
pp.57·58
representing the first rumual
exhibit 15).
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 7
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On July 7,2003, Connie Taylor transmitted a letter to Mr. Maile indicating she represented
the successor Trustee, Beth Rogers, and the beneficiaries of the Trust and that litigation would be
filed over the real estate transaction because the purchase was for less than fair market value. (C.E.
#5 dep Rogers exhibit 19). Beth Rogers did not authorize such a letter and maintained that Connie
Taylor did not represent the interests of the Trust in July 2003. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 67-69
exhibit 19).
In July 2006, the Taylors were demanding that Trustee make payment from the corpus of
TlUst and an additional $50,000.00 payment be disbursed to their mother Helen Taylor. ShOltly
thereafter, Beth Rogers made separate disbursements of$50,000.00 to Helen Taylor, Aunt Joyce, and
Aunt Hazel. (C.E.
(C.B. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 23 paragraph 19). On or about July 22,2003, Beth Rogers
TlUSt would not be pursuing litigation against the Mailes as
wrote to Connie Taylor indicating the TlUst
outlined in Mrs. Taylor's letter to Mr. Maile. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 21). Beth Rogers shared
her letter with a cover note to Mr. Maile on the same date, indicating "now they ar'e after us. Nice
people." (C.B.
(C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 75-76 exhibit 22).
. Berkshire Investments, shortly after the sale closed, commenced the process of developing
the propelty. After Berkshire Investments received notification that the Trust was not interested in
litigation, the Appellants obtained from the Idaho Independent Bank a constlUction loan secured with
a commercial loan agreement in January 2004. Monies from the new loan were used to pay the TlUst
8, 2004. The construction loan was secured by the subject property via
in full on or about Janumy 8,2004.
recorded deed of trust on January 8, 2004. Under the tenus
tenns of the new loan, the Appellants were
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required to finalize construction by July 8, 2004. (C.B. #4). To that end, The Appellants incurred
approximately $177,763.77 in engineering and construction related expenses and approximately
(Tr., Pl'.
pp. 86- 94, exhibits
$31,1
11.24 related to the construction of a barn on their home site. (yr.,
$31,111.24
12,13,14).
The Taylors filed their complaint and demand for jUly trial on January 23, 2004. The Taylors
of Lis Pendens. The filing ofthe Lis
also filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office their Notice ofUs
Pendens caused Berkshire Investments to default under the terms and conditions of the construction
loan. (C.E. #45).
While the Taylors' suit was pending, and while the Appellants undel100k the required
construction, the Taylors, the Rogers, and the Beneficiaries entered into a global "Disldaimer,
"Disl:;laimer,
del'. Rogers exhibit 25; C.E. #39-Addenclum
#39·Addenclum #2).
Release & Indemnification Agreement." (C.E. #5 dep.
Under the terms ofthe Agreement the Taylors released the TlUstees, Beth and Andy Rogers, from all
ofthe
the Trust. The Agreement further provided that the Taylors
liability relating to the administration of
Taylors
10rs did not obtain court approval oftheir
oftheil' alleged
would be appointed as successor Trustees. The Tay
appointment as successor Trustees. The Taylors, as successor trustees, filed litigation on behalf of
the Trust on July 19, 2004.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Taylors, as individual beneficiaries, have standing to pursue their claims?

2.

Did the Taylors, by entering into an Agreement releasing the Rogers, defeat their standing?
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3.

Did the Agreement tenninate the Trust by renouncing any and all

intert~sts
intert~sts

in the Trust

corpus, and agreeing to a full disbursement of the TlUst corpus, makjng the current
proceedings moot as a matter of law?
4.

Did the district court err by lUling that the Trust, was not able to seek recision but allowed
the Taylors as beneficiaries to have the property restored to the Trust and/or themselves?

5.

Did the court err by the entry of the summary judgment?

6.

Was Beth Rogers acting under a conflict of interest as a matter of law under Title 68 of the
Idaho Code, considering the statutory exceptions set forth under Title 68?

7.

Did the successor Trustees act in a reasonably prudent manner?

8.

Did the court en in ruling that Rogers and/or the Appellants breached a fiduciary duty?

9.

Did Theodore L. Johnson's actions amount to a breach of fiduciary to the beneficiaries?

10.

Did the successor Trustees act properly in closing the propelty?
property?

11.

purchaser for value?
Was Berkshire Investment a bona fide pUl'chaser

12.

Was the sales transaction void as a matter of law?

13.

coul1 err by ruling that the contract was void when its prior orders were inconsistent
Did the cou11
with its judgment on beneficiaries claim filed June 7, 2006?

14.

ell' by ruling that the Taylors had properly filed their complaint as successor co
Did the court en
coTrustees without court authorization and does the Trust have standing?

15.

Did the trial court commit error in determining that Appellant Maile did not infonn
Mr. Johnson as to his right to seek independent counsel?
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16.

Did the trial comi commit en'or
elmr in not awarding pre-judgment interest on the return of the
$400,000.00 paid to the Trust by the Appellants?

17.

Are the Appellants entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 40 and 41 of the
12-12l?
Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code Section 12-121?

III. ARGUMENT
A.

The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims
jUl'isdictional, and it may be raised at any time. See Tungsten
The issue of standing is jmisdictional,

Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69,137 P.3d456 (2006). Theodore 1. Johnson, as the grantor of
the Trust, and the Rogers, as successor Trustees ofthe Trust, acted in a reasonably prudent manner in
selling and ultimately closing the transaction. The only evidence in the record relating to the
AffIdavit of Gary
reasonableness of the grantor and the successor Trustees is contained in the Affidavit
McAllister. (C.E. #81-Addendum #3). Mr.
Mr, McAllister established that there was no appearance of
any improper action on the part of the Rogers in closing the transaction. There is no factual basis
supporting a claim of a breach of fiduciary on the part of the Rogers or the grantor in selling the
property for the price established by an independent appraisal and agreed to by Mr. Johnson prior to
his death.
Some time after filing their complaint in January 2004, the Taylors entered into a settlement
agl'eement
agt'eement with the successor Trustees, captioned "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement"
which was dated July 15, 2004. (C.B.
(C.E. #5 exhibit "25"-Addendum #1 herein). Prior to that
agreement, the Taylors repeatedly advised the Rogers that the sale was in their opinion a violation of
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the Trust.
Tmst. Even with such a history, the Taylors entered into the agreement with the successor
Tmstees releasing the Rogers of all liability.
Trustees
ofTmsts
The Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 282 (1959) comment on subsection (2) provides:
Tmstee fails to sue. If the Trustee fails to
e. Where the Trustee
perform his duty to bring an action at law or suit in equity or other
proceeding against a third person (see § 177), the beneficiary can
maintain a suit in equity against the Trustee to compel him to perfOlm
his duty. In order to settle the controversy in a single suit and avoid
of suits, the beneficiary canjoin the third person with the
multiplicity ofsuits,
Trustee as co-defendants, and the matter will be disposed of in a
single suit.
ofTmst in failing to
If the Trustee does not commit a breach ofTrust
bring an action against the third person, as for example where it is
pmdent under the circumstances to l'efi'ain
prudent
refl'ain from bringing an action
(see § 192), the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit against the Trustee
and the third person.
The facts reveal that Rogers acted in a prudent mamlel'.
mamler. Paramount to detemtining
detemLining whether a
of a Trustee.
beneficiary has standing to pursue a claim is an examination ofthe actions ofa

Thl~ record

of the actions ofMr.
of Mr. Johnson, the successor TlUstees,
is now complete and ready for a determination ofthe
and the Appellants.
The facts establish that Mr. Witte's offer in May 2002 to purchase the property for
$400,000.00 was taken off the table by the buyer, who affirmed that he was not going to offer any
more than what tumed out to be the appraised value of the property.

The accountant,

Mrs. Hetherington, provided testimony which demonstrated that she had no basis to theorize the
possible numbers she used in her letter relating to the Witte offer. Mrs. Hetherington's opinions as
to pricing were not based upon any credible fact or principle, as she had no training in real estate
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 12
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valuations. (C.E. 79 dep Hetherington

pp.8~

9.) The accountant ftllther provided testimony that

of which
there were a number of offers in the grantor's file~ from the immediate preceding yt:ars all ofwhich
were substantially below the appraised valuation. (C.E. 79 dep Hetherington, pp. 13-14). The
grantor had information in addition to the appraised value which established that even though he
Trust~ he was exercising pmdence in agreeing to sell the real propelty for
placed his real property in Trust,

Tmstees
the appraised value. Under these facts there is no doubt that the grantor and the suc:cessor TlUstees
acted in a reasonable prudent manner.
1.

The Successor Trustees Were Authorized to Close the Real Estate Transaction
and the Taylors Have No Standing to Pursue Their Claims Against the
Appellants

The district court seemed to analyze the facts and the law in a vacuum,
vacuum~ finding that COUlt
tlus transaction pursuant to Idaho Code § 68-1 08(b).
approval was required for the conclusion of this
ofinterest.
Idaho Code § 68-108(b) requires court approval of a trustee's actions ifthere is a conflict ofinterest.
Here, no conflict existed. Idaho Code Section 68-1 06(a) provides that no COUlt approval is m:cessary
whlch a pmdent man would
under any circumstance when the Trustee acts consistent with "every act which
of the action ofthe grantor and the Rogers establishes that relying upon a
perform." An examination ofthe
perform,"
licensed independent appraisal that confirms a fair market value which coincidently was the value of
a prior offer is totally reasonable and prudent.
08(b)~ there are
Carrying forward with the statutory interlUption
intermption ofIdaho Code Section 68-1 08(b),

celtain provisions (68-106(c)(l), (4),
(4)~ (6), (18), and (24))
(24» which are specifically excluded fi.-om the
prospects of any court approval. The successor Trustees were doing nothing more than finalizing a

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 13

000918

of the Trust had created. The Rogers had statutory
bilateral contractual obligation which the grantor ofthe
responsibilities under Idaho Code Section 68-106(a) to administer the Trust as a prudent person
would do.

The specific language of Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1)
68-l06(c)(1) clearly authOlized the

distribution of the Trust property without court approval.
There is no dispute that Mr. Johnson transferred the 40 acres to the Trust, executed the real
estate contract, received independent counsel's advice prior to closing and confirmed his desire to
sell to Berkshire Investments. The Rogers were doing nothing more than finalizing the transaction as
a reasonably prudent person has a right to do under Idaho Code Section 68-106. Under the clear
reading of Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1), the successor Trustees are specifically and
unequivocally empowered under the statute to sell a Trust asset which was placed in Trust by the
Trustor, all without court approval.
The Revocable Trust Agreement is now part ofthe
of the record. (C.E. #5 dep. Beth Rogers exhibit
"2"-Addendum #1). The Trust provided for equal classes among Mr. Johnson's siblings. Each
living sibling was to receive 20% of the Trust, with the surviving issue of the deceased brother,
Richard Johnson, to receive itmnediately 20% of the property upon the death of Mr. Johnson. In
fact, the Trust Agreement provided that the 20% share in which Richard Johnson's issue were to
enjoy was not even to be held in Trust but rather was to be immediately vested upon the gmntor's
death. The issue of Richard B. Johnson were to immediately obtain 20% of the propel1y without it
being held in Trust. The four living siblings ofTheodore
of Theodore L. Johnson were to receive 20%, with their
of the deceased Richard Johnson. (C.E.
p0l1ions to be held in Trust. Beth Rogers was the daughter ofthe
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 14
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#5 dep. Beth Rogers exhibit 23 page 7). Her portion ofthe
of the 20% share became vested upon the death
of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Jolmson died two days prior to the execution of the closing documents by the
fact that Andy Rogers, as co-successor Trustee, was not a beneficiary
Rogers. There is no dispute of
offact
the Trust. Consequently, he could not under any theory be in a conflict ofinterest
under the terms of
ofthe
relating to the beneficiaries or the Trust. Therefore, he was authorized to close the transaction
cowithout limitation. There cannot be a conflict on the part of Beth Rogers' role in her role as a co
successor Trustee, as her share immediately vested two days prior to filling the role as co-successor
Trustee.
h€lr at the
Beth Rogers held an undivided interest in the 40-acre parcel which vested as to h(,r
Mr. Johnson's death on September 14,2002. The Trust Agreement provided the suecessors
time of
ofMr.
Trustees' absolute discretion in selling property, including undivided interest in any property:
9.
In any case in which the Trustee is required, pursuant
ofthe
to the provisions of
the Trust, to divide any Trust property into parts
or shares for the purpose of distribution, or otherwise, the Trustee is
authorized, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, to make the division
authorized.
in kind, including undivided interests in any
and distribution ill
....,, and for this purpose to make such sales of the Trust
property, ....
property as the Trustee may deem necessary on such terms and
conditions as the Trustee shall see fit.
(Agreement, p. 7 (emphasis added).)
The Rogers were doing nothing more than finalizing the transaction as a reasonably prudent
person would and proceeded with the closing without a court order which is specifically mandated
68-l06(a)(c)(l) and (4) and the provision of the Trust
under the language ofIdaho Code Section 68-106(a)(c)(l)
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Agreement. Beth Rogers was acting as a reasonably prudent investor relying upon the advice of
independent counsel and an independent appraisal supporting the sale consistent with Idaho Code
Section 68-106(a)(c).
This COUlt must construe the plain meaning and intention of Idaho Code Sections 68-106
and 68-108 as well as the reasonableness of the grantor, Mr. Johnson, and the Rogers. The
interpretation of a statute is an issue oflaw over which this COUlt exercises free review. Idaho Fair
Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988). When
coutt is to determine and give effect to the
interpreting a statute, the primary function of the coUIt
legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990).
Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Id. at 539, 797 P.2d
at 1387--88. The present statutory scheme under Title 68 is unambiguous. There is no additional
language contained in the statute that would defeat Berkshire Investments' rights to rely upon its
status as bona fide purchasers ofvalue.
of value. The Taylors lacked standing to pursue their ,claim
'claim as there is
no breach of duty by the grantor or successor Trustees Ullder these facts.
2.

The Restatement of Trust Codifies the Law Regarding the Rights of
Beneficiaries to Assert Both Legal and Equitable Claims Against Third Parties
and the Facts Established in the Record Defeat the Taylors' Standing to Pursue
Their Claims for Either Remedy

The Taylors were advised of the potential purchase of the property the day of the funeral of
the grantor on or about September 17, 2002.

(C.E. #79 dep. Reed J. Taylor pp. 12-14).

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 16

000921

Approximately 15 months later they commenced their individual action against the Appellants. The
Taylors pled for damages and for equitable relief against the Appellants.
The District Court Judge ruled that the Taylors were entitled to the equitable remedy,
rescinding the transaction between the Trust and Berkshire and restoring the real property to the
Trust by declaring the transaction void. As stated in the Restatement (Second) ofTrust
of Trust § 282, Suit
In Equity By Beneficiary (1959):

(1) Where the Trustee could maintain an action at law or suit
if the TlUstee held
in equity or other proceeding against a third person ifthe
the property free of Trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in
equity against the third person, except as stated in Subsections (2)
and (3).
(2) If the TlUstee improperly refuses or neglects to bring an
action against the third person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in
equity against the Trustee and the third person.
the Trustee cmmot be subjected to thejUlisdiction
the jmisdiction ofth~:
Ifthe
(3) If
comi
cOUli or if there is no TlUstee, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in
equity against the third person, if such suit is necessary to protect the:
interest of the beneficiary.
In order to have standing, the Taylors were required to proceed with litigation against both
the Rogers and the Appellants. See Saks v. Damon Raike and Co., 7 CaI.AppAth
Cal.AppAth 41,8 CaI.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d
869 (1992). The Taylors have failed to present any facts to support any theory that the Rogers were
negligent in their failure to file suit against the Appellants. A beneficiary may hav~:
hav(: standing if the
Trustee improperly fails or neglects to pursue a legitimate claim. The case ofPillsbmy
ofPillsbuty v. Katmgard,
22 Cal.AppAth
CaI.AppAth 743 (1994), illustrates the necessity ofa litigant to prove improper aetion on the part
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f)vidence
of the Trustee to empower a beneficiary to have standing to sue a third party. No flvidence
established that the Rogers breached a fiduciary duty, consequently the Taylors lack standing.

3.

Trustee~, Which
The Taylors Entered Into an Agreement With the Successor Trustee~l
Defeated Their Claim for Standing

the
The Taylors were fully aware ofthe circumstances sunounding the transaction, the role of
ofthe
Agrec~ment in
grantor and the Rogers, by June 2004, approximately two years after the closing. The Agrec~ment

June 2004, was a release of all claims against the Rogers. Prior to the agreement, the Taylors had
of the Trust
repeatedly advised the successor Trustees that the sale was in their opinion a violation ofthe
fmther requested in 2003 that Beth Rogers not accept any monies from Berkshire Investments.
and fUlther
The Taylors were fully advised by the Verified Answer and Counter-claim filed on February 23,
of July 2003, with the Appellants
2004, that Beth Rogers, as successor Trustee, had shared her letter ofJuly
indicating the Trust fully stood behind the land sale transaction. The Taylors also knew the
of estoppel to prevent the reversal ofthe
of the real estatf:
estat(: closing. (Case
Appellants were asserting claims ofestoppel
No. 30817, Vol. I, p. 11, exhibit "C" p. 44.) Even with such a history, the Taylors entered into an
an liabili1y.
liabilily. The
agreement with the Rogers, which released the successor Trustees of any and all
Restatement (Second) of Trust § 315 (1959) illustrates:
Rights of Transferee Where Beneficiary Consent to the:
Transfer. Ifthe Trustee in breach of Trust transfers Trust property to
a third person, and the beneficiary by his consent to the transfer is
precluded from holding the Trustee liable for breach of Trust in
making the transfer, the third person takes the propelty free of the
Trust.
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The Taylors agreed that the Rogers would not be liable for any breach of Trust, and as such
had no right to pursue their claims against the Appellants. There was in fact a final accounting and
disbursement agreed between the Taylors and the Rogers. The pertinent specific language contained
Agreement. provides:
in the Agreement,
3. Release of
Trustees Estimated Expenses. The undersigned
ofTrustees
hereby release and discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers
from all claims or causes of action.... The undersigned further
acknowledge that the Trustees have distributed, and he/she has
propeliy, money and benefits to which he/she is
received, all of the propelty,
the Trust.. .. The undersigned acknowledge
entitled under the tenTIS of
ofthe
the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final
accounting; and he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal
final accounting. (Addendum # 2).
By releasing the Rogers, accepting a full accounting, and the full disbursement of the corpus, the
Taylors have waived any claim that the propelty should be returned to the Trust and are barred for
lack of standing to pursue such a claim.

4.

The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims Because When They
Entered Into the Agreement Their Claims Became Moot as a Matter of Law

The Taylors, by entering into the agreement,
of the Trust. All assets
agreement. telminated the purpose ofthe
were delivered to the appropriate beneficiaries under the tenns and conditions ofthe
of the agreeme:nt. The
Restatement (Second) of Trust § 342 (1959) Conveyance by Trustee to or at the Direction of the
BeneficialY provides:
.....if
.if there are several beneficiaries none of whom is under an
tlle Trust propelty to them or at
incapacity and the Trustee transfers tile
of the Trust
their direction, the Trust telminates although the purposes ofthe
have not been fully accomplished.
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The entire TlUst corpus was distributed in June 2004 to all beneficiaries.

All that

Mr. Johnson had intended to accomplish by his estate planning was nullified by the June 2004
agreement between the beneficiaries (Addendum 2). The Agreement dispersed all the TlUst assets
and terminated the Trust as a matter oflaw. The Restatement (Third), Trusts § 2, comment (I), p. 23
(2003) provides, "if a Trust is created and subsequently the whole of the Trust property ceases to
exist, the Trust is terminated because the Trustee no longer holds anything in the Trust." Each and
of the Trust.
every beneficiary agreed to the final accounting and complete disbursement ofthe assets ofthe
The specific language contained in the Agreement provides:
All Other Interests....
Interests .... 1.2.3:
1.2
Disclaimer of
ofAll
l.2.3: Taylor. Reed
J. Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria Rydaich, Virginia
POlier
POlter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen
Taylor, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor
of their mother, Helen Taylor, and hereby approve immediate
C..E.
distribution to Helen Taylor. ( C
.. E. # 5 Beth Rogers deposition
exhibit 25).
The Taylors disclaimed all other interests in the Trust, including any right to existing corpus
of the Trust. The agreement was created after the Taylors had filed their appeal with this (:ourt on
June 4, 2004. (Case No. 30817, R., Vol. I, p. 101.) After the execution of the agreement, the
ofsuccessor
successor Trustee, caused the Trust itselfto file
Taylors, believing they had properly filled the role of
its lawsuit on July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 5.) The TlUst ifit continued to exist, arguably became
pwty in interest at that time, dispensing with the Taylors' individual claims fulfilling the
the real pruty
issues of the real party in interest, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17.
APPELLANTS~ OPENING BRIEF - 20
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The reality however, is that the Trust corpus was fully disbursed consistent with the
agreement. There was a final accounting and disbursement to all parties, and the Trust terminated as
a matter oflaw. The Taylors by the terms ofthe
:;;my right
of the agreement received nothing and renounced ::my
to receive any monies, instead agreeing that all their interests to the Trust corpus, including all
monies paid by Berkshire were disclaimed in favor of their mother Helen Taylor. (C.E. #5 dep
p.l).
Rogers exhibit 25 p.1).
Fwtheln10re, another fundamental problem confronting the standing of the Taylors is
present. Although all the beneficiaries agreed to the modification and final accounting ofthe Trust,
no action was initiated by the Taylors to seek court approval of the modifications and/or final
accounting. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 Telmination Or Modification By Consent Of
Beneficiaries (2003) provides:

(l) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if all of tht:
beneficiaries of an irrevocable Trust consent, they can compel the
termination or modification of the Trust.
(2) If termination or modification of the Trust under
Subsection (1) would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the:
Trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination or modification
except with the consent ofthe settlor or, after the settlor's death, with
authorization of the court if it determines that the reason(s) for
telmination or modification outweigh the material purpose.
The purpose of the Trust and intention of Mr. Johnson have been fundamentally altered by
cowi has never addressed the issues of the modification ofthe Trust's
the agreement. The probate cow1
material purposes. Mootness applies when a party lacks a legal interest in the outcome. State v.
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.3d 1069 (2004). An appellate cOUli
cOUl1 is obliged to raise mootness
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Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125,
sua sponte because it is ajurisdictional issue. Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean.
1129 (9th Cir. 2005). The corpus was, pursuant to the agreement, disbursed to Helen Taylor, their
mother, according to her agreed-to share ofthe
of the Trust. In fact, the Respondents themselves a.dmitted
admitted
to the probate court in their petition for appointment of Trustees, "the petitiom::r's 88-year-old
mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of Trust by virtue of the terms of a
Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement" (C.B. #39 Exhibit "B"). A judicial admission is a
ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose" or with
statement made by a party or attomey, in the course ofjudicial
fact. Sun Valley
the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fa.ct.
Potato Growers. Inc. v. Texas RefinelY Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004).
of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal
Mootness has been described as "the doctrine ofstanding
of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its
interest that must exist at the commencement ofthe
(mootness).'" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1069 n.22
existence (mootness).'"
of a constructive Dust
(1997). The district court lacked jurisdiction to afford the Taylors the remedy ofa
and to enter a judgment voiding the real estate transaction.

5.

R.~cision;
The District Court Had Ruled That the Trust Was Not Able to Seek R.~cision;
the Taylors as Beneficiaries Are Unable to Have the Property Restored to the
Trust and/or Themselves

The district court cOll'ectly perceived in July 2005, that the Trust had allowed too much time
to pass before seeking recision. (R., Vol. I, p. 141.) The successor Trustee, Beth Rogers, had duly
notified the Appellants in JJuly
ul y 2003, that the Trust was allowing the transaction to stand and that the
Trustee saw no merit in the contentions of the Taylors' claims. (C.B. #5 del'.
dep. Rogers Pl'.
pp. 72-76
72~ 76
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exhibits 21, 22). The Restatement (Second) of Trust § 327 Rights of Beneficiary When Tmstee
Barred by The Statute of Limitations or Laches (1959) provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), ifthe
if the Trustee is barred
Limitations or by laches from maintaining an action
ofLimitations
by the Statute of
against a third person with respect to the Trust property, the
beneficiary is precluded from maintaining an action against the third
person.
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a breach of
Trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining an action
against him therefore, unless
gUilty of laches, or
(a) the beneficiary is himself guilty
(b) a co-Trustee who did not participate in the breach
of Trust, or a successor Trustee knowing ofthe
of the claim against the third
ofTrust,
person, fails to bring an action against him until he is barred by th~:
Statute of Limitations or by laches.
Even if the Taylors had standing to pursue their claims under the Restatement, above cited, the
actions or inaction ofthe Trustee and/or a successor can be imputed to the beneficiaries. In addition,
the beneficiaries themselves can be estopped from asserting a claim by their action or inaction. The
Taylors in 2003 advised the Rogers to file suit against the Appellants. The Rogers were aware ofthe
demands of the Taylors. Beth Rogers, fully aware of the intentions of her uncle Ted Johnson, the
grantor chose not to file suit and so advised the Taylors of the position of the Trust. In July 2003,
of the successor Trustees, Beth and Andy Rogers, that the
Berkshire Investments had the assurances ofthe
Trust was honoring the transaction.
The Taylors opined in September 2002 that the Trust was selling the property to Bc!rkshire
B(~rkshire
Investments for a low price. (C.E. #79, dep. D. Taylor pp. 15-16). The Taylors knew in July 2003
that the Rogers were not going to pursue any claims against the Appellants. The Taylors in 2003
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demanded money from the sale from Beth Rogers and accepted those funds from the Trust in 2003.
This money was a portion of the $100,000.00 down payment made by Berkshire Investments in
of the JPropel1y
JPl'Opelty
September 2002. The Taylors, as well as all other beneficiaries, took all the proceeds ofthe
sale in the summer of 2004 and accepted the fmal accounting from the Trustees. As stated by the
district cOUl1,
com1, "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a
light of recision, the right of recision is waived." (R., VoL
Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12; 20-22, quoting,
White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356 (2004).) The Taylors waited until after the real
propelty
propel1y was completely refinanced and full payment was made to the Trust before filing their
litigation in January 2004. Berkshire acquired new financing in January 2004, and committed to the
new lender that the construction project would be completed within six months. The district court
specifically found and so ordered, "the plaintiffs, now with standing as Trustees, did not act promptly
to pursue recision once the grounds for it arose." (R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 20, 21.) l11e district court
balanced the equities and correctly ruled that recision for the "plaintiffs" was not proper.
Consequently, the Taylors lack standing under the doctrine of laches to pursue th~: remedies they
sought and summary judgment was improper.

6.

The Entry of Summary Judgment Was Improper

The Appellants incorporate by reference all the preceding sections relating to the lack ofthe
of the
standing of the Taylors as the same substantive issues of law and facts apply as to whether the
district court properly entered summary judgment. When reviewing a distdct court's grant of
summary
judgment, the appellate com1
summaryjudgment,
cOUl1 uses the same standard a district court uses when it rules on a
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summary judgment motion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001). Upon
review, the Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving
pru1y, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Bonz v.
pWiy,
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).

B.

Beth Rogers as Successor Trustee Was Not Acting Undet·
Un del' a Conflict of Inter,est as a
of the Idaho Code However Even if
There Was a Conflict
Matter of Law Under Title 68 ofthe
ifThere
of Interest. the Successor Trustee Acted in a Reasonably Prudent Manner
The Appellants incorporate their argument in section I herein, as the same U:lctual and legal

summary
issues raised as to standing apply to a determination of the appropriateness of the summaIy
of interest on the pwt
prut ofBeth
of Beth
judgment. As examined in the preceding section, there was no conflict ofinterest
Rogers. Under Title 68, a Trustee is not required to seek judicial approval of a sale if the Trustee is
statutOlY exceptions to any cOUlt
exercising reasonable prudence. In addition, there exist two statutOly
approval requirement, both of which can be applied in the present matter.
Theodore Johnson, and Beth and Andy Rogers, all had the benefit ofa reliable independent
appraisal by Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC. The question that must be addressed, under Idaho Code
Section 68-1 06(
a), is whether relying upon an appraisal from a licensed Idaho appraiser was prudent
06(a),
in this case. As provided by Gary MacAllister, the answer is, "yes." There is no

evidencc~

in the

record that would indicate otherwise. Likewise, there is nothing in the record set forth by any ofthe
of care by Mr. Maile or
Respondents' legal experts stating that there was a violation ofthe standard ofcare
by Berkshire Investments that would lead to the conclusion that reliance under the established case
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law and the plain reading of Title 68 was inappropriate in purchasing real property, without the
cOUlt.
successor Trustee obtaining cOUlt approval by the probate comt.
In addition, the record includes another local licensed real estate appraisal. At the behest of
Idaho Independent Bank, Tim Williams provided his appraisal establishing the fair market value of
the property to be $410,00.00 in the fall of2003. (C.E. #23). Examining the record available before
of the fair market value and that Beth Rogers properly
this Court, there was a prudent investigation ofthe
closed the transaction. The entry of summary judgment was improper.

C.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That Beth Rogers and/or the Appellants Had
Breached a Fiduciary duty
It is generally held that whether a fiduciary duty has been breached is a question of fact for

the jUly and not for the trial court on motion for summaty judgment. See Western Alliance Corp. v.
Western Reliance Corp., 57 Or.App. 263, 643 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1982). The case of Johnson v.
Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982) provides the generally accepted proposition that there
mal!practic(! claim.
must be a showing of all the necessary elements including damages for any legal ma]!practictl
A breach of fiduciary would require the same elements. There is nothing in the record to show any
causal connection between any alleged breach of duty and resulting damages in favor of the Dust.
There has been no detel1nination that the price paid by Berkshire did not represent the fair market
value. There is nothing in the record to infer that Beth Rogers or any of the Appellants knew or
should have known that the independent appraisal was not valid. There was no detennination by the
lower comt
cOUli that the exceptions to any requirement of a court approval did not exist. Nor was there
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any determination that the Rogers were not acting in a reasonably prudent marmer. SUlmnary
judgment was improper.

D.

The Original Grantor, Theodore L. Johnson. Had Adequately and Properly
Formulated a Basis to Determine Fair Market Value and Consequently His Action in
Selling His Property to Berkshire Investment Cannot Be Considered a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty.
The record demonstrates that Mr. Johnson acted as a reasonably prudent man in determining

his needs and desires to sell a portion of his Trust property for the established fair market value.
inpru1:
Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 330.11 (4th ed. 1989), states, inpw1:
The reservation of a power to withdraw property from time to time
from the Trust gives the settler power to terminate the Trust
completely if he so desires. Where he simply reserves a power in
general terms to revoke the Trust, he ordinarily has power to revoke it
of the propel1y from the Trust.. .. Where:
in part by withdrawing some ofthe
the settlor reserves power to revoke, alter, or modify the Trust, he can
properly withdraw part ofthe property from the Trust.
Upon the death ofone
of one ofthe
of the settlors, the Trust becomes irrevocable, see L' Argent v. Barnett
Bank, 730 So.2d 395 (Fla.App. 1999). The Rogers had no power to alter or amend the modiflcations
of the Trust that Mr. Johnson had chosen some two months earlier. The distrkt cOUl1
to the corpus ofthe
eITed in entering summary judgment.

E.

The Successor Trustees Acted According to an Appropriate Standard in Executing the
Closing Documentation on the Property
The Rogers properly fulfilled their legal requirements to act in a reasonably ptudent manner

in conveying the property. The case of Hatcher v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon, 560r.App. 643,
P.2d
mru'k(:t value
643 P
.2d 359 (1982) illustrates the law that a Trustee has as a duty to determine the fair mw'k(:t
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of
stock, which it could accomplish through appraisals or by "testing the market" to determine what
ofstock,
a willing buyer was willing to pay. The Rogers fulfilled all the requirements placed upon them under
Title 68 Chapter 5 of the Idaho Code. Idaho Code Section 68-502 provides the standard of care
required for a Trustee.
The court's authority to review a Trustee's actions is limited to assuring the terms ofthe trust
are met. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959) provides:
Where discretion is conferred upon the Trustee with respect to th{:
exercise of
ofaa power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court,
except to prevent an abuse by the Tmstee of his discretion.
Many jurisdictions have applied this rule and have limited review of Trustee actions to
of the
determining compliance with the Trust's terms, not replacing the TlUstee'sjudgrnent
Tmstee'sjudgillerrt with that ofthe
COUlt.
comt.

"To the extent to which the Trustee has discretion, the court will not control his exerc:ise of it

the discretion conferred upon him." 2 Scott on Trusts (2d
as long as he does not exceed the limits of
ofthe
ed.1956) § 187 at 1374.
an independent appraisal, which the grantor himselfrelied
himself relied
The Rogers, acting with the aid of
ofan
upon, conveyed the subject real property to Berkshire. The language ofthe agreem{mt, spedfically
provided "the Trustee is authorized, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, to make the division and
distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kind and pat11y in money,
and for this purpose to make such sales ofthe Trust property as the Trustee may deem necessary on
such telms and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit." (Trust Agreement, p. 7 (emphasis added).)
Idaho Code Section 68-508 provides:
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Compliance with the prudent investor rule is detelmined in light of
the facts and circumstances existing at the time ofa
of a Trustee's decision
01' action and not by hindsight.
What did the record establish at the time the district judge entered summary judgment? The
Respondents failed to show and the record is devoid ofany
of any evidence to demonstratt: that the Rogers
failed to act in a reasonably prudent manner. The district court was incorrect in entering summary
judgment.

F.

Berkshire Investment Was a Bona Fide Purchaser and Purchased the Real Property
Not Subject to the Claims of the Beneficiaries
Berkshire paid the price determined by an independent appraisal. The appraisal happened to

be the same value as that represented by the withdrawn Witte offer. No argument can be set forth
asserting that Berkshire Investment actively participated in any breach of fiduciary committed by
Beth Rogers. The existing law at the time of
the purchase would have not allowed cmy
emy purchaser to
ofthe
believe there was a breach of fiduciary by Beth Rogers.
There are specific statutory directives that require a Trustee exercise reasonable prudence.
Those directives were met. There are clear exceptions to any court approval requirement, and the
language of the Trust authorized the Rogers to proceed to close the transaction. Idaho Code
Section 68-110 specifically provides protection to third persons dealing with a Trustee. There are
no facts in the record to establish that Berkshire and/or
andlor any other Appellant knew there were any
requirements to obtain a COUlt order regarding this transaction. The original grantor ~md Beth Rogers
appeared to be acting under a reasonably prudent standard.
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There are statutory exceptions that apply to any possible need for a com1 approval. The
Restatement (Second) of Trust § 284 (1959) provides:
Bona Fide Purchaser: (1) If the Trustee in breach of Trust
transfers Trust property to,
tOt or creates a legal interest in the subject
matter of the Trust in, a person who takes for value and without
the breach of
Trust, and who is not knowingly taking part in
ofthe
ofTrust,
notice of
an illegal transaction, the latter holds the interest so transferred or
created free of the Trust, and is under no liability to the beneficiary.
As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Trust § 283 (1959):
Truste{~
Where Transfer Is Not In Breach Of Trust: If the Truste{~
transfers Trust property to a third person or creates a legal or
equitable interest in the subject matter of the Trust in a third person"
and the Trustee in making the transfer or in creating the interest does
not commit a breach of Trust, the third person holds the interest so
transfelTed or created free of
the Trust, and is under no liability to the~
ofthe
beneficiary.

There is nothing in the record to establish that Berkshire Investments had any knowing participation
of any possible breach of fiduciary involving Beth Rogers. In fact, none of the experts reta.ined by
the Respondents provided any opinions stating that any ofthe
of the Appellants pro1icipated
pru.1icipated in any alleged
propertyts fair market value as set forth in an independent
breach by the Rogers by paying the property's
appraisal and/or by not obtaining approval by a probate court. Interestingly, none ofthe
of the complaints
filed prior to the decision in Case No. 30817 provided any reference to any possible violations in the
closing procedure, pursuant to Idaho Code Title 68. No one disputes that there was a legitimate
closing of real estate documents by the Rogers, based upon the fair market value price and after
of sumrnalY judgment was inappropriate.
obtaining independent advice of legal counsel. The entry ofsummalY
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS INCORRECT IN RULING THAT THE SALES
TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE TRUST AND BERKSmREINVESTMENTS WAS
VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Rogers had properly fulfilled their legal requirements to act in a reasonably plUdent

manner. The case of Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 842 P.2d 299, 305 (Ct.App. 1992),
involved a Trustee who entered into a contract with the TlUst for personal profits to himself. In
that case the Court of Appeals affinned the district court ruling that a contract entered into by a
Trustee in order to further the Trustee's ability to make profit from the Trust, was voidable, not void.
The Edwards case involved entirely different factual issues than the case at bar. In the presf:nt
prese:nt case,
the Trust settlor Ted Johnson had in fact authorized the sale and entered the real estate transaction
based upon an appraised valuation and with the aid of independent counsel prior to closing.
Even in cases in which the facts are somewhat similar
similru' to the present case, other jurisdictions
have held the contract may be voidable. There is no basis to infer that a contract must be voided.
ofPratt
The case of
Pratt v Lavender, 319 So.2d 88 (1975) provides that a "failure ofTrustef:
of Trustee: to comply with
Dust Accounting Law was not sufficient to render Trustee's conveyance of Trust property to
purchasers void, and did not affect the rights of purchasers in dealing with the Dust." There is no
statutory directive under Title 68 ofIdaho Code, that would authorize the district court to detennine
the transaction to be void. Other jurisdictions have held that a conveyance by a noncomplying
Trustee is valid and not void, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, see
Lentz v. Lentz, 5 N.C.App. 309, 168 S.E.2d 437 (1969). Idaho Law has no express statutory
language directing that district court void a transaction made by a successor TlUstee" who acted as a

BRIEF·- 31
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

000936

reasonable person. Even if a Trustee should commit a breach of Trust, unlike the case at hand, the
transaction may stand.
The Restatement (Second) of Trust § 291 (1959), comment m provides:
m. Election by beneficiary to affirm. Although the Trustee
transfers property in breach of Trust to a person who takes with notic(;~
transaction... "
of the breach of Trust, the beneficiary can affirm the transaction..."
Similarly, if there are several beneficiaries and if none of them is
under an incapacity and they all agree, they can affirm the transaction.
transaction"
of the beneficiaries lacks capacity to make an
If the beneficiary or one ofthe
effective election to reject or affirm the transaction, or if they do not:
all agree, the court will reject or affirm the transaction as may in its:
opinion be most conducive to effectuating the purposes of the Trust.
So, even if this Court determines that the actions of Mr. Johnson, the Rogers, andlor any of
fiducialY, the above cited provisions of the Restatement
the Appellants amounted to a breach of fiducialy,
make it clear that the transaction is not void, but only potentially voidable, and then only with a
cOUli determination to effectuate the purpose of the Trust. To make that determination, the
probate comt

intent ofMr.
of Mr. Johnson must be considered by the appropriate court. Who was in the best position to
provide testimony regarding Mr. Johnson's intent and to effectuate the direction of the Trust?
Would it have been Mr. Johnson himself, the original grantor, who instigated the rea1l estate
transaction? Would it have been the Rogers, who cared for and maintained a close re:lationship with
the grantor? Or would it have been distant relatives who had not maintained any relationship with
the grantor for more than 12 years prior to his death? The district court erred in rulIng the
transaction void.
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED INCONSISTENTLY WITH ITS PRIOR ORDERS
AND ERRED BY RULING THE CONTRACT VOID
The district COUlt on July 28, 2005, ruled that the Respondents had waived rights to rescind

the contract as "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a
right of recision, the right of recision is waived." (R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12,20-22.).
On February 13, 2006, the district cOUli
cOUl1 entered its Order allowing Appellants to proceed on
claims of quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel set forth in their counter-claim.

The Order

acknowledged the earlier Order of July 28,2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 249, Ll. 10-13.) The district court
recognized that the Appellants were entitled to pursue their counter-claims of estoppel against the
Taylors and the Trust under the principles of estoppel.
The purpose ofthe
of the doctrines ofpromissory
of promissory and quasi estoppel are to
prohibit an individual from securing some advantage for himself, or

to produce some disadvantage to tlte persons seeking tlte estoppel,
after a party has been induced to change his position. See Hecl'l
Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d
1192 (1992).
(Emphasis added.)
The Appellants were assured by the successor Trustees, in July 2003, that the Trust intended
su()cessor Trustee,
to allow the real estate transaction to stand. The Taylors tried for months to get successor
Beth Rogers, to change her mind, but to no avail. As early as July 2003, the Taylors intended to file
a lawsuit. (C.E. # 46, dep R. John Taylor "D" pp. 51-52; dep. D. Taylor exhibit "E'" p. 76). In early
2003, Beth Rogers' attorney, Bart Harwood, contacted the Taylors. In September 2003, the Taylors
received cOl1"espondence
cOl1'espondence from Mr.
Mr, Harwood, explaining that the Trust and other beneficiari'es
beneficiari,es ofthe
of the
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Trust did not want to pursue legal action seeking recision of the contract. (C.B. # 58, dep. Bart
Harwood, exhibit "C" pp. 9-12 exhibit 73).
The Appellants relied upon Beth Rogers' assurances and the Taylors' inaction, and
of the new financing required
proceeded to incur new financing to pay the Trust in full. The tenns ofthe
the loan. (C.E. # 46, ppJ-5 and exhibit "B").
construction of the subdivision within six months of
ofthe
Idaho Independent Bank considered the loan in default under the tenllS of loan, as no lots eould be
released as a result of the Taylors' lis pendens. (C.E. # 45).
Pursuant to the Agreement (addendum-2), the Trust and the beneficiaries took the money and
disbursed the funds to all beneficiaries in June 2004. (C.E. # 46, dep. D. Taylor exhibit "E" p. 75).
Note, the accounting records of Beth Rogers indicate that in 2003 the beneficiaries each received
payments of$50,000.00 from the Trust, and all that was left by June 2004 were the monies paid by
Berkshire Investments when the note was paid in full and the payment from the Taylors from the
ofTed
Ted Johnson's home. All these funds were paid to all the beneficiaries on July 23, 2004,
purchase of
with the individual Taylors renouncing any right or claim to the funds. (C.E. # 66, dep. Rogers
exhibit "A" p.111, 118 dep. exhibit "40" and addendum #2). No tender or repayment was even
and/or the Trust. A party seeking to re'scind
offered to the Appellants by the beneficiaries andlor
l'e'scind a
transaction on the ground of fraud must restore or offer to restore the other. party to the status quo
before the contract was fotmed. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504,112 PJd 188, 792 (2005).
offacts giving rise to a right ofrescission,
of rescission,
Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance offacts
P Jd 356 (2004).
the right of rescission is waived. See White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 PJd
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Even prior to the Trust obtaining the full payment on the contract in January 2004, the Taylors in
January 2003 demanded and obtained monies from the Trust from the down-payment and the first
annual payment made by Berkshire Investments to the Trust. (C.E. #5 dep. Beth Roger pp.64-66).
The Appellants incun'ed considerable expenses associated with the construction costs and time in
the development to avoid a default with the Idaho Independent Barne (C.B. # 66, affidavit of
Mr. Maile p. 3). The Taylors waived their right to seek recision by accepting th(~ benefits of the
transaction and failing to timely pursue such claims. The district court erred in entering summary
judgment (see also section on standing re: laches & estoppel incorporated by reference herein).
he:rein).

v.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE TAYLORS TO FILE THE
COMPLAINT AS COMTRUSTEES OF THE TRUST WITHOUT COURT
AUTHORIZATION AND THE TRUST LACKS STANDING
The Appellants filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment on October 20,

of the complaint by the TlUst on
2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 63.) The motion related to the improper filing ofthe
July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 5.) The legal premise of the Appellants' motion set forth that the
Taylors, as alleged successor TlUstees, failed to obtain court approval as specifically require.d under
cOU1t thereafter allowed the Trust to amend
68·107. The district cOUlt
Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107.

its complaint after receiving appointment in a probate proceeding and allowed the: amendment to
relate back to the filing date of the complaint, July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 141.) Idaho Code
Section 68-101 provides that:
TlUst exists without any appointed Trustees or where
When a Tlust
any or all ofthe
of the Trustees renounce, die, or are discharged, the district
court of the county where the Trust property or some pOltion thereof
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is situated, must appoint another Trustee to direct the execution ofthe
Trust.
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code Section 68-107 also specifically provides that the office of Trustee
is not transferable:
The Trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire administration ofthe
ofthe
Trust to a co-Trustee or another.
Furthermore, Idaho Code Section 15-7-403 provides additional authority that successor
Trustees, not nominated in the Trust documentation, need to apply for court appointment after notice
to all interested pa11ies. These provisions clearly provide that a new Trustee cannot simply be
appointed by the actions of the Trustee and/or beneficiaries to fill the legal position of a successor
Trustee. The only Idaho case law on this subject confirms that where a Trust makes no provision for
the appointment of successors, current Trustees are without the authority to fill

vacanci(~s.

See

Sherman v. Citizens' Right of Way Co., 37 Idaho 528,217 P. 985 (1923).
The district court was incolTect in determining that the amended complaint filed after the
Taylors' received "proper" probate appointment to serve as successor Trustees, related back to the
date of the filing of the Trust litigation. When a successor fiduciary steps into the shoes of a
predecessor who, acting in fiduciary capacity, has brought lawsuit in a court vested with jurisdiction
over subject matter of the suit, the "stepping in" relates back to the time when the original party had
standing to sue, see Corbin v. Blankenburg, C.A.6th, 1994,39 F.3d 650, cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1256,513 U.S. 1192, 131 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995). In the present case it was improper for the district
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COUlt to allow the amended complaint to relate back since there was no confusion as to the proper
pruty
pmty that needed to file suit, and the Taylors and the Trust lacked standing. (See

VI.

S(~ction
S(~ction

I (C)(D).)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MAILE DID NOT
INFORM MR. JOHNSON AS TO HIS RIGHT TO SEEK INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL
The trial court entered its Findings and Facts and Memorandum Decision, and alluded to a

number of items that were not necessary to reach its decision relating to the Appe:llants' daim of
unjust enrichment. (R., Vol. II, p. 352, L. 6.) One such issue was the point that Mr.
Mr . Maile failed to
verbally inform Mr. Johnson of
his right to seek independent counsel. (R., Vol. II. p. 351, L. 6.) The
ofhis
testimony of Mr. Maile established that he in fact did so inform Mr. Johnson. Mr. Maile testified
that on two occasions him so infOlmed Mr. Johnson. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 32-33, 137-38.) Unfortunately,
Mr. Johnson has passed away. As stated in Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 829 P.2d 1355
(CLApp.
(Ct.App. 1991), "A court may not reject the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a eredible witness
unless her testimony is inherently improbable or impeached," Airstream. Inc. v. CIT Financial
Services. Inc., 111 Idaho 307, 723 P.2d 851, appeal after remand, 115 Idaho 569, 768 P.2d 1302
(1988). The trial cOUlt indicated in its decision that the "court has reached its conclusion and make
of Beth Rogers." (R., Vol. Ill' p. 351, L. 23.)
its finding without regard to the deposition testimony ofBeth
of Mr. Maile on that point. There is nothing in
There was nothing offered to impeach the testimony ofMr.
the record to infer that his testimony was inherently improbable. The district court determination
was clearly en'oneous and such a rmding should be set aside and not considered in any future
proceedings.
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VII.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT AWARDING PRE
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE RETURN OF THE $400,000.00
In the event the court disagrees with the Appellants on the substantive
substanti ve issues offact
of fact and law

set forth above, the Appellants request the award of interest on the monies paid by Berkshire
of the monies paid
Investments. The trial court failed to award pre-judgment interest on the return ofthe
by the Berkshire Investment to the Trust. The record established a total $442,021.11 was paid on
three different payments. (September 2002, May 2003 and January 2004.)
Tmst
The Appellants should have been granted an award of interest on the monies which the TIUSt
28-22-1102 have
has retained for over five years. Subsections, 1, 2, 4, 5, of Idaho Code Section 28-22-102
application under the present facts. Prejudgment interest should be awarded on a claim that is
"liquidated or ascertainable by mere mathematical process." Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden,
125 Idaho 695,704,874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993); Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon CQill.,
CQm., 125 Idaho
409,415-16,871 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1994). There is no dispute that the Appellants provided timely
Tmst. Sum payments
paym.ents are
payments under the deed of trust and promissory note due and owing to the TIUSt.
liquidated and celtain. The law provides for pre-judgment interest on such liquidated and certain
sums.

VIII. THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate
attomey fees at the trial court level, pursuant to Idaho Code
when the prevailing party is entitled to attorney
Section 12-120 or Idaho Code Section 12-121. See, generally, Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,
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775 P.2d120 (1989); Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (1986).

Idaho Code

Section 12-121 provides for an award of
attorney's fees in civil actions. There is no disputf~ that the
ofattorney's
Respondents filed their motion for summary judgment approximately 18 months after they had
entered into their agreement with the Rogers and all beneficiaries under the Trust. The Agreement
amounted to all beneficiaries disclaiming their full interests in the Trust, the corpus, any interest
and/or income as to the corpus assets, and fwther disavowed any contingent or remainder iinterests
;interests
they may have in the corpus of the Trusts assets. The monies paid by Berkshire Investments has
been disbursed to all beneficiaries agreed to under the Agreement, and a final accounting has been
agreed to by all beneficiaries under the Tmst.
TlUSt. The Respondents failed to show any factual basis for
any breach of fiduciary by the original grantor or the Rogers or the Appellants. The Appellants
should be entitled to their attorney's fees and costs incul1'ed herein.
CONCLUSION

The Taylors lacked legal standing to pursue their claims and their claims must be dismissed
jurisdiction. There has been no factual evidence submitted by the Respondents that the
for lack of
ofjurisdiction.
original grantor, or the Rogers, committed a breach of fiduciary. The Taylors enten:d into a release
with the Rogers which prevented them from pursuing any claims. The Agreement fi1l1hermore
amounted to a final accounting of the Tmst
TlUst and as such the Trust was terminated.
In the event this Court believes the Taylors have standing, the matter must be remanded

since the district court improperly entered summary judgment. Material facts are in dispute.
pmdent manner
According to the evidence presented in the record, the Rogers acted in a reasonably plUdent
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in closing the transaction and conducted themselves appropriately under the provisions of Title 68.
Berkshire Investment paid the fair market value for the real estate, and was a bona fide purchaser for
value. The Taylors have waived their right to seek recision under the facts in the record.
There has never been a factual determination that Mr. Maile breachc~d his fiduciary either
with the grantor or with the Trust.

The contract specifically indicated Mr. Maile was not

representing the Trust. The grantor was advised to seek independent counsel, and chose not to.
Thereafter and prior to closing, the grantor and the successor Trustees obtained independent
counsel's advice and chose to sell the real property based upon a price arrived at by an independent
appraiser. The district court's findings set forth in Section VI were erroneous and must be stricken.
The Taylors wrongfully filed a lawsuit as successor Trustees of the Trust, without court
appointment as mandated by Title 68. The Appellants should be awarded their costs and attorney's
fees. This matter should be reversed and remanded to the district court consistent th(~ Appellants'
arguments contained herein.
DATED this ~day of September, 2007.

THOMAS G. MAl E, I ., co-counsel, for
Appellants, Berkshire nvestments, Colleen
Maile
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Condensed Course of Proceedings
The lower court has lacked subject matter jurisdiction relating to the Taylors' beneficiaries

claims for the last approximate 23 months oflitigation. The Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim was
predicated upon a misrepresentation of material facts committed by the Taylors. On January 13,
2006, R. John Taylor provided his verified amended complaint to the lower court. (R.
CR. Vol II.
p. 260.) On May 15, 2006, the district cOUlt entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. (R. Vol II. p. 281.)
B.

Statement of Essential Relevant Facts
The Taylors filed their verified petition in the probate cOillt
cOUlt on November 12, 2004,

Johnson Revocable Trust.
requesting the probate court to appoint them as trustees ofthe
ofthe Theodore L. 10hnson

The petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition.
(The petition alone is annexed as appendix 4 without its attachments which are part of the~ record
see C.E. #39 exhibit "B.") Page 2 ofthe verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year
88-yearold mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms ofa

Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement."
On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors. Page 1ofthe
1 of the
Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez
of Nez Perce
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County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are: residual
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust."
The written contract provided that Mr. Maile could not represent the interests of the seller.
of Professional Responsibility provisions
Thomas Maile complied with the appropriate Idaho Code ofProfessional
that were in effect in the year 2002. The Theodore L. Johnson trust obtained independent legal

counsel prior to closing the real estate transaction. Theodore L. Johnson was informe:d of the
independent legal counsel's involvement and again approved his desire to sell the real estate based
upon the appraised market value. The real estate closing occurred on September 16, 2002. The
terms and conditions of the final sales transaction were fair and reasonable.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Are the Taylors entitled to their attorneys fees?

2.

Are the Respondents entitled to their attorneys fees in defense of the cross-appeal

filed by the Taylors pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 ?

III. ARGUMENT
A.

The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims

The issue of standing is jlU'isdictional, and it may be raised at any time. See Tungsten
Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 137 PJd 456 (2006). The Taylors'

reliancl~

on the case of

State v. Searcy, 120 Idaho 882, 820 P.2d 1239 (Ct.App. 1991) is misplaced. Jurisdictional issues

such as standing and mootness are always subject to review at any stage of proceedings (ailthough
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there are some issues which may be waived if not presented on appeal). Generally issues raised for
the first time on appeal will not be considered. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 808 P.2d
1322, 1323-24 (1991). Litigants, however, cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction, and it may be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal, Idaho State Ins. Fund By and Through
Forney v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997). An appellate court will address

jurisdictional issues even though not preserved for appeal by objection in the lower court, cf
LR.C.P . 12(h)(3). Whenever it appears by suggestion afthe parties or otherwise that the court lacks
LR.C.P.12(h)(3).
jmisdiction of the subject matter, the cOUli
COUlt shall dismiss the action. State v. Wood, 125 Idaho 911,
912-13,876 P.2d 1352 (1993). Subject matter jurisdiction presents a question aflaw which we
freely review. Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1986); Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 451,452,807 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Ct.App.
(CLApp. 1991).

The Taylors' first appeal was filed on June 4, 2004 (Docket No. 30817, R. Vol. 1. p. 101).
Many of the issues that are germane to the issue of standing and mootness were not even factual
issues existing at the time of the filing of the first appeal. Contrary to the Responde:nts' contention
that the Appellants failed to raise the disclaimer issue before the district COUlt (Respondent's Brief,
p. 10), the Appellants did raise the disclaimer issue before the lower COUlt. (C.E. #80.)
The Disclaimer, Release, Indemnity Agreement was executed after the Taylors had fil,ed their
first appeal. The Taylors, after the first appeal, filed their petition in probate court in November
2004, requesting their appointment as trustees retroactively to June 10, 2004. The fact that the
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'Taylors specifically violated Idaho Code Sections 68-10 1 and 68-107 by failing to obtain judicial
appointment to act as successor trustees was not established until discovery was undertaken in the
subsequent lawsuit, where the Taylors initially admitted that probate court appointment was not
necessary (C.E. #11 exhibit "A").
On April 18, 2005, the probate court, through the Honorable Judge Christopher M. Beiter,
entered its Order declaring the ex-parte Order entered on November 17, 2004 void. (C.E. #39
exhibit "D.") On May 2,2005, Judge Beiter entered all Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed 1.
Taylor and Dallan 1. Taylor as successor trustees ofthe Theodore L. 10hnson
Johnson Revocable Trust (C.E.
#39 exhibit "E"). Taylor I had oral arguments on May 6,2005.
As this COlllt indicated in the first appeal, Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156
(2005), the matter was reviewed pursuant to a motion to dismiss with nothing in the record except
the bare allegations set fOlth
f01th in the Taylors' complaint.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief." Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611,
533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975). When reviewing a district court's dismissal of a CaS(l
under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor ofth~:
non-moving party. Young v. City ofKetchum,
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157,.
1159 (2002). After drawing all
aU inferences in favor of the non-moving patty, the
COUlt then examines whether a claim for relief
reliefhas
has been stated. Jd.
Id. Where a case has
been dismissed because of a lack of standing, this Court must examine "whether
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the requisite elements of standing in their
complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."
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ld at 257, 127 P.3d at 160.
AI1 inferences were rightly given to the Taylors without the benefit ofa developed appellate
record. The Taylors' reliance on the "law of the case" doctrine is inappropriate when analyzing a
court decision stemming from a motion to dismiss.
COUlt created "law of the case" which precludes
The Taylors summarily conclude that this Comi
an examination of relevant facts which were not part of the record. The law of the case doctrine
states that "upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a
principle or rule oflaw necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the: law ofthe case,
and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeaL." Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 PJd 1278, 1283 (2001). However,
the United States Supreme Court noted that the law ofthe case doctrine "directs a court's discretion,
it does not limit the tribunal's power." Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 103 S.Ct. 1382,
75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983).
"The lUle
rule is wel1 established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon an appeal, the
Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law ne:cessary
of the case, and must be adhered to throughout
to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law ofthe
... " In re Barker v.
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. ..."

Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 11 0 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986) (citing Suitts v. First
13 74 (1985». The issues discussed surrounding the
Security Bank o/Idaho, 110 Idaho 15,713 P.2d 1374
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necessity of
any court approval for a sale consistent with Idaho Code Section 68~ 108,
108, were not issues
ofany
Comi. The court in Taylor Iwas
offact or law which were necessary to the decision rendered by this Com1.
granting the Taylors all inferences permissible and stated that given all inferences possible the
of fiduciary. It was not necessary
Taylors had standing to pursue the allegations concerning a breach offiduciary.
to its decision to comment on the particulars surrounding Idaho Code Section 68-108 compliance.
In fact this Court never was able to examine the trust agreement itself, the two independent
appraisals that supported the purchase price, the facts surrounding the reasonableness ofthe grantor's
decision to sell the propelty for fair market value, or the reasonableness ofthe designated successor
trustees' action in finalizing the sale of real propelty which was placed in the trust by th~~ grantor
consistent with Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1).
68~106(c)(1). The principle pronounced in Taylor I provided:
general rule in trusts is that a third person who "has notice that the truste(~
The generallU1e
oftrust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for
is committing a breach oftlUst
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 326
any loss caused by the breach of tlUSt."
(1969); see LaHue v. Keystone Investment Co., 6 Wash.App.
Wash. App. 765,496 P.2d 343
(1972); 4 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 326.5 (1967).
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 260~61,
163~64 (2005).
260-61, 127 P.3d 156, 163-64

There was no opportunity for the Mailes to raise issues outside the limited pleadings which
comi's initial order dismissing the Taylors' complaint in Apl'i12004.
formed the basis ofthe district comt's
How could additional factual issues be raised in an appeal that stems from a motion to dismiss?
Consequently, how can the Taylors now argue the Mailes waived their rights to present factual issues
(page 14 of Taylors' brief)? Even more perplexing is how the Taylors can argue that the issues of
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-subject matter jurisdiction are waived. There can be no logical basis for such propositions, as many
peliinent facts were generated by the Taylors themselves after the first appeal was filed and this
Court was without an appropriate record substantiating relevant facts on the first appeal.

1.

The Taylors Are Precluded From Taking a Position Contrary to Their Sworn
Statements in the Probate Court

The Taylors petitioned the probate court for their appointment as succe:ssor trustees in

November 2004. The petition before the probate court was only advanced after the Taylors admitted

in discovery responses that they were not required to obtain judicial appointme:nt as successor
trustees (C.B.
(C.E. #11 exhibit "A") and the Mailes had filed their motion to dismiss pursuant Ito Idaho
Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107. (R. Vol I.
1. p. 63.) The record is clear and unambiguous, as to
what the Taylors represented to the probate court. Under oath, R. John Taylor verified that Helen
Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the trust in November 2004 pursuant to the Disclaimer, Release

and Indemnity Agreement. To constitute a judicial admission, a statement must be a deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact with that party's knowledge. See

Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct.App. 1997); Cordova v.

Disl. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 167 P.3d 774 (2007). Clem'ly the
Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dist.
admission was based both upon R. John Taylor's and his wife Connie Taylor's knowledge, as both
of the agreement (appendix 2
were extensively involved in the negotiations and the actual execution ofthe

to opening brief).
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What are the effects ofthe Taylors' judicial admission? AjudiciaI
Ajudicial admission is a statement
of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect,
made by a party or attorney, in the course ofjudicial
of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. Sun Valley Potato
Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765,86 P.3d 475,479 (2004). In thle present
Growers, Inc,

matter both Mrs. Taylor's (as attorney of record) and her husband, R. John Taylor's, admissions
dispense with any need to prove the "admitted fact" that from June 2004 to the present date Helen
Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the trust. There is no room for the Taylors to argue facts or
evidence to the contrary. The verified amended complaint executed under oath on January 13,2006,
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision
by R. Jolm Taylor was an attempt to take improper advantage of
ofthe
in Taylor I. The Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim entered on June 7, 2006, was

~:ntered
~:ntered

pursuant

to the misrepresentation of the Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. The
Taylors perceived an opening to victory based upon the decision rendered by this Court, and chose
to misrepresent their status as beneficiaries under the trust to the lower COUlt. The Judgm{mt must
be set aside.
2.

The Taylors' Claims Are Moot

It is a fundamental tenet ofAmerican
of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to iinvoke (ll cOUlt's

jurisdiction
must have standing. Van Valkenburghv. CitizensjorTermLimits, 135 Idaho 121, 125,
jUl'isdictionmusthavestanding.
15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). The doctrine ofstanding
of standing focuses on the party seeking rdiefand not on
the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641,
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778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). In order to satisfy the requirements of standing, the petitioners must
"allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested
will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id
An issue is moot "if a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief or the pal1y
lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." State v. Rogers, 140
l40 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d
1127, 1131
l131 (2004). Idaho jurisprudence parallels that of the United States Supreme C0U11
Com1 in
identifying that the mootness doctrine applies not only when an issue is dead, but also when the
appellant lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome because even a favorab1t::
favorablt:: decision would
not result in relief. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102
lO2 S.Ct. 1181 (1982); Bradshaw v. State,
120 Idaho 429, 432,816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991).
Mootness has been characterized as "the doctrine ofstanding
of standing set in a time frame." Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997). There must be a justiciable case or

controversy. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944
(1969).

The case of Scona, Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148
(1999) also involved a case where the litigants claimed no interest in the underlying trust, nor in the
property held in the bust. The court in Scona stated:
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the
patty who is seeking the relief. Under the Idaho Rules of
issues raised, but upon the palty
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF - 9
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Civil Procedure, actions can only "be prosecuted in the name of a real party in
interest." I.R.C.P. 17(a). This Court has ruled that a real party in interest "is the
of the action ifsuccessful."
if successful." Carrington v.
person who will be entitled to the benefits ofthe
Crandall, 63 Idaho 651, 658,124 P.2d 914, 917 (1942).

Scona, 133 Idaho at 288,985 P.2d at 1150.
The record establishes that the majority of the beneficiaries, as well as the appointed
successor trustees, of the trust did not want to pursue litigation that was contrary to the wishes and
sU11'endered their standing in the present matter by
desires of Theodore Johnson. The Taylors sUl1"endered
of the trust. By so disavowing their individual
bargaining with the successor trustees for the control ofthe
beneficiary status to the trust, their claims are moot as a matter of law. The Judgment on
Beneficiaries' Claim entered on June 7, 2006, was entered pursuant to the misrepresentation of the
Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. The Judgment must be set aside.

3.

The Taylors Have Not Provided Any Authority Opposing the Appellants'
Additional Claims of Lack of Standing

The are a number of issues relating to standing that have not been addressed by the Taylors.
The Taylors seems to be resting on the notion that the "law of the case" has

b4~en
bl~en

established.

However, the Appellants have previously addressed the issue of standing as it rdates to SUbject
brief must be considered
matterjurisdiction and as such other standing issues set f01th in the opening briefmust
by this Court regardless of the "law of the case" argument. Various sections of the Restatement of
Trusts set forth in the Appellants' previous briefing SUppOlt the position that the Taylors lack
standing. For example, in the Disclaimer Agreement the Taylors released the successor trustees from
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liability. This action precludes them from attempting to set aside the sales transa(;tion based upon
what they allege to be the successor trustees' breach of fiduciary. Likewise, the questions of
reasonableness of both the grantor's and successor trustees' actions are germane to the Taylors'
standing.
Even if arguably the earlier decision in Taylor I supports the proposition that COUlt approval
was required to close the sales transaction, the decision was silent
si1ent as to the application of any
exceptions to court approval ofthe sale. There are clear statutory exceptions that exist und.er Idaho
06(a)(c)(1) and (4) that apply to the present case. Consequently, the exceptions
Code Sections 68-1 06(a)(c)(I)
could 110t be considered a bar to the present appeal as the earlier decision did not address whether
exceptions applied. The "law of the case" doctrine cannot have any application to the underlying
issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the Taylors' lack of standing.

B.

There Are Genuine Issues of Materinl Facts in Dispute Which Require a Trial in This
Matter
The Taylors summarily conclude that this COUlt created "law ofthe case" which precludes

ofrelevallt
relevant facts which were not part of the record. This point has been ad.dressed
an examination of
in Section A. The question of whether any of the Appellants had notice that the trustees were
committing a breach of trust could be considered germane to the legal responsibility of the
Appellants. However, to conclude that as a matter oflaw the Appellants knew the successor trustees
were committing a breach of fiduciary is not supported by the facts or the law. The point bears
repeating, that at the time of the closing of this transaction, there was no case law or statutOly
statutOlY law
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.......

that would have led any reasonable person to believe that a closing on a real estat(~ transaetion by a
successor trustee, who was finalizing a transaction created by the trustor, based upon a llegitimate
kgitimate
appraisal representing fair market value, relating to property which was placed in trust by the tmstor
tlUstor
himself, required any court approval. Once again, there were no opinions rendered by any experts
in this matter, that any of the Appellants violated any standard of care or breached a fiduciary duty
in closing this transaction without court approval.
approvaL In addition there is specific statutory protection
for a third party in purchasing property from a trustee. See Idaho Code § 68-110.
The case of Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 842 P.2d 299 (Ct.App. 1992) provides:
In enforcing the duty ofloyalty the court is primarily interested in improving
trust administration by deterring tlUstees
tmstees from getting into positions of conflict of
interests, and only secondarily in preventing loss to particular beneficiaries or unjust
enrichment of the trustee. Quoting, G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, LAW OF
TRUSTS § 95 (5th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170,
206 (1959); A. scon', ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (1960).

Id. at 969,842 P.2d at 305.
Mr. Johnson, Andy Rogers, and Beth Rogers had properly fulfilled their legal requirements
to act in a reasonably prudent manner in conveying the subject real property. The case of Hatcher v.

u.s. Nat. Banko/Oregon, 56 Or.App. 643, 643 P.2d 359 (1982) illustrates the law that a trustee has
a duty to determine the fair market value of stock, which could have been done tluough appraisals
or by "testing the market" to determine what a willing buyer was willing to pay.
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The successor trustees were acting consistent with the intentions of the grantor and were

exercising reasonable prudence upon relying upon the appraisal by a licensed Idaho appraiser, and
the advice of retained independent counsel, and closed the transaction on September 16, 2002.
Specifically, Idaho Code Section 68-508 provides:
Compliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's decision or action and not by
hindsight.
The Respondents have argued that Mr. Maile advised his client, Mr. Johnson, not to sell to
Franz Witte for $400,000.00. (Respondent's Brief, p. 29.) There is no citation in the record to any
supp0l1ing facts for such an assertion. In fact Mr. Johnson made his own personal: decision not to

(C.E. #5 dep Rogers p. 92.) Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson to submit a Gounter
Gountersell to Mr. Witte. (C.B.
. offer to determine market value. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit "5.") An attempt was made to seek
from Mr. Witte an increase in his initial offer to purchase without subjecting Mr. Johnson to a

binding counter-offer. (C.E. #49 dep Maile p,
p. 93.) There is no showing in the record that the
Appellants breached any standard of care or fiduciary duty to the trust as a matter of law.

1.

Ro&ers Had
There Was No Judicial Admission in the Prior Appeal That Beth Ro&crs

a Conflict of Interest
The language quoted by the Respondents' Brief, p. 17, relating to the briefing in Taylor 1,
does not constitute ajudicial
ajudiciaI admission that the AppeHants in the first appeal admitted to anyeonflict
of interest on the part of Beth Rogers. As stated in the opening brief, Beth Rogers' ownership

interest vested at the moment of death of Theodore Johnson. Her interest is classified as an
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undivided interest in the real property. Neither Andy nor Beth Rogers were Mr. Johnson's siblings.
There were siblings of Mr. Johnson who could arguably have been interested in obtaining income

from the corpus versus a contingent-remainder beneficiary of the trust who could have been
of Beth Rogers were not held in trust; she
interested in preserving the corpus. However, the interests ofBeth

I). Such argument in briefing cannot, under
held an undivided interest in the real property (appendix 1).
the authority above cited, be construed to be ajudicial admission that Beth Rogers had a conflict of
interest that required court approval. Nor can it be argued that the Appellants agr,eed that none of
the statutory exceptions existed which negated any COUlt
cOUl1 approval for an alleged! conflict by the
trustee.

2.

There Arc Statutory Exceptions to Court Approval Which Predude the Entry
of Summary Jud&ment

The Respondents argue that there are no exceptions to Idaho Code Section 68-108 and go on
withiln Idaho
to point out that in the Respondents' opinion the cunent real estate transaction falls within
Code Section 68-106(c)(17). Neither Beth nor Andy Rogers acquired real estate in the name of the
trust and such code provision has no application in the present case.
The successor trustees received trust assets which were placed in trust by the grantor. Idaho
Code Section 68-1 06(c)(l)
06( c)(l) allows them to sell such assets as a reasonably prudent person would sell
bust by the grantor, without a court order. The Respondents
any assets which were placed in the hust
have not argued against that proposition since there is no dispute. That is exactly what happened in
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-the present case. Idaho Code Sections 68-106(c)(l)
68-106(c)(1) and (4) clearly and unequivocally states that a
successor trustee does not need to seek court approval for the following sale of
ofpmperty,
property, to wit:

(1) to collect, hold,
hold~ and retain trust assets received from a tlUstor until, in the
made ....
judgment of the trustee,
tlUstee~ disposition of the assets should be made....
trust(;:e, in any
(4) to acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustl:::e,
trust capacity, holds an undivided interest;.

Id.
The successor trustees once again were doing nothing more than finalizing a bilateral
contractual obligation created by the grantor of the trust. The successor trustees had statutory
responsibilities under Idaho Code Section 68-106 to administer the trust as a plUdent person would
do, even ifthere was a conflict. The above-referenced Idaho Code section authorized the distribution
of the tlUst
tlUSt property without court approval, with the caveat that the transaction must be done with
a reasonably plUdent standard.

Nothing in the record set f011h by the Taylors rebl.lts Gary

MacAllister's testimony that the successor trustees acted prudently. Their only defense is that
"reasonable prudent standard" is not applicable to the present case. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 16,

21,23.)
The Rogers did not violate their position as tlUstees of the tlUst and there is not evidence to
suggest that the Appellants participated or had any knowledge of any breach of fidueiary on the part
ofthe
of
the trustees. The present matter before the court requires this Court to construe the plain meaning
ofIdaho Code Sections 68-106 and 68-108. The interpretation of a statute is an issue
and intention ofldaho
of law over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities
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Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988). When interpreting a statute, the primary

function of the COUlt is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. George w:
W. Watkins
Familyv. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). Such intent should be derived from a

reading of the whole act at issue. Jd
1d at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. If the statutory language is
unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there
is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property
Owners Ass 'n v. Board ofComm 'rs of
Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The
ofValley

plain meaning of a statute, therefore, will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary 01' unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. George W Watkins Famlly, 118 Idaho at
540,797 P.2d at 1388; Driver v. S1
SJ Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 429,80 P.3d 1024, 1030 (2003). In the
present case there are clear and unequivocal statutory exceptions to any requirement for judicial
approval in closing this transaction.

3.

The District Court Erred in Ruling That Berkshire Investments Was Not a
Bona Fide Purchaser

Under the facts in the record, it is undisputed that Berkshire Investments paid the fair market
value for the real estate. There is nothing to establish that anyone, including any of the Appellants,
knew or should have known that the Knipe appraisal was flawed in any way. There is evidence in
the record that establishes both the Knipe and Williams appraisals were properly conducted and that
Mr. Rudd's appraisal was not appropriate in a number ofpmticulars. (C.E. # 99 Corlett Affidavit.)
There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to the whether the Appellants were knowingly
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participating in a breach of trust when Berkshire Investments had statutory protection to deal with
the trustees. Idaho Code Section 68-110 provides:
THIRD PERSONS PROTECTED IN DEALING WITH TRUSTEE. With
respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of
a transaction, the existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the trustee
may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to inquire whethe;r
the trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power; and a third person,
without actual knOWledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if th~ trustee
possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third person
is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to th~
trustee
Sound public policy supports giving effect to contracts entered into with trustees in good faith
and for adequate consideration. In Re Strass Trust Estate, 11 Wis.2d 410, 105 N.W.2d 55~, (1960).
Prospective purchasers must be provided the certainty that their contracts will be honored in order
for trusts to be able to function effectively. Evans v. Hunold, 393 Ill. 195, 65 N.E.2d 373, 376

(1946); Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc. v. Lore, 75 PJd 614 (Wyo. 2003). In the present
matter, the sanctity of the contract is supported by the fact that Berkshire Investments paid the trust
in full for the fair market value of the real property and it qualifies as a bona fide purchaser of value.

4.

The District Court Erred in Not Affordin~
Affordil1~ the Appellants the Opportunity to
Pursue Their Affirmative Defenses and/or Claims ofOuasi Estoppel/
EstoJ)pel/ Egluitable
Estoppel Against the Beneficiaries

The claims of quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel were claimed both as affirmative
defenses and claims for reliefthat survived summary
judgment at the lower level. However, shortly
summaryjudgment
after concluding that such issues were germane to the ultimate determination between the patties,
parties,
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the district court struck those equitable principles raised by the Appellants in awarding the
beneficiaries judgment entered June 6, 2006, as a matter of law. The ultimate recission of the
contract is an equitable remedy and equitable principles should have dictated that tlu: issues ofquasi
of quasiestoppel and equitable estoppel should be resolved by the trier of fact.

5.

The Taylors' Discussion Concerniul:
Concerninf: the Earnest Money as Repn,senting
Unreasonable Terms Is Not Relevant

The Taylors have advanced an argument pointing to the earnest money agreement as some
sOli of
basis to show there was unreasonableness on the part ofthe successor tlUste(~S in closing the
ofbasis
transaction. (Respondents' Brief, p. 22.) For example, one of the issues raised by the Respondents
is the modification of the statute of limitations contained in the contract. This was a provision that
applied to both buyer and seller, however, in response to a letter from Ms. Taylor, Mr. Maile, by
letter dated July 10,2003, specifically waived any reliance upon such a term. (C.E. #5 Rogl~rs dep.
ofthe
exhibit 20.) The reality is that the modification of
the statute of limitation favored the sell,~r.
sell'~r. The
Respondents' expert, Richard Mollerup, also provided testimony indicating the provision favored
the seller. (C.E. #62 dep. Mollerup pp. 38,39.) None of the provisions contained in the earnest
money agreement can be shown by the Respondents to have resulted in any damages to tht;:
tht:: tms1.
tmst.
The Respondents' argument relating to the terms of the earnest money agreement are
misplaced.

trllstees executed a warranty deed for the closing and Berkshire
The successor trustees

Investments granted a deed oftnlst memorializing the debt owing to the tlUSt.
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It is an established rule oflaw that prior agreements between parties are merged into deeds

of the
and/or mOltgages
mOligages which are created based upon a contract to convey real property. The tenns ofthe
deed and the deed of trust become the new telIDS and conditions between

th(~

parties, as the

underlying real estate earnest money is merged into the closing documents. Estes v. Barry,
132 Idaho 82,85,967 P.2d 284, 287 (1998); Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373,414 P.2d
879 (1966).
There is a complete absence in the record to demonstrate that the transaction was not fair and
reasonable for Mr. Johnson or the hust.
bust. The real estate earnest money has merged into the deed of
of the deed and deed oftrust.
trust and deed, and has no relevance in light ofthe unambiguous terms ofthe
The Taylors' attempt to create an issue that the successor trustees acted unreasonably in closing the
transaction based upon terms that merged into the closing documents is unfounded and has no
patiicularly true in light ofthe fact that the trust received all
relevance to the issues at hand. This is pmticularly
the monies and a reasonable interest rate for the purchase based upon the fair market value.
Additionally, the record substantiates that the ultimate terms of the note as to the length of
the note and interest rate were terms which were fair and reasonable for Mr. Jolmson" Mr. Johnson's
accountant, Mrs. Hetherington, sent letter dated May 24, 2004, which provides "The five-year
balloon and the seven percent interest rate are good provisions in the note,"
note." (C.E. #5

Rogl~rs
Rogl~rs

dep.

MacA11ister, an expelt
expeli in fiduciaries, affirmed that the transaction was fair and
exhibit 4.) Gary MacAllister,
reasonable. There is no contradictory evidence submitted by the Respondents.
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The Respondents asselt that Mr. Johnson and the successor trustees were acti.ng unreasonably
by selling the real property for the appraised value and not following the advice of Mr. Maile in
obtaining various opinions and averaging the opinions. (Respondents Brief, p. 23.) In fact, Richard
Mollerup provided in his testimony that if a client wanted to sell for a certain price he stated:
"I don't try to make decisions for people, so I would have said, 'Fine.''' (C.E. #62 dep. Mollerup
pp. 53, 54.) An attorney should provide competent advice; however, clients are free to make their
own determination, and as such there is nothing unreasonable for either Mr. Johnson or the Rogers
to rely upon an independent licensed appraiser's findings as to valuation and selling real property
based upon such an appraisal.

C.

The Trial Court Erred in Determining That Mr. Maile Did Not Inform Mr. Johnson
as to His Right to Seek Independent Counsel
The Respondents have not properly pointed to any conflicting evidence in the record that

would warrant the lower court's finding that Mr. Maile did not so inform Mr. Johnson to seek
independent counsel. The testimony of Mr. Maile established that he in fact did so inform
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Maile testified that on two occasions he so informed Mr. Johnson. (Tr. Vol. I
of Beth Rogers
pp. 32-33, 137-138). The Respondents argue and point to the deposition testimony ofBeth
as creating conflicting evidence. (Respondents' Brief, p. 11.) The Appellants properly objected to
VOil. I pp. 133-37,
the use of such hearsay testimony and the court sustained their objections. (Tr. Vol.
274-75.) The trial court properly concluded that it was not to be considered and consequently there
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was nothing in the record that created any conflicting evidence as to the fact that ]\11'.
J\1r. Johnson was
advised to seek independent counsel. The finding must be stricken.

D.

The Trust Received Independent Legal Counsel Prior to Closing and as Such the
Taylors Cannot Demonstrate Any Overreaching by the Appellants
The Respondents have argued that Mr. Maile committed violations under the Code of

Professional Responsi
bili ty, breached his fiduciary duty towards the nust, and as such a constructive
constructi ve
Responsibility,
trust should. (Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) There is no basis for the Respondents to advance such
of appeals and/or the cross
theories in light of the issues framed by the issues on appeal, the notices ofappeals
appeal. Consequently, under Idaho Appellate Rule 11, there is no basis for such a discussion
advanced by the Taylors. However, in the event this Court disagrees, and without waiving such
objection, the following is provided.
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8, which was in affect during 2002,
provided:
Conflict of Interest:· Prohibited Transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adv'erse
adv,erse to a
client unless:
tl'ansaction ami terms on wllicll tile lawyer acquires tile interest arefair and
(1) the transaction
reasonable to tile client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to th{:
client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a J'easonable opportunity to seek tile advice ofindependent
of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
(Emphasis added.)
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The record contains the Affidavit ofRory Jones (C.E. #88). Mr. Jones, an Idaho attorney,
provided his opinion based upon a review of the pe11inent facts and evidence in the record, that
Mr. Maile had fully complied with Rule 1.8 ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and opined
Mr. Maile committed no wrongdoing.
The record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson he could have an
independent attorney regarding the transaction. Mr. 10hnson
Johnson replied that he trusted Mr. Maile with
the drafting of the agreement. (C.E. #11 pp. 2-3; C.E. #49 dep Maile pp. 104-05.) The fact that an
attorney has a duty to ensure that a client obtains the advice of independent legal counsel does not
cHent has not had
automatically invalidate any transaction between attorney and client in which the cllient

e.g., Jacobsen v. National Bank ofAustin,
ofAustin, 65 Ill.App.3d 455,
the benefit of outside counsel. See, e.g..
382 N.E.2d 277 (1978) (finding of independent counsel is not prerequisite to finding of fairness);

McCray v. Weinberg, 4 Mass.App. 13, 340 N.E.2d 518 (1976) (holding that there is no rule that in
the absence of independent advice a transaction between attorney and client must be set aside).
Independent legal advice is only an evidentiary factor utilized in determining the existence
of overreaching or undue influence in a transaction between attorney and client. Pollockv. Marshall,
ofoverreaching
391 Mass. 543,462 N.E.2d 312 (1984). The Pollock court rejected an argumen1t invalidating a
transaction in which the client did not have independent legal advice. The presenc;e or absence of
independent legal advice is an evidentiary factor which may be weighed, along with other evidence,
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in determining whether undue influence was exercised. Green v. Evans, 156 MichApp. 145,
401 N.W.2d 250 (1985).
Thus, even if an attorney has not specifically advised a client to seek advice from an
independent legal source, the attorney may be able to show that the omission was of no actual
significance by showing that the attorney gave the client the same advice concerning the transaction
as he or she would have given had the client been dealing with a stranger. Gold v. Greenwald,
Ca1.Rptr. 660 (1966). An attorney must give a client all
247 Cal.App.2d 296, 55 Cal.Rptr.
an the advice and
information it would give if the transaction were made with a stranger. Abstract and Title Corp of
Florida v. Cochran, 414 So.2d 284 (Fla.App.
(F1a.App. 1982); Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass.App.
ofBishop, 297 01'.479,686
1975); In re Conduct ofBishop,
Or. 479, 686 P.2d 350 (1984).

There is no dispute that the trust received advice of independent counsel prior to closing.
Theodore Johnson, with the aid of such advice, chose and directed that the proper~y transal~tion be
consummated as he desired based upon the established fair market value. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers
pp. 15, 48-52.) The failure to advise a client to seek advice of independent counsel may be excused
of the transaction.
ifthe client voluntarily and knowingly consents to the transaction and the fairness ofthe
See, e.g., Pollock, indicating an attorney may show that any influence over a client which might be

of an attorney-client relationship was neutralized by independent advice
presumed to have arisen out ofan
given to client, or by some other means, such as client's knowledgeable consent and absence of
overreaching by attorney. See also Jacobsen, which held a transaction was fair despite attorney's
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failure to advise client to seek independent counsel since client voluntarily and knowingly entered
into the transaction.
An attorney's failure to advise a client to obtain independent counsel may also be regarded
as immaterial if the attorney can show that the client in fact obtained independent lega.l advice
ind~:pendent
concerning the transaction. Brown v. Pipes, 366 So.2d 261 (Ala. 1978) (showing of ind~:pendent

advice would clearly rebut claim of
undue influence). The case of Klaskin v. Klepak, 126 Ill.2d 376,
ofundue
534 N.E.2d 971 (1989) involved a case where a document was executed without inde:pendent
counsel; however, the court held that whether a client obtained independent legal advic1e before
completing the transaction at closing was a persuasive factor in determining whether an attol'l1ey has
I11.2d 239,545 N.E.2d 715
rebutted the presumption of undue influence. See also In re Imming, 131 Il1.2d
(1989).
At the time of granting the Taylors' summary judgment, all that was available to th~: district
judge was the affidavit of Mr. Maile explaining that Mr. Johnson was in fact advis~:d of the right to
independent counsel and Mr. Jolmson replied by saying he trusted Mr. Maile. The summary
of the Idaho Code
judgment entered had no bearing on any alleged breach offiduciary duty or breach ofthe
of Professional Responsibility.
There is, however, ample evidence in the record that Mr. Johnson was not su~~ected to undue
influence in directing that the real estate transaction be consummated under the price and terms
time prior to the closing, the Rogers were in constant contact
oftime
which he wanted. During the period of
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with Mr. Johnson and advised Mr. Johnson of the meeting with their independent counsel,
Mr. Wishney. Mr. Johnson received the input from independent counsel and continued to SUppOlt
his decision to sell the real estate for the appraised value. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 15,48-52.) Even
before the executed real estate contract, Beth Rogers was involved with her uncle, Mr. Johnson, and
other family members in discussing the independent real estate appraisal establishing the fair market
value of $400,000. (C.E. #38 dep Rogers p. 23; C.E. #5 pp. 33-34.) On or about July 22, 2003,
Beth Rogers wrote to Connie Taylor indicating the trust would not be pursuing litigation against the
Mailes as outlined in Mrs. Taylor's letter to Mr. Maile and further stated, "we also feel we have a
'to do." (C.E. #5
moral obligation to follow Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he entrusted us to
dep Rogers exhibit 21.)
Beth Rogers provided all affidavit based upon her own recollection of the records and the
same is provided in the record. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 22.) In describing her involvement with
her uncle and his impressions of the real estate transaction, the relevant portions of her affidavit
provide:
He told several of us in the family that his attorney had offered to buy the property
ifhe ever wanted to sell it, but that he just was not ready....
ready ....
I do not recall that Uncle Ted ever specifically mentioned getting another legal
opinion, but Andy and I decided to take the paperwork from Mr. Maile to areal estate
attorney, David Wishney, to review. Mr. Wishney suggested that Mr. Maile
substitute a standard form deed of trust, including a due on sale provision, to the
earnest money agreement. I sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Maile and the: propel'
changes were made. Uncle Ted was satisfied with the sale and never seemed
interested in other opinions, as he considered it a good sale, I do not know if
Mr. Maile told Uncle Ted to get another opinion on the sale, but I was not always
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with him at all of their meetings. Meanwhile, Uncle Ted received a letter in the mail
from Knipe, Janoush, Knipe, LLC, saying that they perfOlmed land appraisals. After
what I recall to be a few weeks, Uncle Ted decided to have the property appraised,
and the appraisal report was completed on luly
July 10,2002. The propelty was appraised
assist{:d
for $400,000. When it was finally decided that he would go to an assist€
:d living
home, Uncle Ted said he may as well sell the property rather than leave it for Andy
and I to have to deal with, and he talked to Mr. Maile about purchasing the land.
Uncle Ted was having trouble with his legs, he kept falling and could not easily get
back up. We began looking at assisted living centers as an alternative. Because h€h€~
l
was a bachelor, Uncle Ted had taken out a good nursing home insurance policy that
would help with his financial needs. He was very careful in all ofhis
of his financial affairs
and kept very good records. On luly
July 22, 2002, Uncle Ted entered into an agreement
to sell the property to Mr. Maile or Mr. Maile's company for $400,000. He seemed
quite pleased with the sale and showed the contract to my brothers and his Sister
Hazel Fisher. He even joked to us about whether or not he could live in the nursing
home on the $100,000 down payment..
payment......
On July 6, 2003, the Taylors called a family meeting that was attended by four of the:
Taylor cousins, Connie Taylor - who is John Taylor's wife and an attorney in
Lewiston, myself, my brother
brothel' - Scott Johnson, and Gruth
Galth Fishel'.
Fisher. They said that Aunt
Helen was closing on her house arid needed $50,000.00 that week. They said they
thl~ sale of
felt that Tom Maile had taken advantage of Uncle Ted in several ways in the
the property and wanted to sue him for return of the property plus monetal'Y
monetru'Y
compensation. They wanted the suit to be named with Andy and myselfas
myself as plaintiffs,
as we are the trustees. The suit would be initiated by Connie Taylor, as the attorney,
and she discussed the fee schedule, etc., with us. Gmth,
Garth, Scott and I all said that we
would look into the matter but made no commitment at the time. After consulting
with the Trust's accountant, I did make a paltial distribution of$50,000 to ea,ch
ealch Aunt
Helen, Aunt Joyce and Aunt Hazel. I felt it was only fair that each of the aunts, not
just Aunt Helen, receive the money.
20.
After a few days, we received a copy of the complaint and the attorney fee
schedule for us to sign. After a cal'efulreading
cru'efull'eading of the papers and a discussion with
several family members, we decided that the suit really had no merit for the Trust.
We had been told repeatedly that Andy and I had a fiduciary duty to the Trust. We
agreed, and in this case we felt titat
tit at obligation was to follow Uncle Ted's wishes.
He IIad sold tile property tI,e way lie IIad wanted amifelt
amifelt good about it.
(Emphasis added.)
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The family members closest to Mr. Johnson, and the ones entrusted by him to

m~U1age

his

affairs in trust, the Rogers and Garth Fisher chose to uphold his wishes and desirl~s. (C.E. #5 dep
Rogers exhibit 21.) These family members knew what their uncle wanted and, based upon the
family involvement with Mr. Johnson, there can be no showing of any undue influence on the part
of the Appellants. The Taylors had little or no family involvement with their uncle for 12 years. In
fact, when Mr. 10hnson
(C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 15,48-52.)
Johnson died, they did not know where he lived. (C.B.

E.

There Is a lack of Evidence for the Imposition of the Constructive Trust Remedy
The Respondents have argued that a constructive uust
hust could be imposed bas,ed upon

Mr. Maile's breach of fiduciary duty. (Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) There is no basis for the
Respondents to advance such a theory in light of the issues framed by the issues on appeal, the
notices of appeals and/or
andlor the notice of cross appeal. Consequently, under Idaho Appellate Rule 11,
there is no basis for such a discussion advanced by the Taylors. However, in the

I~vent

this Court

disagrees, and without waiving such objection, the following is provided.
The record is void of any finding at the lower level that Mr. Maile breached a fiduciary duty
and/or Mr. Maile committed professional negligence. Once again, to date there has been no
all the necessary elements of
andlor breach ofstandard
of standard ofcare.
of care.
ofall
ofaa breach offiduciary and/or
determination of

Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P
.2d 650 (1982). At best, one can argue at this point in time
P.2d
that there is conflicting evidence as to opinions related to the fair market value of the real {:state
t:state in
2002. The Respondents have failed to demonstrate in the record that any ofthe
of the Appellants knew or
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should have known that the appraisal of
Knipe, JJanoush
anoush and Associates ("Knipe"), was unsuppOlied
unsupPOlied
ofKnipe,
or improperly conducted. The expeli opinions provided by the Respondents failed to make any
connection that Theodore Johnson, the Rogers, or any of the Appellants, knew or should have
known, that Knipe, JJanoush
anoush and Associates' appraisal was flawed in any way. The Taylors' retained
expert appraiser, Terry Rudd, conducted his assessment approximately three years after the Knipe
appraisal and provided a contrary opinion as to market value but rendered no opinion that the
Appellants should have known of any alleged deficiencies.
The Knipe appraisal is suppOited by the Williams' appraisal. Conducted approximately 15
months after the Knipe appraisal, this was provided as a totally disinterested third~party :licensed
appraisal for the Idaho Independent Bank. There is testimony in the record provided by a third Idaho
licensed appraiser, Joe Corlett, who provided opinions as to the underlying invalidity of the Rudd
appraisal, based upon improper comparable properties considered by Mr. Rudd. Mr. Corlett, in
addition, provided his opinion affirming the Knipe appraisal as an accurate appraisal ofthe subject
property. (C.E. #99.)
The Respondents' argument related to fair market value of the real property at best, has yet
to be determined and has limited weight and has no relevance to the issues before this COUlt as to
whether the summary judgment was propel'
proper and whether the Taylors have standing as well as the
trust to pursue the claims.
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''Furthermore, the lower court has previously ruled that the trust does not have tht~ remedy
of having the real property restored. As stated by the district court, "once a palty treats
available to it ofhaving
a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recission, the right of
recission is waived." (R. Vol 1. p. 149 LL. 10-12; 20-22.) The Respondents have: failed to appeal
of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 146, EFFECT OF CLIENT'S
such a ruling. The Restatement (Third) ofThe
LACHES, provides, "But if a client desires to set aside a voidable conveyance to his or her attorney,

the client must ordinarily take steps to do so within a reasonable time after the transaction." Once
tl'iaI court has previously ruled that the trust does not have the remedy of restoring the
again, the trial
property.

It is not appropriate for the imposition of a constructive trust without any finding of
wrongdoing on the part of
the Appellants that resulted in damages to the trust. The authority cited
ofthe
by the Respondents, on page 31, provides that, "when a duty is breached, the former client may bring
a cause of action at law." Equitable remedies may be waived and/or
andlor a party may be estopped from
claiming such equitable remedies.
The imposition of constructive trust is not a proper subject for a motion for directed verdict

or a judgment notwithstanding verdict, as the imposition of constructive trust is not an independent
cause of action, but rather a remedy if a jury finds that a defendant was unjustly enriched. See St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 508 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. 1998). The remedy of a constructive trust,
which is alleged to arise fi'om a breach ofa fiduciary duty by a defendant, presents questions whether
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a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of the wrongful acquisition and is an issue for trier of
facts. Smith v. Bolin, 271 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1954).
As the district court stated relating to the claim ofunjust enrichment, "nevertheless, the Court
believes that this case can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust
enrichment claim, without proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable l'eli.efbased
reli.efbased
on the doctrine of unclean hands." (R. Vol. 2. p. 352 L. 7.) Mr. Maile should be entitled to have any
alleged violations of his duties determined ultimately by the trier of fact in the ev(~nt this matter is
remanded to the district court, as the record is void of any determination of a duty owing, any breach

of duty, causation, proximate cause or any assessment ofdamages
of damages based upon a dete:rmination ofthe
ofduty,
true value of the real property in September 2002.
The district court has not found any breach of any fiduciary duty by the Appell:illts
Appell:mts and
further has not determined if there was a duty which was breached which resulted in a proximate

of damages. The lower comt
cOUli has ruled that the trust has waived the right to have the property
cause ofdamages.
restored. This case has never reached any conclusion that the necessary elements have been provided

of a constructive trust is inappropriate.
to show either negligence 01' a breach oftrust. The imposition ofa

F.

The Taylors Have Failed to Address of the Lack of Standin& by the Trust Itself in
Failin& to Obtain Judicial Appointment of Successor Trustees as Required by Idaho
Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107
The Taylors have failed to address the issue raised by the Appellants in their opening brief

that the trust itself improperly filed suit since the Taylors had not obtained judicial appointment
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''
asseltion,
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107. The Taylors are incorrect in their assettion,

that the issue surrounding the trust's standing is not an appealable issue. (Reply Brief, p. 1.) The
Appellants have properly presented another jurisdictional issue before this Court which may be
raised at any time in the proceedings. (See section 1.) The Appellants' argument was previously

briefed and the Respondents have failed to address the claim or provide any authority opposing the
authority cited in the Opening Brief at pages 35-37. The following illustrates the lack of standing
of the tlUSt.
The trust instrument (Appendix 1 of Opening Brief) is silent as to the appointment of
successor trustees other than the Rogers and Garth Fisher. Beth and Andrew Rogers, after being
(C.E. # 5 Rogers dep pp. 75, 76), Sind Garth Fisher
threatened by the Taylors with a lawsuit, resigned (C.B.
declined to serve as trustee after the resignation ofthe Rogers. When both the Rogers and Mr. Fisher
expressed a disinclination to serve in the office of trustee, appointment of a new tmstee became a
cou11 because the trust itself provided no guidance. It is both the general rule and
matter for the cOuti
tlustees can simply appoint a new trustee in the absence of
Idaho law that neither beneficiaries nor tmstees

a specific provision in a trust allowing them to do so. The general rule is that, "in the absence of
power conferred by the trust instrument, the beneficiary of the trust does not have the power to
appoint a new trustee."

CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, TRUSTS,

§ 292. Similarly "in the absence of

authority conferred by the tlUSt instmment, a trustee has no power to appoint his or her successor."
Id., § 293. Courts have also held that a trustee simply does not have the power to delegate to others
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the power to exercise his discretionary functions. See, e.g., McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190,219

ajJ'd inreievantpart,
inrelevantpart, 798 A.2d 503 (2002); Jacob v. Davis, 738 A.2d 904,918-19
n.61 (Del. 2001), aff'd
(Md.App. 1999); Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1979);

Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 P.2d 782, 801 (Kan. 1991); Jennings v. Murdock, 553 P.2d 846, 863 (Kan.
1976).
The above authority makes clear that in the absence of a provision in the trust instlument
allowing for a trustee to appoint his or her successor, the only way a successor can be appointed is
by court involvement. The Taylors' attempt, in June 2004, to remove Beth and Andrew Rogers and
install themselves as trustees was invalid and without effect. Any actions taken prior to appointment
by a cOUl1
COUlt with jurisdiction over the trust, including specifically the filing of the: complaint (R.,
Vol 1, p. 1), filed July 19,2004, are void. The Taylors' retroactive, and fundamentally flawed,
attempt in November 2004 to COlTect their mistake cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court. On April 18, 2005, the Honorable Judge ChristopheI'M.
d,;!claring
Christophel' M. Beiter, entered his Order d,;:claring
the ex-patte Order entered on November 17,2004, void. (C.E. #39 exhibit "D.") On May 2,2005,
Dallan J. Taylor as successor truste(~s
truste(~s ofthe
an Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and DaHan
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust was entered, however, it was not made retroactive. (C.E. #39
exhibit "E.")
Numerous courts have held that where an ostensible trustee fails to be properly appointed,
ei ther by a court or according to the letter of the trust instrument, or where a trustee improperly
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delegates his discretion to a non-trustee, any actions taken affecting the trust are a nullity. For

Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1988),
example, in Citizens Bank o/Edina v. West Quincy
QuineyAutoAuetion,
of property conducted by an individual
the Missouri Supreme COUli, sitting en banc,
bane, held that a sale ofproperty
other than the authorized trustee was void. In so holding, the court stated: "In a private trust ...
[unless otherwise provided in the instrument of trust] the trustee may not delegate a discretionaty
discretionalY
if a trustee
tlustee cannot
duty to a co-trustee, and such an exercise will be void as to the trust .. , Celiainly, ifa
delegate a discretionary power to a co-trustee, he cannot delegate such a power to ,an
an unauthorized
agent." Id. at 164 (substitutions in original). See also Columbia Union Nat. Bank v. Bundschu,
641 S.W.2d 864, 877 (Mo.App. 1982) (tlustee's
(trustee's delegation of a discretionary duty is void);

Morrill v. Trump, 745 So.2d 559 (Fla.App. 1999). Similarly, In re Pinney's Estate, 294 NY.S. 29

(N.Y. 1937), the comi
cOUli held, "A trustee may delegate ministerial duties, but if he delegates
discretiomuy
discretionruy powers he becomes a guarantor and if a trust is of a discretionary nature, the trustee
will be responsible for all the mischievous consequences of the delegation, and the: exercise of the
discretion will be absolutely void in the substitute."
Godfrey v. Kamin, 62 Fed.Appx. 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opini.on)
opinion) involved a

situation remarkably similar to this case. The question in that case was whether a successor trustee
had standing to sue the former trustees ofa
of a trust. The trust instrument in question provided that after
the death of the settlor, it would be necessruy
necessaty to always have two trustees. The plaintiff, Ellen
Godfrey, initially brought suit against one ofthe
of the trust's former trustees, alleging breach of fiduciary
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duty. However, because Godfrey was only a contingent remainder beneficiary, the
tbe court held she
Th<::reafter, Godfrey
lacked standing to sue. After the case was dismissed, the then-trustees resigned. The:l'eafter,
was appointed as one trustee, but a second trustee was not appointed. Godfrey re-filed her lawsuit
in her capacity as tlUstee, but the defendant argued that because the second successor truste(~ had not
been appointed, Godfrey lacked standing to sue on her own. The court agreed, holding that because
the trust mandated that a second corporate trustee serve along with Godfrey, Godfrey lacked the
authority to bring suit unilaterally, even though she was the only trustee in place at the time.
Accordingly, the case was dismissed. Id. at 695-97.
suecessor trustees.
The Taylors failed to obtain the required court order to be appointed as successor
The trust inshument did not provide for their appointment. A trust will not fail for want ofa proper
appointment.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 31 TRUST DOES NOT FAlL FOR LACK Or TRUSTEE
appoint.ment. Restatement.
(2003), The filing of the complaint on July 19,2004, was void under the law as th<::
the: Taylors lacked
(2003).
standing as proper trustees to file t.he
the lawsuit. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
Idabo Code
and must be directed to dismiss the trust's claims as it was filed in violation of both Idaho
Sections 68-101 and 68-107.

G.

..~
The Respondents Were Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Before the Lower Cou
Cour~
Respondents argued for the award oftheir costs and attorneys fees occurred at both the trial

level and the appellate level.

However, the record before this Court establishes that the

beneficiaries' judgment was predicated upon a misrepresentation to the lower court as to their true
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beneficiary status. The individual Taylors relinquished any and all rights to the trust and admitted
that in their verified petition filed before the probate court. The Taylors' legal standing is now moot
before this Court and was moot before the lower court. Consequently, the Respondents are not
entitled to attorneys' fees predicated upon a claim that completely lacks merit and is unsupported
by the true facts in the record. The Court must consider the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.3, which provides:
Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunnl by thl~
lawyer;
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of
....
the proceeding
proceeding....
Commentary
[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in
the proceedings of a tribunal.
[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court
to avoid conduct that undermines
of the adjudicative process. A lawyer
undelmines the integrity ofthe
acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the
client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining
confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to
the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not
required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence
submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false
statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
(Emphasis added.)
The Com1
COUl1 has the following facts which are germane, relating to whether there was a breach
of Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as grounds under Idaho Code
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Sections 12-121 and/or 12-123, for the award of
attorneys fees. Appendix 4 and Appendix
Appendix:;5 provide
ofattorneys
the misleading statements off
act which were provided to the lower court. The Taylors simply were
offact
not beneficiaries under the trust at the time the Taylors attempted to take advantage of this Court's
opinion in Taylor 1.
offact under
I. The Taylors, and Mrs. Taylor as their attorney, verified statements offact
oath that were misleading to the cOUl1 and to this tribunal. Mr. R. John Taylor is .a licens,~d
licensl:!d Idaho
attorney and an officer of the court. (C.E. #27- R. Taylor dep. pp. 7, 8.)
Even though an action might be proper
propel' at its commencement, facts might thereafter develop
which indicate that the case was then pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See

Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303, 939 P.2d 1382 (1997); Ortiz v. Reamy, 115 Idaho
1099, 1101, 772 P.2d 737, 739 (Ct.App. 1989); Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,
137 Idaho 747, 753, 53 P.3d 330, 336 (2002). There simply cannot be any basis for an argumentthat
the Taylors are entitled to attorneys' fees at the lower level 01'
or the appellate level under the facts in
the record.
Likewise, the Respondents are not entitled to attorneys' fee pursuant to the contract between
the trust and Berkshire Investments and/or the Appellants. The Respondents argued before this
Court in Taylor I that there could be no claim for attorneys fees and costs in the first appeal since
the Taylors were not parties to the real estate contract. (Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 13 executed
December 3, 2004.) Specifically, the Taylors and Mrs. Taylor, provided, "The Mailes are not
entitled to attorneys' fees under the contract because the Taylors are not pal1ies to the contract
contJ.'act and
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they are not acting as the Trust. The Taylors are acting as beneficiaries." Once again, a judicial
admission not only as to their status as beneficiaries but that they were not palties to the contract and

no award of attorneys' fees is permissible.
The Taylors now asselt, of course, that they are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs even

though they were not parties to the contract and are not beneficiaries of the trust. This Court
J, and the COUlt should be consistent with that ruling and
previously denied attorneys' fees in Taylor 1,
deny the same to the Taylors in the present proceeding based upon the real estate contract. Idaho

Code §§

12~120, 12-121,
12~121,
l2~120,

or 12-123.
12~123.

Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper correctly analyzed the established case law and determined

that the case of Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 803,
134 P.2d. 648, 654 (2006) applies for the proposition that a non-party
non~party to a contract cannot use the
contract as a basis for an award of attorneys' fees. The court further correctly held that the Taylors

were not part of any commercial transaction which would have justified an award ofattorm:ys'
of attorm:ys' fees
12~120(3), citing Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3),

(Ct.App. 1994).
(CLApp.

of attorneys , fees associated with a def(:J1se to an unjust
In addition, there cannot be an award ofattorneys,
enrichment claim. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 438,64 P.3d 959, 967 (Ct.App. 2002). Finally,
there is nothing which could be constmed as a frivolous defense or appeal involving this lawsuit by

of the legal
the Appellants. The Appellants are pursuing legitimate issues, not only as to the issues ofthe
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standing of the Taylors and the trust, but also the factual and/or legal issues surrounding the entry
of the summary judgment.

H.

The Respondents Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal
The preceding section is incorporated by reference herein. The same argument against the

award for attorneys' fees at the lower level applies to the Taylors' requests on the appeal. The
Taylors are not entitled to attorneys' fees on the appeal either as Respondents or cross-Appellants.
I.

The Appellants Are Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs at the Appellate Level
12-123, I.R.C.P. Rule 11. and I.A,R.ll.1.
I.A.R.ll.1.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123.
40 and 41
The Appellants requested their costs and attorneys' fees in their Opening Brief at page 38.
38,

The Taylors have provided no opposition to the Appellants' request in their reply brief.
Additionally, the Appellants incorporate the preceding Section G relating to the argument
sUl1'0unding the misstatements of material facts contained in the Taylors' verified pleadings as
additional grounds for the award of the attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-121
and 12-123.
In addition, the Appellants request their costs and attorneys' fees in the defense ofthe crossappeal filed by the Taylors. The Taylors have advanced absolutely no credible legal position before
the COUl1 relating to their appeal. In reality, the Taylors have filed their cross-appeal, requesting
appellate level after obtaining the Judgment on
attol11eys' fees at the lower level and the appe11ate
Beneficiaries' Claim, when they were not beneficiaries and submitted a verified amended complaint
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which was false as to their status. The Taylors saw an opportunity to mislead the lower court as to
their status as beneficiaries after having disclaimed their interests in the trust by written agreement.
The Taylors signed verified pleadings before the probate court stating unequivocally that their
mother was the sole beneficiary ofthe tmst
t111st pursuant to an agreement they signed. After the decision
in Taylor I, the Taylors and their counsel executed verified pleadings stating they were beneficiaries
ofthe trust. That was not true as they admitted before the probate court in 2004; Helen Taylor was
the sole beneficiary.
The Taylors, after having mislead the lower court, presented their argument for costs and
attorneys' fees both before the lower court and before this
tIus tribunal which cannot possibly be
determined to be meritorious. The Taylors misrepresented facts to the lower court and their action
amounts to frivolous behavior. If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duek, it's a
duck.
The Appellants/Cross-Respondents request attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 12-121 and 12-123, and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. An award of attorneys' fees on appeal
is appropriate "ifthe law is well-settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that
the district court misapplied the law." Keller v. Rogstad, 112 Idaho 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 710
(1987), quoting Davis v. Gage, 109 Idaho 1029, 1031, 712 P.2d 730, 732 (Ct.App. 1985).
There can be no showing that the Taylors did not actively mislead the district court in
obtaining their Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. Both under Idaho Code Sections 12-121
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and 12-123, the Respondents should be ordered to pay the costs and attorneys' fees inGurred
in<;urred in
correcting the misrepresentations made by the Taylors before the lower court and this tribunal.
COUlt determines that the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims was based upon a
If this Com1
complete lack of foundation, this Court should be left with the "abiding belief that the appeal has
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation" and award a1torneys'
fees and costs. See generally, Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990)
and McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). It is the position of the Appellants that
should be the outcome. The Appellants should be entitled to their attorneys' fees and costs incurred
herein.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Taylors lacked legal standing to pursue their claims and their claims must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is never waived.

The Taylors actively

misrepresented their status as beneficiaries before the lower court after the opinion in Taylor I was
published. The Taylors verified under oath before the probate court pursuant to appendix 2 to the
opening brief that their mother, Helen, was now the sole beneficiary under the trust. The Taylors'
beneficiaries claims became 11100t as a matter of law. Other facts exist in the record that establish
the Taylors do not have standing to pursue any claims against the Appellants. The Taylors, in their
rush to obtain control of the trust, failed to obtain the necessary appointment as successor trustees
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as mandated by Idaho Code Sections 68·
101 and 68-107. The actions ofthe
of the Taylors, as trustees, in
68·101
filing the litigation on behalf of the trust were inappropriate and the filing of the complaint is void.
In the event this COUli believes the Taylors have standing, the matter must b(;: remanded since
AI;:cording
the district cOUli
comi improperly entered summary judgment. Material facts are in dispute. A\::cording
to the evidence presented in the record, the Rogers acted in a reasonably prudent maImer
mrumer in closing
of Title 68. Berkshire
the transaction and conducted themselves appropriately under the provisions ofTitle
Investments paid the fair market value for the real estate and was a bona fide purc:haser for value.
The Taylors have waived their right to seek recission under the facts in the record .
There has never been a factual determination that Mr. Maile breached his fiduciary duty
either with the grantor or with the trust. There is no showing of any undue influence on the part of
the Appellants regarding this transaction.
The Appellants must be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs in defending the fi:ivolous
claims of the Taylors at the lower level and on their cross-appeal. The Appellants are entitled to
their attorneys' fees in this appeal as a result ofthe Taylors' misrepresentations oHact
offact which resulted
in the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. This matter should be reversed and n::manded to the
district couli consistent with the Appellants' argUlnents contained herein.
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STATE OF IDAHO
1

County of Nez Perce

2
3

CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

4

1.

5

of the motion for sanctions addressed in the Taylor's
I submit this affidavit in support ofthe

January 7,2008 memorandum opposing Mr. Maile's Motion to Dismiss.

6

2.

The Taylors request sanctions, including but not limited to costs and attorney fees,

7

8
9

for filing a motion which is frivolous and not supported by either the law or the facts.
3.

In support of that request, and to demonstrate the Appellant Thomas Maile's

10

continuing course of conduct intended to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needless increase in

11

the cost of litigation, I attach a true and correct copy of a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

12

I, 2007.
which Mr. Maile filed in Ada County on December 3 1,

13

4.

ected by the trial court in the matter
This Complaint again raises claims which were rej
rejected

14
15
16
17

that is currently before this court, and adds claims against Clark and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and
Tom Clark for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence.

·'"'7

Hi
M
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Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
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Eagle, ID 83616
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Dennis Charney
Attorney at Law
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive
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DE~ITION OF
DE~ITION

1

HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN

Whereupon the deposition proceeded as follows:

2

3
4

5
6
7
8

HELEN TAYLOR
a witness having been fIrst duly sworn to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, testifIed as
follows:
E~ATION
EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. MAILE:
o
Q. Good morning, Mrs. Taylor. Would you please
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
DO
~0
Dl
~1

D2
P2
D3
P3
D4
D5

state your name for the record?
A Helen Johnson Taylor.
A.
Q. Okay.
And where is it that you currently reside?
A 9483 West Harmonica
Hannonica Way, in Boise.
A.
Boise, Idaho.
Q. And how long have you been at that residence?
A. Six years.
Q. And prior to that, where did you live,
Mrs. Taylor?
A. On Fairview.
MR. TAYLOR: No. No.
THE WITNESS: I can't think of the number. It
was 95 something Fairview.
Boise.
Page

'~-08

Exhibit 1, it asks for a series of docUlll{:nts to be
produced, and they start with number one.
Do you remember reviewing that, those requests
4 for production of documents?
5
A Yes.
6
Q. And what did you do in order to obtain the
7 documents that you brought with you today?
8
A Just went to the place where I had them
9 stored.
~o
Q. Okay.
~1
And where was that?
~2
A In a chest that I keep for my valuable papers.
3
Q. All right.
4
And did you thoroughly read the questions, or
5 numbers 1 through l4?
6
A Yes. I think so.
I 7
Q. Did you talk to anyone about the documents that
!
18 were being requested?
~9
A No.
~0
Q. Did you talk to your brother -- or excuse me.
Q1 Did you talk to any of your sons?
!
22
A I don't remember if I did or not.
~3
Q. All right.
24
And I'm asking about conversations you might
5 have had with any of your sons concern.ing Exhibit No.1
5I
Page 7
1
2
3

i

I
b

1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1
2
3

8

Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And how long did you live at
that prior residence, how many years?
A.
A From 1940 -- from 1942.
Q. Did you start in 1942 living there?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And that was continuous?
A. Yes.
Q. Up until the time that you moved to your new

9

home?

4

5
6
7

o

A. Yes.
~1
MR. MAILE: Going to have this marked as Exhibit
No.1.
~2 No.
1.
~
(Exhibit 1 was marked.)
~33
~
Q. (BY MR MAILE) I'm going to hand you what is
~44
No.11 to this deposition, and I'll
~~55 marked as Exhibit No.
~~66 represent to you that it's a note that's a copy of the
~~77 Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Helen Taylor,
8 and that along with a subpoena that was served on you
9 some time ago.
?0
'/0
Do you remember receiving that document?
'/1
A. Yes.
21
22
72
Q. Okay. And did you review the entire document?
?3
'/ 3 Did you read it?
?4
'/4
A. Yes.
tz5
t:> 5
Q. And in that, if you could tum to Page 2 of
Page 6

I~

3
4

5
6
7
8
I 9
,10
,1 0

i

;11
~1

:12
12
3
4

15
6
7
8
9

20
'/1
21

22
?2

23
74
24
75
25

within the last 45 days.
A. Probably have. I don't know.
Q. Do you remember what might have been discussed
with any of your sons concerning the documents
requested?
A No.
A.
Q. Have you talked to anyone about the deposition
testimony that you are providing today?
-Witness.)
A. (No response from the ·Witness.)

Q. Let me rephrase that.
Mrs. Taylor, what did you do to pr'epare for this
deposition today?
A.
A Well, II talked -- II just ga1hered
galhered up this thing,
talked to Connie.
Q. Okay.
And when is it that you tallked to Connie?
A. Yesterday.
Q. And is that the only time you talked to Connie
Taylor about this deposition?
A. II think so.
A
Q. Now, you brought with you this morning a series
of documents that I have gone through. You brought them
in a little plastic bag, some which I've taken and had
copies made.
So I'm going to ask the court reporter to mark
Page 8
2

(Pages 5 to 8)
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

o
11
2
13
14
5
6
7
8
9

o
1
2
3
4
5

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

o
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

o
1
2
3
4
5

this as Exhibit 2.
(Exhibit 2 was marked.)
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And I'll ask you to look at
Exhibit 2 and explain to me if that is a series of
documents that you found in your house that you brought
with you?
A. Oh.
MR. PRUSYNSKI: Is that it, or?
MR MAILE: Yes. It is.
MR PRUSYNSKI: Okay.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Does Exhibit 2 contain documents
that were in your home that you brought with you this
morning, a copy of which you brought with you this
morning?
A. You mean, did I have those in my house?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, ifI
if! brought them, I did.
Q. Okay. And I know that seems a bit -- and I'll
ask you a series of questions, but were you able to
obtain any documents that you brought with you today that
were not at your house?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
For example, none of your sons had any documents
that you were able to provide here this morning?
Page 9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

11 0

III
112
:12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1
119
t2 0
I
1
22
3
4

E

rFf
r

5

1
2

A. No. Everything I brought was from my house.
Q. Okay. Now, an example, the Exhibit 2, it
doesn't have anything signed by you?
And review that, and indicate to me if you ever
signed any of the paperwork that's contained in Exhibit
No.2.
A. I wouldn't know if I did or not.
I don't know for sure what you are talking

3
4
5
6
7
8

about.

Q. Let me ask you a question in general about the
way you conduct your affairs.
When you sign documents, do you keep copies of
any of your documents with your signatures on them?
A. I don't think so.
Q. All right.
Who would you give those signed documents to?
A. Well, if they said to send them back to the one
that sent them to me, that's who I'd send them to.
MR. MAILE: Let's have this marked as Exhibit 3.
(Exhibit 3 was marked.)
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) You've been handed Exhibit 3.
That has, if you tum to the back pages of Exhibit 3,
there are no signatures on those pages.
Do you remember signing Exhibit 3 and sending
Exhibit 3 back to anyone?
Page 10

.

Page 11

---
--.
._
--

A. July 22nd, 2003.
Q. And do you recall receiving that document?
A. I'm sure I did.
Q. And this is something again that you brought
with you from your home; is thalt correct?
A. Yes.
MR. MAILE: And fIve.
(Exhibit 5 was marked.)

9

MR. PRUSYNSKI: Tom, just because I've been

reading all of these depositions, I~ould you say what
Exhibit 4 is, so that it's in the record?
MR MAILE: Exhibit 4 is a letter dated
July 22nd of 2003 from Andy and Beth Rogers to Connie
Taylor.
That was Exhibit 4.
MR. PRUSYNSKI: Okay.
MR. MAILE: Now, Exhibit 5, Mrs. Taylor, I'll
represent to you, it has on the top the words Assignment
Fonn
And here again this is a document that you
brought with you today.
remember signing an
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remem.her
Assignment Form like we have on Exhibit 5?
(Witness conferring.)
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Just go ahead and tell them
Page 12

i

~~

~!~

2
3
4
25
1

dooument?
Inh"",
ciat, a".he
'" the top of Exhibit 4?
docum""t? Is
thore'a date

o
11
12
13
14
15
16
11 7
117
118
19
119
~0
12 1

I

A. I probably did.
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Just to avoid confusion,
this is one of the earlier drafts. This was not the
final that everyone signed.
MR. MAILE: I appreciate that.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) You don't rem(:mber if you signed
that draft?
This might have been prepared back in 2004. At
the bottom it says, "41712004."
"4/7/2004."
A. What was it for?
Q. Well, it's called a Release And Indemnity
Agreement. It related to the trust, the Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust.
MR. PRUSYNSKI: I don't have any page with a
blank for her signature on it.
MR. MAILE: I may not either.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Does that help you recall if you
received and signed anything, or signed a copy of Exhibit
No.3 that's in front of you?
And if you don't remember, that's fIne.
was ...
A. I don't remember. I don't know. It was...
MR. MAILE: Mark this.
(Exhibit 4 was marked.)
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) What is the date of that

3 (Pages 9 to 12)
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1 that.
2
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remember if you signed or
3 not?
4
A. I don't know if I did or not. I probably did,
5 if I was supposed to.
6
MR. MAILE: All right. Mark this as No.6.
7

(Exhibit 6 was marked.)

8
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) For Exhibit 6, you've been
9 handed an exhibit that is labeled Exhibit 6. And it has
0 a January 8, 2004 date at the top, and there's a
11
12
3
~44
15

1
There again, do you recall receiving Exhibit
2 No.8?
A. Yes.
3
Q. Now, from the documentation that you brought
4
5 with you today, it appears as though you have no
6 documents that go past the year 2004.
7
Tal<ing Deposition
And I've asked in my Noti.;:e of Ta1<ing
8 in the subpoena that you bring with you ~Uly and all
9 documents up to the current date: relative to the Theodore
10 L. Johnson Trust.

11
signature on the bottom.
And do you have additional documents that would
12 be up-to-date?
Can you identifY that signature?
:13
A. It's looks right.
A. I don't have anything else. I brought
14
I had.
everything
Q. All right. And who is Reed Taylor?
114
15
Q. Do you know that there is a lawsuit that's been
A. He's my son.
116 filed regarding actions between Berkshire::
MR. MAILE: Here you go.
Berkshirc:: Investments and
~6
1 7 the Law Finn of Clark and Feeney?
~7
(Exhibit 7 was marked.)
118
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Exhibit 7 has been handed to
A. Not -- say that again.
~8
19
you,
and
the
top
says,
"Disclaimer
of
Beneficiary,"
and
Q. Were you aware that there was a lawsuit filed by
~9
I
20 Berkshire Investments and others against Clark and Feeney
~O then it has, "Beth Rogers, Trustee of the Theodore L.
I
and others?
~1 Johnson, Revocable Trust Agreement."
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: That's the same as Exhibit
A. Yes.
~2
Q. And how is it that you are aware of that?
~3 No.2.
b4
t24
MR. MAILE: It looks like it. It looks like our
A. Well, let's -- I guess either Dallan or Connie
f4
l?5
l25 copying didn't go as well as it should have.
somebody
just told me, I guess.
or
f5
Page 15
Page 13i
13 1
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1

~~
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1
Let's withdraw that No.7, because it's the same
2 as No.2.
3
So we'll withdraw that No.7.
4
Mark this instead.
5
(New Exhibit 7 was marked.)
6
Q. (BY MR.
MR.. MAILE) Mrs. Taylor, we've now handed
7 you a new Exhibit 7 and asked you to identify that.
8
Exhibit 7 came from a document that you

I1

Q. Okay.
2
A. I'm not sure.
3
Q. When did you become aware of a lawsuit?
4
A. I have no idea.
5
Q. Have you been involved with any family functions
6 in Lewiston for the last year?
7
A. What kind of functions?
8
Q. Well,just any family function.

9
provided me this morning. It's dated April 30th, 2003,
0 ,md it says, "To whom it may concern."
10
1
Do you recall receiving this on or about April
11
p-2 the 30th, 2003?
12
P-2
A. If I had it, I guess I received it.
3
~3
P
.1.4
-1.4
Q. Okay. That's fme.
~4
h5
15
15
MR. MAILE: Let's have this marked as Exhibit 8.
6
(Exhibit 8 was marked.)
6
7
7
Q. (BY MR.
MR.. MAILE) And if you could take a look at
8 Exhibit 8, and I'll represent to you that it's a copy of
8
9 a letter dated August 20th, 2003 with the letterhead Law
9
70
70
20 Offices of Clark and Feeney, and your name and address on ;:>0
?1 Wright Street appears.
21
/1
b2
72
t22
22
Do you see where that is on the first page?
t13
t23
23
A. Yes. Right.
/3
;:>4
b4
24
74
Q. And the back page has a signature line for
I
b5 Connie W. Taylor.
25
25
Page 141

Let me ask it this way.
Have you traveled to Lewiston within the last

9

year?

A. Yes.
Q. And when was that?
A. Clark's, for a funeral.
Q. And that was the only time you traveled to
Lewiston?
A. Oh, let's see.
Yes. I think so.
Q. And could you describe for me contact you had
with your sons? For example, the calendar year of 2008,
this last year, do you see them on a weekly basis?
ht:re, I see all
A. Well, the ones that live around he:re,
the time. The others, I don't see as often.
Q. Okay. Who lives around here that you see quite
often?
Page 16
4
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1
A. Just Dallan.
2
Q. All right.
And where do your other sons live?
3
A. Mark is in Indonesia on a mission; Reed and John
4
5
5 live in Lewiston.
6
6
Q. And have either Reed or John come down to see
7
you
in
Boise
in
2008?
7 you in Boise in 2008?
7
8
A. Oh, yes.
089
9
Q. And what events do they come down for?
o A. Well, I think Reed was going on a trip
1 somewhere, stopped by overnight. And John comes down ~ 1
2 every once in a while on business, so he always comes
~~
3 out.
4
Q. All right. And would that be similar for the
~4
5 calendar year 2007?
~5
6
A. Yes.
~6
!
117
7
Q. And do you file tax returns?
11 7
'118
8
A. Yes.
'il8
~~ 9
Q. And who prepares your tax return?
~9
t2t::> 0
A. Kent Rydalch.
EO
t::> 1
Q. And where is his office?
21
t21
~~ 2
A. He lives in Denver.
~ 223
I;>
b3
Q. And why do you have your tax returns prepared in
l2 3
t::> 4
Denver?
4
t24
t25
b5
A. Because he's my son-in-law.
l2 5
Page
171
1---
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3
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A. I haven't.
Q. Okay. And you've never paid any expenses
related to the trust?
A. I don't think so. I don't think I have.
Q. Do you know what the trust consists of? Does it
own real estate, or does it have bank accounts?
A. I don't know.
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: I don't think she's
understanding your questions.
THE WITNESS: I don't lmderstand what you are
getting at.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) All right. Do you know if you
are a beneficiary of the trust?
A. Of Ted's, I mean?
Q. Ted's trust.
Well, I got some money.
Is that what it was?
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: I'm sony. I can't answer
it.
som(~.
THE WITNESS: Well, I got somfl.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. So from
frOom your brother's
trust; is that correct, the Theodore L. Johnson Trust?
carne from there or not.
A. Oh, I don't know if it came
Q. Okay.
Do you receive any moneys on a n~gular basis
Page 19

p
~~

b4
b
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1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

o
h1
2
3
~4
5

6
7

8
9
:/0
? 0
:/? 1
:/2
:;> 2
I;>
b3
[;>4
b4
~5

Q. All right.
And what is his occupation?
A. He's retired. He's a CPA. He's vice president
of a Great Western Insurance.
Q. All right. And how long has he been doing your
tax returns?
A. Twenty years, I guess.
Q. All right.
And let me ask you, ifhe does, to your

knowledge, any tax preparation on behalf of the Theodore
L. Johnson Trust?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Do you know of anybody that does any tax returns
for the trust?
A. No.
Q. What is your current involvement with the
l11eodore L. Johnson Trust?
l1J.eodore
A. Well, I don't know what you mean.
Q. Okay. What is your interest in it? Do you
know?
A. I don't understand.
Q. Well, do you receive any money £i'om the Theodore
L. Johnson Trust?
A. No.
Q. Do you pay any expenses related to the trust?
Page 18

1
2

!

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

o0
1
2
3
4
5
~6
~7
8
9
:;> 0
~1
~2
t::> 3
b4
b5

from the Theodore L. Johnson Trust?
A. No.
Q. When is the last time you might have received
money from the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust?
A. Oh, it's been two years or so.
It's probably been -- it's b,een
lt's
b.een a long time.
Q. Do you have any conversations with any of your
sons about the trust?
A. Yes.

Q. And what is discussed?
A. We just talk about what is going on.
Q. Okay. And what have they been telling you what
has been going on?
A. I don't know.
Q. Now, have you retained an attorney to represent
you?
A. Connie.
Q. Okay. Is she your attorney?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did you retain her?
A. I don't know how long it's been, two or three
years.
Q. Okay. And what has she: done? What was she
retained for?
A. To take care of this.
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Q. And by "this," what do you mean by that, "take
care of this"?
A. Of this trust.
Q. And I noticed, or I heard before we started this
deposition, Ms. Taylor had indicated there were certain
correspondences that would not be produced.
Is that your understanding as well?
A. I don't know what -- I just don't understand
what that would mean.
Q. All right. Are there letters, or were there
letters that you had in your house that you did not bring
with you today from Connie Taylor?
A. Well, I thought I brought everything. I don't
know.
MR. MAILE: And Counsel --
THE WITNESS: I don't have anything else.
MR. MAILE: Counsel, you indicated that there
were certain correspondences that were not being produced
today?
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Correct.
MR. MAILE: Okay. And can we have or expect to
receive a privileged log --
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Sure.
MR. MAILE: -- to be provided on that?
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Uh-huh. It will be short.
Page 21
MR. MAILE: Okay.
And does it just consist of letters?
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remember a deposition
that you were involved in back in April of 2005 where I
asked you a series of questions and other lawyers asked
questions of you?
A. I remember being here.
Q. In a deposition?
A. Right.
Q. At the point in time in 2005, it was indicated
in that deposition that you had not retained an attorney.
Do you recall that?
A. No. I don't.
Q. Well, if! represent to you that that deposition
testimony had indicated that, or Mr. Clark had indicated
on the record that the firm was not representing you,
would you disagree with that?
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yeah.
MR. MAILE: Let me try to ask a question
concerning when you retained an attorney to represent
-
you, to represent your interests regarding -THE WITNESS: Oh, that was a long time ago.
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) How long ago?
Page

1
2

A. I forgot how long ago it was.
Q. Do you remember receiving any correspondence
3 that was an engagement letter by the lawyers?
4
A. I don't know if it was a letter or not.
5
Q. Do you receive any paperwork on an annual basis
6 regarding the trust?
A. Well, I just don't understand what you mean.
7
8
Q. You've brought documents with you that go back
9 to 2004 and before, and my question is if you receive or
~ 0 have you received anything related to the trust from the
~ 1 calendar year 2005 to the present date?
tl.2
A. Well, I wouldn't know of it. You mean -- well,
~ 3 do I receive letters, or?
tr. 4
Q. Contracts, letters, agreements, rdated to the
trust
from 2005 to the present.
tr.. 56
tr.
A. You mean the things like I brought today?
tr. 7
Q. Yes, of course things like you brought today,
~ 8 but from the period of 2005 to the pres(:nt.
~9
A. Well, I -- I don't know. I brought what I
have.
have.
I don't know what the date is on them.
Q. Have you provided any of your sons with a Power
Of Attorney?
A. Yes.
~4
Q. _An_d_W_h_O_d_id_y_O_U_p_r_o_Vl_'
And who did you provide
the Power
Power Of
Of Attorney
Attorney
5
Q_.
de the
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to?
A. Let's see. Dallan has it, and Kent has it.
Kent, Gloria's husband.
I think that's all. I'm not sure.
Q. And when was that Power Of Attorney provided to
those two?
A. I don't know. I'd have to look.
Q. Do you have a copy of it at home?
A. Yes.
Q. Has it been recorded in Ada County, for
example?
A. Yes.
Q. And who recorded that for you?
A. Well, I did it myself, I think.
Q. And what is the purpose to your understanding of
why those two were provided a Power Of Attorney?
A. Well, I wanted them to take care of things when
II died.
Q. And do you have a will now?
A. No.
Q. Do you hold title to your real property in your
name, or do you have a trust that's set up?
A. It's in my name.
Q. And is there anyone else on the deed with you?
A. I don't think so.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/
Respondents,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

)

)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
)
MAlLE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
)
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
)
)
Defendants/Counter-Claimants/
)
Appellants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

--------------~)
--------------------------~)

)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )

NOTICE OF APPEAL-l
Exhibit "BB"
"DB"
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00358

''TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant!
Respondent,
vs.
THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN
MAlLE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Appellants.

TO;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE RESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF mCCORD,
PAUL T. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Appellants, Thomas G. Maile

and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments L.L.C., by through Dennis Charney, and Thomas
Maile, attorneys for the Defendants/Counter-Claimants, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants",
appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court ofthe State ofIdaho, from the
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on May 15,2006 and the subsequent Judgment entered
June 5,2006, and the subsequent Order denying the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend, entered

on June 20,2006, and the First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries claim entered
entered' July 21,2006,
in the above-entitled action by Honorable Ronald Wilper and the Court's failure to award prepre
judgment interest.
1,

Appellants have aright to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District Court

of Ada, and the Judgmert
of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, In and For the County ofAda,
entered June 5,2006, and the Order denying the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend entered on

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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June 20, 2006, and the First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries claim entered July 21, 2006
described above, are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 of the LA.R., in that there was
a final Judgment entered on December 11,2006 resolving all claims of the parties.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the j udgmenls

and orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule
11 (a)(2) LA.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, jurisdiction is proper for the appeal.
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
4.

A preliminary statement ofthe issues on appeal which the Appellants: intend to assert

in the appeal, are as follows:
a.

Was the District Court correct in entering the Order Granting the Respondents Plaintiff
Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment and thereafter denying the Appellants' Motim
for ReconsiderationIMotion to Amend entered in the above-entitled action on June 20, 2006
and entering Judgment on June ~,2006 and thereafter entering it's First Amended Judgment
on Beneficiaries claim entered July 21, 20061 .

b.

Was the Court correct in determining that the Appellants were not bona fide purchasers for
value in the real estate contract between the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Appdlants?

c.

Was the Court correct in detennining that pursuant to Idaho Code 68-108 a Court Order was ..
required to close the real estate transaction, under the facts of the case established in the
record at the time of above referenced Orders?

d.

Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents were entitled to SummaI)'
Judgement when the record established that the both the original trustee of the trust and the
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~,

.

successor trustees did not violate their fiduciary to the trust or the beneficiaries inthe
in the selling
the real property at the price established by an independent Idaho licensed appraiser?
e.

Was the Court correct in denying the Appellants' Motion to DismisslMotion for Summary
Judgement relating to the role of the successor trustees not obtainingjudicial appointment
prior to filing suit on behalf of the "trust".

f.

Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents as beneficiaries of the trust had
standing to pursue the claims which were ultimately granted by the Beneficiaries' Motion for
Summary Judgment?

g.

Was the Court correct in determining that the subject real property was being held by the
Appellants under a constructive trust?

h.

Was the Court correct in determining

t~at

the original trustee and the successor breached

their fiduciary to the Respondents?
1.

Was the Court corred
correCt in determining that the Appellants were not bona fide purchasers for
value in the real estate contract between the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Appellants
and that the Appellants had breached a fiduciary and/or had a conflict of interest in the real
estate transaction?

j.

Was the Court correct in determining that pursuant to Idaho Code 68-1 06 th(~ underlying rea
estate transaction was either void or voidable?

k.

Did the Court err in failing to consider the effect of the Disclaimer and Indemnification
Agreement executed by the Respondents and the successor trustees and the other
beneficiaries of the trust relating the claims against the Appellants?
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1.

Was the Court correct in determining that the Appellants were not able to pursue: a suit for
specific performance even if the real estate transaction was voidable?
Did the Court err in denying the Plaintiff Theodore L. Johnson's and the j;ndividual

m.

Beneficiaries' motion for Summary Judgment which indicated certain claims were viable
asserted in Appellants' Counter-Claim including quasi estoppel and equitable estoppel and
thereafter rule in favor of the beneficiaries motion for summary judgment?
n.

Did the Court err in not allowing the counter-claims ofthe Appellants to proceed to trial?

o.

Did the Court err in determining that the Theodore L. Johnson Trust was entitled to amend
their complaint and relate back the complaint to the date of filing, when the successor
trustees had not been properly appointed by Court Order as required pursuant to

I.e. 68-101

68-1 07?
or 68-1017
p.

Did the Court err in not awarding pre-judgment interest to the Appellants on the

SUITlS

representing payments for the subject real property.
tm
Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. The following transcript is requested: and tre
Appellants request the same to be made a part of the appeal as existing transcripts" to wit:
a.

Hearings dated April 3, 2006; June 15,2006, July 17,2006 and Dect::mber 20,2004;

b.

The transcript is requested in standard format and not compressed.

c.

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript has been paid.

That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record.
5.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clcrk's record:

PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 2004-03642
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5
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1.

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed January 23, 2004;

2.

Verified Answer to Complaint and Counter-Claim of Defendant Thomas & Colleen Maile,
filed February 23, 2004;

3.

Answer to Counter-Claim, filed March 15, 2004;

4.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed March 15,2004;

5.

Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, March 24,2004;

6.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, lodged April 6,
2004;

7.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss, lodged April 8, 2004;

8.

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, entered April 23, 2004;

9.

Civil Appeals to Supreme Court, filed June 4, 2004;

10,

Order (to reopen case), entered June 24, 2004;

11.

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed July 19, 2004;

12.

Defendant/Counter-Claimants' Motion to Consolidate and Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in
Support of Motion to Consolidate, filed August 12,2004;

13.

Defendants/Counter-Claimants' Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, Affidavit of Thomas
G,
Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens and Memorandum of Thomas
G. Maile in Support of
ofRenewed
G. Maile in Support of Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed and lodged September
10,2004;

14.

Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile as Managing Member for Berkshire Wl~st,
WI;!st, LLC, filed
September 10, 2004;
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15.

Affidavit of Phillip Collear in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, executed
September 14, 2004;

16.

Order Denying Motion to Stay, entered September 16,2004;

17.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Strike Lis
Pendens, executed September 17, 2004;

18.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Renewed Motion to Strike Lis
Pendens, lodged September 20, 2004;

19,

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to Striike Lis Pendens,
lodged September 21,2004;

20,

Order to Consolidate with Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-05656D, entered September 29,
2004;

21,

Answer to Counter-Claim, filed October 4,2004;

22,

Order Denying Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, entered October 7" 2004;

23,

Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary
Judgment October 20, 2004;

24.
24,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 20,2004;

25.

Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion to DismisslMotion for Smnmary Judgment,
lodged and filed October 20, 2004;

26.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment arrl
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgmen~
lodged and filed November 8, 2004;
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27.

Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Motion to Show Cause, filed November 9, 2004;

28.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment am
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits ofDalIan Taylor, Rew
Taylor, Judd Taylor, Sam Rosti, COlmie Taylor and Dennis McCracken, lodged November
12,2004;

29.

Order Granting Motion to Strike, entered November 24,2004;

30.

Order Granting Motion to Strike in Part, entered November 29,2004;

31.

Affidavit of Terry Rudd, filed December 2,2004;

32.

Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 3,2004;

33.

Affidavit of Beth Rogers, filed December 10, 2004;

34.

Affidavit of Tim Williams, filed December 23,2004;

35,

Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed February 3, 2005;

36.

Judgm,;!nt; Motion f(I'
fcr
Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgm,~nt;
Leave to City Unpublished Opinion; Affidavit of Elaine Lee;

Second Supplemental

Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; and Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Defendants/Counter-Claimants Motion to Dismiss, filed ani
lodged February 14,2005;
37.

Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Defendants/Counter-Claimants Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support
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of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum Regardiqs
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged February 15, 2005;
38.

Motion to Strike, Affidavit of Donna Jones, Affidavit of Richard White, Affidavit of
Counsel, Affidavit of Richard Mollerup, Affidavit of Terry Rudd, Summary of Facts and
Exhibits and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged
. March 3, 2005;

39.

Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit ofR. John Taylor,
Tayfor, Affidavit of Elaine Lee, Third
Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas G.
O. Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filco and lodged May 13,
2005;

40,

Defendants' Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for SummaI)'
Judgment, filed May 16,2005;

41.

O. Maile in OPP9sition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Affidavi
Affidavit of Thomas G.
of Al Knutson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; and Reply Brief h
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged May 24,2005;

42.

Supplemental Memo in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to DismisslMoticn for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, lodged May 31,2005;

43.

Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Amend; Reply Affidavit in Support of Motion faSummary Judgment; Supplemental Affidavit of Elaine Lee; Reply Affidavit of Thomas
Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; and Reply Brief in Opposition b
Motion to Amend, filed ,md lodged June 3, 2005;
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44.

Defendants Motion to Strike Portions of Richard MollerupAffidavit, Second Supplemental

of Elaine Lee, Defendants Reply BriefRe: Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summaty
Summai)'
Affidavit ofElaine
Judgment, Second Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summaty

J. White, Memorandum in
Judgment, Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Richard 1.
J. White, filed and lodged
SUppOli of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard 1.
June 6, 2005;

45,

Memorandum Decision and Order, entered July 28,2005;

46.
46,

Defendants Second Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens; Memorandum Brief in Support
of Defendants Second Motion to Strike Lis Pendens; Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support
of Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed and lodged August 26, 2005;

47,
47.

Verified Amended Answer and Counter-claim and Demand for Jury Trial, filed September
7,2005;

48.

Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed September 8,

2005;
49.

Reply to Defendants Amended Counterclaim, filed September 26,2005;

50.

Amended Complaint, filed September 28,2005;

51.

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit in Support of Anlended Motion fer

Summary Judgment and Amended Reply to Anlended counterclaim filed October 3,2005;
52.

Order Denying Motion to Release Lis Pendens, entered October 5,2005;

53.

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Elaine

Lee and Defendants Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, lodged and Eiled October 7,
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2005;
54.

Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Second Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens,
lodged October 11,2005;

55,
55.

Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; Reply Affidavit of Thomas
Maile in Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Summary Judgment; and Affidavi
of Colleen Maile in Opposition to Amended Motion for Summary Judgment; arrl
DefendantlCounter-Claimants'
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
DefendantJCounter-Claimants' Reply Brief
Briefin
Summary Judgment, filed October 13, 2005;

56,

Affidavit of Elaine Lee; Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motiun DDr Partial
Summary Judgment, filed and executed October 20,2005;

57.

Corrected Amended Complaint, executed October 21,2005;

58.

Mfidavit of Dan C. Grober and Supplemental Affidavit of Dan C. Grober, filed October 24,
2005;

59.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
lodged November 3,2005;

60.

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Dan C. Grober and Affidavit of Elaine Lee, filed
November 3,2005;

61.

Judgment Re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, entered November 7, 2005;

62.

Memorandum Re: Motion to Amend, lodged November 9, 2005;

63.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend, lodged November 10, 2005;

64.

Opinion Lodged by Supreme Court, lodged December 23,2005;
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65,

Order for Supplemental Briefing in Light of Remand, entered December 30,200.5;

66.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum Re: Supreme Court Remand, executed January 19, 2006;

67,

Joint Supplemental Brief in Light of Supreme Court Remand, lodged January 20, 2006;

68.

Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, entered February 13, 2006;

69,

Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, Affidavit of R. John Taylor in
Support of Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, filed and lodgoo.
February 13, 2006;

70.

Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of Thomas Maile h
Opposition to Beneficiaries Motion for Summary Judgment, lodged and filed March 14,

2006;
71.

Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed March 15,2006;

72.

Affidavit of Gary McAllister; and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to TaylolS
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged March 17,2006;

73.

Answer and Counterclaim Re: Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries, filed March 21,2006;

74.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum and Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion, filed and lodged March 27, 2006;

75.

Affidavit of Counsel, filed March 29, 2006;

76.

Order Resetting Trial, entered May 1,2006;

77.

Order Granting Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim, entered May 15,2006:;

78.

Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed and
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lodged May 30, 2006;
79.

Objection to Proposed Judgment, filed June 6, 2006;

80,

Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim and Affidavit of Elaine Lee, file June 7, 2006;

81.

Plaintiff Beneficiaries' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider; Motion to
Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Experts Affidavits; Motion to Shorten Time; Affidavit of Rory
Jones, lodged and filed June 8, 2006;

82,
82.

Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim; and Response to Motion to Strike Portions of
Expert Affidavit, filed June 9, 2006;

83.

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim filed June 15,2006;

84.

Motion to Anlend Judgment Filed Jure 7, 2006 based upon an Error of Law and/or Motion
to Reconsider filed on or about June 20, 2006;

85.

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, entered June 20, 2006;

86.

Motion for Certification; and Brief in Supp~rt of Motion for Certification, filed and lodged
June 28, 2006;

87.

Objection to Proposed First Amended Judgment, filed July 3, 2006.

88.

Affidavit of Thomas Maile July 13,2006;

89.

Memorandum Decision and Order entered July 21,2006.

90.

Anlended Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims entered July 21,2006.
First Amended

91.
91,

Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 25, 2006.

92.

Anlend First Amended Judgment filed on August 1,2006;
Motion to Amend

93.

Affidavit of Brad Knipe dated September 14,2006.
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94,

Notice of Hearing re: Motion to Amend ludgment
Pre-ludgment Interest filed October
Judgment for Pre-Judgment
4,2006,

95,

Judgment entered December 11,2006.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R.
DATED this

)-1 day of December, 2006.
J-I
THOMAS MAILE, co-c6unsel
co-cp'unsel for Appellants/
Defendants/Counter-Claim'ants
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CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants
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P. O. Drawer 285
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CLARK

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limltedliability,andTHOMASG.MAILE,N,and
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife,

10

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Plaintiffs,

11
VS.

MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LIS

12
13

14

15

16

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a
f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAnOR,
TA nOR, an
individual; CLARK and FEENEY,
FEENEY. a partnership;
PAUL T. CLARK an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, n Idaho
revocable trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X;
AND ALL PERSON IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION

PENDENS

17

Defendants.

18
19
20

21
22

23

COME NOW Defendants DaHan Taylor, Jolm Taylor, and the Johnson Trust, by and through
their attorney of record, Connie Wright Taylor, and respectfully request that this Court
Corurt issue an
order removing the lis pendens from the Ada County Records.

24

25
MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS

26
OFFlee:S OF
LAW OFFlee:S

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LE:WISTON, IDAHO
IDAHO B3501
B3501
LE:WISTON,

001017
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This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Idaho Supreme Court has
recently affinned the District Court's order quieting title to the Linder Road property in the name
1

of the Johnson Trust, on the same operative facts as exist in the present case.
2

3
4

Oral argument is requested.

t1r/Jday of February, 2009.

DATED this :d

5

6

,.
By ""
Connie . Taylor, a member of th
Attorneys for Defendants.

7

8
9

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _I?_
tlrday of February, 2009 I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

12

1-3-7t1r'day

13
14
15

16
17
18
19

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

Prusynski
Mark Prusynsld
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10111 Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

o

u.s, Mail

D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

o
~

o
o

U.s. Mail

o
~

20

Conni
. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

21
22
23

24
25
26
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MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LIS
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By L.J;MES

1

2

3
4

5
6

DEF':)TY

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants .
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

10

11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

12

Plaintiffs,
13

14
15

16
17
18
19

VS.
vs.

CONNIE WRlGHT TA
TAYLOR,
YLOR, flkla CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL 1.
T. CLARK an individual;

AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
AND JOHNSON TRUST

AND
COUNTERCLAIM

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE

TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

20

21

22
23

Defendants.
Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through
their attorney of record, answer the COlllplaint
Complaint as follows:

24
25
26

ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM

1
LAW QFFlco:a OF

CLARK AND FE.ENEY
93S01
LEWISTON, IDAHO e3S01

001019

FEB. 17.2009

4:40PM

1.

CLARV

&FEENEY

ATTY

NO. 11 JO

''-
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Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint which is not

specifically admitted herein.
1

2.

Defendants admit the allegations as to the residence of the respective pluties.

3.

With reference to the multitude of
allegations relating to documents and!or pleadings
ofallegations

2

3
4

filed with the Court, those docwnents speak for themselves and require no admission or denial;

5

however, Defendants do not accept and specifically deny the Plaintiffs' characterizations of such

6

documents.

7
4.

Defendants admit that the Plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from the

8
9

fOlUld to be improper by The Honorable Ronald
Theodore Johnson trust, admit that the purchase was fmUld

10

1.
J. Wilper (whose decision was recently upheld by the Idaho Supreme Cowt), and admit that

11

judgment was entered returning the property to the Johnson Trust. Defendants deny any impropriety

12

on their part in the conduct of said lawsuit.

13

5.

Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries of the

14

Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Idaho Supreme Court has nded that the
15

16

Release and Disclaimer executed by the successor trustees and all beneficiaries specificaHy reserved

17

to the Taylors all rights to the lawsuit against these Plaintiffs seeking recovery of the property they

18

had acquired wrongfully.

19

20

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action against these Defendants upon Which relief

21
22

may be granted.

23
24
25

26

ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM

2
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CLARK
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001020
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable steps to
1

mitigate their claimed or alleged damages, if any.
2

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

3
4

5

The Plaintiffs)
12(b)(8) because there is another action
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by LR. C.P. 12(b)(8)
pending between the same parties on the same cause.

6

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

7
The Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel,
8

9

waiver, laches, and unclean hands.

COUNTERCLAIMS

10

11

For counterclaims against the Plaintiffs, the Defendants allege as follows:

12

1.

13

The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Answer above are

incorporated herein by reference.

14

2.

Slander of Title. Plaintiffs have filed a number of lis pendens against the subject

15

16

property, even after the entry of the District Court Judgment quieting title in the Johnson
real property.

17

Trust. The filing of these documents constitutes slander of title, as the claim to an o,vnership
o\vnership

18

interest in the property was a slanderous statement which was false, done with malice, and

19

resulted in special damages to the Defendants (in an amount which will be proved at trial)

20

because it has prevented them from either financing or selling the Linder Road property.

21

22

3.

Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, in filing this second action relating to the Linder

23

Road property and issuing a lis pendens to prevent the Plaintiffs from having the Us e of the

24

property, have affinnatively used a legal process primarily to accomplish an improper purpose

25
26

ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM

3
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FEENEY

LE:WI$TON. IDAHO

U3~OI
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......

procc:ss was not
outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the proc<:ss
designed (Le. keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the initial lawsuit
1

in which the property was ordered returned to the Jolmson trust). Plaintiffs' actions have
2

3

prevented the Defendants from selling the property, which has declined in value since the filing

4

of this action, damaging the Defendants by misuse of the process external to the litigation that

5

cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding.

6

4.

Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. By

7

8
9

prohibiting the Defendants from selling the Linder Road property, Plaintiffs have committed the
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have had

10

several inquiries on the Linder Road property, but have been prevented from selling the property

11

solely because of the Plaintiffs' lis pendens, resulting so

far in the loss of an offer to purchase the

12

property for $1.8 million dollars, to date, with additional offers being received. The F'laintiffs'
13

14

interference was for an improper purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust.

5.

15

Attorney fees: As a result of the actions of plaintiff in this matter, defc:ndants

16

have been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Clark and Feeney, and are

17

entitled to recover their attorneys fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP 11 and Idaho

18

Code sections 12-121 and 12-123.

19

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the following

20

21
22

relief:

1.

That the Complaint be dismissed and that the Plaintiffs take nothing th:=reby.

23

24
25

ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM

4

26
LAW OF.ICES 01'

CLARK AND FEENEY
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That Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on the attorney for the Plaintiffs for bringing
this frivolous action.

1
2

3.

responding to the Complaint pursuant to I.e. 12-121, 123 and I.R.C.P 11.

3
4

That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in

4.

That judgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at

5
trial for slander of title.
6
7

5.

trial for abuse of process.

8
9

That judgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be detelmined at

6.

That judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for intentional interference with

10

prospective economic advantage.

11

12
13

7.

That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in

bringing their counterclaim
counterclaim. pursuant to I.C. 12-121, 123 and LR.C.P 11.

14

DATED this
15

J2f~ay of February, 2009.
CLARK and FEENEY

16

,,

..

,,,,,.~\.--.,
,,,,,.~\.--.,

,.'
/

17

I

/

18

~--

.-----.
.----_.

By~~~~~~~~--~~~cr----BY--"'-~:=::::':'~~~:::=""""'_--':=::~----.l-CT--Connie W. Taylor, a member of the firm.

J

19

Attorneys for Defendants.

20

--'

21
22

23
24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

2

I~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day ofFebryary, 2009 I caused to be served a
~lddressed to
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and ~lddressed
the following:

3
4

5
6

7

8
9

O. Maile, IV
Thomas G.
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
837011
Boise, ID 8370

o0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

0
o
0
o

r

Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

o0
0
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

o0
~
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.•.,'
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11
12
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13
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Coruiio
Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants
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r«l...,.,'f""':"'1'--~~--AIlIf;jI?~M _ __

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

"~~R

LOU:l
1 U LDU:l

I~MV/~-(i,) Clerk
J. DAvlU I~MVA-U=-j,)

ByKATtty J. BIEHL
DEPUTv
OEPUlv

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER
OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN
TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND
COUNTERCLAIM

v.
TAYLOR,
CONNIE WRIGHT T
AYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Thomas Maile
hereby provide their Reply to Defendant's Amended Answer of John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 1

001025

Johnson Trust and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Answer of John
Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and Counterclaim which is not specifically admitted
herein.
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim.
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2,3,4, and 5 of the Counter-Claim.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid,
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a ''vendee's lien" on the subj,ect
subj1ect real
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Code section
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further
protection ofthe vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but
not limited to:
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 2

001026

directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CNIL REMEDIES.
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery ofthree (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this section as it deems proper.
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise;
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are baITed in the

present action.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the
action above referenced.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

A:~D
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, A:~D
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 3

001027

Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their CounterClaim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided
by the counter-claimants.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient 11lcts are
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counterdefendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this
matter progresses.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and

12reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12
120; 12-121; 12-123.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs.

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 4
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2

For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs.

3

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premises.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2009.

THOMAS G. MA LE, IV., ro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investm ts
Colleen Birch-Maile
CERTIFICA
TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 5th day of March, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN
T
AYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as follows:
TAYLOR,
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
(X)
(
)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. MILE, IV., Pro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investmen s and Colleen Birch-Maile

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 5
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RECEIVtD

1 :{ 2009
MAl? 1:{
Ada COl:nty Clerk
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
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Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
AMENDEDANSWEROFCO~ME
AMENDEDANSWEROFCO~ME

WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
AND COUNTERCLAIM

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TA YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 1

Client: 1152648 1
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COME NOW the defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul
T. Clark, by and through the undersigned counsel, and answer plaintiffs' amended complaint as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

2.

These defendants deny each and every allegation of plaintiffs' complaint

granted.

not specifically admitted herein.
3.

Responding to paragraph 1 of plaintiffs , complaint, defendants admit that

the Mailes are husband and wife and reside in Ada County, that Berkshire Investments is an
Idaho limited liability company, that Clark and Feeney is an Idaho partnership, that Paul T. Clark
is an individual, but deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph.
4.

Responding to paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint, defendants

T. Clark and Connie Wright Taylor were at all relevant times
admit that Clark and Feeney, Paul 1.

licensed Idaho attorneys and were conducting business in the state of Idaho, but deny the
remaining allegations of said paragraph.
5.

Defendants admit paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' amended complaint.

6.

Responding to a multitude of references in plaintiffs' amended complaint

to documents and pleadings, those documents or pleadings speak for themselves and require no
admission or denial; but defendants do not accept and specifically deny the plaintiffs'
characterizations of such documents.
7.

Defendant admit that the plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from

the Theodore Johnson Trust, admit that the purchase was found to be improper by The

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2

Client: 1152648.1

001031

Honorable Ronald J. Roper, and admit that judgment was entered returning the propelty to the
Johnson Trust. Defendants deny any impropriety on their part in the conduct of said lawsuit.
8.

Defendants deny the plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries

of the Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Release and Disclaimer
executed by the successor trustees and all beneficiaries specifically reserved to the Taylors all
rights to the lawsuit against plaintiffs seeking recovery of the property they had acquired
wrongfully.
9.

Defendants deny the remaining allegations of plaintiffs' amended

complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

10.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(8) because there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

11.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, waiver, laches and unclean hands.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

12.

Plaintiffs had no attorney-client relationship with these defendants and

therefore lack standing to bring their negligence claims or breach of fiduciary duty claims.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

13.

Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

14.

This action was brought frivolously and without foundation, in violation

of Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 3

1152648.1
Client: 11526481
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COUNTERCLAIMS
For counterclaims against the plaintiffs, the defendants allege as follows:
1.

The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Amended

Answer above are incorporated herein by reference.
2.

Under the terms of the fee agreement between Clark and Feeney and the

defendants, Taylors and Johnson Trust, Clark and Feeney has an ownership interest in the Linder
Road real property.
3.

Slander of Title. Plaintiffs have filed a number of lis pendens against the

subject real property, even after the entry of the district court judgment quieting title in the
Johnson Trust. The filing of these documents constitutes slander of title, as the claim to an
ownership interest in the property was a slanderous statement which was false, done with malice,
and resulted in special damages to the defendants (in an amount which will be proved at trial)
because it has prevented them from either financing or selling the Linder Road property.
4.

Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, in filing this second action relating to the

Linder Road property and issuing a lis pendens to prevent the defendants from having the use of
the property, have affirmatively used a legal process primarily to accomplish an improper
purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process
was not designed (i.e., keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the
initial lawsuit in which the property was ordered returned to the Johnson Trust). Plaintiffs'
actions have prevented the defendants from selling the property, which has declined in value
since the filing of this action, damaging the defendants by misuse of the process external to the
litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding.

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4

1152648. 1
Client: 1152648
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5.

Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. By

prohibiting the defendants from selling the Linder Road property, plaintiffs have committed the
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have had
several inquiries on the Linder Road property, but have been prevented from selling the property
solely because of the plaintiffs' lis pendens, resulting so far in the loss of an offer to purchase the
property for $1.8 million, to date, with additional offers being received. The plaintiffs'
interference was for an improper purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust.
6.

Attorney fees: As a result of the actions of plaintiffs in this matter,

defendants have been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Moffatt
Thomas, and are entitled to recover their attorney fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP
11 and Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the
following relief:
1.

That the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiffs take

nothing thereby.
2.

That Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on the attorney for the plaintiffs for

bringing this frivolous action.
3.

That the defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs

incurred in responding to the Complaint pursuant to 1. C. 12-121, 123 and 1.R. C.P 11.
4.

That judgment be entered against the plaintiffs in an amount to be

determined at trial for slander of title.

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 5
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5.

That judgment be entered against the plaintiffs in an amount to be

determined at trial for abuse of process.
6.

That judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage.
7.

That the defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs

incurred in bringing their counterclaim pursuant to 1. C. 12-121, 123 and 1.R. C. P 11.
8.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, including

ofCivi1
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED this

/l.a
/l.t:1day of March, 2009.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

&

d_/)~~(
Jl./
;f,,"1 ',

By_
_-f_
By____
~---------------------
Mark . Prusynski - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2..{;Iday of March, 2009, I caused a true and con'ect
conoect copy of
the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
LAW
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Counsel for Plaintiffs

(J

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK AND FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile (208) 746-9160
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(v1'Facsimile

AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAULT. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 7

Client: 1152648.1
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

.• _

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER
OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK
AND FEENEY AND PAUL T.
CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
T AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Thomas Maile
hereby provide their Reply to Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie Wrigth Taylor, Clark and

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND
PAULT. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 1
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Feeney and Paul T. Clark and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie
Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark Trust and Counterclaim which is not
specifically admitted herein.
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim.
3. That based upon information and belief, plaintiffs admit paragraph 2, that under the
fee agreement all defendants maintain an ownership interest in Linder Road real property.
4. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 of the Counter-Claim.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid,
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Code section
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as

such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78
ofthe Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND
PAULT. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg2
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not limited to:
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or
the proceeds derivf~d
derivf~d from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES.
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a determination of liability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this section as it deems proper.
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, i.n
(I)
any enterprise;

That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the
present action.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND
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action above referenced.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief
reliefthey
they seek by way of their CounterClaim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided
by the counter-claimants.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to Rule 11 ofthe IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after count{~rdefendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this
matter progresses.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and
reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12
12120; 12-121; 12-123.
PRAYER

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENjgY AND
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs.

2

For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs.

3

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premises.

DATED this 17th day of March, 2009.

TOMAS G. MAIL, ., Pro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 17th day of March, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK
AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as
follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. MAILE, N., Pro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT R]~:
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM

v.
TA YLOR, £'k/a
£'kJa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the undersigned, Thomas G. Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for
Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile herein, and hereby moves this Court to
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enter Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the grounds and for the reasons, that the
claims set forth in all ofthe defendants' counterclaim are barred as a matter oflaw, and there are
no material factual issues in dispute.
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the
Memorandum Brief in Support of the Motion Summary Judgment, all filed concurrently herewith

and further upon the file and record in this matter. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2009.

ILE, IV
S.
THO
Pro Se and couns 1I foy Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-'M~ile
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of March, 2009, I served the foregoing (1)
MOTION IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (3) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, together with the (4) NOTICE
OF HEARING by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
£1da
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust~ JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is a Pro Se litigant in the above captioned matter and attorney of r,ecord
rlecord for
the Co-Plaintiffs. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your
affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the
matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Thomas
Maile filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile and the same is
made part hereof as if set forth in full herein. involved in either the current litigation
and/or the litigation on appeal.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Lis Pendens
filed with the Ada County Recorders office on May 18, 2006, bearing Instrument No.
106078472.

4.

Your affiant has never executed any documentation releasing said Notice of Lis Pendens
(Exhibit "B") and as oftoday's date it remains a public record with the Ada County
Recorder's Office. There have been no monies received from the Theodore L. Johnson

Trust and/or the individual Taylors, relating to the return of the purchase price and/or
interest thereon.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy ofthe Affidavit ofR. John
Taylor in Support of Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment in Ada County Case
No. CV OC 04-00473D which was filed in February 2006.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 2
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6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Terry Rudd,
dated November 23,2004 with the attachment representing his appraisal report, who
opined that the Linder Road property was valued at $820,000.00 in Ada County Case No.
CV OC 04-00473D.

7.

That in defense to the claims of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Taylors' claims
there were three (3) Idaho licensed real estate appraisers and an Idaho Realtor who were
prepared to provide testimony and opinions that the fair market value of the Linder Road
property at the time ofthe purchase was $400,000.00. That your affiant, his wife and
Berkshire Investments were preparing the defense to the claims by the trust and the
Taylors that the purchase price was fair and reasonable. That consistent with the prior
ruling in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper
had ruled that "the Plaintiffs, now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to
pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose" (page 9 of Exhibit "K" to Affidavit of
Thomas Maile Part 2). That as a result of the criminal conduct and misrepresentations
made to the court by the defendants, your affiant, Berkshire Investments and his wife
were not able to defend such claims for money damages.

DATED this 17th day of March 2 09.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 3
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
17th day of March, 2009.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
...
S....tt....
....A_~~ ?F IDAHO
. .._ _
_S

••

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 4
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law '
380 West state Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYWR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plain tiffs/Coun ter-Defendan ts,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

v.

AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST
COMPUTATION

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, '
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, rVand COLLEEN
MAILE, husband 'and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST COMPUTATION
COMPUTATION·- Page 1
~XIEBIT
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~,,(
,
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1.

Your Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants and
further appears Pro .Se, and provides this Affidavit pursuant to Idaho Code 28-22-104.
That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal
knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted
herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.

2.

That pursuant to the Court's determination that the title to the real property in the subject
proceeding was restored to the trust, the Plaintiffs were obligated to Berkshire Investment
LLC, to repay the purchase price of $400,000.00. No sums have been received from the
plaintiffs to the current date.

3.

Your affiant computed interest pursuant to I.e. 28-22-104, on the First Amended
Judgment entered in this matter on July 21, 2006, as follows:
Principal amount of Judgment:
.

.

$400,000.00

.

Interest from date of Judgment (July 21, 2006)
to and including December 31,2006 (164 days)
at 12.0 percent per annum:

$ 21,567.64

Interest from January 1,2007 to and
including December 31,2007 (365 days)
at 12.0 percent per annum:

$ 48,000.00

Interest from January 1,2008 to and
including December 31,2008 (366 days)
at 12.0 percent per annum:

$ 48,132.66

Interest from January 1, 2009 to and
including February 10,2009 (41 days)
at 12.0 percent per annum:

$ 5,391.91

TOTAL AS OF February 10,2009:

$523,092.21

Interest per annum:

$ 48,000.00

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA VIT OF INTEREST COMPUTATION·
COMPUTATION - Page 2
001050

Interest per diem:
DATED this

$

131.51

J]
J1 day of February, 2009.

/
, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
/1
day of February, 2009.
.
.

~

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires July 30,2014

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA
VIT OF INTEREST COMPUTATION· Page 3
001051

ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO
AMOUNT 9.00
3
BOISE IDAHO 05l1B/06 04:10 PM
DEPUTY Bonnie Oberbillig
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RECORDED - REOUEST OF

Thomas Maile

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

106078472

Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

vs.
THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

)

)
)
)
.)
)
)
)

THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
TRUST,
)
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants,
vs.

)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 1
Z:lA\LO'_\t-'JLElTAYLOR\lISPEND~OT
Z:IA\LO'_\t-'JLElTAYLOR\LISPEND~OT

May 18, 2006

EXHIBIT "B'
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THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.

..

.,,

TO:

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES

RE:

LITIGATION AFFECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BETWEEN AND
AMONGST THE ABOVE-REFERENCED PARTIES

~

The nature of
the action supporting the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claim to
ofthe
the legal and equitable rights in the real property hereinafter described is a quiet title action, declaratory
judgment, estoppel, filed in the above captioned matter in Ada County, State ofIdaho,
ofldaho, including a claim
for damages, detenmnation oftitle and interests to the real property, costs and attorneys fees.
The above Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claims an interest in said real property or properties
described as follows:
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho,
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also
1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 'I West,
1/4 of the Southwest 114,
known as, the Northwest 114

.."

Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho'. ..

D

~ay of May, 2006.

this.)/
DATED this
.)/

.

\
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THOMAS G. MAIL'UV., individually, and as
Managing member of Berkshire Investments L.L.c.
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STA IE OF IDAHO
STAIE
County of Ada

)
) ss.
) .

•

On this ~day of May, 2006, before me, the undersigned, a Not~ry Public in and for said
state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the managing member of Berkshire
Investments L.L.c., and the individual, and further known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same
for Berkshire Investments L.L.c., and for himself individually.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the day and year last above
written.

t
PUbl~'
r daho
,Idah;' .
Residing at
.
Commission E ires:

qII 9Ie '7

'.

I.
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys -for Plaintiffs
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-95] 6
ISB No. 4837

5
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

6
7
8

9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
)
ESTA TE COMPANY,
MAILE REAL ESTATE
)
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
)
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
)
)
)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

TRUST,

18

Plaintiff,
vs.

20

22
23

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF BENEFICIARIES'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

19

21

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
COLLE EN,
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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AFFIDA VJT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

1
LAW OFFICES OF

EXHIBIT "C'

CLARK AND FEENEY
001055
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1

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

) ss.
)

2

R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

3

1.

I am over the age of 18 years and make this affidavit from personal knowledge.

4

2.

I did not learn that the real property on Linder Road was being sold until after the

5

transaction had closed on September 16,2002, which was two days after Uncle Ted's death. My

6
siblings and I did not learn that the property was owned by a trust in which we and our mother were

7
8

named as beneficiaries until several months after the sale. There was no court approval of that sale.

9

To my knowledge, the successor trustees did not carefully examine the fairness and propriety of the

10

transaction before closing it. When my brothers and I contacted Beth Rogers about our concerns

11

over the sale, she initially agreed to bring an action on behalf of the trust, then abruptly changed her

12

mind. This occurred right after we had asked her for a copy of the Trust tax return, which she

13
14

15
16
17

18

refused to provide. The Rogers agreed to step aside as trustees only after all the btmeficiaries
agreed not to sue them and to waive any accounting for the Trust.
3.

Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, (Exhibit A to this affidavit), thl~
thl:! $100,000

down payment made by the Mailes was required to be divided into five equal shares. Because their
father (Richard Johnson) had died, Beth Rogers and her brothers were entitled to immediate payment

19
oftheir
of
their $20,000. My mother would have been entitled to only interest income on the $20,000 during

20
21

her lifetime, at the discretion of the trustees. Of the remaining $300,000 received from the Mailes,

22

Beth and her siblings were entitled to immediate payment of $60,000, while my mother would

23

receive, at most, interest income on her share. Again, this would have been paid only if the trustees

24

elected to do so. My siblings and I were to receive no payment until after our mother's death.

25
26
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1

Ifl
If! had been notified that I was a beneficiary prior to the closing of the Mailes'

purchase of the Linder Road property, I would have been adamantly opposed to the sale being

2

approved. I was very aware in the fall of 2002 that real property values in the Eagle area were

3

escalating rapidly, and I was shocked when I learned that this 40-acre parcel of prime development

4

land in Eagle had been sold for only $400,000.

5

I knew that this property was in an area zoned for

housing developments and was near the new Eagle high school. I was also personally a.ware of the

6
high-end residential development that was occurring in the Eagle area near this real property.

7
8

5.

After Ted's death, there was absolutely no urgency to sell the Linder Road property, as

9

there were other assets which were more than sufficient to pay Uncle Ted's debts (which were

10

minimal) and to make substantial distributions. Because the principal of the trust would not be

11
12

distributed to the members of my family in the foreseeable future, from our point of view it would
have been much more financially beneficial for the property to be held by the Trust and then placed

13
14

15

on the open market so that its value as development property could be explored and maximized.
This is supported by the fact that in September of 2005 (less than three years later) we received an

16

offer to purchase this property for $1.8 million dollars. A true and correct copy of that Real Estate

17

Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit.

18

FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught.

19
20

21

R.

,
,

22

:
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l

:
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23
24

i/;
iii

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _'_
_'_ day of February, 2006.
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Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho.
Residing at
(/:..)[,...'-17: G
( (/:·/[,...'-/7:
therein.
My commission expires: (' ~ t ":;(;

it

2
3

CERTIFICA
TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE

4

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2006, I caused to be se:rved a true
and correct copy of this document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

5
6

7
8

9
10

qfh

Thomas Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State
Eagle, ID 83616
Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouster
P.o.
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83702

11
12
13

Dennis Charney
Attorney at Law
951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140
Eagle, ID 83616

g

u.S. Mail
U.S.
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

D
D

Pl

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
/Telecopy (FAX)
;'

D
D
D

D
D

/
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<Cen'
il\' W_,Taylo;
<Cen~\'
W._,Taylo;

16

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT

2

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made and entered into this -----.!f.- day of November, 1997,

3

between THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person, of Ada County, Idaho, hereinafter referred

4

to as "Grantor", and THEODORE L. JOHNSON, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee".
IITrustee".

5
6

7

8

WIT N E SSE T H:
WHEREAS, the Grantor desires to create this Trust Agreement effective this date and

the Trustee agrees to act as Trustee thereof;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor and Trustee agree as follows:

9

10
11

12

ARTICLE I
1. TRUST NAME: This trust shall be known as: THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST.

2. TRUST PROPERTY: The Grantor hereby transfer, convey and deliver to the trust
the property set forth on Schedule "A" which is attached hereto and by reference made part
hereof. All the property transferred and delivered to the trust shall, upon written acceptance
14 thereof by the Trustee, constitute the trust estate and shall be held, managed and distributed as
hereinafter provided. That no consideration was or will be given by the Trustee for the:
.\.,:15 conveyance or transfer to it of any of the Trust Estate; that the Trustee accepts such title to the
\.,:...,
Trust Estate as is conveyed or transferred to it hereunder, without liability or responsibility for
16 the conditions or validity of such title; and that the Trust estate has been or will De conveyed or
transferred to the Trustee, IN TRUST with power of sale, for the uses and purposes herein
17 provided.
,.

13

,."

18
19

3. ADDITIONAL PROPERTY: The Grantor, or any other person, with the consent
of the Trustee, may name the trust as beneficiary of life insurance poliCIes,
poliCies, or deposit property
with the trust, or devise property to the trust.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

f.,-.
fi.,-.

28

ARTICLE II
1. WITHDRAWALS BY Grantor: While Grantor is living, the Trust shall distribute
to or for the benefit of the Grantor such sums from income and prinCipal as the Grantor may at
any time request.
2. DISTRIBUTIONS BY TRUSTEE: The Trustee may distribute to or for the
benefit of the Grantor, such sums from income and principal as the Trustee deems reasonable
for the maintenance, support and health of Grantor.
3. CHARACTER OF PROPERTY: All property transferred to this trust by the
Grantor shall retain its character as separate property during the lifetime of the Grantor and any
withdrawal from the trust by the Grantor of sucn property shall be his separate property. 4.
LIFE INSURANCE: The following rights and obligations apply to any life insurance'policies
which designate the trust as beneficiary.

a. Premium Payment: The owner or owners of any life insurance policies shall
TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY TIIE LAW OFFICE.
OFFICE . . .illllliiiiiii~
EAGLE, IDAHO
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT NO.~
NO.~

I

A

Y:,.
y>. &,C-£R<:>
DATE f; - I { -D\j
-CJtf
BURNHAM,
BURNHAM. HABEL ""
'"
ASSOCIATES,
ASSOCIATES. INC.
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2
3

4
5

pre~1jums an~ ot~er charg~s
charg~s to keel :!1
:!I force life insurance policies which. sUC;h
pay all pre~1iums
suc:h owner or
owners desire to mamtam on the life of Gr:,ntor.
Gr:,nlor. The trust shall be under no oblIgatIOn to pay
premiums or other charges but may make such payments if sufficient cash is available to the
trust.

b. Collection of Benefits: Upon the death of the insured, the trust shall collect
any benefits. The trust is authorized to take any action to collect the benefits which it deems
reasonable and proper. The trust may compromise or settle any claim and may execute any
property release or acquittance.

c. Policy Rights: The owner of each policy shall retain and have the right to
change the beneficiary and to exercise any option, right or privilege relating to each policy,
7 including the right to borrow in accordance with the provisions of the policy and to pledge the
policy as collateral. Nothing herein shall bestow upon Grantor, who does not own any policy,
8 any nght, privilege or incident or ownership.
'
6

ARTICLE III .

9

1. RIGHTS OF THE GRANTOR: The Grantor specifically reserves the following

10

rights:
11

12

13

14

'-15
]6
16
17
J7

A.
ADDITION TO THE TRUST ESTATE: The Grantor may, from time to
time, by conveyance, assignment, transfer, or Will, add property of any kind or any pal1 thereof,
to the Trust Estate, which shall thereupon be subject to all the terins
terms and provisions of this
trust.
B.
ALTERlNG OR REVOKING TRUST: While Grantor is living and
competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, by written notice filed with the Trustee:

I.
1.

AJter or amend any provision thereof;
Revoke this Trust in whole or in part, and in such event, the Tnlst Estate
property....
or portion as Grantor's separate property
2.

C.
DIRECTION BY THE GRANTOR TO THE TRUSTEE: While Grantor is
living and competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, direct the Trustee in writing:

18
]9
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

26
27

4t..
4f.,'

28

1.
To retain as part of the Trust Estate, any securities, properties, or
investments at any tie held hereunder, for such length of time as such directions may provide;
2.
Or to sell, encumber, lease, manage, control, or dispose of any property
of the Trust Estate;
3.
Or to invest available income or principal in specific securities, properties
or investments.
The Trustee shall not be liable for any loss sustained or incurred by reason of its
compliance with any such written instruction of the Grantor.

II.

AD MINIS TRA TION BY THE TRUSTEE:

A.
THE TRUST BANK ACCOUNT: Deposits and withdrawals by the Grantor or
Trustee to or from Bank or Savings and Loan accounts held by the trust shall automatically be
deemed to constitute contributions to or withdrawals from the trust estate.

B.
PAYMENT OF TRUST EXPENSE: The Trustee shall pay or reserve
sufficient funds to pay all expenses of management and administration of the Trust Estate,
including:

I.
1.

The compensation of the Trustee;

TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAlLE
EAGLE, IDAHO
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13

, 2.
Out of pocket expelCs of management and administration of the Trust
•
3.
Payments of interest and .,rincipal on any outstanding notes, whether or
not secured by a Deed of Trust, on any real estate which may be part of the Trust Estate;

Estate;

C.
DISTRIBUTION TO THE GRANTOR: All of the net income shall be
distributed to or for the use and benefit of the Grantor while he shall live, in convenient
installments, not less frequently than quarterly, as his separate property. In addition to the net
income, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Grantor, out of the prindpal
princ:ipal of
the Trust Estate, such sums as trustee deems necessary for his reason- able care, support, health
and comfort,l if in trustee's discretion, the income to which he is entitled is considered
insufficient JOr such purposes.

a. Distribution: The Trustee shall pay to or for the benefit of the Grantor such
sums from the income and principal as the surviving Grantor may at any time request.
b. Grantor Disabilitf Should the Trustee at any time consider the Grantor to be
unable for any reason to direct the rustee with respect to disposition of such sums from the
trust estate, the Trustee is authorized in its sale
sole and absolute discretion to expend for the
Grantor such sums from principal or income as the Trustee shall deem necessary or advisable
for the Grantor's support, maintenance and health..
.

D.
UNDISTRIBUTED FUNDS: All undistributed funds in the Trust Checking
Account at the time of the termination of the Trust, shall become a part of the Corpus of the
Trust.
III.

14

- . , 15
',:.,;.,;.'

16

ADMINISTRA
TJON OF THE TRUST UPON THE DEATH
DEA TH OF THE
ADMINISTRATJON
GRANTOR:

FU1\~RAL EXPENSES: 1..!pon
A.
FU:l\~RAL
lIpan the death of the Grantor, the Trustee may pay
the expenses of her last illness and funeral, from either income or principal, at the discretion of
the Trustee, unless other adequate provision shall have been made therefore.

17

B.

TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES:

18

'19

20

2]

].
Upon the death of the Grantor, any estate, inheritance, succession or
other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments, together with interest, penalties, costs,
Trustee's compensation, and attorneys' fees incurred by reason of the Trust Estate or any
interest therein being included for such tax purposes, may be paid by the Trustee from the Trust
Estate, unless other adequate provisions shall nave been made therefore. Any such payments
shall be charged to princIpal of the Trust Estate or the separate trust so included for such tax
purposes.
.$.

22
'23

24

2.
The Trustee shall have full power and authority to pay from the Trust
Estate any other taxes, charges or assessments for which the Trustee, the Trust Estate, or any
interest therein becomes liable, and any such payments shall be made from and charged to either
income or principal of the Trust Estate or any share or separate trust thereof, as the Trustee in
its discretion deems proper.

25

26

repre~entative

3.
The Trustee may make any payments directly or to a personal
or other fiduciary and shall be under no duty to see to the application of an funds

so paId.

27

'-,
.... ..

' .."\'.;.:'
\ ;.:.
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IV.

DISPOSITJON OF TRUST ASSETS UPON DEATB
DEA TB OF GRANTOR:

TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAILE
EAGLE, IDAHO
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The Trustee shall hold, manage, imst and reinvest the Trust Estate and shall collect
and receive the interest, income of profits li ,erefrom
lerefrom for the benefit of Grantor for the life of
2 Grantor and thereafter and upon the death of the Grantor the corpus of the trust and all income
and interest acquired hereafter, shall be held, applied and distributed in the following manner:
3
a. After the death of Grantor, the Trustee shall hold, manage and control the
4 property comprising the trust estate for the benefit of the HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL
FISHER (20%); BETTY FARNWORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving
5 issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), as follows:

6

7
8

9

10

11
12
13

14

~15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

o( the trust estate shall be distributed immediately !JQon
(20~) o(the
Twenty percent (20ro)
Grantor's death to the sUrvlvmg Issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RlCHARD B.
rueces or nephews born the
JOHNSON, share and share alike. In the event any of Grantor's nieces
issue of RICHARD B. JOHNSON; should fail to survive the death of Grantor, and leaves issue
then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike in the share of the
predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive.
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of HELEN
remrurung portion shall be distributed to her issue share
TAYLOR and u20n her death then the remaining
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of HELEN
TAYLOR, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share
alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive.
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of HAZEL
shaU be distributed to her issue share
FISHER and upon her death then the remaining portion shalJ
frul to survive the death of HAZEL
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail
FISHER, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and sha.re alike
pred eceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive.
in the share of the predeceased
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shaIl be held in trust for the lifetime of BETTY
F
ARNWOR TH and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to hf!r
h(~r issue
FARNWORTH
share and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of BETTY
FARNWORTH, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and
share alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive.
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of JOYCE
SELLEY and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of JOYCE
SELLEY, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive.
Ha:zel Fisher Bett
Jo 'ce
Ice
Discretiona Pa ents to Helen Tavlor Ha:zeJ
Bea Famwort and 10
Selley: The Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Helen Taylor, Hazel Fisher, ~etty
Farnworth, and Joyce Selley such sums from the income of their 20% share of the corpus of the
trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance, education, support and health of the
said beneficiary during their lifetime. The balance of the income of their respective trust not so
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal thereof at the ena of each fiscal year
of the trust.

25
26

oftrus
A. Income for Grantor's life: The Trustee shall distribute all of the income of
this
Trust in convenient installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually, to or for the
benefit of Grantor, so long as he shall live.

27

~

28

B. Use of Principal for Grantor's life: So long as Grantor is living, the Trustee, in
the sale exercise of the Trustee's discretion, shall distribute to or for the benefit of Grantor, so
TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAll.E
EAGLE, IDAHO
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much of the principal of this Trust as Tru~'ee shall deem necessary or desirable for his proper
heath, education, maintenance and support.
support

2
3

4

5
6
7

C. Creation of Beneficiaries' Issues Trusts if Issue are under the age of 35 years of
age: After the death of HELEN TAYLOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH;
. JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B.
JOHNSON, andlor
and/or in the event any such beneficiary fails to survive Grantor's death and leaves
issue who have not attained the age of thirty-five (35) years, the Trustee shall immediately
divide all of the remaining principal and undistributed income of this trust into as many equal
shares as represent the surviving issue of said beneficiaries, one share to each, per stirpes, and
the Trustee shall establish a separate trust (except as to the share of any issue then thirty-five
(35) years of age or Older)
older) for each issue then living and one for the issue of each deceased
issue, to be held and distnbuted as follows:

1. Distribution When Separate Trusts for Issue Created. If any issue of HELEN
TAYLOR;
TAnOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving
9 issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON shall not have attained the
age of twenty-five (25) years at the time of distribution of their respective share of the principal
10 of this trust IS to conveyed to said issue, the Trustee shall immediately thereafter distribute
absolutely to such issue one tmrd
particular share; If any issue shall have
third (1/3) ofms
of his or her panicular
11 attained the age of thirty (30) years at such time, the Trustee shall distribute absolutely to such
issue one third (1/3) of his or her share; and if any issue shall have attained the age of thirty-five
12 (35) years at such tIme, the Trustee shall distribute absoluteJy to such issue all of his or her
share.
8

13

-.,W
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2. Distribution oflncome and Principal for issue. The Trustee shall distribute to or
for the benefit of each issue all of the income derived from his
ms or her particular share. In
addition, the Trustee, at any time and from time to time, shall distribute to or for the benefit of
his or her share as the Trustee, in the
each issue so much or all or none of the principal of
ofms
Trustee's absolute discretion, shall deem necessary or desirable for the p'roper health, education,
Funher, the Trustee shall distnbute absolutely to or for
maintenance and support of such issue. Further,
his or her share when such Issue
the benefit for any issue one-third (1/3) of the principal of
ofms
attains the age of twenty-five (25), one third (1/3) of the remaining principal when such issue
attains the age of thirty (30) years, and the remaining principal and undistributed income of his
or her share when such issue attains the age of thirty-five (35) years.
3. Distribution to Issue of Beneficiaries. Exceet as herein provided, if a share of this
trust is at any time set apart for surviving issue of Grantor s deceased Beneficiaries above
named, such share shall De immediately aistributed absolutely to such issue, free and dear of
any trust unless said issue is under the age of thirty-five 05) years of age.
4. Distribution Upon Death of Issue. Should any issue of any of the abOVI~
abovl~
his or her share has been distributed absolutely
referenced beneficiaries die before ms
abso]utely to him or her,
the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such share shall
shal] be distributed, upon
the death of the issue, absolutely to his or her then living issue,per stirpes. In the event there
are no such issue then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of the share
of the deceased issue shall be divided among the other beneficiaries above referenced or their
living issue, per stirpes; any portion thereof so divided and set apart for any issue who is the
beneficiary of a share of this trust which has not yet been fully dIstributed shall be added to the
principal of such share and held in further trusts and managed and distributed as a part thereof
under the tenns of this Article; and any portion thereof set apart for any issue who is the
which has been fully distributed shall be distributed absolutely
beneficiary of a share of this trust wmch
to such issue. In the event an of the beneficiary's last surviving issue shall die before the entire
share set apart for such issue has been distributed absolutely to him or her and none of other
beneficiaries issue are then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such
TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAlLE
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share shall be distributed as follows:
100% thereof to: The lawful heirs of Grantor consistent with the laws of intestate Succession
under the Laws of the State of Idaho.
5.
Retention for Minors. In the event any beneficiary of the trusts created
hereunder has not attained majority at the time a share thereof is required under the terms
hereof to be distributed absolutely to such beneficiary, the Trustee, In the Trustee's absolute
discretion, may retain the share of such minor beneficiary in further trust until he or shf~ attains
majority. In such event and during such time, the Trustee shall distribute to or for the benefit of
such beneficiary so much of the income and principal of such beneficiary's particular share as
the Trustee, in the Trustee's absolute discretlOn, shall deem necessary or desirable to provide
suPPc:>rt of such beneficiary; any incc~me from
for the proper healt.h, ~ducation,
~ducation, maintenance and suppc;>rt
such share not so dIstrIbuted
fIscal year
dlsttlbuted shall be added to the pnnclpal thereof at the end of each flSCal
of the trust. At the time such beneficiary attains majority, or upon is or her death, whichever
occurs first, the trust shall terminate as to such beneficiary's particular share, and the then
remaining principal and undistributed income thereof shaII
shaH be distributed absolutely, fn::e and
clear of any trust, to such beneficiary, or, if such beneficiary is then deceased, to hiS or her
estate.

D. PERPETUITIES AND ALIENATION:
a. The absolute power of alienation of real property in the State ofIdaho shall
not be suspended by an provision of this trust agreement for'a period longer than the
continuance of the lives of the persons in being at the creation of any such limitation or
condition and twenty-five (25) years thereafter. This trust agreement shall be construed to
eliminate or modify any provisions violating the fore~oing
maruler so
fore~oing sentence, but in such a manIler
that the provisions of this trust agreement are carriea out to the greatest extent possible.
b. As to real property which is not in the State ofIdaho, each trust's interest
inlerest in
(21) years after the death of the last survivor of
such real property shall termmate twenty-one (2])
liVlng at the time of the death of the last Grantor
such of the beneficiaries thereunder as shall be liV1ng
to die, and thereupon such real property which is not in the State ofIdaho shall be distributed,
discharged of trust, to the persons then entitled to the income of such real property in the
proponlOns to which they are entitled to the income.
E. CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTIONS: Unless otherwise specifically stated, all
distributions, whether of trust income or principal, shall be the separate property of each
individual distributee. All income, rents, Issues, profits, gains and appreciatlOn of property
distributed to each individual distributee as separate property, shall also be the separate
property of each such distributee.

F. SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION: Neither the principal nor the income of any
trust herein created shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary or issue of a beneficiary, nor
shall the same be subject to seizure by any creditor under the writ of proceedi
pro ceedi mrs at law or in
equity, nor bankruptcy proceedings, nor other legal process. No beneficiary otissue of a
beneficiary, shall have the power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to
anticipate disposition of his or her interest in the trust estate or the income produced thereby.
As used in this paragraph, the word beneficiary shall refer to any individual having a be:neficial
interest in the trust and not merely to an indiVidual that the trust may specifIcally
specifically Identify as a
"benefIciary. "
"beneficiary.
G. TRANSACTIONS '\11TH GRANTOR'S ESTATE: Upon the death of Grantor
or any beneficiary the Trustee may, ifit deems such action necessary or advisable for the
protection of the estate of the deceased Grantor or beneficiary, or in the best interests of any
TRUST AGREEIvlENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAILE
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.such estate or this trust and its beneficiaries: (a) purchase securities and other property from
.such
the legal representative of such estate and retain such property as part of the trust estate, or (b)
2 made secured or unsecured loans to the legal representative of any such estate. The Trustee
shall bear no liability for any loss resulting to the trust estate by reason of any such purchase or
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DJRECTION BY GRANTOR: The Grantor, during his lifetime,
loan. H INVESTMENT DlRECTION
reserve the righ{
righf to direct the investment of the trust estate. The Trustee shall not be liable for
any investments made at the direction of the Grantor or of the surviving Grantor in accordance
with the foregoing provisions.
VI.. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE: Should THEODORE L. JOHNSON, be unable or unwilling
for any reason to continue to act as Trustee, ANDREW and BETH ROGERS, husband and
wife shall become co-successor Trustee of this trust and shall have all authority herein granted
to the "Trustee." Should ANDREW and BETH ROGERS be unable or unwilling for any
GARTII FISHER shall become Successor
reason to act or continue to act as Co-Trustees, GARlli
Trustee of this Trust and shall have all authority herein granted to the "Trustee".
VII. POWERS OF TRUSTEE: To cany out the purposes of the trust created under this
limitatlOns stated elsewhere in this Trust, the Trustee is
Trust Agreement, and subject to any limitatIOns
vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in addition
to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law.
1.
To manage, control, convey, exchange, partition, divide, improve and nepair
trust property.
tenns within or be'yond the term
tenn of the trust;
2.
To lease trust property for terms
3.
To borrow money, and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage,
otherwIse, provided sufficient security to manage the trust property.
deed of trust, pledge, or otherwlse,
4.
To carry, at the expense of the trust, sufficient Insurance m such kinds and in
such amounts as the Trustee shall deem advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee
.
against any hazard;
5.
To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust of any property
of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust;
6.
To compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigations against or in favor
of the trust;
.
. 7.
To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, real, Rersonal or
mixed, and every kind of investments, specifically including, but not by way of limitation,
corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, common or preferred, shares of investment trusts,
prudence ,
investment companies, and mutual funds, and mortgage participation, which men of prudence,
discretion, and to manage the trust property. However, that so long as an income beneficiary is
also acting as Trustee herein, he shall
sheill not invest in any wasting assets; provided further that
Ijfetime of Grantor no real property or other investments shall be sold, traded or
during the lifetime
disposed of without the written consent of Grantor.
8.
With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers, and
privileges of an owner, mcluding, but not by way of limitation, the power ofvotmg, give
proxies, any pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures,
reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales, and leases, and incident to such
partIcipation
partlcipation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on
such terms
tenns as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscription or
conversion rights.
9.
In any case in which the Trustee is required, pursuant to the provisions of the
trust, t divide any trust property into parts or shares for the pU!]Jose
pUl]Jose of distnbution, or
otherwise, the Trustee lS
m the Trustee's absolute dIscretion,
lS authorized, In
dlscretion, to make the division
and distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kind and partly
in money, and for this purpose 10 make such sales of the trust propert)' as the Trustee inay
deem necessary on such tenns and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit.
TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. MAIT..E
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.VIII . BENEFICIARY STATUS:
1 .VIII.
A.
Upon the death of any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held, any accrued or
2 undistributed net income thereon shall be held and accounted for, or distributed, in the same
manner as if it had been accrued or received after the death of such beneficiary.
B.
Any instrument executed by the Trustee shall be binding on all parties hereto and
3
on all beneficiaries hereunder. No person paying money to the Trustee need see to the
4 application of the money so paid.
C.
The interest of any beneficiary in principal or income of this Trust shall not be
5 subject to claims of his or her creditors or others, or liable to attachment, execution or other
process of law,
Jaw, and no beneficiary shall have any right to encumber, hypothecate or alit~nate
a1it~nate his
6 or her interest in this Trust in any manner, except as provided for elsewhere herein. The
Trustee may, however, deposit in any bank deSIgnated in writing by a beneficiary to his or her
7 credit, income or principal payable to such beneficiary.

.~

8

IX.

9

sha11 pay from income or principal of the Trust Estate or partly from
The Trustee shall
each, in his discretion, all expenses, incurred in the administration of the Trust and the
protection of this Trust against legal attack, including counsel fees and a reasonable
compensation for his own services as such Trustee, which compensation and expenses
constitute a first lien on the Trust Estate.

]0
11
II

12
13

14

-.,15
-.,15

16

TRUSTEE TO PAY CERTAIN EXPENSES:

AMENDMENT AND REVOCA nON: The Grantor may at any time during his life
amend any of the provisions of this trust agreement by an instrument signed by Grantor and
delivered to the Trustee. During the life of the Grantor, the trust created by this agreement may
deltvered to the
be revoked in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantor and delIvered
Trustee. Upon revocation, the Trustee shall distribute all or the designated portion of the
property to the Grantor.
X.

XI.
TRUST TITLE: This Trust shall be known and referred to as the THEODORE L.
JOHNSON TRUST and shall be administered under the laws of the State ofIdaho.

XIl CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENT: The headings and subheadings used throughout
this Agreement are for convenience only and have no significance in the interpretation oftne
] 8 body of this Agreement, and the Grantor directs that they be disregarded in construing the
provisions of this Agreement.
]9
17

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, THEODORE L. JOHNSON, as Grantor of the foregoing

20

Trust Agreement, have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date aforesaid.

21
22
23

24
25

26

-.,.
-.,'

27

Witness:

28
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The undersigned hereby accepts the trusts imposed by the foregoing Trust Agreement and
agrees to serve as Trustee upon the terms and conditions therein set forth.

4

5

Signed, sealed and delivered
in the presence of:

6

,
~
~L.
)
-,trUStee
~L.J~tee
of THEODORE JOHNSON

7
8

~.

REVOCABLE TRUST

9
]0

Witness:

11

':~;?j?
Q./1~a.
.--:../-.__
-- -

]2

t.

]3

Witness:
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ATE OF IDAHO )
STATE

~

County of A d a ))ss.

.,

Lo/~'.t~, ,
Lo/~'.t~,

1997, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
,1997,
On this -!- day of
Public in and for said State, personiffy appeared THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person,
known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed in the instrument, and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN 'WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
day and year in this certificate first above written.
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SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTY
I Theodore L. Johnson, a single person, Grantor, do hereby quitclaim, convey and
L. Johnson Revocable Trust dated the
transfer to the Theodore 1.
day of November, :I 997, all
reruproperty, to-wit:
of his right title and interest in and to the following described reaf"Property,

4

Parcel I:

5

Government Lot 5 and the Southeast 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 6,
Township 4 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

6

Parcel II:

7

The Northwest Y2
Y:2 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range :I
West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

8
9

L. Johnson
In addition the I provide the following conveyance to the Theodore 1.
] 997 the following personal property, to wit:
Revocable Trust dated the 4th
4lh day of November, ]997

10
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~~~~
DOREr. J
sON
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STATE
ST ATE OF IDAHO

County of Ada
/ /
On thls
t~s ~ day of U
~ ,1997, before me, the undersigned, a
U~
Notary Public in and for said
sald State, personally appeared THEODORE 1.
L. JOHNSON, known or
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal in said
County the date and year first above written.
'. /
.
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
This Agreement is made effective as of September _ , 2005, between Crandall
L. Jolmson Revocable Trust, and John, Reed and
Law Office ("Buyer"), and the Theodore 1.
Da11an Taylor, as co-trustees of the estate ("Sellers").
Dallan
The parties agree as follows:

1.

PURCHASE AND SALE OF PROPERTY.

1.1
Property. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers
se11 to Buyer and Buyer shall purchase the following real property and other assets (the
shall sell
"Property"): The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North,
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho known as 3900 Linder Road. The size of the
acres,
property is approximately plus or minus 40 acres.
1.2
Purchase Price Amount. The purchase price for the Property is One Million
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars
Do11ars ($1,800,000.00) (the "Purchase Price").
sha11 be paid as follows: Eamest
1.3
Purchase Price Payment. The Purchase Price shall
Money Deposit. Upon the execution of this Agreement by the Buyer and the Sellers, the Buyer
shall deposit in escrow at Title One Title Insurance Company, Eagle, Idaho ("Closing Agent"),
earnest money in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be held for the benefit of
the Buyer and the Sellers. Such deposit shall be returned by the Closing Agent to the Buyer if
this Agreement does not close because of (i) the failure of a condition precedent" or (ii) any
reason not the fault of the Buyer. If this Agreement does not close because of any reason not
a11 earnest money shall be paid by the Closing Agent to the
specified in the preceding sentence, all
Se11ers
Sellers as the agreed liquidated damages which shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the
Se11ers. The balance of the purchase price shall
sha11 be paid in immediately available funds delivered
Sellers.
at Closing to Closing Agent.
.-

Conveyance of Title. Title to the Real Property shall be conveyed by a General
1.4
Warranty Deed. Title to the Property shall be marketable and insurable and shall be free and
clear of all liens, encumbrances, and restrictions, exclusive of (i) real property taxes for the
current year which are not due and payable on or before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances,
and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on or before Closing.
Tide Insurance.
Upon the acceptance of this Agreement by the Sellers,
Se11ers, the
1.5
Title
Buyer, for the account of the Sellers, shall
sha11 order a Commitment for Title Insurance
("Commitment") issued by Title One ("Title Company"), covering the Propel1y. If any
exceptions shown on the Commitment are not approved in writing by the Buyer prior to Closing
and cannot be removed by the Sellers by Closing, then the Buyer shall have the right to
terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money deposited shall be refunded to the
Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged from any further obligations under
this Agreement.
At Closing, the Sellers shall purchase and deliver to the Buyer an ALTA
Owner's Policy title insurance policy ("Policy") satisfying the following specifications: The
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - I
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Policy shall name the Buyer as the insured in the amount of the Purchase Price. The Policy
shall insure the Buyer as the owner of the Property, subject only to the following special
exceptions: (i) real property taxes for the current~ar which are not. due and payable on or
before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, and conditions accepted in writing by-'flieBuyeron
bY-'flieHuyeronor before Closing. The Policy shall include the following endorsements: (I) an endorsement
deleting the general exceptions to the Policy, (ii) an endorsement insuring that each street
adjacent to the Real Property is a public street and there is direct and unencumbered pedestrian
and vehicular access to such street from the Property, and (iii) an endorsement insuring that
there are no encroachments by or onto the Property with respect to property, easement, or
setback lines.
1.6
Closing.

Possession. Sellers shall deliver actual possession of the Property to Buyer at

1.
7
Risk of Loss. Until Closing, the Sellers shall assume all risk of loss or damage
1.7
with respect to the Property. In the event of any loss or damage to all or any part of the Property,
the, Buyer shall have the right to (i) terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money
deposited shall be refunded to the Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged
from any further obligations under this Agreement, (ii) close the purchase of the Property and
reduce the Purchase Price by an equitable amount equal to the loss or damage, such reduction to
be applied first to the cash payment at Closing to be delivered at Closing, or (iii) close the
purchase of the Property and elect to receive all insurance proceeds paid or payable by reason of
damage..
the loss or damage
. 1.8
Prorated Items. The following items shall be prorated as of Closing: (i) taxes
and water assessments using the last assessments available prior to Closing; (ii) rents; and
(iii) utilities.
1.9
Time for Acceptance. This Agreement shall be null and void and of no force or
effect unless a fully executed original of this Agreement is delivered to and received by the
Buyer on ot
or before September _,2005.

2.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND COVENANTS OF THE SELLER.
The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants with, the Buyer as follows:

Authority
2.1
Authorit)' of the Sel1ers.
Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of this
Agreement by the Sellers has been duly approved in accordance with applicable law and any
documents or instruments governing the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of
this Agreement by the Sellers will not cause the Sellers to be in violation or breach of any law,
regulation, contract, agreement, or other restriction to or by which the Sellers or the Property is
subject or bound. If the Sellers are a corporation, the Sellers, at Closing, shall provide to the
Buyer (i) a certificate from the State of Idaho dated not more than 45 days prior to Closing
indicating that the Sellers are in good standing and qualified to do business in Idaho, and
(ii) resolutions of the board of directors of the Sellers authorizing and approving this Agreement
and the transactions contemplated hereby. If the Sellers are a partnership, the Sellers, at Closing,
shall provide to the Buyer resolutions of the partners of the Sellers authorizing and approving
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby.
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 2
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2.2
Property Ownership. The Sellers own and possess all right, title, and interest in
and to the Property free and clear of all covenants, conditions, easements, liens, and
encumbrances.
2.3
Condition of Property. All of the Property, including, but not limited to,
parking areas, landscape areas, sprinkler system(s), structural components, electrical, plumbing,
heating and air conditioning systems, is in good operating condition and repair, subject only to
routine maintenance.
2.4
Material Misstatement or Omissions. No representation or warranty made by
the Sellers in this Agreement or .in any document or agreement furnished in connecti.on with this
Agreement contains or will contain any untrue statement ofmaterial
of material fact, or omits or will omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading.
2.5
No Default. The Sellers are not in default under the terms of any contract,
agreement, lease, license or other understanding, and no condition or event has occurred which,
after notice, the passage of time, or otherwise, would constitute a default under or breach of any
such terms. The Sellers are not aware of any condition that will result in a default under any
such terms.
2.6
Broker Fees. Except as disclosed in writing to the Buyer prior to Closing, the
Sellers are not obligated to pay any fee or commission to any broker, finder, or intelmediary for
or on account of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
2.7
Information to be Provided. Within ten (l0)
(10) business days after the date this
Agreement is accepted by the Sellers, the Sellers shall deliver to the Buyer the following: All
contracts of any kind or nature which shall survive the Closing and which relate to the Property;
A copy of all leases relating to the Property, together with any amendments to such leases; A
copy of any and all licenses, certificates, permits, approvals, conditions or similar items, in the
Sellers' possession relating to all or any portion of the Property.
2.8
Conduct Pending Closing. From the effective date of this Agreement to
Closing, the Sellers shall (i) maintain the Property in good repair and in a broom clean condition,
(ii) continue to operate the Property in the manner previously operated by the Sellers, (iii) not
enter into any contracts or purchase orders relating to the Property, and (iv) perform all acts
necessary to insure that the representations, warranties, and covenants of the Sellers shall be true,
complete, and accurate in all respects on and as of the date of closing to the same force and
effect as if made at Closing.

Access to Property. After the Sellers' acceptance of this Agreement, the Buyer
2.9
and the Buyer's authorized representatives shall have reasonable access to the Property for
inspection.
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES.
The terms "hazardous substance," "rdease," and
3.
"removal" shall have the definition and meaning as set forth in Title 42 U.S. C. 9601 (or
corresponding provision of any future law); provided, however that the term "hazardous
substance" shall include "hazardous waste" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6903 (or cOlTesponding
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 3

Doug's clients\OfficeVohnson Trust Real Estate Agreement

001071

provision of any future law) and "petroleum" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6991 (or
corresponding provision of any future law). The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants
with, the Buyer that: the Property is not contaminated with any hazardous substance, the
Sellers have not caused and will not cause the release of any hazardous substcIDces on the
Property, there is no asbestos on the Property, and there is no underground storage tank on the
Property.

4.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING. The obligations of the Buyer under
this Agreement are, at Buyer's option, subject to the satisfaction of the following conditions:

4.1
The representations and warranties of the Sellers are true, complete, and accurate
as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date of Closing as if made as of such date.
4.2
The Sellers have performed all obligations, covenants and agreements to be
performed prior to Closing as set forth in this Agreement.
4.3
The Title Company is prepared to issue a policy in accordance with this
agreement. The Sellers shall have executed and delivered to the Closing Agent the Warranty
Deed and same is recorded.
4.4
The Buyer has obtained financing (effective to the date of Closing) from a bank
or other financial institution, for a loan of $1,500,000.00, bearing interest at a fixed rate of not
more than six and one-half percent (6 1''l'2 %) per annum, with a maximum of one (1) point
payable at funding. The loan shall be repayable in monthly installments of principal and interest
amortized over a thirty (30) year term.

4.5
The Buyer has obtained an appraisal of the Property indicating that the fair
market value of the Property is not less than the Purchase Price. The Buyer has obtained, at the
Buyer's sole cost, an inspection of the Property, including, without limitation, parking areas,
landscape areas, sprinkler systems, structural components, electrical, plumbing, heating and air
conditioning systems and roofs and has approved the condition of the Property, in Buyer's sole
discretion.

4.6
That the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust has been awarded through
successful negotiation, settlement or litigation, clear and unencumbered title to the property set
forth in paragraph 1.1 of this Agreement.
4.7
The Sellers deliver to the Buyer an affidavit executed by the Sellers under penalty
of perjury that provides the Sellers' United States taxpayer identification number, and states that
the Sellers are not foreign persons.

5.
CLOSING. The Closing Agent for this Agreement shall be Title One Title Insurance
Company. ("Closing Agent"). Buyer and the Sellers shall each pay one-half of the Closing
Agent's Closing Fees at Closing.
Closing shall be at the offices of the Closing Agent on
Explorer Drive in Eagle, Idaho on November 3, 2005, or at such other time, date, and place as
may be mutually agreed between Sellers and Buyer. Buyer and Sellers shall execute and deliver
to the Closing Agent instructions on the form generally provided by the Closing Agent with such
modifications as are reasonably made by the Buyer.
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 4

Doug's cJients\Office\Johnson Trust Real Estate Agreement
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6.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

6.1
All notices, claims, requests and other communications ("Notices") under this
Agreement (i) shall be in writing, and (ii) shall be addressed or delivered to the rele:vant address
set forth in Section 7 below or at such other address as shall be given in writing by a party to the
other. Notices complying with the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have been
delivered (1) upon the date of delivery if delivered in person, or (ii) on the date of the postmark
on the return receipt if deposited in the United States Mail, with postage prepaid for certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested.
6.2
The Parties agree that if a party is in default under this Agreement, then such
party shall pay to the other party (a) reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses
incurred by the other party after default and referral to an attorney, (b) reasonable attorney fees
and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in any settlement negotiations, and
© reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in preparing
for and prosecuting any suit or action. This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the courts of Idaho shall
have exclusive jurisdiction and agree that Ada County is the proper venue. Time is of the
essence with respect to the obligations to be performed under this Agreement. Except as
expressly provided in this Agreement, and to the extent permitted by law, any remedies
described in this Agreement are cumulative and not alternative to any other remedies available at
law or in equity.· The failure or neglect of a party to enforce any remedy available by reason of
the failure of the other party to observe or perform a term or condition set forth in this
(I) shall
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of such term or condition. A waiver by a party (1)
not affect any term or condition other than the one specified in such waiver, and (ii) shall waive
a specified term or condition only for the time and in a manner specifically stated in the waiver.
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties and
6.3
their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives.
This Agreement,
together with the Exhibits, constitutes the entire agreement among the parties and supersedes all
prior correspondence, conversations and negotiations. The invalidity of any pOJ1ion of this
Agreement, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall not affect the validity of
any other portion of this Agreement.
This Agreement may be executed in one or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall
constitute one and the same instruments. All representations, warranties, and covenants of the
Sellers set forth in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and shall
shaD survive the recording of
the Warranty Deed.

PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 5

Doug's c1ients\OfficeVohnson Trust Real Estate Agreement
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7.

SIGNATURES.

(Print or ype Name) ,

~-],
~-1.

t.f
N.

I

'--l /
--...I

fA,.. ~ "

(City, State and Zip)

SELLER ACCEPTANCE
Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(S ignature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT·- 6

Doug's clients\Office\]ohnson
clients\Office\Johnson Trust Real Estate Agreement
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"

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,, 2005
2005
Dated:
(Signature)
(Signature)
(Print
(Print or
or Type
Type Name)
Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

PURCHASE
PURCHASE AND
AND SALE
SALE AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT -- 77

Doug's clients\OfficeVohnson
clients\OfficeVohnson Trust
Trust Real
Real Estate
Estate Agreement
Agreement
Doug's
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1

2
3
4

/,

PAUL THOMAS CLARK
CLARK and FEENEY
Attomeys for Plaintiffs
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 1329

5
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

6

7
8

9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
)
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
)
)
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Defendants/
Counter-Claimants.
)
)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

TRUST,

18

21
22
23

AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY RUDD

)

Plaintiff,

19

20

Case No. CV OC 0400473D
Case No. CV OC 04-05656D

vs.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY RUDD

co·· y

1
LAW OFFICES OF

EXHIBIT "D"

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 133501
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STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Nez Perce

)
) ss.
)

2
Terry Rudd, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says:

3
1. I am a Certified General Appraiser, and have been licensed as an appraiser since 1965.

4

5

2. I am attaching a tme and correct copy of my September 22,2004, appraisal of the Linder

6

Road property which Berkshire Investments LLC purchased from the Theodore Johnson Revocable

7

Trust.

8
9
10

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this {;::,
{;~ day of November, 2004.
",-,,--'~

.-." -_._ ...

~-,,~~~-:;;=~

11

12
L

Terry Rudd.. - --- .....- - - - -

13
14

..

~-'~ ~--~._-----

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Q3

day of November, 2004.

15
16
Notary Publi
Residing at ---l.L~'-!.....L.Ln~.....!:....lo~~-=....J.L~.t.!.....L..L.:::..-f..-!.~..l...-..".....",.--_. '
My commission expires: -¥C--I-'-=..,.L.J.~~--¥C-J.'-=.....L.)~~--

17

18
19

I

I

20

21
22

23
24

25
26

AFFIDA
VlT OF TERRY RUDD
AFFIDAVlT

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
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LEWISTON. IDAHO 8:3501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1
2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofNovember,
of November, 2004, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

3
4

5
6

7

8
9

10
11

~

Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State
ID 83616
Eagle, ill

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

~ U.S. Mail

Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouster
P.O. Box 2837
ID 83702
Boise, ill

D
D
D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

~.S.Mail

Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
P.O. Box 7426
ID 83707-7426
Boise, ill

D
D
D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

AFFIDA VIT OF TERRY RUDD
AFFIDAVIT

3
LAW OFFJCES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 8:3501001078

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

APPRAISAL REPORT
FEE SIMPLE INTEREST
REPO:R~T
COMPLETE APPRAISAL-RESTRICTED-USE REPO:R~T
Theodore Johnson Trust Property

LOCATED AT
Linder Rd.
Eagle,ID

APPRAISED FOR
Connie W. Taylor, Attorney
Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID
83501

CASE
Taylor vs. Maile

DA TE VALUE EFFECTIVE
July 10, 2002

PREPARED DA TE
September 22, 2004

I

I
PREPARED BY
PREPAREUBY

•

TERRY R. RUDD, MAl
RUDD APPRAISALS
2901 PERRY LANE
CLARKSTON, WA 99403

(5°~)tJ~h3 rl"

(5o~}tE
_'.fS.._,!"~_~~"
.,.,~ . ~
001079
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''TERRY RUDD,
ROOD, MAl

Connie W. Taylor, Attorney
Drawer 285
Lewiston, 10 83501
RE:

Taylor vs. Maile
Theodore L. Johnson Trust Property
Linder Rd.
Eagle, 10

In accordance with your request, I performed a Limited Appraisal of the
above referenced property as retained The intended u~e of this report is,
for internal analysis purposes to determine the value ,'of the property in
question. Therefore, I am able to report the conclusions to you in a
Restricted-Use format, as you are the only intended user of this report. A
self-contained report will be prepared before trial.
This report intends to inform you of my findings in a brief manner. I
researched the local market for comparable sales- not only in physical
comparison but similar appraisal date as the Knipe et. al. report and
subsequent acquisition by Thomas Maile. I provided the results to you
verbally (as permitted) on 9/15/04 along with a critique of the Knipe report.
You are already aware of the subject property's characteristics and realize
that it is located just inside the minimum 5 acre (subdivided lot) zone.
Properties to the west are limited by a 10 acre lot minimum. Everyone I
talked with knows that there is a strong market for properties like this
today- as well as in 2002; including realtors Dennis McCracken and Craig
Van England of Sel Equity, Jack Kramer of Group One/Eagle, Ned Hansen
st
riCk Sweeney of the
of Century 21 1 place, Mike Sety of ReMax Boise, ~iCk
Preferred Company and Betty Holton of Keller Willi ms Realty. The list
also includes the other buyers I1 spoke with that wi I be included in the
transaction presentations of the final report.

2901 PERRY LANE 509-758-3515
CLARKSTON, WASHiNGTON FAX 509-758-0629
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Essentially the sales fall into two categories. The first one is home site
acreages; 5 acre sites with proposed well and septic, but available
irrigation, power, phone and road access including smaller sites down to 2
acres plus typical urban lots in subdivisions with central water and sewage.

The second category of properties being actively bought and sold are
larger acreages like the subject. The purpose of most such investors is to
subdivide into smaller home site parcels which are bringing very high
prices.
Supporting this market are historically low interest rates and liberal
mortgages for new home construction- plus the ever expanding housing
demand in the Boise basin. The subject direction of Boise's expansion is
fueled by good existing roads, easily developable soil, permissive zoning,
available irrigation water, and pastoral/mountain views.

I valued the subject by two market approaches: larger acreage
comparables and smaller home site sales. After investigating the sales and
arriving at prices per acre, I reflected the breakdown prices to the subject
in a comparable sales grid. That grid includes the most similar sales and
adjusts for differences. to the subject
sUbject in time, location, size and utility
(development capability).
Time adjustments were small since the sales were matched to the
appraisal date. A rate of 3% per year was obtained from Realtors and the
Knipe report. Locale adjustments were based on demonstrated market

desirability, general access and potential development changes. Size
factors were based on a corrective grap~lic analysis of sales diffe!ring in
size. This differs from the erroneous presentation in the Knipe report. Utility
adjustments included differences in zoning development potential,
improvements, water, septic, sewer, road access, etc. The resultant
graphic will be in the final report.
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Acreage Approach
A quick summary of the best sales developed includes:
Sale1) 10.50 acres sold 9/05/02 from Belau to Mahaffey for $283,500
about 5 miles east of the subject just above Beacon Light on Ballantyne. It
was on the market in July '02 which fits for time. It indicates $26,952 per
acre which I had to decrease for size (refer to graph study in addenda).
Adjusted price reflects to the subject.................. ...... $21,562 per acre
Sale 2) 77.9 acres sold 2/24/03 from Harney to SAF, LLC. For $1150,000
about 1 mile south of the subject at the northeast corner of Linder and
Floating Feather. It was on the market for over 10 months which easily
places it in the subject time frame. It indicated ·$20,~36 per acre and.
adjusting up for size but down for being closer to s~\Ner.
s~\Ner. The adjusted
reflection to the subject is ... ............ ......,. ... ............. :$20,126 per acre
Sale 3) 15.50 acres sold 5/13/03 from Gray Trust to J & G Development
less than 4 miles southwest of the subject just outside of Star for $387,500,
indicating $25,000 per acre. It was on the market over 2 years which
places it in the subject time frame. It's been re-zoned for more int,ensive
development and has a better sewer chance, requiring a downward
adjustment in utility.
The adjusted price to the subject is......
is... ... ... ... ... ... ... .....

$19,000 per acre

Subject Value by Acreage Sales:

Using three sales (and supported by several others) reflects a value of the
subject at: $20,300 per acre x 40.00 acres
$812,000
.$812,000

=

I

Subdivision Approach

I

The second avenue I applied was that of home site acreages, applying
discounts for subdivision development per the size study:
Sale 6) 5.00 acres was sold 6/24/02 for $147,900 about 2 miles southwest
of the subject on Longhorn off Highway 44 reflecting $29,580 per acre. The
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only adjustment needed was for size which brought the subject reflection
down to ............................................................... $ 19,522 pe'r acre
Sale 7) 5.01 acres was sold 6/24/02 about 2 miles northeast of the subject
for $207,000 indicating $41,317 per acre. After deducting for barn and well,
a significant size adjustment brings the subject value re"nection
down to ...... ... .................. ......... ... ... ...... ............ $19,419 per acre
Sale 8) 5.00 acres was sold 2/21/03 but was on the market for 140 days
inciicating
placing it near the subject time frame. It sold for $210,000 indicating
Ught near Eagle requiring a down
$42,000 per acre. It's located on Beacon Light
correctioln. The
adjustment in location as well as size and minor time correction.
, . $23,100 per acre
reflected subject value is ................................... ,.
Subject Value by Home Site Sales:
Using the three sales presented (supported by more than 30 others)
reflects $20,700 per acre x 40.00 acres =
$828,000.
Final Subject Value
The correlated and concluded estimate weighting both approaches is
is$820,000
1820,000

The appraisal conforms to the minimum standards of USPAP (Uniform
Standards of the Professional Appraisal Practice). As permitted by the
Appraisal Institute, I invoked the Departure Provision as provided within
Standard Rule 2-2 (b) addressing reporting requirements. The summary
discussions of data, reasoning and analyses were intended to be concise,
no more than the requirements stated, for your intended use as loan
collateral. All file information has been retained and available further
review upon request.
I further certify that I have enlisted no assistance nor taken instruction as to
technique, analysis, opinion, or value conclusion other than my own in this
assignment. The value estimate is based on highest and best use of the
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subject and includes real property, land, improvements, and affixed
appurtenances.
No unrealistic assumptions are presented as basis for value presentation.
The value estimate was based on the current market and existing condition
of the improvements. No inventory, business goodwill or blue sl<y was
included in the value estimate. However, all appurtenant equipment
necessary to the current operation of the property was included. It was
also assumed that favorable loan financing may be in place and available
to any new ownership.
The information gathered was deemed pertinent and correct except as
sUbstantiate .
noted. Sufficient data from the marketplace was gathered to substantiate
the market analysis. Data sources were referenced and the Assumptions
and Limiting Conditions adjusted as necessary in the I following pages. I·
included a certification and Curriculum Vitae. I also treated this appraisal
confidentially and have not disclosed this assignment to: any other parties.
Regarding the Competency Provision now required by USPAP, I have
included an in-depth review of my qualifications in the Curriculum Vitae. I
began appraising in 1956 for the Department of Agriculture in Entlerprise
Ent~3rprise
Oregon. In 1963 I founded a private company which eventually appraised
all types of properties throughout the United States. In 1987 I sold that
company and continued to appraise independently with two assistants. I
am licensed to appraise property in the States of Idaho, Washington, and
Oregon, and have appraised a number of properties similar to the subject.
I further certify, as indicated in the Assumptions and Limiting Conditions at
the conclusion of the appraisal, that trlis assignment was not based on a
pE~nding
requested minimum valuation, specific valuation, or approval of pE~nding
action. No pressure was received from any party to the actions pending the
subject property. I also certify that the analyses aQd presentations are
reasonable in light of the information as set forth in! this appraisal. Mark
Rudd assisted in the preparation of this report.
This appraisal presents and supports current market values, though such
transaction would necessarily occur in the future. The required exposure
period could allow for a change in the market by way of economic shift.
The direction of this change cannot be positively identified, but I anticipate
the remainder of the down cycle which began in 1998 to conclude in 2007.
Real estate prices in this trend could retest the lows set in the 1980's.
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This Restricted Appraisal Report sets forth only my conclusion of value. It
is emphasized that this appraisal cannot be understood properly without
supporting documentation retained in my file. No extraordinary
assumptions or hypothetical conditions were implemented. I'm qualified to
perform this appraisal as indicated in the following Curriculum Vitae.

001085

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

"-

. II
,

SJ~

I

Addenda
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CERTIFICA
TION
CERTIFICATION
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct.
The report analyses, opinions and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and
limiting conditions, and are my personal, impartial professional analyses, opinions arld conclusions.
I have no (or the specified, if indicated), present or prospective interest in the property that is the
subject of this report, and I have no (or the specified, as indicated) personal interest or bias with
respect to the parties involved.
My engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing or reporting predetermined
results.
My compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or
reporting of a predetermined value or direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount
of the value opinion, the attainment of stipulated result, or the occurrence of a subsequent event
directly related to the intended use of this appraisal.

II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

My analyses, opinions and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared,
conformity with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.

III
In

I have (or not, as indicated), made a personal inspection of the property that is the subject of this
report. The body of this report contains specific information as to which individuals, if not myself,
made contributions to this appraisal which I relied upon and am fully responsible.
,

No one provided significant real property appraisal assistance to the person signing this certification,
except as otherwise specified or by signature.
I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions
were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the requirements of the Code of
Professional Ethics and the Standards of Professional Practice of the Appraisal Institute.
I certify that the use of this report is subject to the requirements of the Appraisal Institute and to
review by its duly authorized representatives.
As of the date of this report, I, Terry R. Rudd, MAl, have completed the requirements under the
continuing education program of the Appraisal Institute.

----
~------_.

. Rudd, MAl
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A~UMPTIONS AND LIMITING CO~ITIONS

This appraisal is subject to the following assumptions and limiting conditions:
1.
The value herein coincides with the definition of market value presented as defined.
No other value level is intended, unless presented and defined as located.
2.
The subject property was appraised subject to existing easements, restnctIOns,
encumbrances, leases, reservations, covenants, contracts, declarations, special assessments,
ordinances and other specifications known to the appraiser as stated in the appraisal
assignment.
3.
The subject property is assumed to exist under the management of the c:ompetency and
percentage basis stated.
4.
Dimensions, legal descriptions, public record information and on-site;:
on-sitt: investigations
were assumed to present the information as would be found by a prudent marklet partiCipant.
,
5.
The data and conclusions within this appraisal are part of an entirety. No part of this
appraisal is intended to stand out of context. Disclosure of information contained herein is
governed by the By-Laws and Regulations of the Appraisal Institute.
6.
I have no knowledge concerning the presence of any hazardous materials found on the
subject site as of the date of appraisal, except as stated otherwise. However, I have not
conducted any environmental or engineering inspections to determine whether hazardous
conditions or materials exist that were not readily observable from surface conditions or that
would be easily and expectedly discovered by a prudent market investor. .Any hazardous
waste discovered, beyond that presented, could render this appraisal ineffective. Correction
thereof or for any errors found is reserved as a future right by this appraiser.
7.
The maps included in this appraisal have been relied upon in valuing the property.
The engineering survey and conditions presented were relied upon for the conclusions
reached. No remeasurement, verification or lot boundaries or survey of the ac:cess roads and

Y
:lilil ::s ::;r:~::~::::nes that there are no hid~en cIiditions as to ilie
:tilit
fue subsurface
y

conditions of the property that would render it less valua:e
valua1te than presente:d. Again, no
engineering study was performed which might otherwise discover such factors. This also
applies to any possible infestations from insects such as termites, dry rot, water or earth
movement damage not readily apparent upon surface inspection. The property was assumed
to be free of such problems, unless otherwise stated.

9.
This appraiser assumes no responsibility for legal matters affecting the property other
than referenced herein. Nor does this appraiser render any opinion as to the condition of title
other than presented. The title is assumed to be marketable, in the hands of a prudent
001088
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defe~ clear of all liens and encumbran~,
encumbran~, easements, restrictions and
investor, free of defe~
impediments except for those specifically presented in the report.

10.
The property is assumed to be held in responsible ownership, competent management
and available for whatever highest and best use has been projected. With regards to the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) effective January 26, 1992, I have not made a
specific compliance survey in analysis of this property with regards to conformance and
impact on the value level defined. A detailed compliance survey may indicate non
noncompliance and such could have a negative impact on the subject value in its current
condition. The highest and best use presentation, assumes compliance. Testimony or
attendance at any legal hearing or court action is not required by reason of rendering this
appraisal unless arrangements have been made in advance.
11.
The bifurcation of the valuation between land and improvements may present different
figures than that of conjoined use. Separate valuations may have been presented in the
approaches, but such was intended to produce a combined value, unless indicated otherwise.
12.
Information, estimates and opinions furnished the appraiser in the normal investigation
for this report were obtained from sources considered reliable. Any future inaccuracies are
not deemed to present an impact on value until re-assessed by this appraiser.
13.
The final value concluded is based on the parameters stated herein and limited to the
character of the subject property as stated. Any changes in the property's character or the
market within which it exists, including but not limited to physical, functional, economic,
political and/or financial factors, may affect the value conclusion, whether it occurs within a
different time frame or not.
14.
The value estimate presented within this report is based on the stated definition and
market value level compatible with such function as stated. The location of this level, shown
below, identifies itself within the overall subject value range. No liability is assumed for any
misapplication of this value as representing any other level:

x

o
Lower Range

Mid Range

INFINITY
Upper Range

15.
This appraisal addresses the subject value as of the specified date stated. Value ranges
change over time, as well as applications of the levels therein. Thus, the value level defined
and the matching value presented may not reflect other reader's intentions or expectations.
Also, future change by way of the cyclical nature of the markets may change the location of
the range and thus the commensurate value estimate as well.
16.
Regarding proposed improvements, this appraisal is based on the specifications and
cost projections obtained from the responsible parties referenced. While such information is
presumed to be accurate, no means exists to the appraiser to assure such competency or
fulfillment. Therefore, the completion of items according to plans and specifications may not
fulfill the expectations herein and thus could impact the subject value to the degree of
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resultant difference. 1'rre valuation does assume local co~iance with applicable codes,
occupancy and permitted usage.
17.
As a preliminary title report may not have been furnished, it's assume:d that the legal
within, provided by the client or from the courthouse records, matches the lender's intended
collateral. No analysis of any conditions or exceptions otherwise was attempted. No
leasehold interest either positive or negative was considered if the property is not leased. No
detriment of any easements not observable from surface indications was included. The
dimensions, legal description, public record information and on-site investigations were
assumed to present an adequate information base for the appraisal and as would be found by a
prudent market participant.
18.
The maps included in the appraisal are for assistance in comprehending the report
only. No engineering survey of the building or the land was attempted and thus no
assumption or responsibility for discrepancies exists. The structures were measured on the
exterior to the nearest foot (rounded). Interior measurements were made only where room
size entered into the appraisal or unfinished areas were found.
This appraisal addresses the subject value as of the specified date only. Property
19.
values range in cyclical fashion over time, as well as at the present. Values also vary per
management and utilization. Thus, the value level reflected may not indicate: a future user's
intentions or expectations. Furthermore, additional cyclical change of the market may affect
the subject value and thus render the current opinion invalid.
20.
This appraisal, unless otherwise indicated and so adjusted, is based on quiet title and
legal access to the property as physically described. All of the improvements purported to
exist, including the utilities, water and sewage waste systems have not been separately
surveyed. In the absence of an engineering report otherwise, power, phone, TV systems,
public or private water systems, sewer, septic systems and/or drain field are assumed
acceptable to all government authorities as well as the market and subjl;!ct
subjl~ct application.
Additionally, except as indicated herein, all off-site improvements including the access road,
are assumed to be fee simple or permanent easement open to year around ingress and egress.
Topography, drainage, landscaping and any flood potential are acceptable to both federal
agencies, local government, immediate market and full and uninhibited use of the subject

environmentru
::opert:'llun~:::~:di:t::a:~::~~::te:rfO:;::~i::Hve~, Jng willi any environmentill
~th

willi

considerations, zoning variances or additional considerations
regard to local government
requirements are assumed to be in agreement with all local state and f(~deral agencies
involved and find acceptance in the local market as well as being fully aCI:eptable to and
utilized by the subject property. Professional inspections of the property in any category
where additional concerns may exist are recommended, even if no defects have been made
known to the appraiser. This report is not warrantying the condition or status of any physical
or market feature of the subject property. This report is presented exclusively for the sole
purpose of arriving at a present market value.
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22.
It was not inteiMed that this appraisal should serve~ proof of condition or future
expectancy for any of the parties which may be served. This appraisal was prepared for the
exclusive use of the client indicated and may reflect lending guidelines specific only to that
client. Possession of this report, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the right of
publication. Any purchaser that may be involved should be aware that as of 1994, the States
of Idaho and Washington require a "Property Disclosure Form" to be supplied by the grantor.
That form and the answers thereto should be confirmed and verified. I did not receive a copy
and therefore can offer no input, other than that which was relayed to me by the parties
referenced.
23. It is assumed that there is full compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local
environmental regulations and laws. The presence of asbestos, ureaformaldehyde foam
insulation, and other potentially hazardous materials or the existence of underground storage
tanks may affect the value of the property. I am not qualified to detect such. The value
estimate is predicated on the assumption that there are no such materials on or in the property
that would cause a loss in value.
24. This appraisal has been developed under the assumption that there has been no discharge,
dumping, spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage, migration, or storage of hazardous substances
that would adversely affect the value of the subject property. No responsibility is assumed
for any such conditions or for any expertise or engineering knowledge required to discover
them. The client is urged to retain experts in such fields as necessary.
25. Mark Rudd, along with others whether identified herein or not, providl~d assistance in
this appraisal/report. Comparable properties, which' interiors were not observed, were
assumed similar in architecture and condition to their exterior.
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CURRICULUM VITAE
TERRY R. RUDD, MAl
2901 Perry Lane
(Jarkston, VVll,99403
Clarkston,
WA, 99.403
Phone: Direct (509) 758-0629 Office: (509) 758-3515,
Fax: (509) 751-8820 E-Mail: trrndd@imbris.com
EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE:

40 Years Independent Fee Apprais(~r.
Apprais(~r.
5 Years Forest S~rvice
S~rvice Appraiser/Land Manager
10 Years Surveying
20 Years Realtor

EDUCATION:

FORMAL:
Bachelor of Science Degree, Forest Engineering: Oregon State University 1958
APPRAISAL EDUCATION:

Appraisal Institute:
Basic I-A and I-B courses/February
courseslFebruary 1965
Income Analysis/June 1971
Grazing Lands & Cattle Ranches/June 1972
Financing/March 1980
Mortgage FinancingIMarch
Litigation ValuationIMarch 1986
PartAJJanuary 1989
Capitalization Theory & Techniques, PartA/January
ofProfessional
PracticelFebruary 1989
Standards of
Professional Practice/February
ofProfessional
Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, Part BlMarch 1993
Standards of Professional Practice, Part A & Part B/May
BlMay 1997
Appraising Manufactured Housing/June 199'8
ofLocal Retail Pr~pertieslNovember
Pr~pertieslNovember 1998
The Appraisal ofLoca1
IssuesIMay 1998
30 Specialized Appraisal IssueslMay
Uniform Standards Per Appraisal Foundation/June 2001
Process/June200l
On-Line FHA & The Appraisal Process/June
2001
ofReal
On-Line Overview of
Real Estate Appraisal Principles/June 2001
Educators:

ofReal
The Technical Inspection of
Real EstatelDecember 1998
Understanding Limited AppraisalsfNovember 1994
,Uniform Residential Appraisals/January 1994
.uniform
AnalysislFebruary 1998
Regression Analysis/February
Does it Pencil IIM:arch 1999
Current Legal Issues/1992
CUrrent
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Mo~tary System/1992
Systeml1992
Money & The Mo~tary
Approachl1993
Applied Sales Comparison Approach/1993
Applicationl1993
FIRREA Overview and Application/1993
Real Estate School ofWashingtonl1980
LawlI992
Real Estate Law/1992

Real Estate Education Council:

Appraisal/November 1982
Real Estate AppraisallNovember
Ratio Study StatisticslDecember 1985
Real Estate School of Washington
Real Estate Broker's Education
DESIGNATIONS:
MAIlAppraisal Institute
LICENSES: .
Idaho: Certified General Appraisal CGA-65 .
Washington: Certified General Real ~tate Appraiser 1100585
. Oregon: State Certified General Appraiser· C000419
PUBLICATIONS:
Bell Curve ofValue/1981
1929, Again?11987
APPRAISAL EXPERIENCE:
General:

Fee Simple, Leased Fee, Leasehold Interest, Easements, Right-of-Ways and Appurtenances
Property Type:

Real estate, personal property, personalty, business, manufacturing equipment: and rolling
stoele
.
stock
Property Categories:

LandlUnimproved:
LandiUnimproved: Undeveloped, developed:
land, geophysical, mining and mineral rights

commercial, industrial, residential, timber
I

i

LaridlImproved:
LandlImproved: Ranches, orchards, farms, vineyards, hunting remberships, water frontage,
shorelands, lake and riverbeds.
Improved: Office structures, retail stores, shopping centers, medica1space,
medical space, hospitals,
recreation facilities, service stations, C-stores, truck· stops, auto and vehicle dealerships,
governmental structures, military properties, restaurants, lounges, taverns, fast food facilities
and greenhouses
Industrial Plants, industrial parks, ports, airports, parking garages, subdivisions, golf courses,
sawmills, pulp mills, warehouses, water parks, railroads, terminals and seaport facilities
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prope~ies, multi-family apartments, condominiums, duplexes, four
Single family resIQential prope~ies,
plexes, retirement centers, convalescent hospitals, shelter care, elder care, nursing homes,
and fraternal buildings

Right-of-Ways: Highways, power lines, reservoirs, utility lines, gas lines and water and
sewer plants
Revitalization projects, acquisition projects, sales distribution programs, graz41g rights,
farming leases, air rights and mineral rights
PRIMARY AREAS SERVED:

Eastern Washington
North and Central Idaho
Western Montana
Eastern Oregon
Northern California
Northern Nevada
Western Wyoming
APPRAISAL EXPERTISE:

Value ranges
Consultation
Partitions
Condemnations
Ad Valorem Taxation
. FINANCIAL CLIENTELE:
.FINANCIAL
Zions Bank
Wells Fargo Bank.
of Latah
Bank: ofLatah
Bank
of Pullman
Bank: ofPullman
Bank: of "Whitman
of Washington
First Savings Bank ofWashington
First Security Bank
Seaport Citizens Bank
Twin River National Bank
U.S. Bank
Washington Mutual
Metropolitan Mortgage
Westside Federal Savings & Loan
Fidelity Mutual Savings Bank
of New York
Mutual Life Insurance Company ofNew
Greentree Financial

John Hancock
Safeco Credit
Central Washington B arlk

Aetna Finance
Avco Financial Services
Avco
Blazer Financial Services
Dial Finance .
Transamerica Mortgage
Oregon Mutual Savings Bank
Peoples Mortgage Company

PMI
Lincoln National Life
Bankers Life
Travelers Insurance
Lender's Service, Inc.
Stateline Mortgage
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M~gage
Mountain View M"6rtgage
U.S. Property & Appraisal Services
Ditech
Aetna Life & Casualty
National:Bank
Pacific National
J3ank of Washington
Intermountain Mortgage
ofAmerica
Bank of
America
..Southern
Southern Pacific General American Credit
ofthe
Bank of
the West
Chesapeake Appraisal
Countrywide
Express Financial Services
Security Bank
US Bank/Oregon
Security Funding
Conseco Financial
National City Mortgage
WA Federal Credit Union
.
GFS, Inc.
GMAC Mortgage
Transunion Settlement
Evergreen Community Development Assoc.
Corporate Valuation Services
Nova Star Home Mortgages
PlatinUlD: Mortgage
PlatinlllD:
Northwest Farm Credit Services
·LoneRanger.Com
iNSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS:
Chicago,. Milwaukee, St. Paul and
P~cific
P~cific Railroad Company
Burlington Northern
Weyerhauser Timber Company
Potlatch Corporation
Wickes Forest Industries
Texaco, Inc.
Atlantic Richfield Company
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Shell Oil Company
Mobile Oil
Continental Oil Company
Husky Oil Company
Asarco, Inc.

'-'

Value IT
American Financial
Columbia Mortgage
Citicorp Real Estate
Appraisal & Title Management
Associates Financial Services
DataComp
Far West Mortgage
Columbia Trust Bank
First Star Home Mortgage
USA Mortgage
Source One Services
Global Credit Union
Market Intelligence
Heartland Mortgage
Qualfin Lending
. GESA Ctedit Union
D.M.I. :'
Gateway Financial Services
Settle Appraisal Services
Idaho Claims Service
Potlatch #1 Federal Credit Union
National Valuation Services
National Real Estate
SMK Construction
American Lending Network
I

Tenneco Corporation

of America
Packaging Corporation ofAmerica
Washington Water Power
Oroark, Inc.
True v*e Hardware Stores
Boise C cade
.
Eucon orporation
Norwest Aluminum Projects, Inc.
Team Research and Engineering
Kwik Lok Corporation
Sherwin Williams Company
Payless Stores Northwest
of Idaho
University ofIdaho
Washington State University

v*e
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Battelle Northwest
The Pillsbury
Pillsbmy Company
Tree Top, Inc.
Fred Meyer
Lomas & Nettleton

Elks Lodge
Moose Lodge
Paffile Trucking
Porter Meyer

INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS:
Thousands of private property owners: homeowners, landlords, attorneys, business owners,
developers, investors, buyers, sellers, Realtors, ranchers, farmers,
fanners, timber\land
timber,land owners, trusts,
LLC's, partnerships and numerous corporations. .
GOVERNMENTAL CLffiNTS:
Local Communities
Bonneville Power Administration
Idaho State Highway Department
BLM
County Ad Valorem ProjectslIdaho,
Washin:gton, Nebraska, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi

Spokane County Parks
of Engineers
US Corps ofEngineers
US Forest Service

GSA

PARTIAL LIST OF REFERENCES:

Franc'es Anderson
Mara~igan
Mary Mara~igan
Michael Green
Robert Broyles
----R(')b-Brewster-~--------- .----R(')b-Brewster-~··---·---··
Terry Savage
Ted Potter
Rod or Doug Smith
Skip Sherwood
Bob Baker
Joe Delay
Dustin Ramsey .
Loren or Judy Schademan
Don Brumfield

800-541-0828-2173
206-57.7-1423'
425-333-4516
509-758-3613
509-995-7572
509-324-3555
509-735-1596 or 531-2121
509-882-3377

509-326-8080
509-758-2708
800-572-0933
509-972-1028
509-547-8511
525-885-5513
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------------------,OCctlpational licenses
Bllreau 01 OCctJpational
Department of Self Governing Agencies
entitied
The person named has met the requirements for licensure and is entitled
under the la~Js and rules of the State of Idaho to operate as a(n)

(

CERTIFIED GENERAL APPRAISER
TE~RYRUpD
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; 2~01: PERRY LN
CLARKSTON WA'99403

\
'.

.. •..
./

';~)'

("~.-.

t

CGA-65

.A.,!'.-t6:
~-&-"';:""~'/l~'--ru:
/'<{ql- ~-&--';:'-~>v·--. . ., . ~··...-~~
··_,'f"')·.. . --·~
~··..-~~ . ··-,'f"')·
--·~ . . _.t-+..
_.t-+ ..- - s -..-.. - - -.. -- ........ - ......
..... ~
r, "I
i... l i

...."1-.,

--~~

.;

Chief, B·'.O.L.

Number

07/30/2005
Expires

001098

=-______

NO. 7
I~~__
NO.
77:;:;-:---:----
A.M
FllE~M. _ _ _~~ .

../.1-: 2.Q
./1-.:

THOMAS G. MAILE, N
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

MA~~ 17 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
J,
ByA,
ByA. LYKE
DEPUTY

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RELATING TO THE
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER
COUNTERCLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

The plaintiffs' have filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against all ofthe
defendants' counterclaims. The defendants 'counterclaims asserts claims of slander and title,

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
IADIBERKSHIR"''''.rld'_',...,............,............
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1

c_c_.. . .' ' ' ' . .

I ADIBERKSHIR"''''.........,'. .....".,••••_............,.......,.,.,
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intentional interference with a prospective business advantage, and abuse of process counts. The
following Memorandum Brief incorporates by reference the affidavits of Thomas Maill~ as
additional facts supporting the current motion for summary judgment, the Statement of Facts,
together with the briefing ofthe plaintiffs in filed opposition to dispositive motions.
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS
The Plaintiffs have previously filed a Statement of Uncontested Facts on October 8, 2008
and the same is incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. The defendant attorneys, the
individual Taylors and the trust entered into a contingent fee agreement on April 15, 2005
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 Exhibit "W").
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be

liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Corp.
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v.
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984).
LEGAL ARGUMENT

1. The Plaintiffs Have Properly Set Forth Allegations in Various Counts Which Cannot Be
Considered Actionable by the Counter-claimants.
The apparent basis of the counter-claims alleges that the filing of the Lis Pendens in the
current case is actionable. The publication of the notice oflis pendens is not defamatory. It
merely informs the public that the property is involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v.

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM:ENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 2c"""""""',
2C"""""""" .....
......
'fiIQ\oIAD'JlERlCSHIR.IlMd.""...,_,,,.""
........................
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Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The filing of a lis pendens cannot give
rise to any actionable claim against the plaintiffs.
In order for slander in title to occur there must be a proper showing of malice on the part
of the plaintiffs in filing their complaint and lis pendens requesting restoration of the title to the
real property to Berkshire Investments, LLC. In order for the counterclaim to even approach
providing any viable claims there must be a determination as to the underlining complaint in the
present action.
The complaint sets forth a count of fraud requesting restoration of the title as the result of
the fraud by the Taylors and their counsel in providing verified pleadings before the dis.trict court
wherein they judicially admitted that the Taylors' mother was the sole beneficiary of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust as a result of the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement.
The plaintiffs have requested a constructive trust be imposed on the real property for the
determination of the fraud committed by the defendants in obtaining the title.
In addition to the count of fraud, the plaintiffs have alleged violations of the Idaho
Racketeering Statute. This count sets forth allegations of violations of State Law relative to
petjury, suborning petjury, and obtaining money by false pretenses by the defendants. The Idaho

Racketeering Statue sets forth remedies that specifically provide that property may be n~stored
n~stored to
anyone that has been SUbjected
subjected to violations of Title 18, Chapter 78 ofthe Idaho Code.
There cannot be any slander of title, interference with prospective business advantage,
nor an abuse of process when the verified pleadings and the records clearly demonstrat(l
demonstrat(! that the
defendants perpetrated misrepresentations by sworn testimony before the various court

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 3
_pl...._
.....,.,
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proceedings. The Taylors and their attorney knew full well the facts as set forth in the verified
petition before the probate court and the sworn testimony provided before the Probate Court. As
a result ofthe "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15, 2004, the
Taylors were no longer beneficiaries. They have judicially admitted such a point and R. John
Taylor so testified before the probate court.
The verified amended complaint among other counts sets forth allegations of "fraud upon
the court", violations ofIdaho Racketeering Statute (encompassing allegations of specific
criminal activity by all the defendants acting in unison). The amended complaint involves
allegations that defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, fIkIa
f/k/a Connie Taylor, and Paul T. Clark, and
Clark and Feeney, a partnership participated, directly or indirectly, and engaged in mu1tiple
multiple
instances of "theft", "false pretense", "peljury" and "suborning peljury", in violation ofIdaho
Law. Specifically, the allegations ofthe complaint assert the defendants engaged in multiple
instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "peljury" in violation ofIdaho Code Sections 18-2403
and 19-2116.
Both ofthese counts either by case law or by Statute allow the right to file a lis pendens advising
the public of the claims relating to the real property.

The elements ofthe tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
have been set forth in Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996,
1004 (1999). The elements of slander oftitle have been set forth in McPheters v. Maile, 138
of process have been set forth
Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,321 (2003). The elements of abuse ofprocess
in Cunningham v. Jensen (2005 Idaho 31332). The counter-claims relating to each and every
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg
4C_"'I.".'d61m.1AD'BERKSH1R.1JMd_
4C_"'I_I61m.1AD'BERKSH1R.1JMd _ _...._
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allegation must fail as a matter oflaw. An allegation that a party acquired title to real property
pursuant to a fraud, is justification for relief such as a constructive trust. A constructive trust
arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentations,
concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under circumstances otherwise rendering
it unconscionable for the holder oflegal title to retain beneficial interest in property. A
constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either fraudulently or through
violation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774
(1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). The filing of the lis pendens is
proper in this case to advise the public that the acquisition of the title is being challenged. The
filing of the lis pendens is proper under the facts involved in this litigation and cannot be
construed to give rise to any tort claim as asserted in the counter-claim. The following briefing
focuses only on two claims for relief pled by the plaintiffs, however, the vast majority of the
counts ofthe complaint, would also allow a lis pendens to be filed when title was obtained
through an unconscionable manner.

ofFraud
a. The Claims of
Fraud Give Rise to a Legitimate Claim Against the Defendants.
Berkshire Investments has requested relief to set aside the "Judgment on

Benefi~ciaries'
Benefi~ciaries'

Claims", as the same was procured by fraud. The term "fraud upon the court" contemplates
more than interparty misconduct, and, in Idaho, has been held to require more than perjury or
misrepresentation by a party or witness. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d
1175, 1181 (1980). It "will be found only in the presence of such 'tampering with the
ofjustice'
justice' as to suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
administration of

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\lENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg
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safeguard the public.'" rd.
Id. (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
246 (1944». The party asserting a claim of fraud on the court must establish that an
unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision and that
such acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. Rae V.
Bunce, (S.c. 2008 Docket No. 33996).
The Honorable Judge '¥ilper had entered the court's Memorandum Decision and Order
on July 28, 2005 allowing the "'trust" to amend its complaint after the successor trustees received
the required appointment by the probate court. The district court in that Decision ruled that the
trust had waived rights to rescind the contract, stating "once a party treats a contract as valid after
the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is waived." The
District Court further found that the Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the
Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once the
grounds for it arose. The district court prior to the Supreme Court decision would not aIlow the
trust or the Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Pad
Pali Two
Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 Exhibit "K").
The Affidavit of Thomas Maile filed in Support ofthe Motion for Summary Judgment,

provides testimony concerning how the current plaintiffs were denied their defense in the
consolidated cases before Judg,e
Judg1e Wilper. In the prior proceedings the Taylors retained an expert
real estate appraiser, Terry Rudd, who opined that the Linder Road property was valued at
Taylors'
$820,000.00. That in defense to the claims of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Ta.ylors'
claims there were three (3) Idaho licensed real estate appraisers and an Idaho Realtor who were
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg
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going to provide testimony and opinions that the fair market value of the Linder Road property at
the time ofthe purchase was $400,000.00. The plaintiffs were preparing the defense to the
allegations by the trust and the Taylors. The plaintiffs were prepared to establish that the
purchase price paid was fair and reasonable to the trust.
That as a result of the criminal misrepresentations made to the court by defendants,
Berkshire Investments and the other plaintiffs were not able to defend such claims for money
damages. Without the wilful criminal behavior by the defendants there would have been a trial
for alleged money damages. But for the fraud, and criminal activity committed by the
defendants, there would have been no "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" voiding the real
estate transaction. In the prior proceeding the Honorable Judge Wilper found that the property
was valued at 1.8 Million Dollars in 2006 (Decision & Order dated November 29,2006, attached
as Exhibit "D" to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2:008).
Quite a material misrepresentation by the Taylors and their counsel, providing sworn verified
pleadings asserting the Taylors' status as beneficiaries to the trust in 2006 after they admitted to
the probate court the Taylors' mother was the sole beneficiary. All of which was done in order to
acquire the real property versus potential money damages.

The record establishes that the plaintiffs raised the issue of the fraud, as an issue affecting
the standing of the individual Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction as beneficiaries under
the trust. The Taylors by judicial admissions acknowledged that they had disclaimed their
interests in the trust and the mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust. The deposition
testimony of Helen Taylor establishes she never was a party or was represented in the litigation in
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which the Taylors misrepresented their status as residual beneficiaries of the trust (Affidavit of
Thomas Maile Part 1 Exhibit "D" and Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 Exhibit "AA").
Likewise the deposition testimony of Reed Taylor confirms no assignment form was provided
from Helen Taylor assigning her interests to the individual Taylors (Affidavit of Thomas Maile
Part 1 Exhibit "C").
Defendant Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit ofthe Taylors in negotiating the terms of
the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement, drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April
14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries ofthe
trust unless Beth will affirm

h(~r prior

factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to

cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they
will seek a full accounting ofthe trust and a copy ofthe trust and estate tax returns". (Affidavit of
Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition ,exhibit
thE:Y wanted from Beth Rogers and agreed to give up their rights as
39). The Taylors got what thE:y
beneficiaries. The Taylors and their attorneys judicially admitted the same in the verified petition
in the probate proceedings and in sworn testimony before the probate court.
The Taylors truly were not beneficiaries of the trust in 2006. The Taylors mislead the

district court by claiming they were beneficiaries to take advance ofthe ruling in Taylor v. Maile
1. The Idaho Supreme Court did not address the issue of the fraud in procuring the "Judgment

on the Beneficiaries' Claims" since the appellate court felt that the Taylors had standing since
they specifically reserved an interest in the litigation. The misrepresentations and criminal
behavior committed by the def,endants was not decided since standing was resolved by the
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"Taylors' interest in the litigation".
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but
upon the party who is seeking the relief. See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778
P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286,985 P.2d 1145,
1148 (1999). In the present case the Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issue of the
fraud and misrepresentation of the Taylors and their counsel before the district court. The Idaho
Supreme Court did not have to consider the same on its merits, since the Taylors had standing
reserved by an "interest in the litigation". The material misrepresentations and the criminal
behavior committed by the defendants have not been considered on the merits. There is no
dispute that "but for" the misrepresentations, the current plaintiffs were deprived of their day in
court to address the fair market value of the purchase of the Linder Road property. The Taylors
may have had standing in the litigation, but that did not give them or their counsel a liclense to
fraudulently misrepresent the Taylors' status as beneficiaries or to commit criminal activity
before the district court. Without their misrepresentations as to their status as beneficiaries, the
district court would have allowed a jury trial consistent with its earlier decision relating to claim
of money damages. The district would not have had entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries'

Claims".
There cannot be an dispute of fact that the defendants and their attorneys knew the full
status of the facts in both probate and the district court matters. The amended complaint verified
in January 2006, was fashioned after the Supreme Court ofIdaho authored its decision in Taylor
v.s Maile 1. There was a clear motive and intent by the defendants to fashion a verified
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amended complaint asserting "All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L.
Johnson Trust."
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of the
amended complaint in January 2006 constitutes criminal behavior and/or fraud. The
attachments to the present amended complaint and supporting affidavits of record, sufficiently set
forth allegations to support the numerous claims pursued in the present matter. The plt:adings
have verifications by Mr. R. John Taylor from the probate petition and the amended complaint
(2006) which were both drafted by the defendant lawyers representing John R. Taylor as well as
the other individual Taylors and the trust in the proceedings captioned Theodore L. Johnson
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LEC,
LLC, Ada
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV
OC 04-00473D. The amended complaint in the Taylor v.s. Maile matter was verified under oath
by R. John Taylor in January 2006, and was prepared and finalized by defendant attorneys and/or
their staff who were active participates in the probate proceeding.
The fraudulent statements were surely material as the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled
previously that the trust could not seek rescission of the real estate transaction. The Taylors'

expert retained had provided an
all opinion that the real property was valued at $820,000.00, instead
of the $400,000.00 valuation obtained by an independent appraiser at the time of the sale
transaction. The value ofthe real property in November 2006 was established by the court as 1.8
Million Dollars. Obviously the difference in valuation was material and the peIjured testimony
surrounding the Taylors verification that they were residual beneficiaries allowed the court to
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enter the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim". The actions of the defendants truly amounts to
of justice" and should be considered as an absolute "wrong
"tampering with the administration ofjustice"

against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public". The claims ofthe plaintiffs
are legitimate and well grounded in fact and law.

of Idaho Racketeering Violation is a legitimate claim against the defendants.
B. The Claim ofIdaho
Title 18 Chapter 78 provides the statutory authority for the present claims against the
defendants. Relevant hereto, IC. 18-7803 provides:
(a) "Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or indictable under the
following sections ofthe Idaho Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or
indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any other jurisdiction:
(l0) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial
(10)
transaction card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002,
18-3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306,
Idaho Code);

(17) PeIjury(sections
Petjury(sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code);
(b) "Person" means any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(c) "Enterprise" means any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation,
business, labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals
associated in fact altho1Llgh not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit

entities; and
(d) "Pattern of rack,eteering activity" means engaging in at least two (2)
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one
(1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date
There can be no dispute of facts given the judicial admissions made by the deft::ndant R.

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
][N OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & ]IN
IAfNlERKSH1R.iNV'd,,"'_L~ ~wpd
~
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 11
IAfNlERKSH1R.iNV'd"l<f_L~
_.. l..."..lfi1....
C _..l..."..lfi1....

.....
...

....

001109

John Taylor and his attorneys of record before the probate court. To be a judicial admission a

statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact
within that party's knowledge." Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619,930 P.2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1997).
Judicial admissions may be considered for the purposes which they were made without

admission into evidence, and I'l party making an admission may not controvert the statement

on appeal. Id. at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. (emphasis added). There was only one benefieiary
remaining in the trust after the execution of the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification
Agreement" .
Agreement".
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of the

amended complaint in January 2006 constitutes an allegation of criminal behavior and/or fraud.
Idaho Code Section 18-5401 provides:

PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by
law be administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material
matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of peIjury.
petjury.
petjury is comprised of a corrupt agreement to
The underlying offense of suborning peIjury
testify falsely, followed by the wilful giving of material testimony which the witness and

. 1984),
procurer know to be false. State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 492, 681 P.2d 1,2 (Ct. App
App.1984),
citing 4 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 607 (14th ed. 1981). The undisputed
facts establish that the attorneys prepared the verified petition which affirmatively stated "the

of this trust by
petitioner's 88-year-old moth,~r, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis
of the terms ofa
of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement.". Approximately 14
virtue ofthe
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months later the same attorneY8 prepared a verified complaint for their clients to executle stating

"All of
the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of
the Theodore L. Johnson Trust.". All the
ofthe
ofthe
defendants actively participated in the procuring of a false verification to the court.
Such conduct, by the dt:fendant attorneys and the individual Taylors and the trust leads to
the inescapable conclusion they participated and prepared the necessary documents to the district
court to attempt to materially affect the legal proceedings. Idaho Code section 18-5410 states:
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another
person to commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in
the same manner as he would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November
14th 2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate
court, at page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining
beneficiary ofthis trust by virtue ofthe terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity
Agreement". Immediately above the signature the verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being
sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the
best of applicant's knowledge and belief'.

Finally, there should be no doubt concerning the

actual suboTIlation of petjury committed by the defendant attoTIleys. Both Connie Taylor and her

then husband R. John Taylor were licensed attorneys at the time ofthe commission of the
specific criminal conduct alleg,ed.

v. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A.2007) provides relevant standards
The case of State V.
peljury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P.3d
involving a criminal case of pedury.
P .3d Reports, the Idaho
Court of Appeals provides:
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.......'
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it
is material to any prop€:r point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his
credibility. The degree of materiality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which
quoted I.C. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for petjury that the
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding
(emphasis added).
The Taylors actively participated in the global disclaimer agreement between the
beneficiaries of the trust and the successor trustees. The Taylors and their counsel presumptively
read the Supreme Court case involving Taylor v. Maile 1. The Taylors presumptively read the
issues of standing contained in the court's decision. R. John Taylor, an Idaho licensed attorney
executed under oath the amended verified complaint in January 2006. There can be no
disagreement in the record, the verification in 2006 was contrary to his earlier sworn verification.
In addition to the allegations surrounding petjury, the actions of the defendants violated
I.C. § 18-2403 which provides:

(1)
(l) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.

(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in
any of the following ways:
(a) By deception obtains or exerts control over property of the owner;
(b) By conduct heretofore defined or known as larceny; common law larceny
by trick; embezzlement:, extortion; obtaining property, money or labor under
false pretenses; or receiving stolen goods (emphasis added).
The record is abundantly clear. The defendants perpetrated the fraud a number of times
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with pleadings asserting the Taylors were residual beneficiaries of the trust in 2006 (St!e
(S(~e
Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2 Exhibits "L", "M"). The Taylors acting with and through their
attorneys on February 13, 2006, filed their Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries'
Claim. The first sentence of the motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John
Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the Beneficiary Plaintiffs") (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part
Two Exhibit "L"). The truth and the facts establish they were not (false pretenses). The lawyers
and the clients knew the truth from previous court proceedings before the probate court.
The counter-defendants have correctly asserted a colorable claim under the Idaho
Racketeering Statute against the defendants. The lis pendens is properly filed in the current
action. In alleging wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78 ofldaho Law, certain
remedies are available including but not limited to:
18-7805 Racketeering ..-.-- Civil Remedies.
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery ofthree (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost ofthe suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
((c)
c) The district cowt has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy.
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a detem:lination of liability, such orders may include, but are not

limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this section as it deems proper.
(d) Following a dekrmination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(1)
himself of any interest, direct or indirect,
(l) Ordering any person to divest himselfofany
in any enterprise;
The facts establish that an enterprise was created by the co-defendants to obtain an
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interest in real property (Affidavit Part 4 Exhibit "W" Contingent Fee Agreement between the

attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and Taylors). The activities ofthe defendants in committing
perjury, suborning peIjury, and filing false pleadings to the courts, asserting the Taylors as
residual beneficiaries, amounts to violations of Idaho Law and racketeering activity. I.e.
18-7804 provides that is it is unlawful "for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated,
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the

investment or use thereof in th;:l
th~ acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise or real property". Through the combined efforts of the co-defendants, can be
no dispute that real property was acquired as a result of the alleged criminal activity.
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the

present action.

2. The Lis Pendens Are Properly Filed.
There are two distinct counts which are authorize the filing of the lis pendens in the
current proceeding as set forth above. A lis pendens is allowed to be filed in connection with a

request for a constructive trust, where legal title to property has been obtained through actual

fraud. In addition the Idaho Racketeering Statute authorizes specific relief, including restoring
the real property to Berkshire Investments. A lis pendens is appropriate to safeguard that

remedy. The plaintiffs have done nothing more than to provide public notice of their claims
relating to the above referenced! counts.
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The Affidavit of Thomas Maile filed concurrently demonstrates that the trust has not
repaid its obligation owing to Berkshire Investments. Berkshire Investments has a statutory right
to protect its repayment of the purchase price of $400,000.00. Idaho Law recognizes a vendees
lien for the protection of the money which remains unpaid, including interest thereon. Maho
Code section 45-804 provides:
Lien of Purchaser of Real Property. One who pays to the owner any part of the
price of real property, under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien
upon the property, independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as
he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of consideration.
The money paid to the Itrust remains outstanding, and until returned, Berkshire
Investments lawfully has the protection of the statutory right, to maintain its interest in the real
property pursuant to Law. Berkshire Investments has done nothing more to assert its statutory
right to file a lis pendens to insure the return of the purchase price and interest thereon as may be
determined due and owing.
That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their lis pendens in the prior
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further
protection of the vendee's lien (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion Exhibi.t "B").
That the prior vendee's lien is superior to the lis pendens herein and as such the lis pendens filed
herein has not impaired the tith: to the subject real property and as such the claims set forth in the
counter-claim are barred in the present action.
The plaintiffs are exercising nothing more than what the above Law grants. The plaintiffs
g<:merated
are entitled to avail themselves of the protection of the vendee's lien and the case law gtmerated
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......
for the imposition of a constructive trust. Statutory protection is a defense to any allegl~d
wrongful recording of a notice of claim. See generally, Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120
Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991). Generally a right which stems from statutory
protection is a defense to certain actions. See, generally, Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 656,
917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996).
The case of Clark v. Clark, 56 Idaho 6, 47 P.2d 914 (1935), illustrates, the point oflaw
that acting pursuant to a statutory right, does not amount to malice.
"It is quite generally held that what a person may lawfully do may be done with or
without malice. (Authorities cited.) In other words, there can be no legal malice in
contemplation of law where the thing done is lawful and the means employed are
lawful. Courts must judge the intent a man has in doing an act by the means he
employs and the thing to be accomplished, and if they all be lawful, courts cannot
impute malicious or unlawful motives to the actor."

Berkshire Investments claims rights to have the title restored to it and/or for the payment
of monies due and owing. The vendee's lien is a creature of statute. In maintaining the lis
pendens Berkshire is doing nothing more than the acting consistent with what Idaho Law allows.
CONCLUSION

There is ample statutory authority and case law cited above that warrants the plaintiffs'
claims. The filing of the lis pendens to protect their rights both as to the remedies pled and for
the repayment of the monies that are still outstanding which are lawfully due and owing to
Berkshire Investments is prope:r. There is no legitimate basis for any of the three (3) counts of
the counter-claim. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as to all
counter-claims raised by the defendants.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2009.
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of
1

2

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor and Theodore Johnson

3

Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal

4

knowledge.

5

2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of an Idaho Repository printout

6

with the record of actions for the District Court case, Taylor v. Maile CV OC 2004-00473D. This
7
8
9

printout does not include all the pleadings filed in the two appeals cases associated with this case.
DATED this

~ day of April, 2
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Connie Taylor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
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./

J~y of April, 2009.

14
15
16
17

Notary Public in,tu:d
in,tt1)d for the State of Idaho.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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1

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

3
4

5

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

6

7

8
9

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

D
D

D
D

10

/

11

/--""

//7/ //7

,;/
}-;\
'1/
"~
~

_. .
-' L------_~
Connie W. Taylor
/
Attorney for Defendants

12
13

/

C__-----/
__-----/

14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25
26

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
CONNIE W. TAYLOR
3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO

83~;OI
83~;OI

001120

https:/ /www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHiswry.do?roaDetai l=yes&s ...
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHismry.do?roaDetai

Idaho Repository - Case History Page

_.'
Case History
Ada
1 Cases Found.
RE~ed

Taylor, etal. vs. Thomas Maile lv, eta!.
etal.

cv-OC-

Closed
2004-03642
pl~nding
Ronald
plending
District Filed: 01/23/2004 Subtype: Other Claims Judge: J W"I
Case:Old Case:
Status: clerk
.
I per
action
CV-OCCV-OC
04-00473*0
0:U17/2009
Inv,estments Lie Maile, Colleen Maile, Thomas Iv Thomas Maile IReal
Defendants: Berkshire Invlestments
Estate Com pcllnY
Plaintiffs:Taylor,
Plaintiff
S:Taylor, Dallan Taylor, R John Taylor, Reed Theodore Johnson R, Evocable Tru St
Pending
.
.
DateITlme Judge
eanngs:
h
heanngs:

04/06/2009
.
4:00 PM
Ronald J. Wllper
Disposition: Date

Type of Hearing
Motion

Judgment Disposition Disposition P rt'
~~~~ment
:;~ie°sition Type
~~S::sition Parties
ales
Type
Date

In Favor
Of

06/07/2006 Other

Maile,
Thomas Iv
(Defendant),
Maile,
Colleen
(Defendant),
Thomas
Maile Real
Estate
Company
(Defendant),
Berkshire
Investments
Lie
Unknown
LIe
(Defendant),
Taylor,
T aylor, Reed
(Plaintiff),
Taylor,
Dallan
(Plaintiff),
Taylor, R
John
(Plaintiff),
Theodore
Johnson R,
Evocable Tru
St (Plaintiff)

11/29/2006
11/29/2006 Other
Other

Maile,
Thomas Iv
(Defendant),
Maile,
Colleen
(Defendant),
Thomas
Maile Real
Maile
Real
Estate
Company
(Defendant),
Berkshire
Investments
Lie

Unknown
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(Defendant),
Taylor, Reed
(Plaintiff) ,
Taylor,
Dallan
(Plaintiff),
Taylor, R
John
(Plaintiff),
Theodore
Johnson R,
Evocable Tru
St (Plaintiff)

-

Register Date
of
actions:
01/23/2004 New Case Filed
01/23/2004 Civil Complaint, More Than $1000, No Prior Appearance
01/23/2004 (2)summons Issued
02/02/2004 Another Summons Issued
02/11/2004 Affidavit Of Service And Summons 2-5-04
02/13/2004 Affidavit Of Service And Summons 2-7-04
02/23/2004 Notice Of Service
02/23/2004 Verified Answer,(hoag!and For T&c Maile No Prior
Appearance 8, Berkshire Invest)
02/23/2004 Special Motions, Counterclaim, With Prior Appearance
02/23/2004 Motion For Order Of Disqualification
02/23/2004 Motion Change Of Venue, Dismissal, & Compel
02/27/2004 Order For Disqualification Of Judge Copsey
02/27/2004 Notice Of Realssignment To Judge Wilper
03/05/2004 Notice Of Stalus
Status Conf-4/6/04 At 3:45
03/15/2004 Notice Of Service
03/15/2004 Answer To Counterclaim (taylor For Taylor)
03/15/2004 Notice And Stipulation Of Substitution
03/15/2004 (t Maile For: T & C Maile, T Maile Real Est
03/15/2004 & Berkshire Investments)

03/15/2004 DefThomas Maile's Motion To Dismiss
03/15/2004 Memo In Support Of Motion To Dismiss
03/15/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn To Dismiss (04/12/2004) Ronald
J Wilper
03/23/2004 Notc Of Assn Of Counsel (collaer For Maile)
03/24/2004 Notice Of Sub Counsel(points For Thomas Maile
03/29/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
04/06/2004 Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition Of Motion
04/06/2004 To Dismiss Lodged
04/08/2004 Motion To Continue Hearing On Mtn To Dismiss
04/08/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Continue Hr
04/08/2004 Reply Memo In Suppt Of Def Motn To Dismiss
04/12/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel
04/12/2004 Motion For Order Shortening Time
04/12/2004 Hearing Held - Motn To Dismiss
04/23/2004 Order Grantin~1
Grantin~1 Motion To Dismiss
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05/03/2004 Motion To Amend Order
05/03/2004 Motion For Sanctions,costs & Ally Fees
05/03/2004 Affidavit OfThomas Maile
05/03/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
05/19/2004 Defendant's Motion To Strike
05/19/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion
05/19/2004 Notice Of Hearing (6-10-04 @ 4pm)
06/04/2004 Civil Appeals To Supreme Court
06/24/2004 Reopen (casH Previously Closed)
06/24/2004 Order (to Re-open Case)
06/24/2004 Order Denying Motion Re: Lis Pendens
08/04/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition
08/04/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition
08/09/2004 Motion For Protective Order
08/09/2004 Motion For Order Shortening Time
08/09/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel
08/10/2004 Motion For A Protective Order Re:disclosure
08/10/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Prot Order
OfTa~.ing Deposition Of S Johnson
08/10/2004 Notice OfTa~ing
OfTa~.ing Deposition Of Bret Johnson
08/10/2004 Notice OfTa~ing

08/10/2004 Notice Of Tak
Ta~ ing Deposition Of Bret Johnson
08/10/2004 Notice Of T ak
a~ ing Deposition Of Hazel Fisher
08/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Fr Protect Order (08/30/2004)
Ronald J Wilper
08/10/2004 Amended Motn For Order Shortening Time
08/1012004 Hearing Scheduled - Notc Of Objt (08/16/2004) Ronald J
Wllper
08/1112004 Motion For Order Shortening Time
08/11/2004 Motion For Protective Order Re:defs Notc Dep
08/11/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel
08/12/2004 Def/counterclaimants Motn To Consolidate
08/12/2004 Affidavit Of T .maile
.l1laile In Spprt Of Motion
08/12/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition
08/12/2004 Amended Note
NotG Of Taking Deposition
08/12/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn To Consolidate
08/12/2004 Note Of Issue/request For Trial
08/12/2004 Amended Motion For Order Shortening Time
08/12/2004 Notice Of Hearing 8116104 @ 11 Am
08/12/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For P.o.
08/13/2004 First Motn To Compel Discovery Responses
08/13/2004 Affd Of J Hally In Support Of Motn
08/13/2004 Notice Of Hearing Motn To Compel
08/16/2004 Notice Of Service
08/16/2004 Affidavit Of Tina L. Kernan
08/16/2004 Memo Brief In Support Of Motions
08/16/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
08/16/2004 First Motion To Compel Discovery Responses
08/16/2004 Affidavit Of J.hally In Sppt Motn To Compel
08/16/2004 Notice Of Hearing(08/30104 @1:30)
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08/16/2004 Hearing Held - Notc Of Objt
08/16/2004 Order To Shorten Time
08/16/2004 Motion Fr Order Staying Proceedings Pend Appl
08/16/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Order (08/30/2004) Ronald J

Wilper
08/1712004 Motion For Sanctionslcosts & Attrny Fees
08/17/2004 Affd OfT.maile N Oppstn To Motn To Compel
08/17/2004 ··lodg·8 Memo Brief In Oppostn
08/17/2004 Notc Of Compliance
08/17/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
08/18/2004 Order For Protective Order
08/25/2004 Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
08/30/2004 Hearing Held - Motn For Order
08/30/2004 Hearing Held - Motn Fr Protect
08/30/2004 Acceptance Of Service
08/30/2004 Notice Vacating Defs Motion To Consolidate
08/30/20042 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition
09/08/2004 Acceptance Of Service
09/08/2004 Second Amended Notice
09/08/2004 Third Amende·d Notice
09/08/2004 Notice Of Status Conference (10/26/04 @ 4pm)
09/08/2004 Hea.ring Scheduled - Renewed Motion (09/27/2004) Ronald

J Wllper
09/1012004 Amended Notice Of Hearing (9-27-04@3:00pm)
09/10/2004 Dfndnts Renewed Motn To Strike Lis Pendens
09/10/2004 Affd Of T. mailt:~ In Spprt Of Motn To Strike

Spprt Of Dfndnts Renewed Motn
09/10/2004 Memo In Spprl
09/10/2004 Dfndnts Motion To Compel&rnotn For Costs& Fees
09/10/2004 Affidavit Of T .maile In Spprt Of Motn Compel

Compel(9-27 -04-3:30
09/10/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn Compel(9-27-04-3:30
09/10/2004 Affd Of T .maile Managing Member Of Berkshire
09/16/2004 Order On Protective Order
09/16/2004 Order To Compel
09/16/2004 Order Denyin~1 Motion To Stay
09/20/2004 Pltfs Memo Oppos Motn To Strike Lis Pendens
09/21/2004 Reply Memo In Support Of Defs Renewed Motion
09/21/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
09/23/2004 Notice Of Service
09/23/2004 Notice Of Service
09/27/2004 Hearing Held - Renewed Motion
09/28/2004 Notice Of Compliance
09/29/2004 Hearing Schecluled - Defs Motion (11/22/2004) Ronald J

Wilper
09/2912004 Hearing Vacated - Defs Motion
H~aring Scheduled - Defs Motion (11/22/2004) Ronald J
09/29/2004 H~aring

Wllper
09/2912004 Order To Consolidate W/cvoc0405656d
10/01/2004 Supplemental Affidavit In Support Of Motion
10/04/2004 Answer To Counterclaim
10/05/2004 Objection To Proposed Order
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10/06/2004 Notice Of Compliance
10/07/2004 Order On Motion To Strike Deposition
10/07/2004 Order Denying Motion On Lis Pendens
10/07/2004 (6) Notice Of Taking Deposition
10/07/2004 Amended Nolice
N01ice Of Taking Deposition
10/07/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
10/12/2004 Notice Of Service
10/12/2004 Acceptance Of Service1 0-7-04 (garth Fisher)
10/12/2004 Motion To Bifurcate Trial
10/12/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn To Bifurcate (10/26/2004) Ronald
J Wilper
10/15/2004 Notice Of Service
10/19/2004 Affidavit Re: Motion To Compel Answers
10/19/2004 Motion To Compel Answers
10/20/2004 Motn To Dismiss Complaint
10/20/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion
10/20/2004 Lodged-memo Brief In Suprt Of Motion
10/20/2004 H~aring Scheduled - Motn To Bifurca (11/15/2004) Ronald J
Wllper
Wllpe r
10/20/2004 Notice Of Hearing 11/22/04 @ 11 am
10/21/2004 Objection To lVIotn
Motn To Bifurcate Trial
10/21/2004 Notice Of Ser/ice
10/22/2004 Order On Motion To Strike
10/25/2004 Notice Of Service
10/26/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (12/20/2004) Ronald J Wilper
10/26/2004 Hearing Vacaled - Motn To Bifurca
10/28/2004 Notice OfT rial Setting
10/28/2004 Jury Trial Scheduled - (12/07/2005) Ronald J Wilper
11/03/2004 Motion For Protective Order
11/03/2004 Affidavit Of T Maile In Support Of Motion
11/03/2004 Notice Of Compliance
11/03/2004 Certificate Of lVIailing
Mailing
11/05/2004 Notice Of Service
11/05/2004 Motion To Deny Or Vacate Motn For Partial Smj
11/05/2004 Affidavit In Spprt Of Motn To Deny
11/05/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn Deny 11-22-04@11am
11/08/2004 Memo In Opposition Of Defs Motion For Psj
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Motion
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Dallan Taylor
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Reed Taylor
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Jud Taylor
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Sam Rosti
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Dennis Mccracken
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Richard L Zamzow
11/08/2004 Motion For Appointment Of Discovery Master
11/08/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Apptment
11/08/2004 Hearing Schecluled
Scheduled - Motn For Apptmt (12/06/2004) Ronald
J Wilper
11/09/2004 Motion For Exparte Order To Show Cause
11/09/2004 Affidavit OfT Maile In Support Of Motion
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11/09/2004 Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
11/09/2004 Notice Of Compliance
11/09/2004 Notice Of Service
11/12/2004 Reply Memo In Support Of Defs Motion For Sj
11/12/2004 Memo In Support Of Defs Motn To Strike Affds
11/12/2004 Affd Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motion
11/12/2004 Memo In Oppos To Pltfs Motion For Contunuance
11/12/2004 Affd Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motion
11/12/2004 Notice Of Association Of Counsel
11/15/2004 Supplemental Affidavit Of T Maile In Support
11/15/2004 Hearing Held - Motn To Bifurca
11/22/2004 Hearing Held
11/22/2004 Motion To Compel Discovery Responses
11/22/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion
11/22/2004 Hearing Vacated - Motion
11/24/2004 Order Granting Motion To Strike
11/29/2004 Order Granting Motion To Strike In Part
Notice Of Objection To Plaintiffs
11/29/2004 Defendants Natice
11/29/2004 Motion For Appointment Of Discovery Master
12/02/2004 Notice Of Service(2)
12/02/2004 Affidavit Of Te rry Rudd
12/03/2004 Hearing Vacated - Motn For Apptmt
12/03/2004 Supplemental Affidavit OfThomas G Maile
12/03/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
12/10/2004 Affidavit Of B Hogers
12/14/2004 2nd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
12/23/2004 (2)notice Of Compliance
Tirn Williams
12123/2004 Affidavit Of Tim
12/23/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
Service( 12/16/04)
12/23/2004 (2)affidavit Of Service(12/16/04)
Service
12/27/2004 Notice Of Sel'\lice
12/30/2004 2nd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
12/30/2004 3rd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
12/30/2004 Certificate Of Mailing
12/30/2004 Notice Of Service
01/05/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (03/17/2005) Ronald J Wilper
01/10/2005 Notice Of Service
01/10/2005 Notice Of Service
01/20/2005 Notice Of Service
02/03/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Thomas G Maile In
02/03/2005 Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment
02/14/2005 Second Supplemental Affidavit OfThomas Maile
02/14/2005 In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment
02/14/2005 Motion For Leave To Cite Unpublished Opinion
02/14/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine Lee
02/14/2005 Spplmtl Memorandum In Sppt Def Motn Dismiss
02/14/2005 Notice Of Service
02/15/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Defs
02/15/2005 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
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Suppli~mental Affidavit Of Phillip J
02/15/2005 Second Suppk~mental

-

02/15/2005 Collaer In Support Of Motn For Partial Sj
02/15/2005 Supplemental Memorandum Lodged Re:motn For Sj
02/15/2005 Note Of Hring (03/17/05@3:00)motn:partial Sj
0310312005
03/03/2005 Motion To Strilke
03/03/2005 Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Sum Judgmt
03/03/2005 Summary Of Facts And Exhibits
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Donna Jones
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Richard White
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Counsel
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Richard Mollerup

el"ry Rudd
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of T el-ry
03/07/2005 Fourth Amen I'Ilotice
"'Iotice OfTaking Deposition

Judgrnt
03/08/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn For Partial Sum Judgmt
03/08/2005 Fifth Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
03/08/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Summry (03/17/2005) Ronald

J Wilper
03/09/2005 Notice Vacatin!~ Hearing Re:motn To Dismiss
03/0912005
03/28/2005 6th Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
03/28/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Summ Jdmt (06/13/2005) Ronald

J Wilper
04/25/2005 Notice OfTaking Deposition
04/2512005
05/06/2005 (2) Notice Of Taking Deposition
05/06/2005 Notice Of Service
05/10/2005 (2) Notice Of Taking Deposition
05/12/2005 Notice Of Hearing(06/13/05@1 :30)re:partial Sj
05/13/2005 Notice Of Service
05/13/2005 Motion For Surnmary Judgment
05/13/2005 Memo In Support Of Motn For Summary Judgment
05/13/2005 Affidavit Of R John Taylor

1:30)
05/13/2005 Notice Of Hearing (6-13-05 @ 1:30)
05/13/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
05/13/2005 3rd Supplemental Affidavit Of Thomas G Maile

05/13/2005 In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment
05/16/2005 Defs 2nd Supplemental Memo In Support Mosj

5/13/05
05/17/2005 Certificate Of Mailing 5113105
OfT aking Deposition
05/18/2005 (6) Notice OfTaking
OS/20/2005 Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint
05/20/2005
OS/20/2005 Lodged Memo In Support Of Motion For Leave
05/20/2005
OS/24/2005 Certificate Of Mailing
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Opp To Mosj
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Affidavit Of AI Knutson In Opp To Mosj
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Lodged Reply Brief In Opp To Mosj
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Motion To Amend Answer And Counter-claim
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Amend
05/24/2005
OS/24/2005 Notice Of Hearing Re:amend(6/13/05@ 1:30
1:30 Pm)
05/24/2005
OS/27/2005 Memo In Oppo~,tion
Oppo~.tion To Pint Motion To Strike
05/27/2005
OS/27/2005 Defendant Maill~'s
Maili~'s Motion For Protective Order
05/27/2005
OS/27/2005 Defendant's Memorandum Lodged In Suppt Motion
05/27/2005
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05/27/2005
OS/27/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
05/27/2005
OS/27/2005 Notice Of Hearing (06/13/05@1:30)
05/3112005
05/31/2005 (4) Affidavit Of Service (5-1B-05)
(5-18-05)
05/31/2005 Affidavit Of Ser'ice
Ser/ice (5-19-05)
05/31/2005 Affidavit Of Ser'ice
Ser/ice (5-23-05)
05/31/2005 (6) Notices OfTaking Deposition
05/31/2005 Suppl Memo In Opp To Defs Motn To Dismiss
05/31/2005 Motn For Sumrn Judg & Part Summ Judg
05/31/2005 Notice Of Hearing- Motn Amend Complaint
05/31/2005 (6-13-05 @ 1:30 Pm)
06/03/2005 Affidavit In Opposition To Motion To Amend
06/03/2005 Reply Affidavit In Support Of Mtn Summary Jdm
06/03/2005 Replly Breif In Oppstn To Mtn Amend Lodged
06/03/2005 Notice To Withdraw Mtn To Amend Answer & Ctcl
06/03/2005 Certificate Of Mailing
06/03/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
06/06/2005 Def Motion To Strike Portions R.mollerup Affd
06/06/2005 Second Supplemental Affidavit Elaine Lee
06/06/2005 Def Reply Brief Re:motn To Dismiss/
Dismissl Mosj
06/06/2005 Second Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion
06/06/2005 For Summary Judgment
06/06/2005 Defendant's Motion To Strike Affidavit Of
06/06/2005 Richard J White
06/06/2005 Memorandum In Support Of Motion Lodged
06/06/2005 Notice Of Hearing(06/13/05 At 1:30
1 :30 Pm)
06/07/2005 Notice Of Service
06/09/2005 Notice Vacating Deposition
06/09/2005 Objection To Hearing On Motn To Strike
06/10/2005 Lodged Rply Me,mo
Me!mo Re Motn Protective Order
06/13/2005 Hearing Held - Motn Summ Jdmt
06/15/2005 (2) Notice Of Vacating Deposition

06/17/2005 Notice Of Compl'iance
06/1712005
Compl~iance Re:response To Interrogt
06/17/2005 Notice Of Service
06/29/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Summry Jud (OB/15/2005)
(08/15/2005) Ronald
J Wilper
06/2912005
06/29/2005 Notice Of Service
06/30/2005 (2) Notice Of Compliance
07/12/2005 (2)notices Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
07/12/2005 Notice OfTakin~1
OfTakin~1 Deposition
07/20/2005 Notice Of Compliance
07/22/2005 Hea.ring Scheduled - Motn Summry Jud (OBI29/2005)
(08/29/2005) Ronald
J Wllper

07/22/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn Summry Jud
07/2212005
07/28/2005 Memo Decision I~ Order
07/2BI2005
OBI02/2005
08/02/2005 Memorandum 01 Costs And Attorney Fees
OBI03/2005
08/03/2005 Amen Notc Of Hearing On Motn Amen Answer Set
OBI03/2005
(B-29·05@3pm)motn To Amend
08/03/2005 Continued (8-29·05@3pm)motn
OBIOBI2005
08/08/2005 Notice Of Compliance
OB/10/2005
08/10/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn Summry Jud
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08/17/2005 Acceptance Of Service (07/12/05)
0811712005 (2) Notice Of Compliance
08/24/2005 Stip Re:def Counter Claimts Motn To Amen Answ
08/24/2005 And Counterclaim
08/26/2005 Def 2nd Renewed Motion To Strike Lis Pendens
08/26/2005 Memo Brief Of Def 2nd Motn To Strike
08/26/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motn
08/26/2005 Hearing Schedul ed - 2nd Renew Motn To Strike (09/15
12005) Ronald J Wilper
08/30/2005 Order Re: Stipulation To Amend
09/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re:5th Set Of Requests
09/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance
09/02/2005 Notice Of Servic,e
09/07/2005 Verified Amended Answ & Counterclaim & Demand
09/08/2005 Memorandum Opposing Renewed Motion To Strike
09/09/2005 Notice Of Service
09/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (10103/2005) Ronald J Wilper
09/15/2005 Hearing Vacated - 2nd Renew Motn
09/16/2005 (2) Notice Of Service
09/16/2005 Notice Of Service
09/21/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Defs 9th Responses
09/26/2005 Reply To Def Amended Counterclaim
09/28/2005 Amended Complaint Filed
09/30/2005 Notice Of Servicl~
Servicl~
09/30/2005 Notice Of Service
10103/2005 Order Granting Costs-matter Of Right
10103/2005 Amended Motion For Summary Judgment
10103/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion
10103/2005 Lodged-memorandum In Support Of Motion

10103/2005 Hearing Schedulled - Summ Jdmt Motn (11/03/2005) Ronald
J Wilper
10103/2005 Amended Reply To Amended Counterclaim
10103/2005 Notice Of Service
10103/2005 Notice Of Compliance
10103/2005 Notice Of Compliance
10103/2005 Defnd Disclosure To 5th & 6th Set Of Interrgs
10103/2005 Case Taken Und,er Advisement
10105/2005 Order Denying Motion To Release Lis Pendens
10107/2005 Defs Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment
10107/2005 Memo In Support Of Renewed Motion
10107/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
10107/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (11/07/2005) Ronald J Wilper
10/1112005 Supplemental Memorandum Lodged Opposing 2nd
10/11/2005 Renewed Motion To Strike Lis Pendens
10/11/2005 Answer To Amended Complaint And Demand
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Repsonse To Pint Rqs
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re:def 12th Response
10/13/2005 Reply Affidavit Of T. Maile In Opposition To
10/13/2005 PI. Amended Motion For Summary Judgment
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10/13/2005 Lodged-reply Brief In Opp To Motn For Sum Jdt
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Defs 11th Splmntl
10/13/2005 Responses To First Set Of Interrogatories
10/13/2005 Certificate Of Mailing
10/13/2005 Affd Of C Maile In Opp To Amen Motn For S Jdt
10/20/2005 Motion To Compel Discovery Responses
10/20/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Compel
10/20/2005 Motion In Limine
10/20/2005 Lodged Memorandm In Supprt Of Motn In Limine
10/20/2005 Note
Notc Of Hearng Motn In Limine & Mtn To Compel
10/20/2005 (11/03/2005 @

~i:OO

Pm)

10/20/2005 Affidavit Of E Le,e
10/20/2005 Lodged Memo In Oppstn To Motn For Part Smj
10/21/2005 Hearing Vacated - Summ Jdmt Motn
10/21/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Part Smj & Motn Cmpl (11/10
12005) Ronald J Wilper
10/21/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing
10/24/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing
10/24/2005 Affidavit Of Dan C Grober
10/24/2005 Lodged Memo In Opposition To Def Renewed Msj
10/24/2005 Notice Of Assoc Of Counsel(charney For Maile)
10/24/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Dan Grober
10/25/2005 Sheriffs Affidavit Of Service
10/25/2005 Notice Of Taking Deposition
10/25/2005 Notice Of Taking Deposition
10/26/2005 Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint

10/26/2005 Memorandum In Support Lodged
10/27/2005 Motion To Continue And Notice Of Hearing

10/27/2005 (11/10105@3pm)
(11/10/05@3pm)
1012712005 Motion To Strike And Notice Of Hearing
10/27/2005 (11/10105@3pm)

1012712005
10/27/2005 LOdged-brief In Support Of Motn To Strike
10/27/2005 Answer To Corrected Amended Complaint

10/27/2005 Motion To Vacate Hearing
10/27/2005 Affidavit Of Jack S Gjording

10/27/2005 Notice OfTaking Deposition
10/27/2005 Second Notice OfTaking Deposition
10/28/2005 Lodg Memo In Opp To Motn To Compel Discovery
10/28/2005 Affidavit OfThomas Maile
10/28/2005 (5)affidavit Of Sel'Vice (10/26/05)
10/28/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/27/05)
10/31/2005 Answ/26 Entered In Error On 10/27/05

11/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/26/05)
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/27/05)
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/31/05)

11/0112005 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition
11/01/2005 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition
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11/01/2005 Amended Hearing Scheduled - Def Renewd Motn (11/17
12005) Ronald J Wilper
11/03/2005 Lodged Reply Memo In Support Of Amended Mosj
11/03/2005 Amended Hearing Scheduled - (11/07/2005) Ronald J
Wilper
11/0312005 Notice Of Hearing (11-17-05@4:00 Pm)
11/03/2005 2nd Supplemental Affidavit Of Dan Grober
11/03/2005 Opposition To Plaintffs' Motions In Limine
11/03/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
11/04/2005 Stipulation To Vacate & Reschedule Defs
11/04/2005 Renewed Motion For Summary Judgement And
Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To Amend
11/04/2005 Plaintiffs
Servicl~
11/04/2005 Notice Of Servicl~

11/04/2005 (3) Notice Of Taking Deposition
11/07/2005 Notice Of Takin~1 Deposition Of Thomas Maile
11/07/2005 Judgment Re: Motions For Partial Summ Jdmt
11/07/2005 Hearing Vacated
11/07/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motion
11/09/2005 Memorandum Re Motion To Amend Lodged
11/10/2005 Case Taken Under Advisement - Motn Part Smj
11/10/2005 Memorandum Lodged In Opposition To Motn:amend
11/10/2005 Notice Of Service
11/10/2005 Notice Of Service
11/14/2005 Motion In Limine
11/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (11/28/2005) Ronald J Wilper
11/1412005 Brief In Support Of Motion Lodged
11/14/2005 Motion To Amend Caption
11/14/2005 Dfnd Motn In Limine
11/14/2005 Memo In Suppon Of Dfnd Motn In Limine
11/14/2005 Notice Of Hearin9 11/28/05@3:00pm
11/15/2005 Motion To Quash Subpoena, Motn For Protective
11/15/2005 Ordr,and Motn For Sanctions
11/15/2005 Lodged Memo In Support Of Motn To Quash
11/15/2005 Motion To Continue Trial Date
Hearin!~ 11/28/05@3pm
11/15/2005 Notice Of Hearin!~

11/15/2005 Amended Notice Of Hearing (11/28/05 @ 3pm)
11/1612005 Motion For Order Shortening Time For Notice
11/16/2005 Of Hearing
11/16/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (11/17/2005) Ronald J Wilper
11/1612005 Affd Of T .g. Maile In Oppos To Continue Trial
11/16/2005 (2) Notice Of Compliance
11/16/2005 Defendants' Opposition To Motion For Order
11/16/2005 Shortening Time & Notc Of Hrng (11/28/05)
1111612005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee In Support Of Defs'
11/16/2005 Opposition To Motn For Order Shortenin Tm
11/17/2005 Hearing Held - Motion
11/1712005 Hearing Held - Def Renewd Motn
11/17/2005
11/21/2005 Hearing Vacated
11/21/2005 Hearing Vacated
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11/21/2005 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial

'-'

11/22/2005 Affidavit Of Service 11/07/05
11/28/2005 Order Vacating Trial, Hearings

12/23/2005 Opinion Lodged Supreme Court #30817
12/30/2005 Order For Supplemental Briefing - Remand
01/20/2006 Lodged Joint Supplemental Brief in Light of Supreme Court
Remand
01/23/2006 Motion for Leave, to Amend Complaint
01/23/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Mot~on 02/27/2006 03:00 PM)Motn for
Leave to Amend Complamt
01/23/2006 Lodged Memo
01/31 /2006 Remittitur-Affirmed/Reversed Supreme Court #30817
02/10/2006 Notice of Hearin!1 (Motion for Summary Judgment)
(03/13/2006 01 :~IO PM)
02/13/2006 Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment

02/13/2006 Motion For Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim
02/13/2006 Affidavit of R John Taylor In Support Of Beneficiaries' Motion
For Summary Judgment
Suppo~ Of Motion For
02/13/2006 Lodged Plaintiff's
Plaintiffs Memorandu.m. in. Suppo~
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim

02/24/2006 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/27/2006 03:00 PM:
Hearing Vacated
02/24/2006 Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment held on
03/13/2006 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated
02/24/2006 Amended Notice of Hearing Re: Motion for Summary
(4/3/06 at 11)
Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim (4/3106
02/24/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/03/06 at 11)
03/02/2006 Request for Trial Setting
03/03/2006 Notice of Scheduling Conf-4/3/06 at 11

03/06/2006 Stipulation RE: Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint
03/0612006
03/06/2006 Lodged Amended Complaint
03/09/2006 Order Granting Motion to File Amended Complaint
03/09/2006 Amended Complaint Filed
03/14/2006 Lodged Brief In Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
03/14/2006 Affidavit ofT Maile in Opposition to motion for Summary

Judgment
03/14/2006 Certificate Of Mailing
An~wer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
03/15/2006 An~wer
(GJordmg for Defendants)
(Gjordmg

03/17/2006 Affidavit of G Mcallister
03/17/2006 Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Taylors Motion for
Summary Judgment
Answer.a~d Counterclaim Re: Amended complaint by
03/21/2006 Answer.a~d
beneficiaries

03/27/2006 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum
Support
03/27/2006 Lodged Memorandum in Support of Motion
03/29/2006 Affidavit of Counsel
04/03/2006 Hear!ng result for Motion held on 04/03/2006 11 :00 AM:
Hearing
Heanng Held

10/11/2006 09:00 AM)
05/01/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10111/2006

001132
12 of 17

4/]/20092:3
4!I/2009
2:3 I PM

Idaho Repository - Case History Page

https://www.idcourtsno/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetai J=yes&s ...
https://www.idcourtsno/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&s

-

05/01/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference 09/26/2006

03:30 PM)
05/01/2006 Order Resetting Trial
05/05/2006 Amended Order Resetting Trial
05/10/2006 Motion for Disqu alification of Alternate Judge
05/15/2006 Plaintiffs' Disclosure of Witnesses
05/15/2006 Order Granting Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim
05/30/2006 Motion To Reconsider
05/30/2006 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider
05/30/2006 Notice Of Hearing (06/15/06 @ 3pm)
05/3012006 Hearing Sc~edul~d (Motion 06/15/2006 03:00 PM) Motion

For Reconslderc:ltlon
06/06/2006 Objection to Proposed Judgment
06/07/2006 Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim

L1c,
Civil Disposition entered for: Berkshire Investments Llc,
Defendant; Maile, Colleen, Defendant; Maile, Thomas lv,
06/07/2006 Defendant; Thomas Maile Real Estate Company,
Defendant; Taylor, Dallan, Plaintiff; Taylor, R John, Plaintiff;
Taylor, Reed, Plaintiff; Theodore Johnson R, Evocable Tru
St, Plaintiff. order date: 6/7/2006
Elainl~ Lee
06107/2006 Affidavit of Elainl~

06/08/2006 Plaintiff Be~eficiaries' Memorandum In Opposition To Motion

To Reconsider
06/08/2006 Motion to Strike IPortions of Plaintiffs Experts Afffidavits
06/08/2006 Motion to Shorten Time
06/08/2006 Affidavit of Rory R Jones
06/08/2006 Notice of Hearin!l (6/15/06 @ 3:00PM)
06/09/2006 Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim
06/09/2006 (2) Notice of Hec:lring (6/15/06 @ 3:00PM)
06/09/2006 Response to Motion to Strike Portions of Expert Affidavit
06/15/2006 Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile
06/15/2006 Certificate Of Mailing (06/13/06)
0611512006 Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/15/2006 03:00 PM:
06/15/2006 Hearing Held Motion For Reconsideration, Motion to Amend
Answer and CounterClaim
Lodge~ Plaintiffs Su.pplemental Memorandum in Opposition
06/19/2006 Lodge~

Motion to Reconsider
to MotIOn
06/20/2006 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider
06/20/2006 Motion to Amend Judgment andlor Motion to Reconsider
06126/2006 Objection to Memo of Fees and Costs
Mo~ion for Certification Re: Judgment on Beneficiaries'
06/28/2006 Mo~ion

Claims
06/28/2006 Brief in Support (If Motion Lodged
Mo~ion for Certification Re: Judgment on Beneficiaries'
06/28/2006 Mo~ion

Claims
06/28/2006 Brief in .Su.pport CI~ Motion for Certification Re: Judgment on

Beneficiaries' Claims
Beneficlanes'
07/03/2006 Plaintiff Beneficiaries' Memorandum In Opposition To Motion

To AmendlReconsider Judgment Filed June 07,2006
07/03/2006 Amended Memorandum Of Attorneys Fees and Costs
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07/03/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 07/17/2006 11 :00
AM)
07/03/2006 Objection to Proposed First Amended Judgment
07/10/2006 Response To Defendant's Motion For Certification
07/10/2006 Affidavit Of Coul1sel
Counsel In Support Of Motion For Fees and
Costs
07/10/2006 Reply Memorandum Of Attorney Fees and Costs
07/13/2006 Affidavit ofThomas G. Maile
07/14/2006 Affidavit ofThomas Maile
07/17/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 07/17/2006
11 :00 AM: Hearing Held
07/21/2006 Memorandum D,ecision and Order
07/21/2006 First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim
07/31/2006 (2) Notice Of Service
08/01/2006 Motion to Amend Judgment Filed July 21,2006 Based Upon
and Error of Law-Clerical Error AndlOr Motion to Reconsider
08/04/2006 Motion to Strike
08/04/2006 Motion to Amend Scheduling Order andlor Vacate Trial Date
08104/2006 Affidavit of Dennis M Charney
08/04/2006 Defendant's Supplemental Witness List
08/04/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 08/21/2006 02:00
PM)
08/04/2006 Notice of Hearin!~
Hearin!~ (8-21-06 @ 2 PM)
08/11/2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to AmendlReconsider
Judgment
08/17/2006 Notice of Compliance
08/21/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 08/21/2006
02:00 PM: Hearing Held
Hearin!~ (Motion 09/25/2006 04:30 PM) Motion for
08/23/2006 Notice of Hearin!~
Leave to Amend Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages
JUdgn~ent on the Pleadings or for Summary
08/25/2006 Motion for Judgn~ent
Judgment on Clallm

08/25/2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion
08/25/2006 Notice of Hearin!l re Motion for Judgment (9.25.06@4:30pm)
09/05/2006 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

09/06/2006 Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time
09/07/2006 Affidavit of Counsel in Support Motion to Extend
09/07/2006 Notice Of Hearin9 (09/25/06 @ 4:30pm)
0910712006 Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses
09/07/2006 (2) Notice Of Service

DefendantslCounterciaimants Response to Plaintiffs Motion
JUdgment on the PleadingslMotion for Summary
09/11/2006 for Judgment
Judgment and Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Punitive
Damages
Affidavit of Thom3s G Maile in Opposition to Plaintiffs
09/11/2006 Motion for Judgment on the PleadingslMotion for Summary
Judgment
Affidavit of Joseph Corlett in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
'the PleadingslMotion for Summary
09/11/2006 for Judgment on ·the
Judgment Re: Unjust Enrichment
D~fendants/Co~nterciaimantsSecond Supplemental
09/11/2006 D~fendants/Co~nterciaimants
Disclosure of witnesses
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09/11/2006 Motion to .~trike Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to
Seek PUnitive Damages
09/11/2006 Notice of Hearing (9/25/06 @ 4:30PM)
Reply memorandum In Support Of Plaintitrs
Plaintiffs Motion For
09/15/2006 Judgment On The Pleadings And/Or
AndlOr For Summary
Judgment On Defendant's Claim For Unjust Enrichment And
Motion For Punitive Damages

09/18/2006 Defendant/Counterclaimants Pre-Trial Memorandum
09/20/2006 Certificate Of Mailing
09/21/2006 Affidavit of Bradford Knipe
09/21/2006 Plaintitrs/Counter-Defendants
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Pre-Trial Memorandum
09/22/2006 Plaintitrs
Plaintiffs Supplemental Pre Trial Memorandum
09/22/2006 Pint's Pretrial Disclosure of Witnesses and Exhibits
09/22/2006 Pint's Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/25/2006 04:30 PM:
09/25/2006 Hearing Held Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Seek
Punitive Damages and Motion for Judgment

09/26/2006 Memorandum Decision and Order
09/26/2006 Hearing result fer Civil Pretrial Conference held on
09/26/200603:30 PM: Hearing Held
09/27/2006 Plainitiff Supplemental
Supplernental Exhibit List
09/27/2006 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Diclosure of Lay and Expert
Witnesses
10/03/2006 Plaintiff Beneficiaries' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to AmendlReconsider
Amend/Reconsider 7/21/06 Judgment
10/04/2006 Defendant/counter-Claimants' Motion to Strike Late
Disclosed Expert Witness John Taylor
10/04/2006 Notice Of Hearing
10/04/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/11/200608:30 AM)
10/04/2006 Notice Of Hearing (re:Motion to Amend Judgment for
Pre-Judgment Interest) (10/11/06@9:00)
1
0/11/2006 Hear~ng result for Motion held on 10/11/200608:30 AM:
10/11/2006
Heanng Held

10/11/2006 Hear~ng result for Jury Trial held on 10/11/200609:00 AM:
Hearing Held
Heanng
10/12/2006 Memorandum re Motion in Limine
10/19/2006 Certificate Of Mailing
10/20/2006 Plaintiffs
Plaintitrs Closing Argument
10/20/2006 Def Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
10/20/2006 Def Closing Argument
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Rebuttal
10/27/2006 Defendants'/Counterciaimants'

10/30/2006 Plaintiffs Rebuttal Closing Argument
11/29/2006 Memo Decision Gind
and Order
Civil Disposition entered for: Berkshire Investments Lie,
L1c,
Defendant; Maile, Colleen, Defendant; Maile, Thomas lv,
11/29/2006 Defendant; Thomas Maile Real Estate Company,
Defendant; Taylor, Dallan, Plaintiff; Taylor, R John, Plaintiff;
Taylor, Reed, Plaintiff; Theodore Johnson R, Evocable Tru
St, Plaintiff. order date: 11/29/2006

12/11/2006 Judgment Denying Unjust Enrichment Claim
12/11/2006 Motion to Amend Order
12/11/2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend November
29 2006 Order
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12/13/2006 Second AmendEld Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and
Costs

''-

12/15/2006 Notice of Hearing (1/11/07 @ 3:30 pm)
12/21/2006 Amended Notice of Hearing 02.05.07@ 2:30pm)
12/21/2006 DefendantiCounterclairnants'
Defendant/Counterclaimants' Motion to Disallow Costs &
Attorneys Fees ,f!,./or Objection to Costs & Attorneys Fees
12/21/2006 Appealed To The Supreme Court
01/03/2007 Response To Objection To 2nd Amended Memorandum Of
Attorneys Fees c~ Costs
01/09/2007 Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens
01/09/2007 Notice of Lis Pendens
02/01/2007 NOtice of ~earing
~earing (Motion 02/22/200703:30 PM) Motion to
Remove LIs Pendens
02/05/2007 Hearing result for Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs held
on 02/05/2007 02:30 PM: Hearing Held
02/15/2007 Objection to Motion for Appeal Bond
02/20/2007 Reguest for Add rtional Record
02/21/2007 Objection to Request for Additional Record
02/22/2007 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/22/2007 03:30 PM:
Hearing Held Motion to Remove Lis Pendens
03/01/2007 Order Denying Motion for Appeal Bond
03/09/2007 Request for Additional Record
03/20/2007 Response To Objection to Re~uest for Additional Clerk's
Record and Request for Sanctions
03/20/2007 Appellants' Objection to the Clerk's Record
03/20/2007 Notice Of Hearing 4.2.07 @ 4 pm
03/20/2007 Hearin~
Hearin~ Scheduled (Motion 04/02/2007 04:00 PM) Motion to
reconsider
03/28/2007 Order Denying Request for Attorney Fees
04/02/2007 Hear!ng result fOI".Motion held?n 04/02/2007 04:00 PM:
Hearing Held Motion to reconsider
reconsIder
04/02/2007 STATUS CHANGED: closed
04/06/2007 Order Granting/Denying Request for Costs
04/06/2007 Order Granting Fequest for Additional Record
04/06/2007 Order Clarifying Denial of Request for Pre-Judgment Interest

04/10/2007 Notice of Change, of Address
04/11/2007 Supplemental Memorandum on Out of Pocket Costs
04/16/2007 DefendantiCounterciairnants'
Defendant/Counterc\aimants' Objection to Supplemental
Memorandum on Out-of-Pocket Costs
04/17/2007 Amended Notice Of Appeal
04/27/2007 Second Requ.est For Additional Record Re: Defendants'
Amended Notice Of Appeal
04/30/2007 Notice Of Cross-Appeal
05/10/2007 2nd Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims
06/05/2007 Third Amended Notice of Appeal
06/13/2007 Third Request For Additional Records
02/04/2009 Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 33781
02/17/2009 Notice ~f Substitution Of Counsel (Maile for Maile and
Berkshire Investments)
02/17/2009 Mo~ion
Mo~ion fa rOrder Compelling Payment of Sums Due and
OWing and Interest
02117/2009 Affidavit Of Interest
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02/17/2009 Memorandum in Support of Motion Compelling Payment
02/17/2009 Notice of Hearing (Motion to Compel 03/09/2009 11 :00 AM)
02/17/2009 STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action
02/20/2009 Motion to VacatE! Hearing (set for March 9, 2009 at 11 am)
and Request for Scheduling Conference
02/20/2009 Affidavit In Support ~f Motion to Vacate Hearing and
Request for Scheduling Conference
02/20/2009 Notice Of Hearing
02/20/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/05/2009 04:30 PM)
02/23/2009 Motion to SHortE!n
SHorten Time
02/23/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Shorten time 03/05/2009
04:30 PM)
02/23/2009 Order Shortenin9 Time

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/05/2009 04:30 PM:
03/05/2009 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
Motion to Shorten Time-50
03/05/2009 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 03/09/2009
11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated
03/05/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2009 04:00 PM)
03/06/2009 Order to Vacate and Reset Hearing
03/17/2009 Order Awarding Costs - Supreme Court Docket No. 33781
03/26/2009 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Compel Payment
03/26/2009 Affidavit of John Taylor in Opposition of Motion to Compel
Payment
03/26/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel Payment
o~ Motion for Order Compelling
03/31/2009 Reply Memo BriElf in Support a!
Payment of Sums Due and OWing

Connection: Public
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

APR 0 L 2009
J. DAVID

i'-.if\',
i,-,j\',

CierK
"'-,r-,d. Cierk

/"~'j~ZS
8~' l.
l.I"~'j~ZS
OFl,iTY
OFI,iTY

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE
PART FIVE

Plaintiffs,

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
T AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND

ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA VIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART FIVE - Pg 1

001138

.....
1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
of this matter.

2.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "CC" is a true and correct copy ofthe reporter's transcript
from the hearing dated October 11, 2006 before the Honorable Ronald Wilper in the Ada
County Case No. CV OC 04-000473D.

3.

That Berkshire Investment, LLC and your Affiant had invested approximately
$260,000.00 in capital improvements on the subject property based, in large part, on the
representations of Beth Rogers acting as trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust that the
Trust would not seek to rescind the real estate contract and further based upon the fact
that Berkshire Investment, LLC had obtained construction financing that requin::d the vast
majority of those capital improvements to be made on the Linder property consistent with
Invl:!stments,
the tenns of the construction loan contract which was incurred by Berkshire Invl~stments,
LLC and guaranteed by your Affiant and his wife.

DATED this lciay
lcIay of April, 2009.

IL ,IV, pro se and
THOMA G.
Attorney for Ber ire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
~

SUBSCRIBED AND S'WORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
~_ day of April, 2009.

AFFIDA
VIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART FIVE - Pg 2
AFFIDAVIT

001139

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART FIVE - Pg 3
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Page 10
BOISE, IDAHO

Wednesday, October 11, 2006, 8:50 a.m.

THE COURT:

Please be seated.

The Court will take

up the case of Taylor vs. Maile, Case No. CVOC 0400473-D.
This is the time scheduled for a court trial.

The

remaining issue in this case, to be tried before the
Court, is the issue of unjust enrichment, that has been
pled by the Mailes and opposed by the Taylors.
Fair enough?
MR. CHARNEY:
THE COURT:

Fair enough.
Now, who will be presenting the case

on behalf of the Taylors, and who will be presenting the
case on behalf of the Mailes?
MS. TAYLOR:

Your Honor, I will be presenting on

behalf of the Taylors and the Trust.
MR. CHARNEY:

And I will be presenting on behalf

of the Mailes and Berkshire, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

-Would either of the parties -

do we have any preliminary matters before we get started

with the trial?

.1I

I think that there was a motion to

.

strike, and maybe we should get that out on the table,

•
•

the motion to strike a particular witness that the

·
.
•

Taylors wanted to call.
MR. CHARNEY:

Yes,

Your Honor.

There was a motion

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net
EXHIBIT "CC"

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001141

Taylor v. Maile

~-

10/11/2006
Page 13

Page 11

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

to strike, I believe it was Mr. Taylor, who was going to
be called for some measure of accounting expertise.
There was very late disclosure of that particular
witness, and we've not had an opportunity to depose him
or otherwise obtain further discovery, and the 26(b)
disclosure was pretty thin, at that. I think it's in the
court file. And so, I don't even know if the Taylors
still intend to call him as a witness, but we would
object to him being called.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, how do respond?
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we do intend to call
Mr. Taylor as a witness. I disclosed him as an expert in
an abundance of caution. They do know he is an
accountant. I don't intend to elicit any sophisticated
accounting.
What I will ask him is within the knowledge
of any layperson. If they get money for this property,
they'll have to pay taxes on it. We won't attempt to do
any calculations or estimations of the amount.
TIlE COURT: Is that the only way you can get that
evidence in before the Court?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: And given that limited purpose for
them calling that particular witness, Mr. Charney, to you
still object?

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

exhibits, except for Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 9. And I
believe that the basis of the objection to 7 is that it
violates attorney-client privilege, and the objection to
No.9 is on the grounds of hearsay.
So we can cross that bridge when we go
through the exhibit packets, I presume.
MS. TAYLOR: No.7 was also on hearsay, but I
understand they have subpoenaed Mr. Harwood to court on
Friday so, obviously, that objection may be addressed.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We have three
days.
MR. CHARNEY: There's one other stipulation.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CHARNEY: I believe we have another
stipulation that Mr. Maile did, in fact, pay a fair
market value for the property, in the sum of $400,000.
So the appraisals, I think, would be appropriate
considerations for the Court.
Am I mistaken?
MS. TAYLOR: Totally mistaken.
MR. CHARNEY: My bad.
MS. TAYLOR: What I have suggested we stipulate to
is that whether or not Mr. Maile paid a fair market value
for the property is not at issue in unjust enrichment.
That would let us avoid having the testimony as to
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MR. CHARNEY: If it is limited to that, I think
that that's acceptable.
MS. TAYLOR: We will have other testimony from the
witness, but not in an expert context in any way. Just
that -- the fact that the Trust hasn't received any
money, nor have the beneficiaries.
THE COURT: Okay. Was he disclosed as a lay
witness previously?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. From the beglnning.
THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.
Are there any other preliminary matters?
MR. CHARNEY: Would you like to talk about
possible stipulations, things like that?
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHARNEY: We stipulate to the admission of the
exhibits, what are the numbers, 111 through
through--MS. TAYLOR: 101 through 134.
MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 101 through 134, we stipulate
to the admissibility of those exhibits.
THE COURT: By the Plaintiffs?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there a similar stipulation,
by the Plaintiffs, to defense witnesses -- or to defense
exhibits?
MR. CHARNEY: They stipulate to all of my
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what -- who did what prior to the closing, and all of
that.
So I think it's just as irrelevant, !~ven the
rulings of the Court, the contract has been set aside.
don't
Whether he did or did not pay fair market value, I don'tll
think has any value on the improvements, which is the
issue we're here to try.
We did not stipulate to the admission of any
appraisals or -- and we did not stipulate that he did pay
an n !;
fair market value. We just don't think that that's a
i
issue that is before the Court.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, do you believe that the 11';
fair market value of the property, at the time that
,
Mr. Maile purchased it, is a relevant, material issue
!
that needs to be proven?
I
MR. CHARNEY: I don't think, in my case in chief, I
it does. But I think, if they -- if the defense to the
unjust enrichment claim is that Mr. Maile engaged in
misconduct that either put the property in his hands, or
engaged in misconduct subsequent to the -- to the
contract being entered into, then the fair market value
of the property, at the time he purchased it, may very
well become relevant.
But, as far as my case in chief, initially,
no. It would be something to respond to.
j

";,ft=\,,~Mik;-,,-,,,ttt
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THE COURT: All right.
And, Ms. Taylor, is it your intention to
present evidence that would essentially support an
unclean hands theory?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, it is, Your Honor. But not as
to the value of the property.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you saying that you are --
MS. TAYLOR: No.
]\11". Maile did pay
THE COURT: -- stipulating that JV1r.
fair market value?
MS. TAYLOR: No, I'm not, Your Honor. I'm saying
that I don't think whether he did or not is relevant at
this time. Our unclean hands argument will go to conduct
after
after--THE COURT: Subsequent.
MS. TAYLOR: -- after the transaction was closed.
THE COURT: All right. We can cross that bridge
when we come to it, as well, then. Let's do this.
Now, we -- I don't know how long the parties
intend to take to present their -- their proofs to the
Court. This case is scheduled to go for three days.
Mr. Charney, do you believe that we can have
this case wrapped up in three days?
MR. CHARNEY: I do.
THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, ~,arne question?
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MR. CHARNEY: Not at the moment. Could we keep it
tluoughout the course of this
open, somewhere throughout
proceedings, though, so I can get that back in my head?
THE COURT: Fair enough.
TIlE
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: We won't address it right now. Let's
TIlE
do our best to use our time as efficiently as we can. So
we'll come back in at 10 minutes until th{~
the: hour, by that
clock. And I think that clock is off. I don't know what
time you folks have.
MS. TAYLOR: Depends on what time you have,
Your Honor. That's what --TIlE
THE COURT: Well, I have 8:42. I just set it to
the computer, which is set to the electronic clock in
Colorado, so I know that my watch is right. So that
thing is about 3 minutes fast. But we're going to take a
5-minute recess, then we'll reconvene.
And we will -- how do the parties intend to
proceed? Do you intend to present your {~vidence
e:vidence fust,
on your case of unjust enrichment, Mr. Charney?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
TIlE
THE COURT: How many witnesses?
MR. CHARNEY: Two, maybe three,
three.
THE COURT: Okay. And then you'lll present your
TIlE
evidence and testimony in opposition to their evidence
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MS. TAYLOR: I do.
THE COURT: Very good. All right. We will take
a real brief recess, we'll come back in in about
5 or 6 minutes. Will you folks be ready to go?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Do you have a copy of my exhibits?
Plaintiff, exhibits, from
THE COURT: I have the Plaintiff"
Taylor. But that's all I have.
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I also received a notice
of hearing, for 8:30 this morning, on thdr motion to
arnend the July 21 st judgment. Are we not addressing
that?
MR. CHARNEY: We need to take that up at some
later point, because I need to look at it, see what it
is, if that's okay?
THE COURT: Was that something; that you filed,
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: No. It was something that the
Defendants filed.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Charney, you're not asking to be heard on
any other motion at this time?

If
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and testimony?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor. It was my
understanding that they would use all of the time today,
so I don't have any witnesses ready to go until tomorrow
morning. Ifwe get done early, I could put Mr. Taylor
on. He is here.
THE COURT: Fair enough.
MR. CHARNEY: That may be a likely circumstance.
THE COURT: All right. We'll reconvene in
;
10
you.!
1 0 5 minutes. Thank you.
11
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25
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(Recess taken 8:50 a.m. to 8:56 a.m.)

I

i
THE COURT: The Court is again on the record in
the case of Taylor vs. Maile.
I
Are the -- I think I'll just refer to the
parties as the Taylors and Mailes. Are the Mailes ready
to proceed on their case in chief?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
II
THE COURT: And are the Taylors prepared to
proceed?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: Very well.
I:
Mr. Charney, if you feel it would be helpful
Ii
to make an opening statement, you may do so. You're not H

,_.'"n
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1
2
3
(Brief discussion between Counsel.)
4
5
MR. CHARNEY: You know what, I think that both
6
opc:ning. I think
parties are going to dispense with an Opt:ning.
7
you probably know a little bit about this case.
8
THE COURT: Okay.
9
MR. CHARNEY: So we'll go straight to testimony.
10
THE COURT: Very good. You may call your first
11
witness.
12
MR. CHARNEY: We'll call Thomas Maile.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, you IIlay inquire whenever 13
14
14
you're ready.
15
MR CHARNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
17
THOMAS MAILE,
18
18
one of the defendants herein, called as a witness by and
19
on his own behalf, being first duly sworn, was examined
19
20
and testified as follows:
21
21
EXAMINAnON
DIRECT EXAMINAnON
22
23
23
BY MR. CHARNEY::
24
Q. Will you please state your name and spell
25
your last for the court reporter.

1
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Q. Do you also have any expertise in the real
estate area?
Idaho,
A. I've maintained a broker's license, in l
daho'i
70s]
since maybe 1980. Back in nineteen -- in the late ''70s
and early '80s, the Idaho Real Estate Commission provided
reciprocity, if you will, so that you didn't need to
complete any educational requirements to obtain a license
as a real estate broker, or agent, if you, in fact, were
a licensed Idaho attorney.
So I've been actively licensed as ,ill Idaho
II
real estate agent for the state of Idaho.
Q. Okay. Did you occasionally buy and sell
properties?
A. Yeah. For my -- for our family investments.
I can't remember of an occurrence where I bought or sold
property for a third party, with the exception of 2004.
If I could elaborate, the real estate!
estat(~ --having a real estate license is just that. But there's
another level of real estate called the multiple listing
partak~: of that
service, which is a fee required to partak~:
service. And with that service, you can access the
database and look at various sales and acltivity that are
listed by real estate agents.
So in nineteen -- in 2004, I activated that
MLS fee with the American Realtors Association, and I did

I
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A. It's Thomas Maile, M-A-I-L-E
How are you presently employed, sir?
A. I'm a licensed Idaho attorney.
Q. Tell the Judge a little bit about your
practice as an Idaho attorney.
A. Oh, I was licensed in 1979, clerked with
Jess Walters for one year. Went into private practice,
and have been in private practice for, I 1hink, 28 years.
Q. Where do you currently practice?
10
l O AA.
. My office is in Eagle. Primarily Ada --11 Ada County and Canyon County.
12
Q. Has your practice been primarily in Eagle the
13 entire time that you've been in private practice?
14
199 J.
A. My office opened there in 199].
15
Q. Are you married?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. And your wife is who?
18
A. Colleen.
19
Q. Here in court with you today?
20
A. She is.
21
olther parties
Q. And as far as just identifying oither
22 in this case, what is Berkshire Investments?
23
A. Berkshire Investments is a limited liability
24 company that was established in 2002. lts members are my
25 wife, Colleen, and myself.
1
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7
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Q.
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sell, I think -- either sold one property for a client,
and -- two properties for a client, I think, in 2004.
And the intent of reactivating my MLS was to market the
property known as Fairfield Estates, after I had
developed it.
Q. Is Fairfield Estates the 40 acres that has
been the subject of this litigation?
A. Yes; that's correct.
Q. Okay. Let's go back in time a little bit.
Did you know an individual by the name of Ted Johnson?
A. Yes.
acquaintc~d with
Q. How did you become acquaintc!d
Mr. Johnson?
A. Ted came to my office in Eagk, in about
1993, as a legal client for some collection work.
Ted had a tenant farmer out in his Star
property, where Ted lived. And the tenant farmer had
leased the farm ground for a year or two and hadn't paid
Ted, so we did a collection effort for the!
th(~ money that was
due and owing. And we were able to gd a default
judgment and ultimately collect on the judgment for Ted.
That was in 1993.
Q. Did you do some other legal matters for
Mr. Johnson over the years?
A. Right. In 1997, Ted came back to the Eagle

I

'I!

r.

I

~~,~~~~~~~~"~~_-~~~~,~~~'7'~,~~".",""~"
• .~·~~~~~~~~~w-.~.mmmm~~~~~~mml~~~~~~,I)
,,',
'f
"

,~"'",',"

4 (Pages 19 to 22)

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001144

Taylor v. Maile

~-

10/11/2006
Page 25

Page 23
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

office and indicated he wanted to do some estate
planning. Ted was not married. He had some strong
family connections with Beth Rogers, and some of his
immediate family in the Valley. SO WI~ prepared, and Ted
executed, a trust agreement for his estate planning.
And I also think I did a last will and
testament and also power of attorney, for Beth Rogers, to
kind of act and oversee on his behalf. I can't remember
if I did a durable power or a health care proxy, but it
was -- it was along that line of work.
Q. When, in the relationship that you had with
Mr. Johnson, did you become aware that he had this
40-acre parcel out on Linder Road?
A. Well, back in '93 and then, again, in '97.
Ted talked about his two different famIs, one in which he
lived on in Star and the other one was the 40 acres on
Linder Road.
Q. Did you ever have just some general
discussions with Mr. Johnson regarding the sale of that
property?
A. On the -- on the 40-acre parcel, I can't
-- it was either
remember with specific clarity, but I -
'93 and/or '97, because we talked a number of times
about, ifhe ever wanted to sell his property, that my
wife and I, and our family, would be interested in buying
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think is when the first conference was.
Q. What did you do in response to Ted bringing
you that information?
A. Well, we sat and talked about it. And Ted --
you know, I was reviewing the contract on one side of my
desk, and Ted was sitting on the other. And Ted, during
the course of the discussion, he goes, well, this is the
40 acres that you and I had talked about you some day
buying, if you wanted to.
I said, oh. I said, well, does that create a
problem? The fact that I've expressed an interest in
buying this property, that could be construed as a
conflict. Does that bother you, in me representing you
in dealing with this potential buyer?
And Ted said, no, no. Not at all.
Q. What happened next?
A. So, from that point, in that discussion, Ted
really didn't know what he wanted to do. By that I mean,
he didn't know ifhe wanted to buy it -- or sell it or
keep it, and we talked about pricing of it. And I told
him, I said, well, you have a $400,000 offer on the
table. Do you know what it's worth?
He says, well, I really don't know. I said,
I don't really know either, Ted.
I said, there's a variety of ways that you
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1
the 40-acre parcel, ifhe ever decided to sell it.
2
I told him we had horses, and that we were on
3
an acreage in Eagle, and the kids were getting older, and
4
it would have been nice to enlarge our property in Eagle.
5
Q. All rigllt. So the idea would be, you and
6
Colleen would live on one parcel and maybe your kids
7
would live in the same area?
8
A. Yeah, that's true. But that wasn't really
communicated with Ted until 2002, that I can remember.
9
10
Earlier, in '93 and '97, it was just
11
generally discussing the prospect of Ted, if you ever
12
want to sell your property, let me know. I would be
13
interested in buying it.
14
Q. Okay. Nevertheless, did there come a point
in time when Ted came to you with an unsolicited offer to 15
16
purchase the property?
16
17
A. In May of 2002, Ted, who I hadn't seen for a
17
18
few years, came to my office, either by scheduling an
19
appointment or just showed up, I can't remember which,
20
but I remember he filled out a client information sheet.
21
And he had a real estate contrac:t that was
22
given to him by his, as I recall, his tenant farmer,
Sam Rosti. And it was from Franz Wilte, the landscaping 23
24
contractor in Boise, for the 40-acre parcel on
Linder Road. And this occurred in mid-May, May 22nd, I 25
25

Page 26
can try to establish a good opinion on tilir market value.
You can have a combination of real estate agents, or an
appraiser or two, give you some opinions as to what it's
worth.
The long and short of it, at the end of the
conference, was that we came up with somewhat of a
strategy that we would -- I would write his accountant to
find out what tax ramifications he would have, relative
to ifhe sold the property versus whether he retained it
and held it during -- at the time of his death. Because,
h
if you hold property at the time of your death, you get a
stepped up basis, so there is an advantage to that.
:.1
So before responding to the attorney
representing the buyer, the potential buyer, I c
alled!
called
Ted's accountant, Imogen Harrington, and talked with her ,:
about the issues of tax and the valuation of the
property. And, then, she did a follow-up letter to both
II
Ted and I, one -- I think the original carne to my office
and Ted got a copy of the letter. And she outlined the
tax consequences, if Ted held the property versus Ted
selling the property.
I~
Q. SO what happened next?
It
A. Well, we had another telephone conference in
IIII
that period of time. And then, ultimately, I think at
liiii
I
the end of May -- because all this took about a week, to
IiI:i

J
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get the accountant on line, to get the letter from the
accountant -- I met with Ted. And then, at that point in
time, Ted still really didn't know what he wanted to do,
buying -- or selling or retaining the property.
So I said, well, the only thing we can do is
see if we can keep the ball rolling for you, Ted, in so
many words, and write a letter to the potential buyer,
and indicating we think your offer is low, and let's see,
Ted, ifhe'll come up without even presenting a
counteroffer to him.
Because I explained to Ted that, if you --
you have a $400,000 offer on the table, and if you
present a counteroffer for X amount of dollars and he
accepts it, you've got basically a contract. So I said,
this is a safe way to see if there's any budge, or any
movement, in the potential buyer to get them up and above
$400,000.
So we did that letter, or I did thf: letter,
and Ted got a copy of it. And that went out of my office
at the end of May, 2002.
Q. Did Mr. Witte budge on his offer?
A. No. In fact, he was pretty -- Wi;: got a reply
letter back that was very certain that he had done his
research and $400,000 was his top end. He would not go
any higher than that. And in fact, his research, that

--
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I should have put on the record, at the
beginning of this trial, I would like a continuing
objection on the same grounds, and also on the grounds
that, under the cause we're going forward on now, unjust
enrichment, the manner in which he initially acquired the
property is not relevant. So I would like a continuing
A
objection to that.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule the
objection on relevance. It may be true that the fair
market value might end up not being relevant on the issue
of unjust enrichment. It may be so.
But, on the other hand, I think that to rule
this early in this proceeding that the manner in which
the property was acquired is irrelevant is -- is perhaps
premature.
I think that the manner in which the property
was acquired is relevant, for purposes of this
proceeding. So that objection is overruled on the
grounds of relevance.
!•
Now, we might -- I think it would be
,
'
appropriate to listen to both sides' argument on the
f
i1
issue of statements attributed to Ted Johnson before his
death.
Now, Ms. Taylor, you have suggested that any
statements by anybody other than Ted Johnson, on what
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the adjoining property sold for $7,300 an acre.
Q. As opposed to?
A. $10,000 an acre is what he was offering.
Q. Okay. So what happened after Mr. Witte
refused to raise his offer?
A. Well, I didn't -- I had no more contact from
Ted. I sent Ted the letter from Mr. Wi1te. And I think
the letter to Mr. Witte said, this offer of $400,000 will
only stand until June 20th, or thereabouts, and our
family was on vacation, in New York. And when I came
back, the letter was a little late getting out to Ted.
But I got it out before that deadline of the 20th, and
Ted never responded. I never heard from Ted again.
I had sent him bills for my legal work, and
he had paid the bills. And I think my last statement was
in July, and it showed that it was paid in full as of
July 1st, I think.
Q. SO after that, tell Judge Wilper what
happened next.
A. Well, now-MS. TAYLOR: Excuse me, Your Honor. I neglected
to do a housekeeping issue at the beginning. We had
previously filed a motion objecting to Mr. Maile relating
any conversations he had with Mr. Johnson under hearsay
and the dead man statute.

II

Page 30
Page
30

Page 28

Ted Johnson allegedly said at a certain time before his
death, are objectionable and they should not be heard;
I,I
correct?
MS. TAYLOR: That is correct.
4
'I
5
THE COURT: You're basing that objection on -__,I
MS. TAYLOR: Primarily, Your Honor, on the dead
6
Ii
7 man statute. And we have argued that previously, the
8 Court found it didn't apply.
9
We were in a completely different context at
1 0 the time. Now, we're solely looking at a cause of unjust
10
11 enrichment, which I think is virtually identical to a
112
2 claim against an estate.
!
13
Because of the fact that Mr. Maile was the
14 one that did the estate planning, there was a pour over
15 will, all of the assets went into the trust.
1 6 Essentially, the trust is the estate and the;:
16
the: situation is
1177 indistinguishable from filing a claim against the estate.
1188 He is seeking repayment from the trust.
19
THE COURT: Okay.
2200
How do you respond, Mr. Charney?
I'
21
21
MR. CHARNEY: I would disagree with the assertion
22 that the dead man statute operates to prohibit the
I
23 statements regarding Mr. Johnson. But it's also
24 important to note that most of what we're talking about
2 5 ....here,
with respect
claim, and
2.~.,
~ere~",~th
respect to
to the
the unjust
unj~st enrichment
e~chment,.:.~.~~~:,~d
.!
1
2
3

I:
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what Mr. Johnson did or didn't say, isn't being offered
for the truth of what he did or didn't say, but rather
just to explain why Mr. Maile took the next steps along
the way as he proceeded to purchase the property.
And, as the Court is aware, most of this case
is going to involve things that occurred after
Mr. Johnson's death anyway. So every:hing we have done
thus far is kind of historical groundwork and foundation,
if you will, to explain why Mr. Maile, and the other
parties defended here, are entitled to the moneys that
they're going to be talking about later on.
THE COURT: All right.
The objection is overruled, to the extent
that the information elicited from this vvitness
vllitness is not
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the
statements by Ted Johnson, but simply to explain why
Mr. Maile took action that he took.
MR. CHARNEY: Exactly.
THE COURT: All right. I'll overrule the
objection.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: So where I was, Mr. Maile,
was asking you to tell Judge Wilper about the next time
that Mr. Johnson showed up in your office. I believe
this was the unannounced visit.
A. Right. Approximately six weeks had gone by
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contract, it's fine. I trust you on that. Just do the
same terms that were in the other contract, as far as the
length of time, the down payment.
I said, well Ted, it will take me a couple of
days. I'll get back to you, or Beth, because he had
referenced that he wanted either -- well, I had asked
iiili
him, I said, do you want Beth involved with this
)
transaction?
i~
That's-He goes, yeah. That's-
Q. Could we stop just a second. We've talked
il
about Beth having some interplay here with Ted Johnson.
But, did you know Beth Rogers at this point?
A. No. No. I don't believe I had ever met her
prior to July of 2002.
Q. Who was Beth Rogers, in relation to
Mr. Johnson?
A. Well, I -- he had described her as someone
that was very active in his life. It was a niece. You
know, her and her husband, Andy, had cared for Ted's cows
out on the Star property. They were active in his health
care issues, you know. And I know that he had put a lot
of trust in her.
Q. You know, another thing we haven't
established in this record is, how old was Mr. Johnson?
Was he a young guy, middle-aged?

~
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since I had seen Ted, or heard from Ted, and he was in my
lobby of my office in Eagle. And I think my door was
open, so I saw him out there, and I just came down the
hallway. I remember waving at him. I said, Ted, what
are you doing here?
And, of course, he stood up. And
he goes,
Audhe
well, I want to talk to you. So we ended up having a
conference. And he said, are you still interested in
buying the property?
I said, well, Ted, I've always be~:n
interested in buying your property.
And he said, well, I had an appraisal done.
I said, oh? Well, how much do you want for your
property? And he handed the appraisal to me, and he
goes, I want the appraised value.
So I said okay. I looked at it. And, at
that point in time, I said well, Ted, you Imow, I need to
check this out with my wife. You always have to do that.
And I said, we'll get back to you. But I would be very
interested in buying the property.
I said I can prepare the real estate
contract, but since I have represented you in the past, I
said, I have an obligation, ethically, to tell you that
you have the right to seek independent counsel.
To which he replied, you know, if you do the
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A. No, no. I had a father-in-law, at the time,
that was probably 88. Ted was quite a bit younger, then.
I think he was in his early 70s, like 73 or somewhere in
that neighborhood.
Q. All right. Still capable ofliving on the
farm, making decisions for himself?
A. Oh, sure.
Q. Okay.
A. He drove himself to the office. You know, he
was astute, very alert.
I;
Q. All right. So going back to the
conversation, then. I departed for a moment.
'I'
A. Well, we -- again, I know, in this
conference, I talked to Ted specifically about how much
money he could make on the property. I said well, you
have the potential of developing the property, because in
the appraisal itself, it had indicated that the highest
and best use, the most likely purchaser, would be a
developer.
And that kind of made sense. You really --and I always recall saying, and I said this to Ted, well,
you can't grow onions on ground that's worth $10,000 an
acre. It just doesn't pencil, there's no economics to
it. I said, well Ted, you could make more money doing
I:
developing:
different things on the property, perhaps even developing
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1
it for yourself.
2
And it just wasn't -- it wasn't hi s desire to
3
do that. He didn't want -- I don't think he used the
4
word, he didn't want to jump through the hoops, but it
5
was along that line, that he just didn't want to deal
6
with the governmental issues resolved in trying to take a
7
piece of property and getting it developed.
8
So, I think the conference concluded after
9
that. And I told him, I said, I -- you know, we'll
10
prepare a contract and we'll call Beth up and she can
11
come and pick it up.
12
So, I think that probably happened in July,
13
19th as best as I can remember. I never -- I never noted
anything in my calendar, never filled out a new client
14
sheet, because it wasn't -- but I'm pretty sure it's
15
July 19th that he was at my office. The appraisal was
16
dated the 15th, I think, of July.
17
Q. Did you eventually enter into a written
18
contract with Mr. Johnson?
19
A. Well, my wife and I went out there, and we
20
walked the property. And, you know, we said well,
21
this -- this could work. This is a nice location. It
22
was about three miles diagonally from where we had been 2233
living for 20 years.
2244
25
So I went back, prepared a contract from some

like a fair price. It was an appraised value.
Q. This was even in light of Mr. Witte's letter,
w011h that amount?
where he said he didn't think it was w0l1h
A. It was six weeks after that, yeah.
Q. All right. Let's move to the exhibit packet
then, if we can. Do you have a packet in front of you?
MR. CHARNEY: No, no. I've got one and I've got
anothe:r one?
one for the Judge. Do you need another
THE COURT: This is the original; correct?
MR. CHARNEY: That is the original.
(Exhibit packet handed to the witness.)
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: So, let's start looking at
these exhibits, then, and start with Exhibit 1, under the
first blue sheet?
THE COURT: As a housekeeping matter-
matter-MR. CHARNEY: Yes?
THE COURT: -- the parties had stipulated, I
believe, that Defendant/Counter-Claimants', that is
Mailes' Exhibits 1 through 6, and No.8" and 10 through
16, would come in without objection, is. that accurate;
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: That is, your Honor.
THE COURT: But you're reserving your right to
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of the computer forms that I had in my electronic file
base. And prepared the contract, and called Beth Rogers
up, and indicated that there was a contract prepared for
4 her and Ted's review.
5
Q. What was the purchase price reflected?
6
A. Oh, it was $400,000, the appraised value.
7
Q. That was consistent with the appraisal?
8
A. Yes. Exactly.
9
Q. Did you have any participation, whatsoever,
lOin the preparation of that appraisal?
-
11
A. None. Didn't even know it was going -12 didn't know it was being done.
13
Q. Did you have any -- did you make any efforts
property after the
14 to solicit Ted to sell you the prope:rty
15 Franz Witte offer died?
16
A. Not before and not after.
17
Q. And after you received the appraisal, did
18 you ever attempt to negotiate a better price with
19 Ted Johnson, anything less than $400,000?
20
A. No. I kind of remember that -- that
21 conferencing, telling him and asking him, are you
22 comfortable with this price?
23
And he said yes. And he said he didn't want
24 to pay for an additional appraisal, didn't want to get
25 real estate commissions involved. But to me, it seemed

II
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object to Exhibits 7 and 9?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Very well. Then, for the record,
4 Defense Exhibits -- are you moving the admission of these
5 at this point?
6
MR. CHARNEY: I will offer the -- those exhibits,
I
7 Your Honor.
It
8
THE COURT: And reserving -- I won't make any
:
9 ruling on 7 and 9, at this time. ]'11
I'll take some argwnent
1lOon
0 on it at the appropriate time. But other than that,
11 without objection from you Ms. Taylor, I will admit
12 Defendants, or Maile's, Exhibits 1 throur,h 6, and No.8,
13 and 10 through 16, inclusive. They are admitted.
14
?
(Exhibits No.1, 2, 3, 4,5,6,8, 10,
15
113, 11,
16 12,13,14, 15, and 16 admitted.)
17

18
19
2200
2211
22
23
24
25

Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Before we get to Exhibit 1,
one other question I had, the appraisal that you looked
at, was that the one that was prepared by Tim Williams,
Tim Williams and Brad knight?
A. No. It was Brad Knipe.
Q. Brad Knipe.
A. That's correct. It was -- it was
appraised -- the report of July 15, 2002.
2002 .

I

I
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Q. All right. Now, let's take a look at
Defendant's Exhibit No.1. What is E]lhibit No.1?
A. This is a real estate contract that I pulled
out of my computer and modified for the contract with
Ted Johnson and my wife and I.
Q. Is that the first four pages, which
constitutes the contract, at least the initial contract?
A. That's true.
Q. And did Mr. Johnson sign thaI: in your
presence?
A. He did. I had called Beth Rogers, she came
in and picked it up. My wife and I had signed it. So
she must have picked it up the 22nd. I remember meeting
her, for the first time, in the hallway of my office. I
said, here's the contract.
I remember specifically telling her, too, if
you want to take it to an attorney to have it reviewed,
feel free to do that. So she called back -- Beth Rogers
called back, probably the 24th or 25th, and said
everything looked fine, and they had mviewed it.
I said, does Ted want to come to the office
or what does he want to do? She said, oh, you can go out
to his house. So I didn't know where he lived. So I
ended up calling Ted, asking Ted the same thing, do you
want to come in the office or do you want me to go out to
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So Ted was concerned that Sam Rosti should
have the benefit of going through and having another year
of seeds off of his onions. So I said, that's not a
problem. I said, it's going to take a long time to get
the governmental applications through. Five acres, down
in the corner, is not a problem to keep his onion seed
there.
So we initialed that as agreement that he
could have -- Mr. Rosti could have five acres of onions.
Q. And, then, are the last 2 pages just the form
Deed of Trust that you had on your computer?
A. Yes. It was -- well, they were one of them,
yeah. This Exhibit A-2 was attached to the contract-
contract-Q. All right.
A. -- as a form.
Q. Now, let's move to Defendant's Exhibit No.2.
What is Exhibit 2?
A. Exhibit 2 is the assignment that was
referenced in the Exhibit 1. I explained to Ted, on
frrst paragraph gives Colleen and I
Exhibit 1, that the first
the right to assign. And I explained to Ted that we
would be setting up an LLC to hold titk to the property,
which ultimately happened.
And, then, sometime in mid-August, maybe
the -- just mid-August, I sent a letter to Beth Rogers
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the house.
He said, come on out here. So I ended up
going out to his house.
Q. All right. Signed in your presence though?
A. Yeah. We had a long conference about it. I
went over the substance of the contract. I explained the
essential terms with Ted. And during that conference, I
again advised Ted, I said, do you want to seek an
independent lawyer, because I represented you in the
past? And he declined that, and he said everything
looked fme with the exception of one provision.
Q. And that's what I wanted to talk about next.
There's some handwriting on the frrst page of the
document entitled Addendum to Real Estate Agreement,
which I believe is the fifth page of Exhibit I?
A. Right.
Q. Talk about that, if you would.
A. Well, Ted had leased his ground to Sam Rosti,
for five acres of onion seeds, and the balance of
34 acres was in alfalfa seed.
And I didn't know this at the time, but onion
seeds take 3 to 5 years to make them commercially viable
and profitable, and Mr. Rosti was in his fourth year. He
had one more good year of onion seeds, whatever the math
worked out to be.

It
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indicating that we had prepared the assignment,
consistent with Exhibit 1, and it had been signed, I
think, August 15th, by my wife and I.
Q. Now, I note that Beth Rogers signed it and
she put title, power of attorney. Was Ted still alive at
that point or had he passed away?
A. Ob, he was alive.
Q. Did Beth Rogers have the authority to sign
that? Did she have, in fact, have the power of attorney
from Mr. Johnson?
A. I believe so.
Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit No.3. Can you tell
Judge Wilper what Exhibit No.3 is.
A. Exhibit 3, down to the corner,
comer, is initialed
with my name T. Maile, 8-20-02.
This was the pre-application hearing required
of Ada County to start this subdivision process. And
this neighborhood meeting was scheduled for a certain
date. We did a mailing consistent with Ada County
Developmental Services. You have to do a mailing to the
adjoining property owners, and to the titkd owners,
which would have been the Theodore L. Johnson Revokable
Trust, indicating your intention of doing a subdivision
I
application.
And, at this stage, I had referenced eight
·1r
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lots of five acres each, and that was ultimately reduced
down to seven lots of 5-plus acres each.
Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit 4, what is
Exhibit4?
lbis is the warranty deed received, from the
A. llis
Trust, to Berkshire Investments LLC, September 16, 2002,
regarding the subject property.
Q. Now, I note that that is signed by Beth and
Andy Rogers, as trustees. Had Ted Johnson passed away at
that point?
A. Yes. He had passed away, I think, two or
three days prior to this. Well, I think th{:y signed-signed-
I think his death was September 13th.
Q. Okay. Now, after Mr. Johnson passed on, did
you then begin to undertake development efforts for the
property in question?
A. Well, I started actually earlier. And 1-
1-the contract itself, Exhibit 1, had a provision that said
I had to do certain due diligence. I have a backhoe, so
I went out and did backhoe tests, perk te.;;ts.
te,;;ts.
We knew -- we -- we believed, based on Ted's
comments, that there was high water in this area. High
water is a real problem for development.
So probably in early August we went out, I
went out, and physically dug seven test holes with the

1
2
3
4
5
6
77
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
23
24
25

run tests for a -- basically a full irrigation season.
So all of 2003, either I, or my staff, or other folks,
would go out there and measure the water table in our
test holes to determine the fluctuation of ground water.
So we did that all during 2003. The
engineering continued to progress through 2003.
Once we received a preliminary plat approval
from Ada County, which was in 2003, we then, with the
engineers, started work on the construction drawings and
construction criteria to satisfy Ada County Highway
District, satisfy DEQ, Ada County, City of Eagle. All of
that is a tremendous amount of work to oversee and
accomplish before you even get to the construction phase.
Q. All right. Now, the transaction was closed
in the late summer of 2002. And recognizing that there
has been a court order already, indicating that
Beth Rogers had an obligation to go see:k court approval
to close the transaction, did you personally know of that
obligation at that time?
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: On the contrary. There's been a
Supreme Court -- is that the --Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: The question is, did you
needt:d to tell Beth to
know of -- did you know that you need{:d
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backhoe. I enjoyed working the backhoe, so I went out
and did that.
So I started early on, pursuant to the
contract. And, of course, we did the work with
Ada County. And, of course, I had the ,engineer involved
in early August, 2002, as well.
Q. What other steps did you take?
A. Well, we had the neighborhood meetings,
through the fall of 2002, working extensively with Ada
County Developmental Services and with the engineering
staff.
In 2002, the water was a huge problem for the
property. And by that I mean, it was -- the water table
was so high on the southwest corner of !the
the 40 acres, the
engineering staff and I concluded that we had to enlarge
the lots on the south side of the road, on the road to be
constructed, so that people can put a septic tank closer
to the center of the property, because the southwest
corner of the property was so high with water table.
So, we worked with the water -- soil
conservationists, and engineers, and specialists in
water, ground water. We had to monitor the ground water
for DEQ and Idaho Department of EnviJronmental Quality.
And it was touch and go, as far as the level
of water goes. But, ultimately, after -- they make you

1
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3

go get court approval?
A. No. I did not tell her. And no, I did not
believe she needed it. And she was represented by
David Wishney at the time of the closing. She had
retained another attorney, which I had conversation with
in August or early September, 2002.
Q. Okay. Had you thought that court approval
would be required, would you have simply advised, Beth,
go have a judge sign off on this contract so we can go
forward?
A. Had I believed that -- if something is
required under the law, I most certainly would have
advised somebody to follow the law.
Q. And, in fact, had you known that or done
that, those files -- piles of files right there probably
would not exist, if I'm not mistaken; cOIrect?
A. I don't know. Rephrase that question.
Q. I'm sorry. It was more of a point of
argument than anything else.
So let's, then, move on. Did you, then,
become aware that the relatives in the Lewiston area were
making some waves about the sale, sometime after it
occurred?
A. Well, we have Exhibit 5.
Q. Which I was going to get to. But prior to

11

11
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Exhibit 5, were you aware of any consternation, from the
northern relatives, that maybe this sale: shouldn't have
gone through?
A. Maybe in March or April of 2003, I had a
letter, either from Connie Taylor, representing her
husband as a beneficiary and her mother-in-law, wanting
some sort of accounting, financial accounting, concerning
the trust. So I knew that -- and Beth had referenced
2001.
something, perhaps, in March of 2003
Q. Okay.
A. Because I had to do something, I had to pull
files. I had to pull files in the spring of 2003 because
Beth wanted information to pass on to some of the
beneficiaries about the financial aspects of the trust.
Q. Moving, then, to July 7, 2003 and Exhibit 5,
did you recognize Exhibit 5?
A. You bet.
Q. What is Exhibit 5?
A. I received this on or about July 7,2003.
And it was an indication that Beth Rogers, acting on
behalf of the Trust, was -- had asserted., through her
apparent attorney, Connie Taylor, that I had violated
certain rules of professional conduct.
Q. Let me -- let me stop you there. After
July 7,2003 did you continue to invest money and effort
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thereafter.
Q. Now, the second paragraph indicated that it
is apparent that you had purchased the property for far
less than the fair market value. Was that also a
statement that you believed to be false?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Based on what?
A. Well, Ted had the benefit of gt:tting the
appraisal from Brad Knipe and Associates, who I knew to
be a very reputable and qualified appraisal company in
the Valley.
Q. And, at that point in time, had you also had
a second appraisal done, reflecting nearly the same
purchase price?
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; hearsay.
THE WITNESS: That was done later.
THE COURT: Well-
Well-MS. TAYLOR: Move to strike.
THE COURT: Hang on. How do you respond to the
hearsay objection to the appraisal?
MR. CHARNEY: It was -- actually, I'll withdraw
mistakl~. I thought
thOUght that
the question, because it was my mistakl~.
that second appraisal had come prior to this letter. So
I'll
I'l1 withdraw the question.
THE COURT: All right.

------~--------_r--------------------~---------------------1}
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into the development of the property?
A. It was ongoing.
Now-Q. All right. Now-
A. It actually became more work, in my life,
than the practice oflaw for that year, I would say.
Q. All right. But did you continue to invest
your time resources and your finances to continue to
develop this particular parcel of propelty?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, let's talk about this
letter. The first few words of the letter indicate
representing
that I am -- Connie Taylor says, I am n:presenting
Beth Rogers, the successor trustee of the
Theodore Johnson Revokable Trust.
Did you later determine that was a false
statement?
A. I did.
Q. Was that one reason why you continued to
develop the property?
A. Well, Beth Rogers --Q. We'll get forward. Don't jump ahead. I know
you're a lawyer, too, but -- was that om: reason why you
continued to do the development, because, in fact
Ms. Taylor was not representing Ms. Rogers?
A. That's true. I found that out shortly
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Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: But, in any event, you did
have the first appraisal, and you disagre:ed
disagrf:ed with the
assertion that you purchased the property for far less
than the fair market value; is that fair?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay. So did you, then, after looking at the
assertions in this letter, decide that you were going to
continue to develop the property?
I;
11
A. At some point in time, yes.
2
Q. Now, moving to Exhibit No.6. Do you
recognize Exhibit 6?
A. Yes.
Q. What is Exhibit 6?
A. This is a letter that I received. It was --there was two parts to this Exhibit 6. The first part is
the letter dated July 22, 2003, signed by Beth Rogers.
And then there's a note that was -- a sticky
couniter over there.
:1
note that's -- the original is on our counter
Beth Rogers had put a sticky note on top of -- on top of
this letter that she sent on off to Connie Taylor.
And the sticky note provided that she wasn't
at all in support of the theories by Connie Taylor, and
just made it pretty apparent that she didn't like what
they were doing.
Q. All right. Was Beth still the tmstee at

".,.,
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that point in time?
A. Her and Andy were co-trustees; that's
correct.
Q. In reading that portion of the July 22nd
letter, it says, we know we have a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries of the Trust to act in their best behalf,
but we also feel we have a moral obligation to follow
Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he entrusted us to
do.
Did that give you further support, I guess,
for the conclusion that it was safe to go forward and
develop the property?
A. Absolutely. Because I kept bdieving, or
thinking, that maybe these people from northern Idaho
don't believe that I had -- that there was an independent
appraisal on this property.
So I said, combination of the fact that I
paid fair market value, as established by an independent
appraisal, and that the grantor of the TlUst was doing
what he wanted to do, in the guidelines of being a
reasonably prudent person, I said, it just doesn't make
sense to me.
Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit 7, and we actually
need to first talk ahout
about the third page of Exhibit 7,
which I don't believe there's an objection to; is that
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point, and then we're going to go back and talk about the
Harwood letter in a moment.
THE COURT: Very well. Then, for sake of the
b{:fore me. And I
record, I have those original exhibits be:fore
am going to mark on the lower, left-hand comer of the
third page that this is Defendant's Exhihit 7-A. And it
is admitted.
(Exhibit No. 7-A admitted.)

:
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, talking about
this particular exhibit, did there come a point in time
when you became aware of the September 5,
2002 letter?
5,2002
A. It was during litigation that I n:ceived a
copy of the letter.
Q. Were you still in the process of developing
the property when you received this letter?
A. Yes.
Q. After looking at this letter, did you see any
indication that the Trust needed to seek court approval,
after Mr. Wishney looked at the documentation?
A. No.
Q. Did that lend further support to your
conclusion that everything, as far as the: closing went,
was okay?

---"'-------;-----...:-----------,--------Il
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it

1
fair?
2
MS. TAYLOR: Pardon me.
MR. CHARNEY: The Wishney le:tter?
3
Harwood letter.
4
MS. TAYLOR: Exhibit 7 is the Hanvood
5
MR. CHARNEY: Well, there's two letters on there.
6
MS. TAYLOR: No. Actually the third page, only,
7
of Exhibit 7, I don't have an objection 10.
8
THE COURT: All right. For the record,
9
Defendant's Exhibit 7 consists of three papers. The
first and second papers appear to be pages 1 and 2 of the
10
two-page letter dated September 5th 2003, on the
11
letterhead of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht, and Blanton,
12
addressed to Ms. Connie Taylor.
13
And I have not read it. I have it in front
14
of me. It's been offered. Well, it hasn't actually been
15
Defl:nse Exhibit 7 is a
offered yet, but anyway, page 3 of Defl!nSe
16
one-page letter, dated September 5, 2002, on the
17
letterhead of David Wishney.
18
Ms. Taylor, are you saying that you have no
19
objection to the admission of page -- this third page,
20
this September 5th, 2002 letter?
21
MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor.
22
THE COURT: All right.
23
And you're moving its admission?
24
MR.
CHARNEY:
I
will
offer
this
document,
at
this
25
MR. CHARNEY: I will offer this docu~~llt',~~,this,"%~",5
':::;":'

.,~~,

--,------,,:""~~,~~;;<:0,:.,','

""":»;',,~,,,:::m

Page 54
A. Yes.
Q. Now, we need to talk about the Bart Harwood
letter.
MR. CHARNEY: And I understand, Your Honor, that
the objection by the Taylors, in this case, is simply
that this is a privileged communication, subject to the
attorney-client privilege.
THE COURT: Let's fmd out.
Ms. Taylor, Mr. Charney has now moved the
admission of the remainder of Defendant's Exhibit No.7;
is that correct, Mr. Charney?
MR. CHARNEY: I will offer that at this point.
THE COURT: Okay.
And, Ms. Taylor, let's hear your objection.
II
MS. TAYLOR: My objection is nO!:
nOl: only
attorney-client privilege, but also hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: If it's not offered to prove the
truth of the matters asserted, it's not relevant.
•
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Charney, how do you respond to those two
objections?
MR. CHARNEY: The hearsay argument is hard to get
around, so I'll simply just have to call Mr. Harwood or,
II
unfortunately,
perhaps
Ms.
Taylor,
which
I
don't
care
to
unf0tiut1~!;,~~:,£~?,!fS~~,:,~~~I~~i\V~:1~~,,~~~:::are to"....... !!
,

;/·;·;·:·",,,,·~;;0),,m,,:m,,,,::::~

I€b::':;;:i,MA

,<;;;""";;:;:;:;:;:::;"",,,,;;.;;;::~W1j"

... ,

".,;;;,;0;;,'."'0.=,,=.,..,.,,.;.. .,

I:
Ii
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1 need some foundation to determine in what -- and maybe
do. If there is really truly a hearsay oc~ection to
2 you could clear this up for me, Ms. Taylor. Who -- is it
this, I can establish the authenticity and get over the
3 your contention that Bart Harwood was representing you,
hearsay issue.
4 as an individual, or was representing a client of
As far as the privileged issue, so that we
5 yours -- can you help me out -- when h,~ wrote this
don't call Mr. Harwood here and then that be an exercise
6 letter?
in futility, I think that the privilege issue is a red
7
MS. TAYLOR: When he wrote this letter,
herring. The attorney-client privilege applies to
8 Your Honor, he was representing the trustees of the
communications between an attorney and a client that are
9 Trust.
intended to be confidential in nature.
10
THE COURT: The trustees, Beth Rogers and
Here we have Mr. Harwood, after meeting with
11 Andrew Rogers.
the Trustees in this case, communicating some thoughts
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And the Trust, as an
regarding the matter to Connie Taylor. And I would point 12
13 entity, was his client.
out that, while Ms. Taylor does represent the Trust right
14
The trust, as an entity, is now my client.
now, the previous trustees clearly had intended that this
15 And I believe he needs the current trustee's permission
communication, this letter, be sent to somebody else and
16 to disclose any confidential information.
there is no indication whatsoever that there is any
17
And where I'm getting at with this objection,
confidential, or attorney-client privilege type of
18 Your Honor, is -- the other objection I have to this is
communications in here. So I think that the privilege
19 relevance. Because-
Because-argument just rings hollow.
20
THE COURT: Well, wait a minute, really truly.
THE COURT: Well, I haven't read the letter.
TIIE
21
MR. CHARNEY: And that's the bind you're in.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. One at a time.
11
22
THE COURT: Correct. I think the best thing to
THE COURT: If someone who is entitled to rely on 11
23 the attorney-client privilege waives thai: privilege by
do, at this point, is reserve ruling on the issue
IiI!
24 disclosing the otherwise protected communication with
ofeomments.
completely. Let me make a couple of
Gomments.
25
other people, doesn't that waive the privilege? In other
Mr. Charney, you said that you thought that

I~
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you could call, apparently, the author of this letter,
Bart Harwood, okay, to get over the hearsay objection or
to establish the authenticity.
It seems to me if you called Bart Harwood to
testify about what Bart Harwood said in this letter, that
certainly gets over the hearsay issue, but it doesn't
necessarily allow you to admit the document.
MR. CHARNEY: True.
Now-THE COURT: Now-
MR. CHARNEY: I've got the business records
-exception, which I think would be -
THE COURT: Perhaps you could get around a hearsay
objection to the letter in that fashion, by calling
Mr. Harwood; okay.
Now, with respect to the attorney-client
privilege, I really want to discuss this at :,ome greater
length. And, again, I -- and I promise all the parties.
I truly have not read the contents of this letter.
I'm looking at the date, the letterhead, it's
obviously from a law firm. There's no dispute about
that. It's written to Ms. Connie Taylor, at Clark and
Feeney, in Lewiston. And just so the record is clear,
there is no question but that Connie Taylor is an
attorney.
I suppose the question is, perhap8 I would
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words, if the trustee -- if the then trustel~ of the
Trust, Beth and Andrew Rogers, receive a letter from the
attorney representing them as trustees, and they take
that letter and they communicate it and disclose it to
other people, how is that consistent with. relying on that
privilege that they're allowed to keep these
communications confidential, at that point?
Do you see what I mean?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: And then, realizing that there are
-successor trustees now, you're saying, well, now they -
that the new trustees want to assert the Trust's
attorney-client privilege.
It just seems to me that if the cat's already
out of the bag, if that attorney-client privilege has
previously been waived by the people who were, then,
acting as the trustees for the Trust, that it's gone
forever, isn't it?
MS. TAYLOR: As to that isolated document, yes.
THE COURT: Yeah.
TIIE
MS. TAYLOR: It is, Your Honor.
The problem I am seeing is, it's dear, from
the way this case has progressed, what the Defendant is
going to try to do is infer, from this letter, that
because of this position, there weren't other discussions

I
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between Beth Harwood -- or Beth Rogers and Bart Harwood
as to whether the Trust had the power to do the sale,
whether the they needed court approval, all of that --
all of that will be privileged.
We will be prevented from answering this
inference. And they shouldn't be allowed to do that,
when they know that we won't be able to counter
cOWlter it.
THE COURT: But you're representing the Trust.
You don't have to rely on the privilege. [mean, as --
Mr. Charney, let me ask you a question.
MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you trying to get the Harwood
letter in, in order to show the effect that the knowledge
of this letter -- I mean, are you going to find out-out-
are you going to elicit testimony from Mr. Maile, this
morning, to the effect that Mr. Maile was aware of the
contents of this letter and relied on it, in some way, in
further activity that he took?
MR CHARNEY: There are a couple of
points,
ofpoints,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: First off, that there was some
knowledge about the letter, and -- well, it's difficult
for me to talk about it in a vacuum.
THE COURT: Well-Well-
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frankly, hearsay, and whether or not you're offering it
for the truth of the matter or the affect that it had on
the hearer.
MR.
MR CHARNEY: Well, there's no doubt the
document's hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay.
TIlE
MR.
MR CHARNEY: So, if I have to deal with that
objection, I would just deal with it with an appropriate
witness.
Let me ask Mr. Maile this question about the
letter.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, when did you come
into possession of September 5th, Bart Haywood letter.
A. The years kind of run together, but I really
think it happened during the deposition of Bart Harwood.
So it probably was -- this is 2006. It was probably in
preparing for last year's trial, maybe September of '05.
'05?
Q. September of 'OS?
A. Yeah. I think so.
Q. Now, how did you come into possession of the
letter?
A. I took Bart Harwood's deposition.
Q. He brought this with him?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Was there any claim of privilege at the time
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MR. CHARNEY: But there's indieations in here
that, we will just simply argue, led him to feel safety
about continuing to invest in the property.
THE COURT: Okay. So what -- I'm
l'm taking your
-
comments as, essentially, an offer of proof -MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
THE COURT: -- that -- are you telling me, then,
that Mr. Maile will testify, if asked, that he was, in
fact, aware of this letter, that it was disclosed to him,
by Beth and Andrew Rogers, while they were still
trustees?
MR.. CHARNEY: Not at the time, but at a later
MR.
point in time.
though?
THE COURT: While they were still trustees thOUgh?
MR.. CHARNEY: I think I need to confer before I
MR.
can -- with Mr. Maile before I could state, clearly, the
answer to that question.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, if you are able to
establish that the people to whom this letter was
addressed, that those folks revealed thi~; letter to
others, to Mr. Maile, while they were still the trustees,
then I think that I would overrule the attorney-client
privilege objection to the admission of this letter.
Now, there may be a question, still, as to
relevance. And there may still be a question as to,

1
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l
of the deposition, when he disclosed it?
l
A. No.
Q. Was Ms. Taylor there at the deposition?
A. I think Mr. Clark was.
Q. That would be Paul Clark?
A. Yes.
Q. Who is also in Ms. Taylor's firm --A. Yes.
Q. -- and represents the trustees?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: I guess then, Your Honor, it seems
to have been volWltarily
voluntarily disclosed and no objection being
raised when it was initially disclosed.
Another point in the offer of proof has to do
with -- I don't want to talk about the contents of the
letter too much Wltil
until you rule on it, but the absence of
any indication that one would have had to seek court
approval to close the sale.
Just about a year after the sale was closed,
which is also seeming to be an area whe:re the Court has
h
obviously had concern, but we've had -- this letter, I
think, would demonstrate, one attorney looked at it,
Mr. Wishney looked at it, Mr. Maile looked at it, and
nobody ever had said, hey, there's a -- you know, red
,~"m"
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alert here. You needed to have a judge sign off on this.
And that would be a secondary reason for offering this
letter as the absence of that point, as well.
THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't 1<::t it in just for
that, over an objection based on attorney-client
attomey-client
privilege.
Ms. Taylor, let me ask you, how do you
respond to the argument that this letter was disclosed,
without objection, during a deposition?
MS. TAYLOR: I don't think that I can argue that
it isn't -- that the attorney-client
attomey-client privilege prohibits
it from being admitted, just the letter itself.
But again, where we're headed is an attempt
to raise an inference that, because something isn't in
here, conversations that would absolutely be privileged
didn't occur.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I'm --
MS. TAYLOR: That's our issue.
THE COURT: -- going to do then -- okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor --
THE COURT: No. I don't think fb.ere's any more
argument required. The issue facing me, right this
moment, is the admissibility or inadmissibility of the
two-page letter that has been marked D)r identification
as Defense Exhibit 7.
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It's not authenticity, it's more relevance; isn't it?
You tell me why you want -- why you think I need to see
this. Are you offering it for the truth of the matter or
why are you offering this?
MR. CHARNEY: I'm offering it, as I stated, for
two basic reasons. One, to demonstrate that -- to defeat
any claim that -- let me back up.
Mr. Maile is here on an unjust enrichment
claim, because he continued to develop property after
knowing that there was at least a threat of litigation.
And I think it's important for the Court to
recognize that David Wishney looked at the transaction
and didn't see the need for court approval. Mr. Harwood
looked at the transaction and didn't see the need for
court approval.
THE COURT: Now, is that last assertion what you
believe will be established by the admission of his
letter?
MR. CHARNEY: I believe in part, yes. And then,
fmally, I think that the letter, to the extent that
Mr. Maile had it in his possession and may have continued j
to develop the property, after seeing this and knowing
some of the facts that were set forth in this
tillS letter,
also demonstrates his good-faith reliance on the trust
againsl him, in
not going forward with litigation against

1--,-----------------------+----"-----''--------"''-----'----.--------
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I had previously overruled the objection,
with respect to -- to relevance. Well, maybe I didn't.
Maybe what I said was, I really had to wait and see how
Mr. Charney wanted to handle the objeetion on hearsay and
attomey-client privilege was
relevance; okay? But the attorney-client
the issue that was most concerning to me.
tlcis letter was
Now, based upon the fact that tlas
produced during a deposition, the attorney-client
privilege has been waived, given the fact that Ms. Taylor
had an opportunity, during the depositions -- as I
understand the testimony, that Ms. Taylor was present at
the deposition where Mr. Harwood disclosed the letter,
attomey-client pri"ilege.
and didn't assert any attorney-client
Is that untrue, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Actually, Mr. Clark was there, but it
would have the same affect.
THE COURT: Thank you.
attomey-client privilege i~ waived;
So the attorney-client
attomt:y-client
therefore, the objection based on attornt:y-client
privilege is overruled.
Now, we still have two other issues, one is
hearsay. I suppose Bart Harwood could come in and -- or
the custodian of this particular record could come in and
establish the authenticity of the letter.
i~ it?
But that's not the real question, is
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continuing to develop the property.
So what I would ask you to do is, on the
relevance, whether the Court views it as marginal
relevance or, you know, overwhelming relevance, it's
still relevant to the issues here.
On the hearsay, I'm going to ask the Court to
conditionally admit it, just so we can continue to
proceed in an orderly fashion. And I will backfill and
call Mr. Harwood if, in fact, we can't work out the
hearsay issue on some kind of a break.
THE COURT: Well, I think that what you're
suggesting is that if Mr. Harwood had thought that there
'I
was a need to get court approval before the sale had gone J
there, that that would have been contained in this
'1Ii1
letter.
Now, maybe this letter says, I've checked it
out and you don't need court approval or something like
that. But even at that --MR. CHARNEY: It doesn't say that. I mean, it
II
doesn't say that. It talks -- well, I want to be careful
that I don't tell you what is in the letter, unless you
want to-
to-I
THE COURT: That's all right.
Ms. Taylor, you have risen to your feet. Did
you have something to enlighten me with?
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MS. TAYLOR: Well, I actually just never sat down
since the last time, Your Honor.
But I -- I'm in the same position that
Mr. Charney is in. Without discussing what is in the
letter, I think it's improper and irrelevant to try to
infer that a conversation hadn't occurred between
Mr. Harwood and his clients, at the time, just because he
chose not to put it in a letter that he was writing to
someone who was at odds with that client.
THE COURT: Well, I --MS. TAYLOR: This letter is long after the sale
had closed.
MR. CHARNEY: And Mr. Harwood can come testify,
and they have the right to waive the privilege. And if
Mr. Harwood has notes that said, they should have got
court approval, and I had this conversation with Beth and
Andy Rogers, then you would think that that would be
testimony that would be offered by the Plaintiffs or --yeah, by the Plaintiffs in this case, and they would want
to put that before the Court.
So we're not making any inferen(;e.
inferen<;e. If
they've got that type of evidence, then let's -- I would
think that that would be very important.
THE COURT: Well, that can go to argument. I am
not going to admit the letter, at this time. As both
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Q. Yes. What I want to know is, after closing
the transaction, you sought financing for the property in n,
question through Idaho Independent Bank?
A. Yes, I did.
.'1
Q. Why did you do that, and when did you do
II
that?
A. Well, in mid-2003, I had approached Beth by
phone, and I asked Beth if she would consider -- if she
wanted to modify the promissory note 1md deed of trust to
allow the Trust to be paid off in what's called lot
splits. So, when I would sell a lot, I could pay a
portion of the balance owing to the The:odore L. Johnson
Trust.
Q. Would this have been a modification of the
prior agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
A. And she said she would talk to her accountant
about it, because it could have had advantages to the
Trust, in addition to having advantages to us.
Anyway, she got back maybe a week or 10 days
later. I either called her as a follow-up, or she called
me back and said, basically, the accountant wasn't
interested in adjusting anything. And they just wanted
to be paid off in full.

il

,

--------+----=----------------------/\
-----------------r------~----------------------------------_i
Page 68

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

attorneys are -- it's obvious that I don't want to know
exactly what's in this letter, because I'm in this
offact, as well as the
position of being the finder offact,
Judge determining, as a rule oflaw, what evidence makes
it into this record, and what evidence the finder of fact
considers.
I don't want to consider this letter from
Bart Harwood, at this time. It seems to me there hasn't
been any showing that Bart Harwood would not be an
available witness. There's no showing that -- at this
point, that Mr. Maile relied on certain assertions that
were contained in a letter that he was aware of at a
certain point in time.
So, I'm going to just have you move on from
here, Mr. Charney. There may be another way to get
Mr. Harwood's, you know, belief in, later on in the
trial, at an appropriate spot. But I'm not going to let
it in at this point.
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
THE COURT: Okay.
I'l1 move forward.
MR. CHARNEY: I'll
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, let's tum to
another aspect of your testimony, not Exhibit 8 as you
just did.
A. I'm just ready for you.
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So that caused us, my wife and I, to consider
different avenues with financing, for construction
financing on the project.
So we went to -- I went to a couple of banks.
u:
And Idaho Independent Bank was the barlk
bank that expressed an II!I
interested in doing the take-out fmancing, to payoff
the Trust and to provide construction financing for the
project, Fairfield Estates.
Q. All right. Now, turning to Exhibit 8, is
Exhibit 8 the deed of trust that was entere:d into between
It
Idaho Independent Bank and Berkshire Investments, and I
believe it's the second line, on January 8th, 2004?
Coun~y Recorder's
A. I was looking for the Ada Coun~y
stamp on it. It's on the first page. It was recorded on
or about that, January 10, 2004. Yes. It is signed by
I'
my wife and I, as member managers of Berkshire
Investments LLC.
tnlSt, that it
Q. Now, I note, from the deed of tITlSt,
of$531,150.
reflects a loan in the amount of
$53 1,150. Is that the
amount of money that you borrowed? That's the top line,
I believe, right under where it says deed of trust.
A. That was the extent of what was available to
us. Initially, we borrowed, in January, just a
sufficient amount of money to payoff the Theodore L.
t
Johnson Trust in full.
:111
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Q.
Q. And then you had a credit line for the
balance?
A. That's true.
Q. What was the credit line for?
A. Construction. We
We--Q. Go ahead.
A. The way the commercial loans work is that you
provide the lending institution with estimated costs of
construction and development by a certified engineer,
Joe Canning in this case, outlining -- so the bank would
be comfortable in realizing what the costs would be in
developing the project.
proj ect. The dollar amount to payoff the
Trust, plus those estimated costs, represent the dollar
amount of$531,000.
Q.
AIl right. And for lack of any better term,
Q. All
did you tap out that loan, meaning did you borrow the
maximum amount?
A. Yeah. I don't think we actually used all of
it. It was, you know, a combined effort of money in,
money out, and just trying to keep your interest payments
down as best as you could. So I can't remember, but I
don't think we tapped it out.
Q. Okay. And the deed of trust having been
recorded January 8,2004, was there a development portion
of the loan that required you to have tht: property split,
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Is this a record that was kept in the
ordinary course of Berkshire Investments' business?
A. Yes.
Q. Was Berkshire Investments' business the
Q.
development of Fairfield Estates on Linder Road?
A. Yes.
MR. CHARNEY: At this time, I would offer Exhibit
No.9.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. I object on
hearsay. The business record exception doesn't apply to
the person who just has it in their file. It applies to
the person who created it.
THE COURT: Right. That's a fact. I mean, the
business records exception is a valid exception to the
hearsay rule. But, an otherwise hearsay document
doesn't -- you know, it doesn't become admissible merely
because the person who has it kept it in the ordinary
course of business. It's still hearsay. It's authentic,
but it's still -- it's still hearsay.
Do you have any other exception that you want
to offer it under?
MR. CHARNEY: Well, I could try 803.24, but I
I'11
haven't given the appropriate advance notice. So I'll
call Mr. Knudsen for purposes of getting this in.

---~~~~~----~----------------~~~----~--.~-----------
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Q.

developed, ready for sale by a certain point in time?
A. Right. The -- Al
AI Knudsen, with Idaho
Independent Bank, and the banking documents, provide that
there has to be construction done within six months, and
the lots have to be marketable within six months, which
really puts your feet to the fire to get everything done
..
done..
Q. What is the purpose of that?
A. Well, the bank, through regulators, they just
have to have the assurances that, when they loan money,
things are getting done and there's going to be a
flnished
fInished product that will pay back the b.mk, up to the
amount that it's borrowed by my wife and I.
Q. Turning to Exhibit No.9.
A. Yeah, I'm there.
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit No.9?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is Exhibit No.9?
A. Well, what had happened --
Q.
Q. No, no. Just what is Exhibit No.9?
A. It's a letter from Idaho Independent Bank.
Q. Is it addressed to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it signed by Al
AI Knudsen, Vice President of
Idaho Independent Bank?
A. Yes, it is.
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THE COURT: The objection is sustained, and
Exhibit 9 is not admitted.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: After receiving Exhibit
No.9 -- well, let me say. Before receiving Exhibit
No.9, did you feel a certain pressure to get this
project, at least the development portion of
Fairfield Estates, completed?
A. You bet.
Q. Why?
A. Well, the bank -- I advised the bank -- I
thought it was my obligation to go tell the bank,
Al Knudsen, in February or March of2004, after the
AI
lawsuit was filed, that these folks had filed a lis
pendens on the project.
Al and I said, well, you know,
So I went to AI
this is filed. But, by golly, we feel pretty optimistic
about it and we're going to try our best to get it
resolved in court quickly. And we're still trying to do
that.
But he -- we -- I had conversation with
him-him -
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; hearsay.
MR. CHARNEY: I'm not asking what Mr. Knudsen
said.
beenpremature,
MS. TAYLOR: I may have been
premature, but...

.....
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THE COURT: Okay. You would object to this
witness testifying as to what Mr. Knudsen may have said?
Okay. And I don't think that was the tenor of the
question, yet. So you're acknowledging that your
objection was premature, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Go ahead, Mr. Maile.
A. Okay. So I felt obligated to tell Al what
was going on. And we had a number of phone conversations
throughout the following months, February, March, April
May of 2004, because my reading of the commercial loan
documents that I had executed, Exhibit 8, that, you know,
we had certain obligations to the bank.
And we had to pursue development or they were
going to -- they had the right to call the loan due, not
only for nonpayment of the amount, but any liens that
were ftled
flied against it, and anything that would give them
a sense of insecurity about the project, including me not
doing construction.
Q. If they called the note due, did you have the
funds liquid to pay it off in order to protect the
property?
A. No.
Q. Had they called the note due, could they have

payoff.
1 payoff
2
Q. And in the first few months of the
3 litigation, was there any indication, by way of any court
4 orders or anything else the Plaintiffs had done, that
5 would lead you to conclude that the appraised value was
6 bad, or you had engaged in any misconduct which was going
7 to undo the sale?
8
A. No. And, in fact, the court order was
9 entered dismissing ground one, or the Taylors' complaint.
10 That was in about April of 2004. Beth Rogers and
11 Andy Rogers were still at the helm, as trustees, and
12 everything was thumbs up from them.
13
Q. Had Idaho Independent Bank also commissioned
14 their own appraisal regarding this property before doing
15 this deal?
16
A. Yes. That was completed in December of 2003,
1 7 by Williams.
18
Q. Was the appraised value that was set forth in
19 the December '03 report also an indication to you that
2a
0 you had, in fact, paid fair market value for the
2 1 property?
22
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; calls for hearsay as to
23 the amount of the -- the appraisal is not in evidence.
24 It has not been submitted as an exhibit.
25
THE COURT: Okay. But that -- as I understand the

Page 76

Page 78
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simply foreclosed on the property and Idaho Independent
Bank would be the owner now?
A. Absolutely. Well, somebody would-Q. Somebody-A. Someone would have purchast:d it at the
foreclosure sale, I'm sure of that.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, let me ask you to
establish something else, and I may have just missed it
during the testimony.
MR. CHARNEY: That's all right.
THE COURT: Did you have Mr. Maile testify as to
the date of the lis pendens, when he first was informed?
MR. CHARNEY: I was -- I have a big star right by
that very question.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: I want to talk about -- go
back to refresh your memory on -- Exhibit 8 was entered
into January 8th of 2004; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When was it that you got sued and the lis
flied in this case?
pendens ftled
A. I think it was January 23, 2004.
Q. SO well after you had already obligated
yourself to Idaho Independent Bank?
A. About two weeks after the Trust received the

1
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question, the question was not asking how much the thing
appraised for. The question was whether or not there was]
was
anything, including an appraisal or anything else, that
would have put Mr. Maile on notice that he might lose thei
the I,'
property, or that the sale would be rescinded in s
ome?
some
way.
'
Is that essentially what you were asking.
i!
i
MR. CHARNEY: It is, Your Honor. And it's also
offered to show the effect on the listener, or on the
reader, as to why he felt comfortable continuing to
develop in light of allegations, at the timl~,
timc~, that he had
paid less than fair market value.
THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to overrule III'
the objection. And, Ms. Taylor, it's diffi,;;ult for me to
see, just because of the configuration of I:he courtroom.
MR. CHARNEY: I'm sorry. I'll move aside when she
objects, Your Honor.
I:
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection
because, as I take it, the amount of the appraisal is not
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
In other words, I don't know whal: that is,
but assuming it's say $400,000, it's -- it's not being
offered to establish to the fmder of fact, or the trier
of fact, that the thing really was worth $400,000. It is
being offered to show the effect that it would have had

Ii
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1 on the person who, you know, is being charged with
2 proceeding in spite of this contrary knowledge.
Do you see what I mean? So I'm going to
3
4 overrule the objection.
5
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
6
THE COURT: Go ahead.
7
MR. CHARNEY: So let's -- so that we're
Q. BY MR..
8 clear, did part of that first lawsuit allege that you had
9 paid less than fair market value for this property?
10
l O AA.
. Yes, it did.
11
Q. It was a significant allegation against you,
12 wasn't it?
13
A. Seemed to be.
14
Q. SO we already know, from the record, that we
15 had the initial appraisal from Mr. Johnson at $400,000.
hal flater, how much was Mr. Williams'
16 A year and a halflater,
17
1 7 appraisal?
18
18
A. Well, that was done for Idaho Independent
19
1 9 Bank. And it said, at that point in tim~:, the property
20
$410,000
2 0 was worth $4
I 0,000 in the unimproved state that I had --21 that we had acquired it in.
22
Q. SO, with the two appraisals, and then
23 entering into the deed of trust that obligated you to go
24
2 4 forward, and then a lawsuit that said you had paid less
25 than fair market value, did you feel comfortable going

1 construction being done for the final plat, and all the
2 governmental hoops that have been approved; highway
u.s. Department of
3 district, irrigation districts, U.S.
4 Geology.
5
So I think this is all -- for all intents and
6 purposes, the final plat.
7
Q. I would note that it appears that the road
8 goes into the center of the subdivision, and maybe -- it
9 looks like most of the driveways, then, would peal off of
10
lOaa center court there?
11
A. Each lot would be serviced, have a driveway
12 on West Cornerstone Lane, except those that are on the
13 cul-de-sac. But the entire road is called West
14 Cornerstone Lane, and it's a private road as opposed to a
15 public road.
16
Q. Is it developed with the center, I'll call it
17 a cul-de-sac if you will, because of the septic issues
18
1 8 and that's the way it needed to be designed to deal with
19
1 9 the septic issues you talked about?
20
A. The center issue, ultimately, was going to be
an n I
21 a landscape area that had a pond that was dug, and a
22 irrigation system was going to be hooked up in the center 1)
23 area. And that was going to be the irrigation source for
2244 the seven lots.
25
So -- and quite a bit of the work had been

I
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forward with the development, on one hand comfortable
because of the appraisals, and on the other hand,
uncomfortable because you had to develop to maintain
consistency with your obligations under the loan?
A. Well, to this day, I know that I paid a fair
market value for the property. And I did back then, as
well.
And I also know the pressure from the lending
documents, that I had to get the job done or it was going
to be called due. I was between the proverbial rock and
the hard place.
Q. Okay. Let's move to Exhibit 10. What is
Exhibit 1O?
A. Exhibit 10 is just a docu -- part of the
documentation referencing, from B and A Engineering, the
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, which is the 40-acre
parcel that's the subject of this litigation.
Q. What does it take to get, I guess, a project,
a development project, to this state where you've got it?
Is this a preliminary plat, or is this a final plat?
That's a question to you.
A. It is a question to me. It looks like part
of the date is deleted from this sheet.
There really isn't much change between the
preliminary plat and the fmal plat, other than the
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done to effectuate that, except the actual installation
of the pump and the fmal landscaping.
Q. Now, I understand you began construction on a
bam?
A. Yes. Up in Lot 1.
I.
Q. Was Lot I to be your lot?
A. My wife and I; that's correct.
Q. Was there any obligation, under the Idaho
Independent Bank note, for you to build the bam?
A. No.
Q. That was something you chose to do?
A. Right. I wanted to build the bam first, and
we had plans drawn up for the house. We were -- that was
going to be our home site.
Q. Had you, at some point in the liIigation,
decided that it would be a wise idea to stop construction
on the bam?
barn?
A. Well, including paying your bill and a
variety of other reasons, yeah. I stopped construction
of the bam.
MR..
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I might ask, can we
take, maybe, a five-minute break? We're: going to move
into a lot of the drier stuff -THE COURT: Sure.
MR..
MR. CHARNEY: -- about expenses and stufflike
", _",{_,,,d

it,
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that. And it would be good to just sit for a couple
minutes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHARNEY: Just five minutes.
THE COURT: Fair enough.
MR. CHARNEY: Thanks.
THE COURT: Court will be in recess.
(Recess taken 10:14 a.m. to 10:25 a.m.)
THE COURT: Please be seated.
Are you all set, Mr. Charney?
MR. CHARNEY: I am all set.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, a couple of
follow-up questions, here, before we get into the
finances.
With respect to both of the complaints that
had been filed, the one that we talked about in '04,
January of '04, and the second one, was there ever an
allegation, in either of those complaint;;, that the sale
should be undone because the trustees did not seek prior
court approval?
A. No.
Q. SO you wouldn't have had an opportunity to
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A. Up through the Supreme Court's ruling, yes.
Q. And it appears to me that the second to last
page of this summarizes those amounts?
A. Well, for the calendar year -- no, it doesn't
summarize the entire amounts. Let me -- let me try to
explain it. Going through Exhibit 1 --Q. I?
dilat in the
A. Excuse me, 11, page 1, shows dlat
calendar year 2004, there was a total of ....- of two
payments made of $406.02.
Q. Okay.
A. We made those payments on the property.
The next page of Exhibit 11, actually, one,
two, three, four five, the next five pages of Exhibit 11
come from the Ada County tax records, showing what the
assessed values are after the subdivision is platted.
You go from agricultural base ground in 2004, and now, in
2005, the Ada County Assessor's Office is basing it on an
improved subdivision.
And then, the page, the following page --
Q. Let's back up, just so that we're clear about
this. It appears that the property address on the second
page, for example, is 4680 West Cornerstone, the third
page is 4602 West Cornerstone and so on, and so forth; is
that fair?
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research that, to see if there was any validity to that
claim, prior to making all the investments in the
property?
A. Based on the complaint, I had no reason to
research that issue, because it wasn't raised in the
complaint.
Q. All right. Finally, on that point, was all
of the development that you are seeking reimbursement
for, by way of this proceeding, completed, done prior to
the point in time when there were court rulings
indicating that that might have been an issue?
A. That's true. The Supreme Court ruled, in
December of
,OS, that -- on that narrow issue, and the
of'05,
subdivision was fully completed and platted in October of
'04.
Q. Let's continue to move through the exhibits,
then. I think we had left off at 10. So let's move to
page, in Exhibit
Exhibit No. 11. There are several page;;
No. 11.
What is Exhibit No. II?
A. It should be a record of the tax payments
that my wife and I were making on the property since the
acquisition.
Q. Have you, in fact, kept the tax~:s current on
all of the tax years in question?
......
,",
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A. That's true.
Q. SO are these the assessments for the
individual lots?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you kept those current?
'OS, I paid
A. Up through -- paying in December '05,
$9,527.69 for that tax year, 'as.
'05.
Q. And then the fmal sheet in page -- in
Exhibit 11, I should say, is what?
A. It shows the calendar year 2003, My wife and
I paid $702.98 for real estate taxes on the subject
I'
property.
Q. As far as the unjust enrichment claim goes,
do you believe that you should be repaid by the Trust for
making these tax payments?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Why is that?
their-A. Well, the Court has ruled that it's their-
the title is in the Trust, currently, and they would have
Iii
had to have made those payments. And][ was acting under
the color of title, if you will, that the property was
ours. So I made the payments during that period of time.
Q. Let's move to Exhibit 12. Do you recognize
Exhibit 12?
m
A. Exhibit 12 was a docunlent prepared in
II
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offset for attorney f
fees. e e s . )i\
2
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: But for purposes of this,
3
4 we're assuming that we're talking about funds above
5 $400,000. So, as far as that entry, 6/1/03, for 32,357,
6 is that really included in the $400,000 that the parties
7 have already agreed to?
A. Well, no. Because we have, before the Court,
8
9 A request for prejudgment interest on that $400,000. So
10
1 0 some of that -- well, excluding the prejudgment interest,
11 just back out the $32,000, because I know that there will
12 be testimony from Joe Corlett on the evaluation of the
IT
13 improvements.
14
Q. Okay.
15
A. I don't know if that answers the question.
16
Q. In other words, on the second page we have a
17
1 7 total amount of costs associated with Fairfield Estates
18 of$210,120.77. My question is, should that be reduced
19 downward by the Court by $32,357, since the $400,000 is
20
2 0 already accounted for?
21
A. Yes. In that sense, yeah. But, there's one
22 thing I want you to also look at. On the: entry, for
23 example, 10/22/2004.
24
Q. Okay. So second page, about third from the
24
25 bottom.
'-------=-"-------+------------------------1,·
Page 88
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discovery, in response to interrogatories, that tries to
give a summary, a reconstruction of the various items for
construction that were incurred, and when they were paid.
This would be for Fairfield Estates, partial costs.
Q. When did you prepare this?
A. Probably in 2005.
Q. Does this reflect all of the expenses
associated with the development of Fairfield Estates?
A. No. I don't -- I don't think it did because,
the work sheet, Exhibit 13, probably is a better overall
of the -- of what I consider to be expenses associated
with the development of the Fairfield Estates
Subdivision.
Q. Okay.
A. But we could not make a paper trail for the
entirety of Exhibit 13. So some of the items in 13 were
-. we couldn't
not included in 12, because we didn't -figure out when they were incurred, for example.
Exhibit 13 shows when they were paid.
Q. And the incurred demonstrate:;, for example,
if we look at 2003, B and A Engineers, this was incurred
December of 2002, in the amount of$2,143.25?
A. Right.
Q. SO this is to help the Court understand when
you were actually incurring the expense, as opposed to

when it was actually being paid?
A. That's true.
Q. Okay. Let's move to Exhibit No. 13. Do you
recognize 13?
A. Yeah. It's a business record of our
QuickBooks program that we use. It's labeled, it's
printed 2/02/05. But it's a transaction history, and up
on the top, left-hand comer it says Construction Costs
Fairfield Estates.
Q. Yes?
A. So this Exhibit 13 was our internal
bookkeeping, to try to show what items went into
Fairfield Estates. And they also include payments. For
example, on 6/1/2003, Theodore L. Johnson Trust was paid
$32,357. That was a combination of interest and
principle on the note.
Q. Do you believe that that's fairly included in
the unjust enrichment claim, since] think it's an agreed
upon, between the parties, that you will get the $400,000
for the initial purchase price of the lot?
MR. CHARNEY: Actually, before I ask that
question, is that an agreed upon, that prot of the order
in this case? We're not disputing the $400,000, his
entitlement to the $400,000?
MS. TAYLOR: We'renot. But we're asserting an
""" "',, "",""

~""

1

II

1
A. Yeah. It's an entry called Hopt: Development
2 Company.
3
Q. Okay.
4
A. And that was mislabeled, and I know
5 Joe Corlett didn't catch that. It's employees' fees for
6 construction of remodel. That's not true.
7
Hope Development is a construction company
8 that -- that I -- that is a family-run construction
9 company. And in this case, in developing Fairfield
10 Estates, we had -- Hope Development was retained, by
11 Berkshire Investments, to handle certain portions of the
12
1 2 construction.
13
So Hope Development hires its employees, and
14 they did work out on Berkshire property for the -- a
15 portion of it, certainly, was related to grading,
16
1 6 excavating, and also the installation of pipe, for
17
1 7 example.
18
18
If I can just back up to the plat and
19 subdivision --20
20
Q. Exhibit 10?
21
A. Right. I can explain. On Exhibit 10 -- I
22 alluded to it a little bit before, but Exhibit 10 has
23 this circular plat. And in the middle of the platted
24
2 4 area is an irrigation lake or pond.
25
irri~ation system used to be flood
The irrigation
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irrigation out on this property, as agricultural land.
In order to do lots, and make them commercially
reasonable for resale, nobody has time, that lives on a
5-acre parcel, to irrigate land by flood irrigation. So
you have to have pressurized systems.
So Hope Development, in addition to doing
grading with backhoes, bulldozers, they also were
commissioned to install gate pipe, buried pipe, that was
up from the northeast comer.
corner.
Water came down the northeast corner of
Lot 10, down a cement irrigation line. And from that
point, which is between Lots 3 and 4, there is buried
pipe that goes to service this irrigation area in the
center of the subdivision.
So the entry, for example, Hope Development
on 10/22/04, each year, historically, my company in this
case, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company, pays Hope
Development, typically annually, for its contract
services for any development that I might do.
So this $23,000 was done for the installation
of the irrigation system and other items.
item8.
So that-that-
Q. Can I -- was this money paid to you, or paid
to the actual people that did the work?
A. Well, Hope Development is my family company,
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costs invested into this property?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's, then, move to Exhibit No. 14. Do you
recognize Exhibit 14?
A. Exhibit 14 is basically the same scenario, as
far as our internal accounting system, that shows what
was done on Lot 1, where the barn -- where our home was
to be built and the barn is back built.
Q. Is it a fact there's a barn that's partially
built on the property right now?
A. I would like to think it's 90 percent done.
The barn was started in October of'03. We had
excavation work done in October of'03. We had footings
formed in '03 and poured.
And then, in November, the framing crew went
out, and they started to actually put the sticks up on
the barn, through November and December. Then the bad
weather hit, so the sticks, depicted in the pictures,
were in the -- just up in the air.
The lawsuit hits. We have quite a bit
invested in materials. So, here again, if you don't
cover up what you've done in construction, the wood is
problems.
going to warp and a variety of problem8.
So I felt that it was prudent to finish the
barn, at least to the point where it's up and shingled,

Page 92
1 but -- so one arm
ann of my family paid, in essence, another
2 arm
ann of my family business. But, as a lawyer, I don't
3 hire construction workers. So Hope D(~velopment
D(~velopment hires
4 construction workers to do construction work. I think
5 Joe Corlett missed that in his analysis.
6
But here, again, when -- this was for
7 internal bookkeeping. If this was done by a private
8 contractor, the fees would be quite a bit higher than
9 what Hope Development charged our f1IIlily.
10
Q. Okay. So you think that that's a valid
11 charge?
12
A. Oh, absolutely.
13
Q. Okay. It all ---
14
A. That -- the entry says 5811 Airport Road,
15 because Hope Development also did work out there. But
16 it had the line item for -- the secretary didn't delete
17 5811 Airport Road. It should have been deleted.
18
Q. All right. So there's that error. And your
19 belief, as far as the unjust enrichment portion of this,
20 is that the 210,120.77 should be reduced by the 32,357?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Okay.
23
A. And there might be some -- a different
24 reduction, too.
25
as far as your hard
Q. And that's, at least,
....

_.

,»->

>ili»>m="">"%,,YdBm""»">,m>""»hm"ili,, ,»»,

11

I:

i

Page 94
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
n~.M:iK;,,~,~,

the siding is up and painted, the concrete is poured.
We didn't put on the exterior doors, because it just --said okay.
it just didn't -- at that point in time, we 8aid
I intended to enclose to keep the trespassers out, but we
got some doors done. But the big overhead doors at both
ends, we haven't -- we haven't gotten those done.
Q. Is it fair to say, then, that Exhibit 14
Q.
reflects that you spent $31,111.24 on the barn, to date?
A. Yes. Well, you have to back out -- the
u·I
barn -- the Classic Cottage Company, any entry with
;'
Classic Cottage Company relates to the home design that "
we had out there.
Q. Oh.
A. So you have to back those out.
Q. Okay. So, I see the first entry and the
It
third entry --A. Right.
Q. -- should be backed out?
A. Right. Because that relates to a. house that
I:
we have plans for, but isn't being built right now.
Q. Let's move to Exhibit 15. Do you recognize
Exhibit IS?
A. This shows a -- as of February 8, 2006, that
there is a total due of$I,476 on irrigation.
Q. Has this since been paid?
O.

II
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but 1 didn't -- we
A. I thought $637 was paid, but]
had paid, in the years 2003, 2004 -- it works out to be
$801I a year. Anyway, we have not paid the last, 2006.
$80
Q. SO how much have you paid for irrigation,
then?
$80 I a year.
A. I would say three years at $801
Q. All right. And the Trust would have had to
that-pay that-
A. Yes.
Q. -- if they were in possession of the
property?
A. Yes.
Q. SO three years at $801 -- is it S801.60
actually?
A. That's what I think, yes.
Q. Okay. Finally, let's move to Exhibit No. 16.
Do you recognize Exhibit 16?
A. Yes.
Q. What is Exhibit 16?
prl~judgment
A. It's a calculation relating to prl~judgment
interest on monies paid to the Trust.
Q. If you can, walk the Judge through items 1,I,
2, and 3 on Exhibit 16.
A. Okay. We paid -- Berkshire Investments, my
wife and I, paid $100,000 on September 17,2002. That

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

prejudgment interest. And the following year would yield
$28,781.76.
The next bold item is for the next year,
from January 8,2005 through January 7,2006. That
amounts to $38,715.37.
The next entry is going from January 8,2006.
The per diem rate on that dollar amount is $118.80 per
day. Going to October 19,2006 equals $33,382.80, for a
total $156,717.68 for prejudgment interest on the
purchase price paid, in the increments when they were
paid, in three different installments, because there
were, basically, three different payments, at three
different dates, that the trust was finally paid off.
Q. You initially had to borrow money to purchase
this property; is that fair to say?
A. Yeah. We had a line of credit, yes.
Q. And had you paid interest on that line of
credit?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you still owe any money on it, at this
point?
A. No. On that line of credit, we've paid it
off.
Q. Did it roll into something else that you have
been paying interest on in the interim, or is that paid

Page 96

Page 98

1 was the date of closing.
2
So, everything related to Paragraph 1I shows
3 what prejudgment interest is, on that dollar amount, for
4 the three years following, including a per diem for this
5 last year. I have assumed that a decision may not be
6 rendered until October 19th, but I just I~hose
I~hose that date
7 somewhat arbitrarily. That equals $1,478.08 on the per
8 diem of that $100,000 paid, for that portion of this
9 third year.
10
lOOn
On line item 2, we have paid the Trust

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11 thirty-two -- we paid the Trust $32,357 on May 19,2003.
So on that dollar amount paid to the Trust,
prejudgment interest, it's a liquidated undisputed
amount, and a 12 percent interest applies for that
following year, to take you to May 18,2004. That totals
$3,882.84.
17
17
And so, too, with the second year, shows a
18 $4,348.78 amount. And the third year shows $4,870.63.
19
1 9 And the per diem, from May 19th, is fourteen -- excuse
20 me, May 19, 2006, is $14.95. Taking that to October 19th
21 equals $2,242.50.
22
And then, finally, Paragraph 3 shows, on
23 January 8th, when Idaho Independent Bank paid off the
24 Trust, $2,390 -- 848.03 was paid as a -- and we assert
25 that that's a liquidated amount that's subject to

11

12
13
14
15
16
16
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,"'''''
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off and, in the absence of a court order to the contrary,
would you own this property free and clear right now?
A. I would own it free and clear now.
Q. Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Usually, before any of my questions,
I consult with my client and he is usually over there,
Judge. Can I just approach Mr. Maile, just briefly, make
sure we have covered everything?
;
THE COURT: Yes.

I

'i:'.:

(Discussion between Counsel and Mr. Maile.)

12
13
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I don't have further
MR..
14 questions.
15
THE COURT: Very well.
16
16
Are you ready to cross-examine, Ms. Taylor?
17

MS. TAYLOR: lam, Your Honor. [fIcouldhave

18 just a moment.
19
20
CROSS-EXAMINATION
21 BY MS. TAYLOR::
22
Q.
Q. Mr. Maile?
23
A. Yes?
24
Q. Are you ready to proceed?
25
A. If you would give me a second, I seem to have
.....
"""""
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I

n
II,

Ii

,,'"

23 (Pages 95 to 98)

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
f9ff8113-684.8-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001163

Taylor v. Maile

,~

10/11/2006
Page 101

Page 99

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
I 8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

made a mess out of this exhibit binder that I have.
Okay.
Q.
Q. I would like to start with the year 2002. At
that time, you had been an attorney for about 25 years;
is that right?
24,25,
25, yes.
A. 24,
Q. And in the course of your representation, you
had handled a considerable number of lawsuits?
A. At times, yes.
Q.
Q. You appealed a number of cases to the
Supreme Court?
A. I have appealed cases to the Supreme Court.
Q. And you are aware, as an attomey, that
Q.
there's never a guarantee on what will happen in
litigation?
A. I think some cases are, yeah.
Q. You have lost cases you thought you should
have won?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. You have lost cases, on appeal, you thought
you should have won?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. SO, in this case, you knew that there was
never a guarantee that you would prevail?
A. That's true.

,,''',''

IIi'

(Exhibits No. 101 through 134 are admitted.)

f!

Q.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, you -- this is a
copy of Mr. 10hnson's
Johnson's Last Will and T{:stament; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you prepared that?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. Would you look at Paragraph 402, on page 2.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what is known as a pour over
provision?
A. Yes, it is.
Q.
Johnson had
Q. Under the terms of that, if Mr. 10hnson
any assets that hadn't been transferred into the Trust,
upon his death, they would be transferred into the trust?
A. That's what the intent is yes.
Q. The intent is to avoid the necessary --necessity of probate?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. Can you turn to page 106 -- or Exhibit 106,
please.
A. Okay.
Q. Is that a copy of the revokable trust
agreement that you prepared for Mr. 10hnson?
Johnson?
A. Yes.

Page 100

f

If

,1

Page 102

1
Q. And you were aware of the fact that
2 Beth Rogers was one of the beneficiaries under that
3 trust, were you not?
4
A. At the time I drafted this, sure.
5
Q. And throughout all of the dealings with the
.66 Trust, you knew that she remained a beneficiary under the
7 trust?
A. We -- say that again.
8
9
Q. That situation didn't change?
10
l O AA.
. I assume it didn't change.
11
und';:r the Trust, as
Q. Okay. And you knew that undl~r
12 you had drafted it, there were different classes of
13 beneficiaries?
14
A. I did at the time, yes.
15
15
Q. There were direct beneficiaries, which would
16 be the children of Ted 10hnson's
Johnson's siblings, if the sibling
17
1 7 had already died?
18
A. Okay. That's true.
19
Q. And did you know what class of beneficiaries
20 Beth Rogers fell into?
21
A. For what period of time?
22
Q. At the time this was drafted.
23
A. At the time it was drafted, sure.
24
Q. And which category was she in?
25
A. Beth Rogers?

1
Q. And you, in fact, did not prevail?
2
A. Not currently.
3
Q. And in 2002, you handled real estate matters?
A. For clients?
4
5
Q.
Q. For clients.
A. Yes.
6
7
Q. And you also had handled estate planning?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Can you turn to Exhibit No. 105 in the
10
1 0 Plaintiffs Exhibit folder?
11
THE COURT: Is there any estimation among the
12 parties -- we may have covered this early -- is there a
13 stipulation with respect to these exhibits?
14
14
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. They have all been stipulated
15 as admitted.
16
THE COURT: Is that correct?
17
MR. CHARNEY: That is correct, yes. The
18 Plaintiffs binder can be offered and admitted.
19
THE COURT: For the record, then, Plaintiffs
20 Exhibits -- let's see, how are they numbered again?
2211
MS. TAYLOR: 10 1 through, I believe, 134.
22
THE COURT: Okay.
23
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, 134.
24
THE COURT: 101 through 134, vrithout objection,
25 are all admitted then.
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Q. Um-hmm.
A. I have to look and see.
THE COURT: Can you point him to the provision to
answer the question?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, I can. It's Roman numeral 4,
Subparagraph, A on page 4.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Well, I may be able to ask a
question that would be a little more clear.
Were you aware that Beth Johnson's father was
Ted Johnson's brother, that she was Mr. Johnson's niece?
A. I knew that, yes.
Q. Were you aware that her father had died?
A. When?
Q. At the time this was prepared.
A. Back in '97?
Q. Um-hmm. Just to assist you, Ithe second
paragraph, under Number A, talks abO'llt an immediate
distribution to the surviving issue of Richard Johnson.
A. Okay. I see that.
Q. Were you aware that Beth Johnson was
Richard Johnson's daughter?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever ask who her father was?
A. Ask Beth Rogers?
Q. Um-hmm.
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A. I don't believe so, no.
Q. And you - you were aware, prior to tills
this
transaction being closed, that Ted Johnson had died?
A. Yes.
Q. You received a telephone call informing you
of that fact?
A. I remember -- I can't remember if I called
because I saw it in The Statesman, or whether I received
,I,I
a call. But I knew he had passed away.
..,. .
MS. TAYLOR: May I have a moment, Your Honor? I',I
THE COURT: You may.
II
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you turn to Exhibit 114,
please.
A. Okay.
Q. Is that a copy of a message record, from your
office, that you printed out and provided in discovery?
A. Yes.
tills, on the third entry
Q. And in looking at this,
down, you were informed on August 2nd of 2002 that
Ted Rogers had had a heart attack?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had never had any contact -- I said
Ted Rogers. I meant Ted Johnson. You had never had any
contact with Mr. Johnson after the signing of the earnest
money agreement on July 25, 2002?
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A. No.
Q. Did you ever ask Ted Johnson who the children
of Richard Johnson were?
A. In '97?
Q. In '97.
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay. And as this transaction was -- with
the Linder Road property was being developed, at that
time did you ask what class of beneficiaries Beth Rogers
would have fallen into?
A. At the time the Linder Road was being
developed?
Q. When you were buying the Linder Road
property?
A. In July of 2002?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You didn't ask?
A. No.
Q. After Ted Johnson died, you were informed
that he had died; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. At that point, did you make any effort to
determine which class of beneficiaries Beth Rogers
belonged to?
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A. I don't think so.
Q. SO after Ted Johnson died, YOUl
that
yoUl knew t
hat,'
Beth Rogers and her husband, Andy, were co-trustees of
the Trust?
A. No. I knew that they were exercising the
capacities as co-trustees in August, because they
signed -- or Beth signed an assignment as co-trustees of
the Trust.
Q. Okay. Let's go back and look at that
assignment. I believe it was your Exhibit No.1 O. I'm
not sure on the number.
Actually, that is Defendant's Exhibit No.2.
And looking at page 3 of that assignment, Beth Rogers
didn't sign as a co-trustee, did she?
A. No, she didn't.
Q. She signed as a power of attorney?
A. That's true.
Q. But there's no question that by the time this
I
transaction closed, she and her husband were the
;j!J
co-trustees?
.
A. That's true.
Q. And the Supreme Court has ruled that that
created a conflict of interest; correct?
A. That's the way you read it. I don't read it
that way.

I

Il

••

,,':<':kJt,»., '

'''_

-,,:~A "",,,-,-,,~::l"W~

25

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(Pages 103 to 106)

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001165

Taylor v. Maile

10/11/2006
Page 107

Q. This Court has ruled that it created a
conflict of interest; correct?
A. I would have to look at that decision. You
know, I read that Supreme Court decision probably eight
times, I've read Judge Wilper's opinion a couple of
6 times. [would have to read it again.
7
Q. Would you like to take the time to do that
8 now?
9
A. If you want.
10
TIIE
lOm
E COURT: Well, maybe you can make your point in
11 a quicker manner.
12
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
13
Q. BY MS. T
AYLOR: The written decision issued
TAYLOR:
14 by the Supreme Court, and Judge Wilper, both have
15 indicated that her dual role as a trustee and beneficiary
16 created a conflict of interest. I'm not asking whether
1 7 you agree with that.
18
A. Yes.
19
Q. I'm just asking you to confirm that that's
2 0 the decisions.
21
A. I don't think it is. I think -- I think they
22 were saying that court approval was necessary.
23
Q. And you drafted the real estate documents for
2 4 the closing?
25
A. Yes.
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Page 109

as the new trustees, they had an independent duty to look
into this transaction?
A. By that, you mean look into the transaction
of the fair market value of the property, or the real
estate contract itself?
Q. The entire propriety of the transaction,
after Mr. Johnson's death.
A. No. I didn't advise them.
Q. Okay. And after the sale was dosed, you
proceeded to take possession of the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have had possession of the property
formally, until the court ruling
from that date until -- fonnally,
on July 21 st of 2006; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You have made use of the property during that
time?
A. Well, I -- I haven't been able to use it
entirely. I have done things on the property. I haven't
been able to build a home there, because I can't get
financing. The title is clouded.
Q. But you've had access to the property?
A. That is true.
Q. You have had hay cut from the property?
A. That's true.

1
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Q.

You knew that Mr. Johnson had died?
A. Yes.
Q. You had a duty, at that time, to draft those
documents in a way that complied with Idaho law?
A. After his death?
Q. At the time you drafted the documents.
A. Okay. Yeah. I had a duty to draft proper
documents, yes.
Q. You knew that the sale had not been approved
by a court?
A. When? Well, it hasn't. Not to this day it
hasn't, sure.
Q. And you knew that?
A. When?
Q. You have always known that.
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. You knew that David Wishney's review of these
documents had occurred prior to Ted Johnson's death?
A. I knew, at least, he met with him one time
prior to death. I don't know ifhe was in contact with
Beth Rogers after that. I don't know.
Q. You haven't received anything to indicate
that he was?
A. That's true.
Q. You didn't advise either of the Rogers that,
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Q. You have hay stored on the property?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. You, to this day, have hay stored on the
property?
A. It's no longer hay. It's something. You
can't feed it to anything, but there's something there.
Q. There's a big pile of something there?
A. That's true.
Q. That you placed there?
A. That's true.
Q.
Q. There's also some equipment there, at this
time?
A. Yes. There's probably -- there's a tank
there that needs to be removed, and also a tractor part,
yes.
Q. Prior to the Court's decision July 21st of
2006, the -- none of the Plaintiffs had access to this
property; did they?
A. Well, I think, of course, they did, like
anybody, the public. There was no trespassing signs.
But they couldn't plow a field out there, if that's what
you mean.
Q. Right. And they couldn't rent the property
out?
A. That's true.
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Q.

At the time you bought the property, there
was a fanner
farmer named Sam Rosti leasing the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And the Trust has not been able to obtain the
income from that lease after you took possession;
correct?
A. Well, I think he paid the Trust for the year
following on the onions. That would h~ the crop year of
2003.
Q. And that was the term you negotiated between
you; right?
A. Between me?
Q. Between you and -- at the time of -- the
earnest money agreement was signed, you talked about the
problem with the onion seeds?
A. Right.
Q. But other than that, this is not property
that the Trust, or the individual Plaintiffs, could take
any action regarding?
A. Not until there has been a court resolution,
that's true.
undt:r the Idaho
Q. You've already stated that undt!r
Independent Bank loan, there wasn't a requirement that
you build a barn on the property?
A. That's true.
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Q.

And that is a profit that you could not have
made without doing the development?
A. I couldn't sell them unless I did the
development, that's true.
Q. Now, one of the conditions of the Idaho
Independent Bank loan was that you get a deed of
reconveyance from the Johnson deed of trust; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Without that, you would not have been able to
draw on the loan to make any improvements?
A. No. Without that, they wouldn't have loaned.
It was simultaneous.
Q. Okay. You wouldn't have gotten the loan,
period?
A. Yeah. The banks have to be in first
position.
Q. Can you turn to Exhibit No. 12.1, please.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell the Court what this is.
A. Well, it appears to be a request for full
reconveyance, signed by the Rogers, as trustees, on or
about September 16, 2002.
Q. And that was addressed to Alliance Title and
Escrow Company as the trustee?
A. Yes, it is.
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Q.
Q. You were building that for your own purposes?
A. That's true.
Q.
Q. All right. Exhibits number 13 and 14, those
are just a summary of your costs; correct?
A. They represent payments that [have made to
vendors. Costs, I think that's -- yeah. You could say
that.
Q.
Q. And you were developing this property for
yourself, for your family; correct?
A. Yes.
tht: improvements,
Q.
Q. And the purpose of making tht!
and getting the plat approved was so you could sell the
other lots at a profit?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. SO the development was done for your purposes
and for the financial gain of Berkshire Investments?
A. And it was a necessity to payoff the Trust.
Q.
Q. Certainly, yes. But your plan was to keep
two lots and sell off five lots?
A. Sometimes it was to keep two or three. Yeah,
we would sell the balance.
Q. And the plan was to sell the lOIS for between
$185,000 and $215,000 each?
A. I would say that -- without looking at the
documentation, that seems like the right range.

...
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Q. September 16, 2002 is the date of the closing
of the sale on the Linder transaction; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you turn to -- actually, it would be
easier to me if I could have you tum
turn to our Exhibit 116,
.which
. which is a copy of the earnest money agreement. I know
that you have it, too, but my cross-indexing works better
this way.
,I
A. Sure, sure.
}
Q. And that earnest money agreement indicated
i'
that the parties would enter into a deed of trust, did it
not?
I·
A. Yes.
Q. And the deed of trust that was to be entered
into was attached as an exhibit to the earnest money
agreement?
A. Yes. That was the fonn that was to be used,
yes.
Q. That fonn indicated that Alliance Title would
be the trustee?
A. That's what it said on the attachment, that's
I
true.
Q. And this would have been the document that
was reviewed by Dave Wishney?
I
I:
A. Well, I assume so. I mean, it appears that

~~~~~~~==~~~~"~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~,~@,,,~~c_~",i~~~~~~1
....•..
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Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers took documents, the appraisal
and this, among other things, to David Wishney.
Q. And Wishney reviewed the documents at some
point in time; correct? You don't know l:he date of the
office meeting; is that right?
A. Well, in discovery I think it was known to be
sometime in late August, 2002.
Q. And in your Exhibit No.7, there's a copy
of a letter from Mr. Wishney, dated, I believe,
September 5th of2002?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you receive a copy of this letter
around that time?
A. No.
Q. You received it in discovery?
A. Yes. Well, Beth might have given it to me,
but it was during litigation.
Q. But you did receive a telephone call, did you
not, indicating that Mr. Wishney wanted a standard deed
of trust form
fonn substituted for the one you drew?
A. Dave Wishney and I spoke, and we talked about
a new provision being added that would protect the
beneficiaries, under the deed of trust, for any
delinquent taxes that weren't being paid by my wife and
I. I think he approved of the form,
fonn, he just wanted extra

1
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deficiencies or delinquencies.
Q. And you indicate that, at the time of the
closing, the deed of trust you provided listed
Steve Shearer as the trustee.
A. I did. I sent that into the title company
sometime prior to closing.
Q. A copy of that deed of trust is at
Plaintiffs Exhibit 120.
A. Yes.
Q. You had never discussed, with Beth Rogers,
substituting a different deed of trust -- or a different
trustee on the deed of trust, did you?
A. No. I did not.
Q. You say that was just another mistake that
was made?
A. I'm saying that my office -- I knew that I
wanted to modify the deed of trust to include a
beneficiary -- for protection for the beneficiary on tax
delinquency. Either I did this, or my office staff did
this. In the search of trying to find another form, I
think that's how it was substituted with Steve Shearer.
But I'm not sure.
Q. And I believe my question was, you never
informed Beth Rogers that you were substituting a
different trustee?

Page 116

Page 118

protection as to delinquent taxes.
Q. Can you turn, again, to page -- or Exhibit
No. 114 in the Plaintiffs book?
A. I'm there.
Q. Again, this is a message ledger. from your
office, that you printed out and provided in discovery?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Do you see the entry on
September 5th, 2002? That's the same date as the Wishney
letter.
A. Yes.
Q. On that date, you received a tdephone call,
from Beth Rogers, indicating needs a stlmdard deed of
trust form
fonn added to the real estate agreements?
A. That's what our office notation said on our
messages, yes.
reque~,ted changes to
Q. And you never made the reque~.ted
the deed of trust, did you?
A. I spoke with Dave Wishney, and I just
indicated what him and I talked about. And I don't know
how it happened, but another form was used that was, in
essence, the same form, except Steve Shearer's name was
added, instead of Alliance Title.
So, in answer to that, no. I didn't put any
language in about protecting the beneficiaries from tax

1
A. I say no. I already answered that no.
2
Q. And Mr. Shearer is a friend of yours?
3
A. He has been, yes.
4
Q. You have socialized in the past?
5
A. Many years ago, yes.
6
Q. You have shared calendars?
7
A. We have shared calendars.
8
Q. And you were present during Beth Rogers'
9 second deposition, weren't you?
10
A. I think so.
11
Q. Do you recall, at that deposition, when she
12 was shown this second deed of trust and she said that she
13 had never seen it before?
14
A. I don't recall that.
15
If! could have a moment, Your Honor?
MS. TAYLOR: IfI
16
THE COURT: All right.
17
MS. TAYLOR: I think we may be short one copy.
18 I have submitted this to the clerk under the requirements
19 of the Rule that we just submit the portions of the
20 depositions we're planning to use.
21
if! approach
Would it be okay with the Court ifI
22 and Mr. Maile and I read offof
off of this together? I don't
23 have an extra copy for him.
24
THE COURT: I don't have any objecltion. What you
25 are attempting to establish, I take it, is that

-,0,,- "",,,,,,,,.,_
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28

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

I

j

II
1;1

lit

!

!)
r::i:
I

:

I!

"_,.<;0__

(Pages 115 to 118)

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113·684·B-49f3·bbf2·ff824a94236c
f9ff8113-684B-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001168

Taylor v. Maile

"-

10/11/2006

Page 121

Page 119

1
Q. All right. And you have no idea whether
Beth Rogers testified, during her testimony, that she had
2
Alliance Title showed her the one with Steven Shearer,
not seen the second deed of trust; correct?
3
MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor. And if it would 3 or the one that you had sent previously" with
4 Alliance Title?
4 be acceptable to the Court, I can just read from this and
5 cite
5
A. No.
cite--6
Q. You had taken Beth Rogers' d~:position
6
TIIE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question.
d~:position in this
7 Perhaps you could ask your witness, here, questions that
7 case; correct?
8
A. Yes.
8 would -- I take it that it's not that you're attempting
9
Q. At the time you took that deposition, you
9 to elicit testimony from Mr. Maile, hen:, that
10
10 knew that Plaintiffs didn't have any cotmsel available?
1 0 Beth Rogers did or did not ever see thi~,
thi~. second deed of
A. No. I had correspondence with a Mr. Hally,
11 trust, but his knowledge about whether or not she had
11
12 made that representation. Do you see what I mean?
12
1 2 or Hileigh, from the Lewiston area, indicating that his
13
MS. TAYLOR: Correct, yes.
13
1 3 office would have to have someone down there at the
14
TIIE COURT: Could you ask your witness a question 14
1 4 deposition.
15
15
Q. They asked you to continue that deposition
1 5 like this, I will represent to you that Beth Rogers
1 6 testified at her deposition that she never saw it.
1 6 because I was not available?
17
17
17
A. I think you filed a motion with the Court.
1 7 Something like that.
18
MS. TAYLOR: That could be -18
but..
1 8 I may be confused on another date, but....
-
19
TIIE COURT: If you believe the evidence would bear 19
Q. No. You're absolutely correct. We filed a
20 you out.
20 motion with the Court, asking for protective order and
21 moving to quash the subpoena, so that the deposition
21
MS. TAYLOR: Certainly. All right.
22
TIlE COURT: I'mjust trying to save a little time
22 would not go forward.
23
23 here, because we don't have a jury, and I get where
A. For Beth Rogers' deposition?
24
2 4 you're going. But I want to be fair to Mlr.
Mrr. Maile, too.
Q. Yes. For Beth Rogers. You knew that that
25 And if he has a -- ifhe contends that that was not the
2 5 had been filed?
r
---.---------------.-------t-------------.---.-------.
r---"
1

2
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testimony, feel free to show it to him.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, I'll represent to
you that when Mr. Clark took Beth Rogers' deposition, the
second deposition, he provided her with a copy of the
deed of trust with Mr. Shearer as the tmstee, and asked
her if she had seen it before. She said, I don't think I
recognize this, sir.
He explained what it was, and a.sked if anyone
had discussed it with her. And she said, no, sir.
Do you agree that you had not discussed that
or shown it to her?
A. Well, I know I didn't discuss it with her,
- I will not agree to that. Because I -- I'm
but I -10 1 percent certain that I faxed over, or provided the
title company with what documentation I was going to
sign.
And I don't know if they didn't !;how it to
her. I know I didn't show it to her. But the purpose of
a closing is to provide this material, and the title
company signed off on -- or not signed off, but they
received our deed of trust dated September 16, 2002.
Q. You weren't present when the Rogers signed?
A. No, no. I'm 101 percent certain I wasn't,
because
don't happen that . wa~:
because normally
normally closin~s
closings~.~~.'t.~"~~~~.~~.~~at
~~~:.'""'.
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A. I'll take your word for it, based on memory.
I know there was a lot of discovery depositions that I
was trying to do at that point in time, yes.
Q. Okay. But you knew a motion had been filed
to prevent you from going forward with those?
A. I knew, yes, there was a motion.
Q. You know it was scheduled for hearing?
I,;
A. I -- I can't say that. I think -- I would
have to see the documents. But I can't say that it
was -- that I remembered, today, that it was scheduled
for a hearing. This was in, probably, 2004, August o
of f ' !:1
2004. I know that we had a hearing.
MS. TAYLOR: I'll ask the Court to just take
judicial notice, from the court record, that our motion
to quash the subpoena was, indeed, scheduled for a
Ii i
hearing in August of 2004. Ifwe can take a little
break, I could come up with a date on it, or we can
backfill on that.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm hesitant to take judicial
notice of that point right now. Your contention may be
III!i
true, Ms. Taylor, that there was a hearing scheduled on a
motion to quash a subpoena on a particular date.
I don't have any independent recollection of
that, myself, so I'm hesitate to say well, yes, I'll take
judicial notice. The record is what it is, and you may

I:

II

1

I'Ii

',-:,-"",
:_,_,_,._.,_.,_:':._.
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be able to establish, at an appropriate time, that such
was the case.
But, for the purposes --
MS. TAYLOR: Rather than stop now and search for
the record, Your Honor, I will just come back to that, if
that's okay?
THE COURT: Yes. It seems to me, for purposes of
your cross-exam questions of Mr. Maile, that -- I don't
know if you need to establish that fact in order to lay a
foundation for further questioning along this same line
or
not.
ornot.
MS. TAYLOR: I don't believe I do.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: If it's obvious I do, then we need to
take a break.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: And I hope not.
THE COURT: Okay. And, at this point, I just
can't tell. And absent an objection from Mr. Charney,
you know, on the question offoundation
of foundation for subsequent
questions, I just won't do anything.
But you've asked me to take judicial notice
of this fact. And, as you can see from my bench here,
I have numerous files and many thousands of pages of
documents that I would rather not go through right now.

Page 12511
.~

deposition?
A. Probably not. Steven Shearer didn't sign the
deed of trust.
4
Q. You had received a letter from my office,
5 from me, in early July of 2003, infonning
informing you that I
6 represented the beneficiaries and the tmstees of the
7 Johnson Trust?
8
A. In 2003?
9
Q. Yes, 2003.
l O A . Yes.
11
Q. And that is at Exhibit 124 for the
12 Plaintiffs?
A. Yes.
13
14
informed. you, first,
Q. And in that letter, we infonned.
15 that we felt the property -- or the price you paid for
16 the property was not fair market value. Also infonned
informed
1 7 you that we believed that your purchas{:
purchas{! constituted
1 8 professional negligence, didn't we?
19
19
A. Yes, you did.
20
Q. Can you turn to Exhibit No. 125, please.
A. Yes.
21
22
Q. This is your response to the letter that you
23 received from my office?
24
A. Yes, it is.
24
Q. It's dated July 10th of 2003?
25
1
2
3

--"'--"-------1---..........;..........;----"'----------------
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Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, you took
Beth Rogers' deposition prior to the hearing objecting to
you taking it in Plaintiffs absence?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: What is the relevance?
MS. TAYLOR: It goes to the unclean hands
argument, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Restate your question again.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I -- I want him to confirm
confinn
the fact he took an ex-parte deposition of Beth Rogers
without Plaintiffs counsel being present.
THE COURT: Okay. I will ovemtle
oveml1e the objection.
The witness can answer the question.
THE
TIlE WITNESS: I provided notice:, pursuant to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, to the respective parties
involved in the litigation.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Actually, Mr. Maile, I think
you're trying to start back at the beginnling. My
question was simply, you took her deposition without
Plaintiffs counsel being present?
A. Yes. You were not there.
Q. And you had 49 exhibits at that deposition?
A. Could be, that's true.
Q. And you did not submit the deed of trust that
Steven Shearer had signed as an exhibit at that
"___ "_, _ ".-"""~",~~,_,,,,,,d, .
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A. Yes.
Q. And in that letter, you do not, at any point
in time, state that you advised anyone relating to the
Johnson Trust to -- that there was a conflict of
interest, do you?
thOUght -- that's not true. I
. A. Well, I thought
thought I addressed it on the last sentence of the first
paragraph. Finally, your clients sought independent
II
cllient chose to
legal counsel prior to closing and your cJlient
close the transaction, even after consulting an attorney.
I
;
Q. But you don't say that you advised the client
that there was a conflict of interest?
A. It was inferred in the fact that they had
legal counsel, independent, prior to closing. I didn't
go into the detail, that's true.
Q. Yes. You didn't say, I told them there was a
conflict of interest?
A. I didn't believe it was a position that I
,
needed to explain to you, other than the elements that I
explained in the first paragraph.
advised them of the need
Q. You didn't say, I advise.d
,j
for independent counsel?
A. I didn't say that in my letter.
!
Q. And, in fact, David Wishney wa.s -- was seen
after the earnest IUUllt:y
money agreement had closed, or had been

,'.'.'" ,,,"~;--,, -;--;'--"-'wV'·-;·" --,

i
"

I

i

""'" "-"M' ,,-,
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1

signed?

2
3

A. Yes.
Q. He was seen after the assignment to
Berkshire Investments had been signed?
A. That's true.
Q. David Wishney's letter to you indicates --
or the letter that we have seen from David Wishney,
your Exhibit No.7, last page, indicates, because the
agreements have already been executed by the respective
parties, it is really too late for me to provide any
substantive input, doesn't it?
A. That's what it says.
Q. As far as you were concerned, this was a
binding contract?
A. Now, as far as I'm concerned, what is that?
In relation to the letter of September 5th, or just the
real estate?
Q. Actually, I had moved on. As far as you were
concerned, as soon as Ted Johnson signed the earnest
money agreement, there was a binding contract?
A. I believe there was, yeah.
Q. And as soon as Beth Rogers had signed the
assignment, that was also binding?
A. I believe it was, yes.
Q. And you never explained this assignment to

4
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A. As I explained to Ted, when I met with him,
that we would be assigning this -- that it would
accomplished that. So he was fully advised of that.
That the letter --Q. SO only Berkshire Investments would be
responsible for payment of the deed of trust?
A. That's true.
Q. Berkshire Investments had -- had just barely
been formed at that time?
A. That's true.
Q. It had virtually no assets, other than
perhaps a little cash and a line of credit it could draw
on to make the down payment?
A. It had a line -- it had the resources for a
line of credit, and my wife and I were standing behind
it, so sure.
r;
or
Q. You didn't advise either Mr. Johnson, o
Beth, that they should have that assigmnent reviewed by
an attorney, did you?
A. No. I felt I covered that in a meeting with
Ted.
Q. I would like to go back to thos4~ meetings.
You indicate that there were two different times that you
talked to Ted, in detail, about the conflict of interest
and the possibility of him consulting an independent

----~~--------~--------~~----~--------·--~----~--------~t
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Beth Rogers?
A. It seems, though, I mailed it to her.
turn to Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 118.
Q. Can you tum
A. Okay.
Q.
Q. That is a copy of a letter from you, dated
August 15, 2002?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. And it is addressed to Theodore Johnson, but
in the salutation it says Dear Ted and Beth?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. And this was after the time that Beth Rogers
had told you that Ted had had a heart attack, was in a
nursing home, and you needed to have all your dealings
with her; correct?
A. Yeah. On my -- on Exhibit 114, I was advised
of that on August 2nd, that he had a heart attack.
Q.
Q. In the letter of August 15th, you don't go
into any detailed explanations about the assignment?
A. I don't go into detail, that's truf~.
Q.
Q. You don't point out the fact that this
assignment would relieve you and your wife of any
liability, under the terms of the original earnest money
agreement?
A. That's true. I don't say it in the letter.
Q. And the assignment did do that, didn't it?

7

8
9
10
11
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attorney?
!l
A. Well, I think there were three, but...
Q. Okay. Well, let's focus just on the
conversations we've already -- of you purchasing the
property.
A. Okay. There would be two.
Q. There were two. One was a few days before
the earnest money agreement was prepared and signed by
by).~
you and your wife?
A. That's true.
Ii
Q. And the other one was when you say that you
took the earnest money agreement out to Mr. Johnson's
home for him to sign?
A. Yes.
Q. And you indicated that just you and
Mr. Johnson were present at both of those meetings?
A. Yes.
Q. And I will represent to you that Beth Johnson
Ii
dl~position, that
testified in her deposition, her second d'::lposition,
she was present at both of those meetings, that the
signing occurred in your office, not at Mr. Johnson's
home, and that you did not, at any point, say that there
was a conflict of interest or a need for independent
Ii:::
counsel.
I!
IiI
A. My recollection of her testimony was that she

III

•••
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said she was present at one of the meetings. She told me
to go to her house -- to go to Ted's house, so she knew
she wasn't present then. But she is mistaken about where
it was executed. She was not there.
Q. SO you acknowledge that in her deposition she
stated that she was present, it was signed in your
office, and that you didn't make those explanations?
A. She asserts that, yes. That's true.
Q. She also said she was present when he came in
and offered to sell you the land, and you didn't make
those explanations?
A. I don't know about that. I don't think she
said that, because he was by himself again.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, may I approach the
witness?
TIIE COURT: Yes.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Mai1t:, I'm showing you a
copy of the transcript of Beth Rogers' second deposition.
It is under Tab I-C of the submission of transcripts --
submission of deposition transcripts we've submitted to
the Court.
Can you just read this along with me and tell
me if I read it correctly?
MR. CHARNEY: What page are you on?
MS. TAYLOR: I'm on page 25, starting at line 7,

,
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the second meeting.
Q. Okay. And it was -- and she says it was just
prior -- it was when he came in to tell you he wanted to
sell the land; correct?
A. That's what she says.
Q. And was there any other meeting when
Mr. Johnson came in to tell you he wante:d to sell the
land?
A. Well, we had a second meeting, back in May,
when Ted came back to my office after receiving the
correspondence from Imogen, and we discussed the attempt 11
to solicit a higher offer from Mr. Witte. 'That was our
I::::
second meeting. She wasn't there for that either.
Q. Okay. This one, she is talking about a
meeting that happened about three weeks before the
exhibit -- or the earnest money agreement was signed.
You're saying that that was not the one where
I
he came in with the appraisal?
A. No. It would -- the appraisal -- he came in
with the appraisal six weeks after having his second
meeting about the Witte offer.
Q. But you -- you just disagree that she was
present at the signing and that it happened in your
office, rather than at his home?
A. I know that it didn't happen that way. I'd

-'-----::.-.---'----1---------------:.."------.--':....--------1'1
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on Tab I-C.
Q.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The question was:
Question: So when is the next meeting you
remember with Mr. Maile?
Answer: It was sometime after that when
Uncle Ted went in to tell him he thought he would like to
7 sell.
8
Question: Did you go in at that time?
9
Answer: Yes, sir.
10O I s
l
Is that what her testimony was? Or did I
11 read that correctly?
12
A. I think you're reading this out of context.
13 I think she recalled -- this is regarding the Witte sale.
14 But she -- she wasn't there.
15
Q. But her testimony was that she went in when
116
6 he came in to tell you he would like to .sell?
sell?
A. At the second meeting.
1177
18
Q.
Q. Yes.
19
A. That's not the meeting where he came with the
2200 appraisal, if that's what you're asking.
21
Q. All right. He came with the appraisal and
22 said, I would like to sell this to you?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q.
Q. She indicates that she was present.
25
A. That transcript doesn't say that. It says
"" .... ".........

Page 134
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
110
0
11
12
13
1144
15
1166
17
18
1199
2200
2211
22
2233
24
25
25

never been to Ted's house before.
Q. And she also asserted that when she was
present at the signing, you just gave them the earnest
money agreement --MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay. All the stuff
Beth Rogers said --THE COURT: Well, I -- do you want to respond?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I do want to «:spond. I am
using this to impeach.
THE COURT: I understand. The objection is
overruled.
You are -- as I understand it, this I:.:ntire
line of questioning, Ms. Taylor, is your attempt to
impeach Mr. Maile's testimony regarding what he says he
told Ted Johnson about, at two different meetings, in
connection with the sale; correct?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: You're attempting to impeach that by
showing that another witness, at another time, said that
these meetings occurred at a different location and no
such thing was -- was discussed; right?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Have you made your point?
MR. CHARNEY: That is not a proper manner in which
to impeach somebody. She needs to call that witness to
=
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come in and say he's not being truthful about that.
THE COURT: Well, essentially though, as I see it,
Ms. Taylor is making these assertions to the witness, to
Mr. Maile, and has said, look, this other witness said
that, how do you explain it, essentially.
MR. CHARNEY: That's different.
THE COURT: Right. She's not offering this
Beth Rogers transcript testimony, the deposition
testimony, for the truth of the matter that's asserted or
as substantive proof of where these meetings took place
and what was discussed, but just attempting to knock
Mr. Maile off his pins, with respect to his prior
testimony in court today; right?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I -- now, when
I say I'm with you, what I mean is, I understand the
reasons for this line of questioning.
The objection that this is improper
impeachment is overruled. The reason I explained my take
on what you're doing here, on this line of questioning,
is to demonstrate that I'm not confused about how this is
being used.
I think it would be problematic in a jury
trial; you know what I mean? But I think that I
understand what you're doing here. And I understand that
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THE COURT: Is that a question?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: What is the question?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: How to you square her
[:
testimony with what you have said?
A. Well, I'm the one that drove the car to his
house. She wasn't there. I just don't think she
remembers it accurately.
Q. Let's go to your Exhibit No.1, the earnest
money agreement. You indicate that you recognized there J
you'!
was a potential conflict of interest on two counts; you
had expressed an interest in buying this property,
yourself, for years, and you also had represented the
Trust in regard to the Witte offer; correc:t?
fIrst
A. No. I advised Ted. I said, in that first
conference concerning the Witte offer, that I could have
express(~d a willingness
a conflict here, because we had express(~d
for you to sell and me to buy, if you ever decide to sell
it. And do you have a problem with me representing you
with the Witte offer, and he said no.
So that's the issue there.
Q. Okay. Was that the only conversation you had
about there being a potential conflict of interest?
tviO other
A. No. When I explained on the t",{O
occasions that he had the right to seek independent

I;
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you must know, Ms. Taylor, the limitations of what you're
doing here.
If you want to get Beth Rogers in, in front
of me to testify in the trial, you're certainly free to
do so. And I understand that you're just using her
testimony for the limited purpose of making an assertion,
to this witness, that on another occasion somebody who
might know has said something different than what you're
saymg.
And he has answered those questions; right.
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: I have a couple more questions in the
same line.
pfOl:eed.
THE COURT: Okay. you may pm:eed.
testified
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile:, you have testifIed
that you went over the earnest money agreement with
Mr. Johnson and explained it to him?
A. Yeah.
Q. I will represent to you that Beth Rogers
office, you handed it to
said, when they came into the offIce,
them, asked them to read it, and asked if there were any
questions.
She was asked if anything else was said, she
says, not that I can remember.
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counsel, it was -- I can't remember if I used the word
conflict of interest on the second time. I certainly
used it on the first
fIrst time, saying that I ha.d represented
him in the past. And his current offer deals with
property that we had talked about buying and selling, so
there's.a conflict there.
And on the other occasions, spedfically
spedfIcally told
him that he had the right to seek independent counsel, if
he chose to.
Q. You agree that as -- that Mr. Johnson was a
former client?
A. Yes.
Q. At the time you entered into your earnest
money agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. And you agree that under the ethical rules,
you had an obligation to only enter into an agreement
that was fair and reasonable?
A. That's true.
Q. If you'll turn to page 2 of the earnest money
agreement.
THE COURT: Defense Exhibit 1; correct?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Defense Exhibit 1. I'm sorry,
Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
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Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You elected to include a
provision wherein the parties would waive a trial by
jury, didn't you?
A. I didn't elect to include this. This was a
form that I had used on a number of times, for both
buyers and sellers. So there was nothing intetjected
here. This was one of my standard real estate forms.
Q. You drafted the agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. And you included that provision?
A. Yes.
Q. You also included a provision that the
parties would submit to the jurisdiction and venue in
Canyon County, didn't you?
A. Yes. It says that in there.
Q. And is that fair and reasonable, when all
the parties live in Ada County and the property is
Ada County?
A. It was included and not corrected. It has
nothing to do with being fair and reasonable. It's a
clerical mistake.
Q. It was a mistake?
A. Yes.
Q. That you did not catch?
A. Could have caught it. Didn't really consider
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going on to page 3, you included a provision in this
agreement that would limit the statute of limitations to
one year?
A. That's right.
Q. Regardless of whether damages were otherwise,
as of said date, calculatable, didn't you?
A. Yes. That was included, yes.
Q. And as an attorney, at the time 25-some years
of practice, you knew that the statute of limitations on
a written agreement was five years?
A. Yeah. That's true.
Q. That is not a provision that is fair and
reasonable?
A. Well, I think it cuts both ways. It was a
form that I had -- that I had used a number of times,
and -- both for buyers and sellers, and I think it cut
both ways. So I didn't -- I really didn't have a problem
with it as being unfair or unreasonable.
Q. Okay. Can you name a single Gause of action,
in the state of Idaho, that has a one year statute of
limitations?
A. Not off the top of my head, no.
Q. And when you were initially contacted, the
attorney for the trustees and the beneficiaries had to
ask you to waive that one year statute oflimitations,
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it significant.
Q. But you agree that that would have been
inappropriate, to try to have any procet:dings in
Canyon County, under the circumstances?
A. I suspect you can have an agreement that
people agree to litigate their issues in any county.
Q. But there was no reason for it ro be there;
right?
A. In Canyon County, no.
Q. After the Trust filed the lawsUllt, you filed
a motion for change of venue to Canyon County, didn't
you?
A. Sam Hoagland and I did that, that's true.
Q. And you also included, in your pleadings,
that Ada County wasn't the appropriate venue under the
terms of the earnest money agreement?
A. We did initially, that's true.
Q. Even knowing that that was jw;t a mistake you
had made?
A. That's true.
Q. Going on -- and these provisions, by the way,
are all included in the paragraph entitled Attorneys Fees
and Costs, aren't they?
A. Yeah, they are. Yep.
Q. Then, beginning at the bottom of page 2, and
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didn't they?
A. And I agreed to do that, yes.
Q. You also included a provision requiring that
the parties agree to binding arbitration in lieu of court
proceedings?
A. .That's included in the agreement.
Q. And you also asserted that in th,e motion you
filed, when the beneficiaries first filed their suit,
said the Court doesn't have the right to hear this?
l O A . It was never noticed for hearing. It was
11 filed, that's true.
12
Q. It was filed, and it was also ass~:rted in
13 your pleadings?
14
A. Part of the filing, yes.
15
Q. And you were aware of the fact that
16 Mr. Johnson had not had this reviewed by an attorney
1 7 prior to the time he signed it?
A. He declined, that's true.
18
18
19
MS. TAYLOR: Could I -- how are you doing on time,
20 Your Honor? Are you wanting a break? I'm not sure what
21
2 1 the timing is.
22
THE COURT: Oh, you know, we'n: going until 2:00
2 3 today, and we're going to take, probably, just one more
23
24 break. How are you doing, in terms of how much longer
2 5 you intend to do your cross?
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MS. TAYLOR: I have quite a bit.
1HE COURT: Quite a bit left? Well, let's just
take a little break. Let's take 10, and we'll reconvene
at noon by that clock, so 10 minutes from now.
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(Recess taken 11:49 a.m. to 12:04 p.m.)
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1HE COURT: Please be seated.
MR. CHARNEY: We have an agrl~ement
agrl;lement to take
Mr. Corlett out of tum, since he's here ~md just as --
1HE COURT: Okay. And is Mr. Corlett
Ms. Taylor's or your witness?
MR. CHARNEY: My witness.
1HE COURT: Okay. No problem.
MS. TAYLOR: No problem, Your Honor.
1HE COURT: Okay. Then you may call your second
witness, with there being no objection from the other
side.
MR. CHARNEY: We'll call Joe Corlett.
TIm COURT: Mr. Charney, are you going to need the
exhibits for this witness?
MR. CHARNEY: No. I may just need our exhibit
number-number -
MS. TAYLOR: 17?
117
MR. CHARNEY: -- 13.
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A. I graduated from the University of Idaho in
1973, and there began a career in Boise, jin 1974, in the
appraisal business. So that's 32 years of practice in
the appraisal business. I'm a commercial appraiser. I'm
an MAl, an SRA. Those are professional designations from
the Appraisal Institute.
I've had, actually, hundreds of hours of
continuing education and basic education to achieve those
designations. I've been an MAl designee since 1981, so
that's about 25 years there.
We do appraisals in Idaho. And I'm also
certified by the State ofIdaho
ofldaho as a CJA-I', and I'm also
certified in the state of Oregon.
Q. And so that we're clear, are you a real
estate appraiser?
A. That is true. I'm a real estate appraiser.
Q. How long have you had your current business,
Mountain States?
A. Mountain States was incorporated, I believe,
in 1976. And prior to that, it was Corlett Associates,
in 1974.
Q. Have you been called upon, in the recent
months, to provide some analysis, for the Court's
consideration, regarding the value of the improvements
made on the Linder Road property that is the subject of
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THE COURT: That's in the packet; right?
pack;lt.
MR. CHARNEY: That's in the pack~t.
THE COURT: Okay.
4
THE CLERK: Did you want this marked?
5
MR. CHARNEY: Please.
6
THE CLERK: As?
7
MR. CHARNEY: As 17.
8
THE COURT: Okay. You may inquire whenever you're
9 ready, Mr. Charney.
10
11
JOE CORLETT,
12 called as a witness by and on behalf of the defense,
13 having been first duly sworn, was eXarnlrled
examined and testified
14 as follows:
15
DIRECT EXAMINATION
16
DrnECTE~ATION
17 BY MR. CHARNEY:
18
Q. Will you please state your name and spell
1199 your last for the Judge.
20
A. Yes. My name is Joe Corlett, C-O-R-L-E-T-T.
21
Q. Mr. Corlett, how are you presently employed?
22
A. I'm a principal in Mountain States Appraisal
23 and Consulting, here in Boise.
24
Q. Tell Judge Wilper a little bit about your
25 background and training in the appraisal business.
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this particular action?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Describe, if you will, first, the property
address that you have had an opportunity to look at.
A. Okay. The property in question is located
in the Eagle District, and it's known as the
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, which is accessed by
West Cornerstone Lane.
It is on the east side of Linder Road, and I
believe it's northerly of Beacon Light Road.
The site includes approximately 38.72 acres,
and has been effectively subdivided into seven
single-family lots, and has a partially finished b
barna r n '
improvement on one of the lots.
Q. All right. Did you, prior to coming to
court, summarize your findings and conclusions in a
report?
A. Yes, I did.
MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Bailiff?
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(Exhibit No. 17 is handed to the witness.)
22
23
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: The bailiff is handing you
24 what has been previously marked as Exhibit 17. Do you
25 recognize Exhibit 117
17?
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A. Yes, I do.
Q. JVhat is Exhibit 17?
A. It is the analysis of the contributory
improvement value for the subdivision improvements on the
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, on West Cornerstone Lane.
Q. Did you prepare that yourself?
A. Yes, I did.
MR CHARNEY: At this time, I would offer
MR.
Exhibit 17
17,, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is there any objection?
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm inclined to object,
because what this basically is is the opinion of an
expert, who is here to testify to it.
I believe the appraisal is cumulative.
Obviously, it would be of more concern if we had a jury
present. But I do object to the report, itself, being
admitted.
THE COURT: It is hearsay, Mr. Charney. How do
you respond to the objection?
MR CHARNEY: As far as it being hearsay,
MR.
Your Honor, I can certainly ask another ,;ouple
I;ouple of
follow-up questions regarding if it's produced in the
ordinary course of his business, at which, certainly the
obvious answer.
But if the real problem is cumulative, I
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So I'm going to sustain the objection. And
if you want to renew your motion for the admission of
that exhibit at a later time, you can do so.
But, I mean, from what you're telling me,
this entire exhibit, Exhibit 17, is his appraisal report;
right?
MR.
MR CHARNEY: That's true.
THE COURT: It's not components of it or
-photographs. But I mean what I'm saying is, this is -
I'm familiar, somewhat, with real estate appraisal
reports.
MR. CHARNEY: Right.
THE COURT: And so, what you're representing to me
then, Mr. Charney, is that this report is the report that
an appraiser would do when doing his work and conducting
an appraisal of real property, and he would like to
submit the entire thing as an exhibit.
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The objection is hearsay, and
-cumulative; right -
MS. TAYLOR: Right.
THE COURT: -- as I've heard it from Ms. Taylor.
I'm going to sustain the objection, at this time, because
it is hearsay.
You can elicit whatever opinions you can from
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think that, realistically, Your Honor, it may come a
point, while you're doing your own dehberations, where
instead of referring to, necessarily, notes or testimony,
there might be something that comes up that is -- would
ease the finder of fact in rendering its decision.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, is your primary objection,
or is your only objection, that it's cumulative?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. If we -- if we had
a jury here, I would be obj ecting a lot more strongly,
because I think there's a chance that they will misread
documents. And in my experience, expert reports don't go
to the jury.
But as far as in a court trial --
THE COURT: It can. It just depends on whether or
not they're admitted as exhibits.
The issue, in a situation like this, is that
the -- when an expert compiles a report, that report
is -- by definition it's hearsay.
It is an out-of-court written statement
stat{:ment that
is offered for the truth of the matter
martel' assl~rted there in.
It might be an efficient way to get things
in. But, on the other hand, the witness lis
iis here and is
subject to cross-examination. And I think it's fair
enough to allow the opponent to have a crack at the
witness on cross.
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the witness. If, then, you want to have it come in, it
may just be objectionable because it is cumulative; do
you see what I mean?
MR. CHARNEY: All right. If I establish the
hearsay exception, as far as the business records
exception, is there going to be an issue, at that point,
on the hearsay? I mean, that's cleared up with two
questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I have no question but
that they can establish that this was prepared in the
ordinary course of business.
th,::refore, satisfy
THE COURT: And that it would, thc::refore,
the hearsay exception?
MS. TAYLOR: The hearsay exception. The problem
we run into is, if they submit the exhibit, his testimony
is cumulative on direct. I would get to cross-examine.
If they question him first, and then submit the exhibit,
the exhibit is cumulative.
THE COURT: Well, go ahead and lay your foundation
to overcome the hearsay objection, if you care to.
MR CHARNEY: All right. And the point -- a lot
MR.
of the questions that I'm going to ask are going to be
discussion about explaining some of the things that are
exhibit, Your Honor.
found in the exhibit~
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For example, there's an indication in here
about Marshall Evaluation, which is soli of the
appraiser's Blue Book, if you will. So it's not going to
be entirely cumulative. But I'll cover the hearsay
issue.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, with respect to
Exhibit No. 17, is this a document that is prepared in
the ordinary course of -- is this the type of document
that is prepared in the ordinary course of your business
as a real estate appraiser?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. In fact, can you even really do your job
without preparing a report such as this?
A. Actually, I can.
Q. Okay. How often is that accomplished?
A. Actually, portions of this assignment have
been oral, up to this point. So I have not prepared a
written document. So, I would say that maybe in a small
fraction of my assignments, that they would be oral with
no written report. But then reduced to a file memorandum
upon completion.
Q. Nevertheless, is this a true and accurate
O\\,ll original file,
copy of the document that is in your O\\'ll
if you will, that has been created in the ordinary course
of your business?
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Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, to defme
the value that you're seeking to attain. Sometimes you
may be asked to do a lease fee value, which would
represent the lessor's interest in real prop,erty, or you
may do the fee simple, which is the unencumbered property
title, subject to the governmental restrictions. In
other words, all the sticks in the bundle of rights.
Q. And in this case, we're analyzing only the
improvements that were placed by Mr. Maile; correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Moving to the dates of value estimate, what
does that section cover?
A. I did a retrospective analysis that goes
back to October, 2005, and then, subsequently, to
June 1, 2006.
frame!?
Q. Why did you use that time frame:?
A. I was requested to complete the analysis
effectively as of that date.
Q. Turning to page 2, we have Purpose of the
Appraisal section. What is the purpose of this
particular appraisal?
A. Again, it informs the reader of what I'm
doing, as far as why am I doing this. Is it to estimate
market value, rental value, reproduction cost? And it
more or less gives you an idea of what I'm doing.
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A. Yes, it is.
Q. And is it the regular practice of your
business to put appraisal reports in writing and to
retain them in your file?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: At this time, I would reoffer
Exhibit 17, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Is there any further
objection?
MS. TAYLOR: Not at this point, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to admit
Exhibit 17.

Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Turning to page 1 of your
report, you have identified in your report several, I
guess, highlighted paragraphs as we go through it;
correct?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. We have talked about identification of the
property. And then we talk about the sl~ction entitled
Property Rights Appraised. What does that cover?
Imf,..,rrn
A. It's a requirement, under the Uniform
.c.,_.__ , c.' ... ,.,."

,_, -

~,.'CO ." •• ",0,;0.00

c.o",,'_.·

e"",·cu'

Q. And in this case, what was the purpose of the
appraisal?
A. To estimate the contributory value of the
improvements placed by Mr. Maile.
Q. Okay. We have Function and lntended
Intended Use of
the Appraisal. That section is, basically, f
for o r : :
litigation?
",i
sir.
A. Yes, s
i r . ;,
Reporting . .,
Q. Moving to Appraisal Development and Reporting'
10
1 0 Process. What is that section supposed to cover?
11
A. This
This is
is the
the scope
scope of
of work.
work. And
And it
it more
more or
or
Iii'
12 less outlines what has transpired since being initially
13 contacted by the client, and subsequentlly, the -- the
II:
14 acts that I went through to get to the value conclusions.
15
Q. Moving, we're going to skip one, going to the
16 Market Value Defined section, what dOles that typically
17 cover?
18
18
A. That tells you, if you're seeking market
Ii
19 value for a fee simple title type of property, that's a
20 standard definition offered by the Appraisal Institute in
2211 their Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal.
22
Q. Moving to page 3, Exposure Time Defined.
23 What does that cover?
requirem1ent from use
2244
A. Again, this is another requirem,ent
25 "path.
path. What
it
does
is
it
,..
of the time
What it,~~~~",,~,~, it informs:the
the reader
r:~,~~:~,,~~~he
time

Ii

(Exhibit No. 17 is admitted.)
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effectively preceding the date of appraisal, whereas
marketing time is differentiated by saying that's the
amount of time, from the date of appraisal forward, that
it would take to market the property.
Exposure time effectively says, if this
property was offered, or appraised as of this date, which
would be June or October as I previou81y stated, that it
should take one year or less to market [he property.
Q. Property Data section, it just describes the
property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, in this case, if you could provide a
description of the property for Judge Wilper?
A. Okay. It's 38.72 acres. It's a sectional
shaped parcel. It has been subdivided into seven
single-family lots.
The lots are accessed by a cul-d.e-sac known
as Cornerstone Lane. This cul-de-sac has a 24 foot width
and approximately 1,300 lineal feet of asphalted concrete
paving. The subject also has power boxes, gas stubs, and
telephone to each of the sites.
I was unable, during my inspection, to
determine whether there was, in fact, an irrigation
system in the property, and I assumed that there was not.
Q. Have you had further consultation indicating
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And that addresses the structure of the
valuation analysis.
It tells the reader what the appraiser has
considered, based on market evidence, to be the highest
and best use. In other words, would this be better
served as a farm field, or would it be bdter served as a
subdivision.
high1est and best
And that is analyzed in the high,est
use section of the report.
Q. With respect to this particular property, is
the highest and best use agriculture, or is the highest
and best use subdivision?
A. It's clearly subdivision.
Q. Could it be subdivided into ewn smaller
lots, for example, to get even more money out of it?
A. Possibly it could have been.
Q. All right. But that would be up to an
individual who is doing the development?
A. It would be not only up to the individual,
but it would be up to the zoning authorities or the
police power, so to speak, evident.
I believe the property zoned Rmal Urban
Transitional, which is a 5-acre density. It also would
depend on the proximity of central utilities, such as
water and sewer, and possibly the percability (sic), or

,i

Page 156

Page 158 ~i
Page
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1 whatever, of the soils with regard to maybe an on-site
that there is?
2 type of system, and the relative size of the property,
A. Yes, I have.
3 whether that would be feasible.
Q. All right. Keep going.
4
Q. In your experience, would it have been more
A. Lot I is also improved with a free-standing
frame structure. It's what I would call a clear story
5 difficult to get even smaller lots out of this 40 acres,
6 or are the 5.33-acre lots pretty consistent with what
type of barn. I estimated the square footage in the
structure about 2,000 square feet, based on aerial
7 we're seeing in that particular area at this time?
I
8
A. I believe the 5-acre site dimension is a
photography.
finish,~d. The
9 proper and normal type of development in that area.
The structure is not quite finishl~d.
:••
10
Q. We're seeing other divisions with large lots
10
1 0 doors are not placed on the ends, and it would be
11 in that area, as well?
11 considered more or less a farm building at this point.
A. Yes.
12
12
Q. You have a prop -- I'm sorry. Go ahead. I
13
Q. All right. Moving to the page 4 Analysis
1 3 cut you off.
14
A. Other than that, that pretty well describes
14
14 Section, you talked about analyzing the value of the
i
~
15 improvements Mr. Maile has made. And we've talked about
15 the subdivision. The average site size is approximately
1 6 the value of the property and the value of the bam
16
barn
16 5.33 acres, or somewhere in there.
1 7 itself
Q. You have a Property History section
17
18
You used something called Marshall Valuation
18
1 8 indicating it was purchased in August of '02 for
1
19 Handbook. Can you describe for Judge Wilper what the
19 $400,000; correct?
20 Marshall Valuation Handbook is.
A. Yes; that's correct.
20
21
21
21
Q. What is the Highest and Best Use section
A. Yes, I will. The Marshall Valuation Handbook
22
2 2 supposed to cover?
2 2 is -- comes in two fonos, one is residential and the
23 other
otherisconunercial.
is commercial.
A. The highest and best use is initially defined
23
24
And the commercial
conunercial manual includes everything
24 as that use that is most profitable, economically
25
from
subdivision
costs, Piima:::v".in".:g;;.:.,~c~om~p".on~et-".lt~CT:::0s~t~s
paving, component costs ~f0T:::r".e~v..."ery~,...",.il
for every
feasible,
physically
possible,
and
legally
possible.
2
5
L...2___:_5___:_fl~eas___:_ib~1::;e=:,p=h~y=s~ic~a~ll:-,y..,;!;p-o-s-si-b-le...., ".an~d___:_le,.,.~g~all,y~p~(o::;s:::si:::b~le-.___:____:____:_~2~5___:_fr-o-m___:_s~ub~di:::·::;V1T:::·s:::io:::n:::c:::o::;sts.,
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Page 159

type of building imaginable. It also includes yard
subdivision type of costs. And it's very detailed.
You can do either a calculator method or a
segregated cost method. So you can quite -- you can
define quite well what you're looking at.
Q. Okay.
A. Also, it's updated, I believe, monthly or
quarterly, and you'll see the adjustment factors in my
report. And they do that as a basis of surveying.
Nfr. Bailiff, if you
MR. CHARNEY: If we could -- NfT.
11 could hand Exhibit 17 to Judge Wilper.
12
13
(Bailiff complied.)
14
15
TIlE BAILIFF: The whole packet?
THE
16
MR. CHARNEY: Just the report. And, then, this
17
1 7 one to the witness. Oh, you've got it. Okay. We're
18 good.
TIlE COURT: I have, now, what has been admitted as
19
THE
20 Defense Exhibit 17. This is the Court's original now.
21
MR. CHARNEY: Ifwe could go to page 4,
22 Your Honor.
23
TIlE COURT: And the witness has one, too?
THE
24
TIlE WIlNESS: I do.
THE
25
MR. CHARNEY: He does.
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$114,147. And those were aggregate costs, according to
his QuickBooks program.
Q. Okay. So we move then to rock base?
A. Yes.
Q. Talk about that, if you would.
A. That's the substructure for future paving.
It's compacted. That would also include 31,200 square
feet.
Q. How did you come to the conclusion that
31,200 square feet would be what you used?
A. I believe if I took 24 feet in width, for the
right-of-way, and an extended distance of 1,300 lineal
feet, you will come up with about that number.
Q. Moving to paving. Talk about that, if you
Q.
would.
A. Paving is the asphalt concrete type of paving
that is rolled and placed, as the surface, over the rock
base. And that also is 31,200 square feet.
Q. Gas main?
A. The gas main was calculated based on the
lineal footage of the cul-de-sac. And the cul-de-sac is
actually a round type of cul-de-sac, so there's a void in
the center.
And it's pretty much grown over, when I last
for a
looked at it. It looked like, maybe, a depression fora

1I

I
;

i

II

I
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Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: I would like to go to the
section that says, following are the subdivision costs
estimated in section 66, on page 1 of the manual; all
right?
You've got one, two, three -- looks like
seven different items there. And I'm curious to know how
you arrived at the values for each of those items by
utilizing the Marshall Valuation Handbook?
A. The Handbook segregates these costs. And
what we're looking at is, the initial cost is 26 cents.
That's based on a square foot cost estimate. The rock
base is on top of that.
Q. Grading is 26 cents a square foot?
Q.
A. That's correct.
Q. And that you have at 31,200 square feet?
A. Yes, sir.
valueof$8,112?
of$8,112?
Q. For a total value
A. That's correct.
compoli, though, with
Q. How does that actually campOli,
Mr. Maile's actual costs?
A. His actual costs are actually contained in
this exhibit. And I saw some land costs, I thought that
were in there, as well as one that had a different
address, and I backed those off.
So I estimated that those costs were about
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pond.
Q. Okay. Electrical main line underground?
A. That was estimated, based on the Marshall
Handbook, at 419.10 per lineal foot, again 1,300 lineal
feet.
Q.
Q. Is that for digging the trenching, putting in
the power line, all that stuff?
A. Yes, sir. That's the composite cost.
Q. Electrical lateral lines?
A. Yes. These are the individual stubs into the
lots, the seven lots. And I estimated that based on
about 20 feet per lot.
Q. And, finally, we have telephone.
$8..30 cost for 1,300
A. And that's about an $8.30
lineal feet.
Q. Now, I note one thing that is not included in
here would be a pressurized irrigation system. If that,
in fact, were included, what would be the estimate as to
the expenses associated with that per foot?
A. I really don't have that information in front
of me. And I believe it -- and I'm not exactly sure of
$56,000" or something,
the number, but approximately $56,000,.
dollars were spent in that component by Mr. Maile.
Q. And is that included in your calculations
here, where you come to the total?
'"

I,II

II;

II
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A. No, it is not.
Q. SO that would be exclusive ofthat, then?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. All right. Now, you have a total here of
129,302. And maybe, if! can analogize this to you,
Marshall Valuation, is that to you what Blue Book might
be to a used car dealer?
A. I think it is. It's quite a bit more
sophisticated.
Q. But still, this would be your book to tum to
to figure out values, whereas the Blue Book would be
where a car dealer would tum to?
A. It is the book of choice.
Q. All right. So you've come to the 129,302,
and then you have a current multiplier of 1.06. What is
a multiplier?
A. That effectively updates the pages that come
in the Marshall, so they don't have to r l'1'lace thern on
every update. And they just say, if you're in the
western U.S., it's this section, 66, page 1, you multiply
the answer you got from the manual by 1.06.
Q. How often is the actual book, itself, updated
where you don't have the supplement, iif you will?
A. I believe it's on a quarterly basis.
Q. You, then, have included a 30 percent
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It appears you have also used Marshall Valuation, as
well. How does that interplay with, I guess, a
structure?
A. Well, as you can see, it's not section 66
anymore, it's section 13. And this deals with
outbuildings.
And on page 31 of that, I believe the bam
was estimated based on an average quality, frame
structure. And I believe I modified it a little bit for
the lack of finish. And so the estimate there was $26.02
per square foot.
Q. And, then, you have a modifier again?
A. Yes, sir. I do.
Q. And that is also to compensate for the
difference between the manuals as they get updated?
A. Yes, that's true?
Q. For a total barn value of how much?
A. The total barn is $55,683.
Q. And so, then, when we add the two together,
we come to $235,000?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And why did you round it up?
A. I generally round to the closest $5,000.
Q. Okay. Now, the Retrospective Analysis, what
is that?
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developer's incentive. What is that?
A. That is the entrepreneurial return, or the
profit, garnered on a component of a su"bdivision.
su'bdivision. In
other words, in a subdivision, when you sell a lot, you
have a percentage of that going to the land cost
underneath the lot, and the development costs, in other
words the roads, the water, sewer, all that, and then a
component for the entrepreneurial retum, which is, in
this market, generally measured between 25 and 35 percent
of the fmished lot value.
So what I've done here is, I've brought this
hard cost component into the mix, and Ive added the
incentives on top of that, because -- because we're not
doing the actual developed sites.
Q. Right. And you come to a total of $178, 178?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. SO that's what somebody, in today's market,
would have to pay to get the property into that shape?
A. I believe that they would, yes.
Q. Turning to page 5 -- and with the one
exception that you have not included in here irrigation?
A. Correct.
Q. SO this underrepresents the value?
A. It would, yes.
Q. Moving, then, to page 5, we have barn costs.
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A. The retrospective more or less takes the
value I estimated as of October 18,2005, and I took it
back to, I believe, June of2005. And so, all you do is,
you take your adjustment factor and go backwards with it.
Q. In other words, you're basically taking
inflation out of the equation, if you will?
A. Yes, sir. I am.
Q. You come to exactly $220,0007
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. In that case, you actually round down a
little?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you also done an analysis as to the
current value of the 40-acre parcel if it were still raw
land?
A. I have done a preliminary analysis, yes.
obj1ect, at this
MS. TAYLOR: I would like to obj,ect,
point. This witness has only provided a proposal. We've
not been given any documentation to support him, haven't
seen an appraisal of the underlying land.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney?
MR. CHARNEY: I don't think I was required to
provide them documentation on every bit of his potential
testimony. And clearly, in the witness disclosure that
we made, this type of testimony was ~oing
going to come up.
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THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that my pretrial order
expm1: opinion, would
said that any expert testimony, any expmt
have to be disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4), did I
not? I usually do.
MR. CHARNEY: I need to look at
alt it, because we've
the case.
had, as you know, a series of orders in lhe
THE COURT: What I want to fmel
fmd out is whether or
that his opinion
not this witness' anticipated -- well, thaI
was given to the opponents, when they asked for it in
discovery. And he'll be limited to the opinions that
were disclosed in discovery.
MR. CHARNEY: Well, let me read to the Court what
has been disclosed, and you can make your call.
TIlE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Substance of testimony. In addition
to previous disclosures of Mr. Corlett's testimony, he
will provide an opinion regarding the value of
improvements and enhancements of the real property
provided by the Defendants/Counter-Claimants after
acquiring title to the real property, procuring
improvements on the property, and fmal platting of the
property, based on his review of the Multiple Listing
Service data and market analysis, based on comparables of
similar improvements and lots throughout the Treasure
Valley.
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salable price in its current condition. And I think
we've disclosed that.
THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, you disagree?
MS. TAYLOR: I sure do, Your Honor. All this says
is that he is going to adopt an opinion from a different
expert, Joe Williams, who has -- we sat here, in this
courtroom, and talked about who would be called as
tOo be called as a
witnesses. Joe Williams is not going to
witness, his appraisal has not been submitted as an
exhibit, and would clearly be hearsay if it were.
I was afraid this would come up, so I have
prepared a bench brief on this subject, Your Honor. If I
may come forward?
THE COURT: Sure.
MS. TAYLOR: I researched this issue, and one
expert may not be called to simply adopt the opinion of
other experts. Even if they were going to be here to
testify, that would be improper. It would be based on
hearsay.
This expert has not provided us with an
appraisal that has any background, any facts, any
documentation of any opinion he would have as to the
underlying value of the real property. This disclosure
was made before we got the appraisal. The appraisal we
have, that you have submitted, is only as to the
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The witness will render an opinion that the
improvements created a market value of $1.4 million for
the real property, as opined by Joe Williams in his
appraisal. That additional opinion will be provided.
However, to date, the expert has not finalized his report
and the same will be provided once the same has been
completed.
prooj~ What I
Now I'll make the offer of prooj~
want to demonstrate for the Court is, what the value of
the land would be in -- today, ifit was raw land that
had not been touched by Mr. Maile because, obviously,
$400,000 is no longer a valid price for this property.
And, then, to compare that to the value of the individual
lots and what the property could tum around and sell for
right now.
And I think that that's clearly be:en
disclosed, as a basis for his opinion, and if they wanted
to depose him, I suppose they could. But I think that
that's another way for the Court to analyze the unjust
enrichment to the Plaintiffs in this case -- oh, yeah.
To the Plaintiffs.
the lots
I think to simply say right now lhe
would sell for a particular sum, and to compare that to
the old price, would be unfair to them, actually. I
think we need to compare the current raw price to the
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improvements.
And it's improper to try to sandbag us and
IIii
get in three experts for the price of one, when he would
be relying on the opinions of two others who aren't here.
'i
It deprives me of the opportunity to cross examine.
MR. CHARNEY: I think she -- Ms. Taylor's missing
the point. I'm not asking this witness a single question
about the Williams appraisal or the Knip~: appraisal.
THE COURT: In your disclosure, I think you -- the
fmal sentence, or final paragraph of your disclosure,
you mentioned something about a Williarns disclosure. Did
you mention an amount?
'li;i;i
MR. CHARNEY: I did.
THE COURT: What did that say, again?
MR. CHARNEY: Well, the disclosure says, the
witness will also render an opinion that the improvements
created a market value of $1.4 million for the real
property, as opined by Joe Williarns in his appraisal.
I'm actually not going to do that. Where I'm
going with this is, Mr. Williams providing an opinion
regarding the value of improvements and enhancements of
the real property. And this squarely fits within that
disclosure.
I would agree with their motion in limine.
I don't think he can bootstrap in others that -- well, if
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he is an expert, he probably can. But I'm not intending
to go there.
In fact, previously, the Plaintiffs in this
case had agreed that the affidavit of Tim Williams, which
had the $410,000 appraisal, could be admitted as an
appraisal and there's an affidavit with it. And we may
wind up offering that at some later poinr.
THE COURT: All right.
Well, Ms. Taylor, I'm going to overrule the
objection for this reason.
I think that the disclosure that's been made
is adequate. I think that your side was on notice that
this witness would be asked questions regarding the
increase -- his opinion on the increase in the fair
market value of the property due to the improvements that
were allegedly done by Maile.
And I'm going to allow him to testify with
respect to that.
Now, Mr. Charney, you may go ahead and
restate your question for the convenienoe of the witness.
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
Q. BY MR CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, have you had an
opportunity to come to an opinion with respect to the
value of the 40 acres in question, if it was simply raw
land, as of today's date?
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per acre, that would be about a million 900,000.
Q. But you think that $1.3 is the dosest?
A. I can support that better through subdivision
analysis, which analyzes the gross sell out, selling
expenses, profits, and infrastmcture cost.
Q. Now, with the improvements 1hat
that Mr. Maile has
made to the property, and recognizing that you haven't
thought about the irrigation so we'll exclude that for
the moment -- not through any fault of your own, it's
buried -- but with that in mind, what would be the value
of each individual lot, of the seven lots right now, if
they were sold on the open market? And I also want you
to exclude the barn on Lot 1.
A. Yes. And I didn't really include that in the
subdivision analysis. That would be about $347,700 per
lot, based on an average price per acre of $66,963.
Q. $66,900?
A. $63 per acre for each of the sites.
Q. SO, then, what is the difference between the
1.3 million, if it was raw land, versus if all seven of
these parcels were sold right now?
A. That would be the gross aggregate retail
sales amount, the 2.4 million. And the 1.3 would be a
residual land value, without improvements.
Q. SO is that -- the difference, then, is
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A. Yes, sir, I have.
Q. What types of information did you consider in
coming to that opinion?
A. I considered the sales in that Eagle Bench
area, running towards Middleton and Star, raw land sales
without utilities, such as the sewer and water.
I've also analyzed some sales of developed
5-acre sites for the purpose of doing a subdivision type
of analysis on the property, much as other experts have
done.
Q. All right. With respect to the raw land
analysis, sitting there today, what is your opinion as to
a potential range of values for the raw parcel, as it
sits there today?
A. Well, my most probable estimate would be in
the $35,000 per acre range. But there are sales out in
that district that range up to, actually, over $100,000.
-
But I think, in this market as we speak today, fifty -$50,000 per acre would probably be a cap for the lack of
utilities.
Q. Which would equate to a total sum of how much
for the 38.22 acres?
A. Well, it would be based on about a $1.3
million, as what I think is probably the most realistic.
And perhaps if it were offered, like I say in the $50,000

r

ii
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I

1.1 million?
A. That would be about right.
I
Q. SO without putting
puttihng words in
ifn your mouth, is it
'ii'
4 fair to say, though, that the
t e value of
0 the improvements
5 that Mr. Maile has made to the property have increased it Ii'
6 from a current raw land price of 1.3 million, to a
7 current salable price of2.4 million?
8
A. That would be the end result, yes.
9
MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, I don't have further
I.
1 0 questions, but Ms. Taylor will.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, go ahead.
11
r;
12
CROSS EXAMINATION
13
TAYLOR::
14 BY MS. T
A Y L O R : : 'I
Q. Mr. Corlett, you didn't do any written
15
w r i t t e n !I
166 appraisal report on the value of the land itself, did
1
17 you?
188
A. No, I have not.
1
Q. You haven't provided us with a listing of the
19
20 comparables you looked at?
A. I don't believe that -- I don't know whether
21
22 counsel has given you the sales that I have sent them.
Q. You sent them documentation on how you
23
2244 reached the underlying values of the land itself?
25
A. I believe that I have done that,iust in the
1

2
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course of the past few days.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would like to move,
again, to strike any of this witness' testimony about the
value of the underlying land. They, obviously, had
information they did not disclose to us.
And, in addition, the disclosure indicated
he would be testifying to a value of 1.4 million after
improvements. His testimony differed significantly.
He talked about 2.4 million. The disclosure did not
adequately alert us as to what this witness would be
testifying to.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, how to you respond to the
motion to strike this witness' testimony regarding this
$1.1 million increase in value that he has just opined
about?
And that's your motion, isn't it, Ms. Taylor,
is to strike that part?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
MR. CHARNEY: The 1.1 million increase,
Your Honor, the request to strike that, is still not
inconsistent with the disclosure that had been previously
made.
THE COURT: Okay. As I undersumd this witness'
testimony on cross, he has testified that he provided
your side with data from which he would be rendering the
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Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) deals with trial preparation and
experts, and it reads, in relevant part: Discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts expected to
testify, otherwise discoverable under thf: provision of
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, and acquired or
Ii
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may
be obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition.
Now, I take it that there was an
interrogatory that was propounded by your side,
Ms. Taylor, to the Maile side, requesting opinions of
experts?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. We have a standard
interrogatory asking for the underlying data.
THE COURT: Okay. The disclosure should include a
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, and
h
the basis and the reasons therefore, the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the
opinions.
So it looks to me like the data or other
IiII
information considered by the witness in forming the
opinions was discoverable and should have been disclosed
to Taylors when it was received by the Mailes. I mean,
I don't know how I can read that rule any other way.
Mr. Charney, what you have represented to me
is that you have received some information from this

I:

i
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opinion that he testified to today. And ]\18.
JMs. Taylor's
request for discovery would have included, as I
understand it, and the court order, would have required
wi1h that raw data;
all expert testimony to be backed up wilh
do you see what I mean? Let me tell you what I mean.
MR. CHARNEY: Okay. I have -- I do have some
E-mail that transpired back and forth between this
individual and I three days ago. I believe that's what
Mr. Corlett is referring to.
THE COURT: Okay. And I take it
ilt what you're
saying is, in the E-mail, the testimony that he has just
given today, that he did provide some -- it sounds like
he provided some values of comparable properties or some
that he used for comparison.
MR. CHARNEY: That's correct.
THE COURT: And that hasn't been disclosed to
Taylors' side.
MR. CHARNEY: Not since -- let's see,
October 10th. No. That would not have been disclosed.
THE COURT: Well,just
Well, just let me take a peek at Rule
26(b)(4).
MR. CHARNEY: Yes. I received this yesterday.
I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Okay. I want to look at Rule 26(b)(4)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Rules of
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witness, upon which he based his opinion as to the
1.1 million in increased value, and that that has not
been disclosed to the Taylors.
MR. CHARNEY: It was information received to me
late. I met with Mr. Corlett Monday, and asked him for a
little bit of follow-up information, because I was
interested in a different way to analyze this.
And I did advise Ms. Taylor, prior to court
this morning, that I would be attempting to offer this
I!,II
type of information. And she indicated she would be
objecting to it.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: So yes. I've had this information
for less than 48 hours.
THE COURT: Okay.
Let me ask you, Mr. Corlett, did you -- you
have supplied some information to Mr. Charney within the
last few days?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I did.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, did you supply him that
information because that was the information that you
were using to make your calculations on the value?
I~'
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. CWIHARNETNESSy: Yoekas,sir'
d'
fhi
III
The secon
MR. CHARNEY:
second portion
: Okay.
y. The
portIOn of
0 his
s
I"
testimony, Your Honor. Not-
Not -If
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THE COURT: Understood. And I understand the
motion is to strike this witness' -- not the witness'
entire testimony, but only the testimony with respect to
the opinion that the 38-plus acres has increased in value
by roughly $1.1 million because of the work done by
Maile; right?
MR. CHARNEY: Correct.
MS. T
AYLOR: And, Your Honor, another basis for
TAYLOR:
this I may not have made clear, his testimony does not
comply with the information we were given in the
disclosure.
They said that he would testify that the
improvements created a market value of 1.4 million for
the real property. The numbers he had -- he has given
are significantly different.
THE COURT: 2.4 million, didn't he?
MS. T
AYLOR: Pardon? Yeah. He said --
TAYLOR:
MR. CHARNEY: Yeah. He didn't say the
improvements made it worth 2.4 million. He said that the
improvements increased the difference by 1.1 million.
THE COURT: My understanding of the witness'
testimony that is the subject of this motion to strike,
is that, had this ground just sat there, from the time it
was purchased until when the appraisal was done, was it
would be worth about 1.3 million today.
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And if the issue is they don't have time to
meet this evidence, let's see if their appraiser, after
reviewing this evidence, has the ability to do so. And,
then, ifhe doesn't have the ability to do so, that's
when this becomes unfair.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this -- and this is a
question for you, Ms. Taylor -- you're telling me that
-the response to your discovery request about expert -
about this expert's opinion addressed orily the
information contained in Exhibit 17, the appraisal
report; right?
MS. TAYLOR: No. They did also include a sentence
saying, the witness will render 1m opinion that the
improvements created a market value of 1.4 million for
the real property.
THE COURT: Okay.
Well, let me ask you that, then, Mr. Charney.
this witness was going
If that's a fact, if you said that tills
to opine that the fair market value of the property was
-1.4 million, and he comes in today and says one point -
or 2.4 million, how is that fair to the othl~r side?
MR. CHARNEY: Well, it's the witness will also
render an opinion that the improvements created the
market value. That's -- I guess, maybe, it wasn't worded
as artfully as it could have been. And, in fact, it
Page 182

Page 180
1
But, now, because of the improvements which
2 have been made, it's worth about 2.4 million, according
3 to the method that he used in calculating it, which is a
4 difference of about 1.1 million.
5
Your motion is to strike that p011ion of the
6 testimony because it was not revealed pursuant to your
7 discovery requests?
8
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And it's inconsistent with
9 the opinion they said he would be holding, which we
10
1 0 relied on in determining not to --
11
-
THE COURT: Get your own appraiser -12
MS. TAYLOR: -- take the -- this deposition.
13
THE COURT: -- right?
14
MS. TAYLOR: Our appraiser will be here tomorrow.
15 He will not be testifying as to the value of the
16 underlying land after the improvement~" however.
17
17
MR. CHARNEY: Well, your Honor, if -- I would
18
1 8 suggest, then, is you hold back on the motion to strike.
19 Let them present this information to th~:ir appraiser, and
20 he can either agree or disagree.
21
21
What I would point out is that I asked
22 Mr. Corlett for this analysis and he was able to come up
23 with it just by -- just pull comps in the local area.
24
2 4 It's not particularly time-consuming or difficult to come
25 up with.
,

.. eo""""""""""""""
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turns out to be 1.1, as opposed to 1.4.
lA.
But, we also said, as opined by Joe Williams
in his appraisal.
Now, that's not an area that we wanted to
go -- that's not a path that I wanted to go down with
respect to this. But, instead, I have just wanted to
have him provide an opinion regarding the value of
improvements and enhancements of the real property
provided by them -- by the DefendanUCounter-Claimants, !Ii
and that's where his testimony went.
So, once again, I don't think his restimony
is at all inconsistent with the disclosure, nor is it
inconsistent with his affidavits that have been
previously submitted. And I would, once again, point out
that the Plaintiffs in this case have a full and fair
opportunity to meet this evidence. And if they don't,
then maybe the motion to strike should be reconsidered at
that point.
THE COURT: Well, it concerns m~ that you didn't
supply the material that you just received from
Mr. Corlett within the last 48 hours or so.
MR. CHARNEY: I will point out that I did attempt Ii
to contact Ms. Taylor's
Taylor'S office on Monday. It was closed.
closed.,
I got an answering service, and they had no forwarding
number for her. Yesterday, quite
I was deer
j

I'

~~~b: ~:~:~nf::t;~:~,a;:;~;~;~;;:!~~{;:;~~~~~gi
"
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hunting. I mean, I was out.
TIIE COURT: All right.
Let me ask you this question thl~n,
Ms. Taylor. You have an appraiser who is coming
-- if you called
tomorrow. Is that appraiser prepared -
him right now, is that appraiser to address the opinion
that this wjtness
witness has just testified to, and the opinion
is on the precise issue of how much the: ground is worth
now, versus how much the same ground would have been
worth had none of the improvements been made?
Is he ready to testify about that or she
ready to testify?
MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. None of this has
been disclosed to him. We gave him a copy of the
appraisal of the underlying improvements. We have
prepared for trial based on what had been disclosed to
us.
I don't think it's fair to say, well, we
sprung this on you. Now you have to stop the preparation
for the rest of your trail and -- and start over.
TIIE COURT: Right.
Here's the problem I see. I hate to -- I
mean, the two competing issues here are, on the one hand,
rd~vant information as
you know, the Court wants as much rd~vant
it can get. And on the other hand, I have to insist that
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different developer is going to buy this and have the
wjll be
property replatted, and the road and the barn will
removed, would you agree that they have no value to the
Plaintiffs?
A. They would probably have no value to a future
investor, but they would probably still hold value to the
owner.
Q. If they were going to remain in place?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have only done an estimate of the
cost approach for putting these in place; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You haven't attempted to place a value on the
actual benefit that any individual would receive from the
improvements?
."
A. That's kind of hard to do from a sales
comparison approach, because when -- improvements just
wjth the underlying
don't sell by themselves. They sell with
land, the creation of the subdivision.
And so I can -- I looked at the subdivision
analysis, and these numbers that we w{:re just talking
about, that's the macro analysis of the wbdivision.
Q. Right. So it's based on theoretical
analysis?
A. Yes.
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wjth the rules of discovery, you know,
the parties comply with
in order to be fair.
The disclosure that was made by your side,
Mr. Charney, didn't -- I didn't ever hear it say that
this witness
wjtness will
wjll testify that the fair market value of
these seven lots on this ground is going to be about
2.4 million, as compared to 1.3 million. I just never
heard that opinion rendered in response to the discovery
requests.
And so, the -- this witness' testimony, with
regard to that issue only, is going to be stricken,
because it is beyond the scope of that which was
disclosed in discovery.
So the motion to strike is granted. And you
wjth the next question.
may move on with
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, was your
appraisal based on an assumption that these improvements
wjll remain in place?
will
A. Yes. It would be.
Q. If that assumption isn't correct, would the
value of the improvements change?
A. I haven't made that analysis, so I'm not
sure.
Q. Let me give you a hypothetical. Ifa
If a
"""

t

i
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-Q. The actual value improvements would have -
could vary, according to the potential buyer, couldn't
it?
A. They could, sure.
Q. If someone wanted to put onions, to plant
onions on the land, they're not going to want a barn,
they're not going to want a pond, they won't want a road?
A. They probably wouldn't want that property,
because it would be too expensive to bl~ a farm.
Q. That's true. But let's say you already owned
the property and you just wanted to go back to farming
it. Would there be any benefit to the improvements that
you have analyzed here?
A. As a farm, probably not.
Q. All right. For example, if a -- if someone
is looking at a piece of property, and they don't have
horses, they don't want horses, they don't want a barn,
is having a barn on the property going to be of any
benefit to that person?
A. Not to a particular person perhaps.
Q. And you haven't attempted to talk to the
current owners of the property?
A. I wasn't exactly sure who the owners of the
property were when I got involved.
Q. You haven't talked to anyone from the Johnson

I
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Trust?

1

A. I don't believe so.
Q. Did the defense disclose to you 1hat
lhat there's

a perspective purchaser for this property?
A. I -- I have a vague recollection of
that,
ofthat,
saying something like that. I don't think [have
[ have it in
my notes.
Q. But you didn't attempt to talk to that
person?
A. No.
Q. So
SO you don't know, at this point, whether
these improvements will be left in place at all?
A. That's true.
MS. TAYLOR: If I could have a moment, Your Honor?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, as part of your
placing a cost value on these improvements, you were
provided with a list of payments that Mr. Maile made;
correct?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And I have made a blowup of that, that is --
MS. TAYLOR: If I can approach, Your Honor?
MR. CHARNEY: Is this your 101?
MS. TAYLOR: It's -- I actually thought I would
jump straight to 103.
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
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$2,631. Is it fair to assume that that would have been
for the home that was never built?
A. It appears to be, yes, ma'am.
Q. Looking down further, to the second line that
is drawn by item number 14, if you can review those
items, is it correct to say that, at that point, the only
physical improvements that had been made on the property
was putting in a foundation?
correcil, but it also
A. That would appear to be correct,
includes the soft costs of the bam permit certification.
Q. And that takes us to the date that a lawsuit
was filed against Mr. Maile.
At that point in time, would the work that
constitutf! a benefit, in
had been done on the property constitutf:
and of itself?
A. I haven't really made that analysis. What
you're asking is if somebody would purchase this, based
I
on him having done this. Possibly yes, it could have
I
some value.
Q. If nothing further was done, if work had been
stopped at that point, would we be looking simply at the
value of a foundation with nothing on it?
A. And the ability, perhaps, to build a home.
Q. Okay. But the home was never built?
A. Okay.
1

II

1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - . - - 11
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(Exhibit No. 103 handed to the witness.)
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Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, I'm handing you
what has been marked and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 103. And I will represent to you that that's a
document we received in disclosure. Does it look
familiar to you?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. And I would like to focus, specifically, on
the -- as I understand it, the first two pages are the
costs expended on the bam; is that com~ct?
com~ct?
A. Yes. That appears to be correct.
Q. And in looking at -- I would like you to look
at the first six items. I'll represent to you that those
were incurred prior to the time that Mr. Maile received a
letter telling him the sale was being challenged.
Can you look at those six items and tell me
whether any physical improvements had been made to the
property at that time?
A. It looks like these were primarily permitting
and plan costs.
Q. Some of those were relating to a prospective
home that was never built?
A. Yes.
Q. Item number 6 is a building permit fee for
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Q. In placing a value on this bam, you have
used the Marshall's Valuation?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Does that assume that the building was
actually completed?
r
A. Made some modifications there, through some
it t
adjustments in my calculations, saying that, you know, it':'
wasn't quite finished yet. And that's where that $26 per
square foot figure comes from.
Q. And you have seen this bam?
I'
A. Yes.
Q. It -- it isn't done, is it?
A. No, it is not.
Q. There are parts of it that siding has never
I,
been put on?
I
A. Correct.
Q. It has been left open to the elements?
A. The two bam doors were missing, yes.
Q. Has birds roosting in it?
A. Right.
Q. You haven't included any deduction for
depreciation or deterioration of the bam, have you?
A. No, I didn't. Other than through the
,i
adjustment of the reproduction cost.
Q. You said that -- in your report, rhat the
I:

Ii
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reason you used the Marshall's Valuation for the barn was
because it did not appear that Mr. Maile had paid himself
for labor?
A. That's -- that's true.
Q. Did you -- in looking through these
summaries, did you see reference to labor paid to
Hope Development Company?
A. I did, and I think I excluded that.
Q. Are you aware that Hope Development Company
is a corporation, a family-owned corporation, with
Mr. Maile and his wife?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. SO under the analysis you received, he did
actually pay himself for the work done?
A. Okay.
Q. If you would like to turn to tht: third page
of Exhibit 103. Starting with Item No. 49, an
expenditure for pipe at Silver Creek. Did you, by
chance, notice that that expense was incurred months
before the property was actually purchased?
A. Yes. I believe I saw that.
Q. Did you, I presume, deduct the $2,500 in
earnest money payment?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay. And also the other payments that
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Q. Okay. And if they have elected not to
develop it, or it's developed in a completely different
way, you need to redo the engineering, don't you?
A. If it were redone, yes.
Q. And in looking at these expenditures, would
you agree that the primary improvement on the land
itself, as opposed to the barn, would be the construction
of the road?
A. The road and subdivision infrastructure are
probably the most prominent improvements, yes.
Q. And would you agree, by looking at the last
page of Exhibit 103 that you have there, that the
payments to Capital Paving weren't made until July 28th
of2004?
indicatt$, yes.
A. That's what the exhibit indicattlS,
MS. TAYLOR: May I have a moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You talked about the
developer's incentive --A. Yes.
Q. -- that you added in. That -- bt:cause
Mr. Maile was the developer in this case, that
essentially would be profit to him?
A. Yes.
Q. You have no knowledge, do you, about the
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clearly were just for acquisition of the property?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. In looking at this page, page number 3, if we
go down to Item No. 59 -- and I'll repn:sent to you that
those are the items that fall before the time Mr. Maile
was provided with the letter telling him that the sale
was being challenged.
Looking at those expenditures, were any
improvements made to the real property prior to that
time?
A. There were, in fact, engineering services
provided. And so, if you talk about physical
improvements, I can say no. But there -- there were
infrastructure, or soft costs, expended, based on
engineering and planning.
Q. And that was all planning for the work that
was eventually put into place?
A. I believe so.
Q. If the work had been stopped at that point,
would the engineering that had been done be of benefit to
anyone?
A. I believe so.
Q. If they developed it in the sam,~ way as had
been planned?
,
A. As legally IlCIUlHlCd, yes.
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expenses that the Plaintiffs have incurred in getting
this property back?
A. I have no knowledge.
MS. TAYLOR: If I can have a moment, Your Honor.
We have no further questions.
THE COURT: No.further questions, you say?
MS. TAYLOR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Very well. All right.
Mr. Charney, do you have any n~direct?
n~direct?
i":'
MR. CHARNEY: I do not have redirect.
THE COURT: Very well. May the witness be
excused?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, sir. You are excused.
THE
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Thank
Thank you.
you.
"
THE COURT: Is that 103?
I 03?
THE WITNESS: 103, Judge.
THE COURT: Just stick that back in the sleeve.
That'll be good. Okay. Thank you, sir.
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(The witness left the stand at 1: 12 p.m.)
21
22
THE COURT: And, Mr. Maile, I suppose it's time
23
2244 for you to retake the stand, and you were under cross;
25 correct?

j
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THE WITNESS: That's correct.
THE COURT: So, at this time, we will resume the
cross-examination of the Defendant/Counter-Claimants'
4 first witness, Mr. Maile.
5
Do you need a minute to set up?
6
MS. TAYLOR: I do, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Let's take about five minutes, and
8 then we'll reconvene. And, hopefully, we'll finish with
9 Mr. Maile today, direct and cross. We have to end at
10 2:00, and I have court in here again at 3:00; okay? All
11 right.
12
(Recess taken 1: 13 p.m. to 1I:20
:20 p.m.)
13
14
15
THE COURT: Please be seated.
16
Ms. Taylor, when you're ready, you may
17 continue with your cross-examination of Mr. Maile.
18
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Cont'd)
19
20 BY MS. TAYLOR:
21
Q. Mr. Maile, we were talking earlier about the
22 fact that getting a deed of reconveyance to -- from the
23 Johnson Trust was an absolute requirement to your loan
2244 with Idaho Independent Bank.
25
A. That's true, yes.
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,f
Q. And this is a release and reconveyance that
you drafted for Mr. Shearer's signature?
',;
A. Yes.
TlUs release and reconveyance does
Q. This
Q.
ililil
considerably more than the standard del~d of reconveyance ~
that the Rogers had signed at the closing, doesn't it?
TlUs is a form
A. It's a point of contention. This
that I --Q. My question was, it does considerably more
than that one, does it not?
A. I'm not sure it does.
Q. Does this release and reconveyance purport to
release you and your wife from any and all liability, any
claim, liability, demand, andjudgment of an kind or
nature, or any claims that could have or may have been
asserted?
A. Well, let me explain.
Q. Well, does -- is that the correct language?
A. I want to explain that this was ~m error. My
wife and I weren't the grantors of the Trust. So as soon
as I figured that out, I had made a mistake on this. I
did a second one that was related to Berkshire
Investments.
Q. Let's finish talking about this one first.
A. Sure.

*
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Q. And the trustees had signed a standard form
deed of reconveyance at the time of th(~ closing, we have
looked at that.
At the time that you were getting the
construction loan from Idaho Independent Bank, you were
still aware of the fact that there were some
beneficiaries who were disgruntled over the sale, weren't
you?
A. I would have on say no, because
became that letter
in July of 2003 had represented that Beth Rogers was
spearheading this -- this contention. And, then, of
course Beth Rogers reaffirmed to me that that was not the
case.
Q. You had Steven Shearer sign a release and
reconveyance?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. At the time you had him sign that, you told
him there were some disgruntled benefi ciaries, didn't
you?
A. I had said to him there had been some in the
past, that's for sure.
Q. That was January 9, 2004?
A. I don't know the date. I don't know.
Q. Would you turn to Exhibit No. 126, please.
A. Okay. I'm there.
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Q. The language in this one purpolis to release
you and your wife from any claim, of any kind whatsoever,
relating to the purchase of this property, does it not?
A. As it relates to the deed of trust, yes.
.
Q. Only as to the deed of trust?
started. using this larger release
A. I was -- I started.using
and reconveyance about two or three years prior to this
.
being executed, because I felt that it better -- it
better explained the circumstance of an accord and
satisfaction.
I
And that, to me, is the essence of what a
deed of reconveyance does. It is an accord and
satisfaction. And I -- and this is a form that I had
seen over the years used by deeds of trusts, or related
to deeds of trust. And I started using this at least two
or three years before Steve Shearer signf~d this one.
And this one is in error as to the names of
the parties.
Q. But this purported to release you from any
liability relating to claims, as to the real property, as
well, doesn't it?
MR. CHARNEY: I'm going to object at this point on
grounds of relevance?
THE COURT: Does it go to unclean hands?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
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THE COURT: I'll -- no. I'm going to ovenule it.
I think that that's in the mix, quite frankly.
MR. CHARNEY: Would you entertain more argument on
that point?
THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.
MR. CHARNEY: My point is that the contract, and
the deed of trust, no matter whether or not they were
defective or contained some terms that seem
unconventional, like the demanding litigation on one hand
and arbitration in the same paragraph, isn't a relevant
inquiry any more because the Trust was paid its full
$400,000, on time, as it was suppose to have been paid.
THE COURT: I think the point is, though,
Mr. Maile, and the Mailes as a group -- and I'm lumping
them all together -- are seeking damages under a theory
of unjust enrichment, which is an equitable theory.
MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
THE COURT: And the doctrine of
unclean hands has
ofunc1ean
been raised as a defense to an equitable remedy. And,
therefore, any evidence that has some rekvance to the
issue of unclean hands, it seems to me, is coming in.
MR. CHARNEY: But if -- I guess I would agree with
the Court to the point that, if there was a demonstration
that he got the property in an improper manner. But
whether or not the documents are sound, or defective, or
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of this. But right now, it's just a simple relevance
issue, and relevance is pretty easy. And I'm explaining
why I think it's relevant, and why I'm ruling it is.
So I'll allow you to go ahead and continue,
Ms. Taylor.
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, I'm going to try
to reconstruct my question so I don't have to ask the
court reporter to read it back.
Isn't it true that this release and
reconveyance purported to release you and your wife from
any liability, whatsoever, regarding any claim relating
to the real property, not just to the deed of trust?
A. No. Because why -- if that was my intention,
~
to have such a global release, why would I, as your
exhibit packet shows, February 16,2004, propose a mutual '1
release to be signed by the Trust?
I knew that this release and reconveyance
form was not a global resolution for our family to pay
ha<; been a form that I had
off the deed of trust. And it ha'l
used on other transactions.
i
Q. Okay. So you didn't show it to Beth Rogers?
A. I sent it to Steven Shearer as trustee.
Q. Did you advise Steven Shearer that he needed
to show it to Beth Rogers?

I
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1
A. No. I'm sure I didn't.
what have you, doesn't really answer that question.
2
Q. And you're aware that he did not ever show it
I would agree that unclean hands, if Tom had
3 to Beth Rogers?
gone to Ted in a nursing home on his deathbed and said,
A. I don't think he did.
just sign right here --
4
5
Q. And as you stated, this one was incorrect,
THE COURT: Oh, sure.
6 wasn't it? You drafted it incon~ectly, wlth the wrong
MR. CHARNEY: -- that clearly would be a relevant
7 parties; right?
inquiry. But that's not the evidence in this case.
II
ovenuling
8
A. My staff put my wife's name and my name in,
THE COURT: What I'm doing, here, in overruling
I'"
9 and it was corrected in Exhibit 130 and sent out again.
the objection as to relevance is just telling you that
10
1 0 It took us a month to figure out we had the wrong names 11
I'm taking a look at the entire transaction, really, from
i,1
11 on the form.
beginning to end.
12
And I understand what Ms. Taylor is
Q. Okay. So let's go to Exhibit No. 130. You
13 prepared that as well?
attempting to elicit. She's attempting to elicit
14
14
evidence, present evidence to me, that demonstrates that
A. Yes. The staff did, under my direction, yes.
[,
15
Q. It also included all of this release
Mr. Maile was just doing too much self-·dealing and that
16
1 6 language?
he wasn't looking -- that he was drafting: documents that
17
17
protected himself and his interests, to the detriment,
A. Included what?
18
TIUSt.
18
perhaps, of his former client or to the Tmst.
Q.
II'i'
Q. The release language --19
And -
A. Yes, it did.
And-20
MR. CHARNEY: The argument in response to that is, 20
Q. -- that we had talked about previously? And
21
2 1 you agreed that that release language is not in a
he was equally bound by the exact same terms.
22 standard deed of reconveyance?
THE COURT: Okay. Right. And all that is
23
-
A. It's not -- I don't know what a sltandard
23
perfectly good argument -standard is,
24 because I had received this type of form from other
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
25 attorneys related to a deed of trust. It is not like the
THE COURT: -- with respect to the effect of all

Ii
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Ii
Bart Harwood, as her attorney, on February 16th of 2004? ~if
A. Yes.
Ift
Q. That letter encloses a mutual rdease that
you're asking that they sign; correct?
A. I was asking Bart Harwood to have his client,
Beth Rogers, to sign the mutual release, yes.
Q. And that release would have released you --you, doing business as your real estate company and
Berkshire Investments, from any liability relating to
your purchase of this property; correct?
A. This was intended to be a global release from
the Trust, yes, with the Theodore L. Jolmson Revokable
Trust.
Q. And you didn't provide Mr. Harwood with a
copy of the release and reconveyance that you had
Mr. Shearer sign over a month earlier?
A. I don't think I did. And it's the one that
had my name and my wife's name incorrectly on it. Is
that the one you mean?
Q. After this letter of February 16th, you
talked to Mr. Harwood and he told you that the Trust was
not going to sign your mutual release, didn't he?
A. At some point in time, he madl~ it clear that
he didn't -- he was walking a tight rope and he didn't
want Beth and Andy to get sued.

Page 203

1lone
1
one used at Alliance Title.
2
2
Q. It's not like the one Beth and Andy signed at
3
3 the closing?
4
4
A. I don't know if they signed it. When they do
5 closings, they break the buyers and sellers up into
5
6 different rooms, and at different times, So I don't know
6
7 what she got.
7
8
8
Q. Would you please tum to Exhibit No. 121.
9
9
A. Yes.
10
10
10
Q. Do you recognize that to be the request for
11
11 full reconveyance that the Rogerses signed at the time of
12
12 the closing?
13
13
A. I've seen this in discovery. I -- it is my
14
14 belief that Alliance Title and Escrow rletained the
15 original in their files. I never saw it until discovery
15
16
16
16
1 6 in this case.
17
17
17
17
Q. Okay. But you'll agree that the release you
18
18 drafted is far more broad than the one I:hey
rhey signed?
19
19
19
A. It had been my practice to use this type of
19
20
20
2 0 release and reconveyance for a couple years prior to
21 doing it here.
21
21
22
22
Q. Okay. So the suit by the beneficiaries was
23
23 filed on January 23rd of2004?
24
24
24
24
A. Sounds right.
25
25
25
bc:en filed?
Q. You knew that that suit had
----------i----------"----::-----,-------1ill
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A. Yes.
Q. You knew that there was a lis pendens
recorded?
A. By the Taylors, yes.
Q. And you knew that the lis pendens constituted
loart, and that payoff
a breach of the terms of your bank loarl,
was the only alternative?
A. That was -- that was part of the conditions
of the bank loan, that I keep it free ofliens.
Q. And by this time, you knew thlt Beth Rogers
had an attorney?
A. In January?
Q. No. We're in February now.
A. Well, I thought you said it was filed in
January, 23rd.
Q. You're right. I'm going to the date of the
release and reconveyance, which was February 18,2004.
A. Exhibit 130, okay.
Q. Yes. You knew that Beth Rogers had an
attorney?
A. I'm pretty sure, yes. I think she told me,
in this period of time, that she was with Bart Harwood.
Q. Can you tum to Exhibit No. 128, please.
A. Yep, I'm there.
Q. Is that a copy of the letter you wrote to
~::;:~;~&h,) -,~",",illh",,*:,

;.;,

1

Q. That release was never signed?
2
A. That's true.
3
Q. But you prepared a new release and
4 reconveyance, releasing Berkshire, for Steven Shearer's
5 signature two days later, on February 18th?
6
A. Two days later? Yeah
Yeab about this point in
7 time, I realized that I had put the wrong names on the
8 release and reconveyance and it should have said
9 Berkshire Investments.
10
Now, I don't know when I heard that the
11 mutual release wouldn't be signed. I was trying to get a
12 meeting with everybody.
So I don't know when it was actually
13
14
1 4 determined that Bart said there won't be a mutual release
15 signed.
16
16
Q. Okay. But this Exhibit No. 30, that release
17
1 7 and reconveyance you never provided to Beth Rogers?
18
A. I'm pretty sure I didn't. I thought it was
19
1 9 the trustees' obligation to clear the title. What I was
20 trying to do was clear the title, even though, as I
21
2 1 recall, the bank didn't catch the error that I put my
22 name and my wife's name on it.
23
23
It took me 30 days to figure out, wait a
24
2 4 second, we put the wrong name on there" So I tried to
25 make sure
Berkshire In,~:~~ents
Investments w~¥~:,~ecause
was -- because they
they were
were
"~~,,,,~e
sU::L~,~rks~:
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the titled owners.
Q. You didn't provide a copy of this second
release and reconveyance to Bart Hanvood, even though you
knew he was the Trust attorney by that time?
A. I don't think I did.
Q. When you provided this second release and
reconveyance to Steven Shearer, you didn't tell him that
you had been sued?
A. I can't remember.
Q. You didn't tell him that the Tru,t
Tru3t had an
attorney?
A. Probably not. I can't remember.
Q. Then, if you can turn
tum to Exhibit No. 13l.
131.
On February 24, 2004, you wrote to Bart Hanvood, again,
telling -- urging him to get the mutual release signed
and back to you; correct?
A. Where -- what paragraph is it in?
Q. I'm just summarizing the entire document.
A. It says, I would also appreciate your input
regarding the proposed mutual release.
Q. Okay. So you didn't have a signed release at
that point in time?
A. That's true.
Q. If we turn
tum back to Plaintiffs Eil1ibit
No. 130-130-
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Trust, didn't you?
A. Now, I don't think that really developed --there was some issues, even in April, from what I can
the Trust in
recall, that the taxes had to be filed by Ithe
April. And Beth and Andy were doing that work, so I
don't know.
motiOon to dismiss,
And Beth appeared at the motion
with us, when the Taylors were dismissed in the first
complaint, and that was in April.
And -- no. So even in April, Beth and Andy
were very friendly with my wife and I. And, you know,
they were act -- they were the trustees of the Trust.
Q. SO in the middle of February, you didn't have
any inkling there was a risk that the Taylors would be
replacing the trustees?
A. I didn't see it -- I didn't see it that way
in February. Certainly developed that happened.
Q. Can you tum to Exhibit No. 129, please.
A. Yeah.
Q. This is a letter that you authored, dated
February 16, 2004?
A. Yes.
Q. Talking about your opinion of what may happen
in this lawsuit?
A. (No verbal response.)
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A. Yes.
Q. -- the release and reconveyance, the
recording stamp indicates that you recorded it -- it was
recorded, at your request, the day after your letter to
Bart Hanvood; correct, on February 25th of2004?
A. Well, that's what the recorder stamp said.
But it would be highly -- it could have been sent back to
my office. But I can't remember if Steve Shearer signed
it and filed it, or whether -- most times, the --
Q. The document says --
A. I don't know whose request it was done at. I
don't know.
Q. Doesn't it say right on it, at the top on the
stamp, recorded, request of Thomas Maile Real Estate?
A. Well, that's only because I could have
enclosed a check for the $6, knowing it's $3 a page. It
could have been my check that accompanied the runner to
the Ada County Recorder's Office with the release of
reconveyance. It doesn't mean I was standing there,
physically filing it.
Q. But you intended that it be filed?
A. Sure. It had to be.
Q. And, at this point in time, you knew that
there was a good chance that the beneficiary Plaintiffs
would be substituting in as trustees, and suing you, as a

i
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Q. Would you like me to ask a different
question?
A. Yeah. Go on.
Q. I'll direct your attention to page 2, the
second page of that exhibit, bottom paragraph.
A. Yes.
Q. Starting with the italicized language that is
highlighted.
I'
February 16th of 2004, you stated, the risk,
full
I'
from my perspective, is the Trust has been paid in full}
in January 2004, relative to the dead of trust on the
1I
remained ·1
subject propertY, the money is believed to have remained!
in the Trust account. Bart Harwood has indicated that
Trust may be liquidated, and the current trustees will be
discharged or resign. The plaintiffs may creatively pick
up the pieces and become the successor trustees and have,
arguably, a more colorable claim.
m y i lII
A. Okay. That's probably accurately recites my
thinking on or about February 16th.
II
Q. And on or about February 16th, you had not
Ii
put very much money, at all, into the development of this ,
property, had
had you?
you?
property,
Ili
be,'1
A. I don't know what the percentage would be,
'I
but there was, in my estimation, a considerable amount.
Q. Well, will you tum to Plaintiffs Exhibit
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No. 103.
A. You bet. Okay.
Q. If you look at the first page, through item
number 14, those would have been the expenses you
incurred prior to this February 16th letter acknowledging
the risks of the Plaintiffs becoming the: trustees.
I'll represent to you that I have added these
and re-added them, and that the total amount incurred at
that point in time was $13,080.80.
A. Okay.
Q. That is not excluding the items that
Mr. Corlett said had been excluded because they related
to your home.
A. Okay.
Q. And the answer and counterclaim you filed in
this case asserted that there was an absolute bar to a
lawsuit against you because of the releases and
reconveyances that Steven Shearer had signed, didn't it?
A. Now, say that again.
Q. I'm sorry. That was a very long question.
You filed an answer and countf:rclaim?
A. Yes.
Q. In that answer and counterclaim, you raised
the fact that Mr. Shearer had signed these releases and
reconveyances, didn't you?
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A. Yes.
Q. And you have been aware of the lis pendens,
obviously?
A. Yes.
Q. You have been aware, from thl~ beginning, that
the Plaintiffs were seeking a return of the property?
A. Because the property was purchased for a
grossly undervalued sum. That was thf: basis of your
pleadings.
Q. And also negligence in preparation of the
documents and self-dealing in the transaction; correct?
A. The negligence, if any, in creating documents
was no damage to you folks.
Q. I'm not asking you for your legal opinion.
I'm just saying, you were aware that thf: Plaintiffs
wanted the property back.
A. Yes. And then the Court entered an order, at
some point in time, saying recision wasn't a remedy for
the Plaintiffs.
Q. You never informed any of the: Plaintiffs that
you expected them to pay for improvements you were
making, as they were being made, did you?
A. No. I relied on the title.
Q. You didn't tell them you were starting a
bam?
barn?
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A. Yes.
Q. And you claimed, in the lawsuit, that they
were a bar to any lawsuit against you or your
corporation -- or your LLC, didn't you?
A. My position is, and has been, lhat when
somebody is paid in full for an obligation it's an accord
and satisfaction. So I couldn't see where you folks were
coming from, asking for a recision of the contract when
it's a year and a half, two years after the contract and
you have been paid in full on it.
Q. SO is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And you asserted that defense vigorously?
A. I don't know.
Q. We filed a motion for summary judgment, you
opposed the motion for summary judgment?
A. I would say I contested this case.
Q. Yes. And you continued to pursue a claim
that these releases were a bar against any type of
lawsuit against you?
A. No. I think in my briefing for summary
judgment, it doesn't say that. It still argues accord
and satisfaction in relation to those releases.
Q. There's been a lis pendens in place in this
case since January 23rd of 2004?
,,'

',,,,
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A. No.
)Jutting in a
Q. You didn't tell them you were ]Jutting
road?
A. No, I did not.
A. No, I did not.
Q. And the road wasn't put in until after the
Trust had filed against you; cOlTect?
A. I'm not sure on that. Let's look.
Q. Okay.
A. The road doesn't come in overnight. There
was a lot of bidding, there's preparation. Trust filed
in July. I would think the road was in, or substantially
in.
Q. Well, let's look at Exhibit number 103.
A. It would be line item 728, 2004, Capital
Paving.
Q. Which item? I'm sorry?
10 I,
A. It's 101. Your handwritten notation, 101,
dated July 28,2004,
28, 2004, the last page of Exhibit 103,
Capital Paving was paid $20,000.
Q. Okay. And that didn't happen until
approximately two weeks after the Trust had filed their
lawsuit?
A. I don't know. It was in July that the Trust
filed a lawsuit.
Q. And I'll represent to you that it was on
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July 15th.
A. It could have been.
Q. And you knew, when we were in court on the
motion to dismiss on April 12th, that frre
flle trustees were
resigning and that the Trust would be iiling?
filing?
A. That's what you had said.
Q. Well, the trustee was present, as well, and
confirmed that; correct?
A. On which hearing is that, ma'2m?
Q. On your motion to dismiss the: beneficiaries.
A. I think my wife and I attended that hearing.
And there wasn't any statement made by Beth Rogers, in
court, that she was going to be resigning.
Q. You don't remember us talking about how long
it would take to get the signatures, and Beth Rogers
being in the gallery and discussing it?
A. I remember you discussing it. It could very
well be. The transcript would speak for itself. I -- I
don't recall if she volunteered that.
Q. But in any event, you didn't seek or receive
improvement from the Trust -- I'm sony.
You didn't seek approval of making these
improvements, from the Trust, before you made them?
A. No. I did not.
Q. And you didn't expect that they would be

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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10
11
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14
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16
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paying you for what you did, at the time that you did it?
A. At the time, we were the titled owners. I
had no expectation of anything from the Trust.
Q. Okay. And during the course of this case,
you have, on three different occasions, tried to get the
lis pendens removed?
A. A number of times, two or three.
pllce?
Q. And each time it was left in place?
A. When I was filing the motions to remove the
lis pendens, I had the bank loan. And] kept telling
the -- I kept talking to the bank, telling them we were
trying our best to get the cloud removed. I was
obligated to the bank to clean up the title.
Q. You continued to make improvements after each
of your unsuccessful attempts to get the lis pendens
removed?
A. (No verbal response.)
-
Q. I'll represent to you -A. I -- I don't think many improvements. I know
that there was a lot done in September of '04, and the
Court, with all due respect, denied our motion to remove
the lis pendens. And the subdivision, at that point in
time, was substantially constructed.
Q. Let's look at Exhibit No. 103. If you'll
Y011 that the
look at line item 94, I'll represent to you

But, yes. I continued, as the bank required,
that the subdivision be completed.
Q. Okay. You knew that the lawsuit had been
4 filed very quickly after you had gotten the loan from
5 Idaho Independent Bank?
6
A. Yep. The beneficiaries filed a lawsuit.
7
Q. Yep. And, at that point, all Idaho
8 Independent Bank had done was payoff the balance owing
9 on the deed of trust; correct?
l O A . That was enough.
11
Q. Okay. And one of the options you had, at
12 that point in time, was to seek different financing which
13 wouldn't have had a six month requireml~t for
14 development, didn't you?
15
A. Impossible. You can't go to a knding
1 6 institution with a lis pendens and get fmancing on
1 7 property.
18
Q. Well, you refinanced the loan, after
a.fter making
19 all the draws for improvements, in December of 2004,
2 0 didn't you?
21
21
A. I refi -- no, no. I beggen,
begge.d, borrowed, and
22 stealed -- and stole from various assets to payoff the
2 3 Trust. Remortgaging our home, doing a variety of things,
24 just any way I could do to payoff the Trust. So it
25 wasn't a refmance, no.

court order denying your motion to remove the lis pendens
was entered on June 21 st of 2004.
A. That was based solely on the fact that the
beneficiaries' lis pendens was the only thing
filling of record,
and the case had been dismissed, and you folks were
talking about appealing the case. So it was a very --there was really no evidence before this Court, but it
was denied.
Q. Thank you. That was my question, it was
denied on June 21st. At that point in time, you had put
approximately $60,000 into improvements; correct?
A. Well, I'll qualify that by saying" the
Exhibit 103 shows the date of payment, not necessarily
the date of when it was incurred. But for sake of
argument, it would have been approximately $60,000.
il
Q. And following that first dismissal, you
continued to make improvements?
tht! paving was
A. Let me clarify that, actually, thll
on a 30-day account. So that probably was started, as I
recall, sometime in May. I didn't have to pay for it
until July 28th.
So maybe $60,000 is a little light on your
last series of questions, because I think somewhere in
there is that Capital Paving charge that was being
incurred.

Ii
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Q. SO those are all things you could have done
rather than drawing on the line of credit with
Idaho Independent Bank?
A. No. And I'll tell you why. A good majority
of the money that was used in December of '04 to payoff
Idaho Independent Bank came from properties that were
listed for a year prior to that, that just were not
selling.
And I would have to say that, just out of the
fortunately,. sold to free up
blue, that those properties, fortunately"
enough equity to move from one piece of property to pay
off the Trust.
So, it wasn't as if I wasn't trying to raise
money, because I certainly needed to raise money to pay
for improvements on Fairfield Estates. It just was -- it
whtm they did, to pay
was a good timing that things sold whm
off the bank.
Q. You didn't make any effort to refinance
before you put the improvements in, dld you?
A. Refinance the Linder Road property?
Q. Find another way to payoff Idaho Independent
Bank?
A. I couldn't find -- I had tried. I couldn't
find -- but the property having a claim clouding the
title, no bank would loan on it. And we were leveraged

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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10
10
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16
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24
24
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compounding interest at 12 percent, arc~n't they?
A. Well, I added the interest rate from one year
to the next, and figured a new 12 percent rate. So I
guess it could be called compounded annually. It's not
compound daily, that's true.
Q. It's compound annually?
A. It appears that's what [ did.
THE COURT: It's 2:00 o'clock. Ms. Taylor, are
you about finished? If you're not, that's fme. If you
have any more than a minute or two, we'll just recess now
and come back tomorrow morning.
MS. TAYLOR: No. I can do it in two minutes.'
minutes.
a,0
THE COURT: Okay. Go.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I would like to go back to
the beginning of this transaction.
A. You would like to go back whc:!re?
whl~re?
Q. To the beginning of the transaction, when
Mr. Johnson came to you with the Franz Witte offer.
A. Yes.
11
Q. Will you tum to Exhibit No. Ill, please.
A. Yes.
MR. CHARNEY: Which one?
MS. TAYLOR: 111.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: 1hat is a letter that you
received from Mr. Johnson's accountant?

Page 220
1 with everything else.
2
MS. TAYLOR: May I have a mom~nt, Your Honor?
3
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Would you go to your Exhibit
4 No. 16.
5
A. Okay.
6
Q. This is your calculation for prej udgment
7 interest?
8
A. Yes, it is.
9
Q. Do I understand correctly that il's your
10 position you're entitled to this under Idaho Code
11 28-22.104?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And this is the payments that you made to the
14
1 4 Trust; correct?
15
A. Yes.
16
tenns of the deed of
Q. They were made under the terms
17 trust?
18
18
A. Or under the real estate contract. The fIrst
first
19
1 9 payment, technically, was paid under the real estate
20
2 0 contract.
21
Q. There was not an order, or any other
22 requirement, that the Trust repay you this money until
23 July 21st
21 st of 2006, was there?
24
A. No, no. There wasn't.
24
25
Q. Your calculations, here, are actually
"

Page 222!Y
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1
A. Yes. Both Ted and I received it.
2
Q. And in that letter, she raised a concern.
3 She said, I believe the sales offer for $400,000 is too
44 low; correct?
5
A. She says that, yes.
6
1\
Q. Then tum to Exhibit No. 113, please.
77
A. Y
Yes.
A.
e s . ,i
8
Q. That is a letter that you sent to Mr. Witte's
9 attorney, Eric Haff, on June 4, 2002?
10
A. Yes.
IiI;
11
Q. And in that letter, you state that based upon
12 comparable values in the area, we feel your offer is
13 extremely low.
14
A. That's what it says.
15
Q. And you bought the land for the same price
16
1 6 about six weeks later?
117
7
A. I paid the appraised value for the property,
18 that's true.
19
MS. TAYLOR: I have no other qUI~stions,
19
qUI~stions,
I.,
20
2 0 Your Honor.
I
21
THE COURT: Thank you.
22
Mr. Charney, do you have any redirect? If
23 you have some extensive redirect, I don't want to push
24 you into jumping into it right now because, frankly,
25
2 5 we're over time.

IiII
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A. Okay. Ted wasn't sure what he' wanted to do
in our second conference, May 29, 2002. It was our
attempt to flush out, to see if we could get a rise in
price by Mr. Witte, without committing to a counteroffer.
I had conversation with Imogen, the
accountant, in addition to receiving the letter. And she
did talk about a 40-acre parcel. And it was -- come to
8
fmd out, it was at McMillan, developed into a
REDIRECT EXAMINAnON
EXAMINATION
high-density subdivision.
9
1 0 BY MR. CHARNEY:
Q. SO not really a true comp, if you will?
10
leading.
Q. Mr. Maile, a couple of points that have been
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; l
eading.:]:
11
THE COURT: Sustained.
12 raised in about the last half an hour.
TIIE
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Was it a true comp,
First off, with respect to the lawsuits that
13
14 had been filed by the Taylors, the one that had initially
comparing the property in the high-density area to the
wa'>?
15 been dismissed and the follow-up one that exists today,
rural area that this property wa",?
1 6 did any of the original theories of recovery ever pan
A. I didn't feel that it was. I guess the
16
1 7 out?
argument could always be made, as we'll see -- an
17
A. Not in my opinion.
argument can always be made that comparables are in the
18
19
Q. We had negligence claims; correct?
eye of the beholder.
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And so, fmally, when the Franz Witte offer
20
21
Q. We had claims against you as a real estate
sort of died on the vine, if you will, you then paid the
22 agent?
same amount of money that you had previously reflected as
2
233
A. Oh, yes.
extremely low.
24
Q. We had claims that you had paid less than
What changed to lead you to the conclusion
25 fair market value for the property?
that that was, in fact, fair?
I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - = - - = - - - - " - - - - - - - - - - - t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -...
~------------------~~~-------------------+------------------------------------------Page 224
Page 226
Ii
1
A. Oh, yes.
1
A. Well, there was a licensed real estate
2
2 appraisal that was done, that was qualified, had a good
I::
Q. It was not, in fact, until December of 2005
3 that the Supreme Court offered a theory that eventually
3 reputation, and it was truly the fair market value in
4 led to the Trust recovering the property?
4 2002. Things have changed.
5
A. That's true.
5
Q. Did Ted try to get more money than the 400?
6
Q. And as of December 2005, had you completed
6
A. He never -- not to my knowledge.
7
7 the improvements that we're talking about in this trial?
Q. From you. In other words, did he ever say,
8
8 Tom, I've got an appraisal for four, I'd like you to pay
A. I had to, for the bank.
9
9 five?
Q. Ms. Taylor also asked you questions about,
';
10
1 0 did you ever ask the Trust for pennission to improve --10
A.
A. No.
No.
IE
11 make the improvements on the property. The question to
our.;
11
Q. Did you say, I see an appraisal at f
four.
12 you is, why would you ask the Trust to improve property
12 I'll pay you three?
13 that you owned?
13
A. No.
14
A. Well, that's what I had indicated. We were
Q. You both agreed, buyer and seIler came
1144
we' were proceeding
15 the titled owners on the property, and we,
15 together and agreed on the appraised value?
16 on what both Ted and Beth knew we were going to do since 16
A. We did.
l7 2002.
17
17
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
17
fmally, the Plaintiffs have
18
Q. Okay. Then, finally,
THE COURT: Thank you.
18
TIIE
19
All right. You may step down, then,
accountan1, Ms.
19
1199 shown you the letter from the accountanl,
20 Hetherington, and then your follow-up ktter, which
20 Mr. Maile.
21 somewhat parroted Ms. Hetherington's ktter, back to
21
MR. CHARNEY: Oh, I have --22 Mr. Witte's attorney, where you indicated that the
22
TIIE
THE COURT: Listen, do you need to confer? Go
23 property -- that you thought the value, or the offer,
23 ahead and confer, and then, if you have another question
24
24 after that conference, we'll take it.
2 4 was extremely low.
25
Upon what did you base that decision?
25

MR. CHARNEY: Right. I probably have five minutes
of redirect, so it's your call. We can do it first thing
in the morning. I know you have a huge calendar.
THE COURT: I do, at 3:00. If you can do it in
4
TIIE
5 five minutes, I'll give you five.
Inga? I'm asking the
6
MR. CHARNEY: Are you sure, Iuga?
7 real boss.
1
2
3
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(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CHARNEY: As far as Exhibit 16 goes -- I don't
obje~tion -- he would
know if the Plaintiffs will have an obje~tion
like an opportunity to rework that was simple interest,
instead of the compounding. I don't think he did that on
purpose, so he would like to probably offer a revised
l6-A, if you will, that removes that annual compounding,
because that would not be appropriate Imder the statute.
THE COURT: Would you otherwise be resting at this
point?
MR. CHARNEY: My client is shaking my head no at
me.
TIlE
THE WITNESS: No. I'm shaking my head.
MR. CHARNEY: That's true.
Can I rest in the morning, after we've had a
chance to confer? I would say that there's a high
likelihood that we would be resting, but I need to rework
the exhibit. And if they're not going to stipulate to
it, then I may need a little bit more testimony.
THE COURT: I'll give you a little bit of --MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: I'll give you a little bit ofleeway.
MR. CHARNEY: There won't be a lot of time in the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
18
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19
20
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24
25

BOISE, IDAHO
Thursday, October 12,2006,8:59 a.m.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. CHARNEY: Good morning.
THE COURT: When we finished yesterday,
Mr. Charney, the question was whether or not the
Plaintiff was going to rest. And you indicated that you
might want to get one other exhibit in, to substitute
lil'i
for the -- I think it was Exhibit 16, wasn't it?
MR. CHARNEY: It was.
THE COURT: So, what do you want to do this
morning? o r n i n g ? \H
m
MR. CHARNEY: Well, we have aat couple matters to IiI
II
bring up.
AIl right.
THE COURT: All
MR. CHARNEY: I guess we can talk about exhibits
and things like that, first.
The first one is, as far as some additional
exhibits, 16-A, which is a refiguring of the calculation
of the interest. And I don't believe there's an
objection from the Plaintiffs on that.
MS. TAYLOR: There is not.
THE COURT: No objection?
MS. TAYLOR: We're not agreeing it's owing, but we

Page 230
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1 morning.
2
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. We will be in
3 recess, now, until 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. I have
4 just been told we're not certain that we'll be in this
5 room, but you'll be packing up anyway, because we have a
6 room full coming in at 3:00. But we may be in this room,
7 hopefully; okay?
8
AIl right. We'll see you folks tomorrow
All
9 morning at 9:00.
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

(The proceedings adjourned at 2:05 p.m.)
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stipulate --THE COURT: No objection to the admissibility?
MR. CHARNEY: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. l6-A is admitted.
(Exhibit No. l6-A is admitted.)
MR. CHARNEY: Okay. As far as other exhibits we
have an agreement on, I believe we will stipulate to the
admissibility of Defendant's 18, which is the appraisal
prepared by Mr. Knipe.
MS. TAYLOR: Based on the understanding that
Mr. Knipe is not going to be a "litness, there won't be
any testimony. We're just agreeing they could meet the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.
THE COURT: Okay. So that Exhibit 18 would come
in, and it is a written appraisal.
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Offered by the Cowlter-Claimants,
COIDlter-Claimants,
essentially.
MS.
TAYLOR: Yes.
Yes.
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT: Offered by Maile against Taylor, and
no objection to the admissibility of 18; is that right,
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. Based on our understanding.
,M:,0i%:,,:,

~::';'ii;:~.:!@?-lm,"~
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1
2
3
(Exhibit No. 18 is admitted.)
4
5
MR. CHARNEY: We'll come back to 19.
6
THE COURT: Okay.
7
MR. CHARNEY: We have Exhibits 20 and 21,
8
Your Honor, which we have agreement on. And these are
9
other examples of the release and reconveyance form that
1100
was offered previously, other times when Mr. Maile has
11
used the identical form in other situations.
12
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHARNEY: I'll make argument about that, and 13
1144
I believe the Plaintiffs stipulate to the admissibility
15
of those documents.
16
16
THE COURT: Is that right, Ms. Taylor?
17
MS. TAYLOR: Well, it's my understanding there
18
will be testimony to go along with thern. They are not
19
just being entered in a vacuum; is that correct.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess that would be the 20
21
question.
Did you intend to call Mr. Maile back and lay
22
23
some groundwork, lay some foundation for the
2244
admissibility and relevance of these?
MR. CHARNEY: Well, I didn't know the
2255
THE COURT: Okay. Then Exhibit 18 is admitted.

-
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THE COURT: You will not be. Okay, very good.
I'm not going to admit those right now, then. You're
-going to have to put Mr. Maile on -
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: -- to lay a foundation for admission
of those and, then, that will subject him to some
cross-examination. Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Exhibit 22, which is the last one
we have a stipulation on, that is the letter from
Franz Witte, with a cover letter from Mr. Maile to
Mr. Johnson.
THE COURT: Is there a stipulation for the
admission of Plaintiffs 22?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, there is.
THE COURT: There is. Okay. TIlen No. 22 is
admitted.

::~1

(Exhibit No. 22 admitted.)
MR. CHARNEY: Okay. Now, I want to also offer,
Your Honor, Defendant's Exhibit 19, which is an affidavit
of Tim Williams and the Tim Williams appraisal that was
done in December of
of'03,
'03, the one that n~ferenced
rl~ferenced
'I
-'I
yesterday, appraising the property -
THE COURT: Hang on just a minute.

Page 232

Page 234

1 admissibility was this big of a deal, but I can certainly
1
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
2 have Mr. Maile talk about the representations I just
2
THE COURT: I have to catch up.
3
3 made, very briefly. I don't want to belabor the issue,
MR. CHARNEY: No problem.
4
THE COURT: Okay. I'm ready to go, now, with your
4 but a couple moments of testimony on that point.
your.!]
5 argument on No. 19. What is No. 19?
,I
5
THE COURT: So your offer of proof is that -- to
6
6 rebut a suggestion, or an inference, that Mr. Maile had
MR. CHARNEY: No. 19 is the Tim Williams appraisal
-7 made up a new reconveyance form for this case only -
7 that was done about 18 months after the purchase. I'm
8
MR. CHARNEY: Exactly.
8 sorry, 18 months after the Knipe appraisal, appraising
9
THE COURT: -- and to bolster his testimony that
9 the property of $41 0,000.
10
10
I 0 he has used that same form in the past, you want to put
I 0
Late in October of last year, I sent
11 him back on the stand, to lay foundation for Exhibits 20
11 Ms. Taylor an E-mail-- or I'm sorry -- a letter, with an
..'
12 and 21, which you contend -- or which he will contend are 12 affidavit of Mr. Williams, that was an authenticating
."
13 reconveyance forms similar to the one that was used in
13 affidavit of business records, under Rule '902.
14
14
1 4 this case, that he has used in the past?
I received a letter from Ms. Taylor, dated
15 November 4,
15
2005, which reads: Dear D~s, thank you
MR. CHARNEY: That's perfectly correct.
4,2005,
16
THE COURT: Okay.
16 for your October 28, 2005 regarding the appraisal of
17
And, Ms. Taylor, is that your understanding,
17 Timothy Williams. We will stipulate to allow
I
18 as well? You're not -- well, I guess, then, my question
18 Mr. Williams' appraisal to be admitted as an exhibit at
19 would be, what is the stipulation with respect to these
19 trial. There was also other commentary about another
20 documents, to these exhibits?
20 unrelated matter.
21
MS. TAYLOR: I won't be objecting to them being
21
This is that affidavit and that appraisal.
22 admitted, but I will have some limited cross-examination. 22 Based on that letter, I did not subpoena Ivlr. Williams,
23
THE COURT: Okay. All right. You will not be or
23 and we believe, given the Court's comments yesterday
24 you will be objecting to their admission?
24 about wanting to understand the entirety of the
25
25
MS.
TAYLOR:
I
will
not
be.
W1
ll
L...2,5
Mi7S;m'm::T:mAT:YL~0:7:R=:
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!!"lIIh,2r5~tr;mans~a..mc"lllti0i;rn!lri,"lIIIrni:b:melii;ie:irv:i:erni:thrniiai:7tciithmiem-a.,J"p+,p...;ra,is;,i;ai;rl
hmi:as!=r:mel;mern;van~c.;;.e. _ __
_......J
. . 1'.
~mmmm~~~~~~mm~~~~mm~~~mmmmmmmmmm+=mm~tr~ans~a~c~tio~nm'ml~b~el~i:T~~e~~~th_~a~t~th~e~a~p~p~ra_is~a~lh~as:==r~el~e~van~c~e.~
~I"
iii
...,'

57

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(Pages 231 to 234)

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001197

Taylor v. Maile

10/11/2006
Page 237

Page 235
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So I'm going to offer this appraisal, at tllis
tIlis point.
I don't think that she's disputing that this
is not, in fact, a copy of the appraisal. But I'm
offering it based on the previous stipulation entered
into between the parties.
TIIE COURT: Thank you.
And, Ms. Taylor, do you object to the
admission of Exhibit 19?
MS. T
AYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. After the issues
TAYLOR:
were narrowed down, we knew we were only coming in on
unjust enrichment. I informed Counsel that we were no
longer willing to stipulate to the admission of this.
This is not an authenticating affidavit.
TIIE COURT: Hang on. You -- when did you inform
Counsel that you were no longer stipulating to the
admissibility of the Williams appraisal?
MS. TAYLOR: In our pretrial memorandum, which
was-was-
TIIE COURT: When was that submitted?
MS. TAYLOR: I don't know that I still have it
in my notebook. Let me see.
TIIE COURT: Well-Well-
MS. TAYLOR: I have it right here, Your Honor.
TIIE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: But I don't have the date it was
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know, that just has any tendency to establish a fact at
issue has -- is relevant.
Now, there's -- you know, there's certainly a
question about whether or not relevant evidence should be
excluded, because it tends to muddy the water, it tends
to confuse things, or waste time, or inappropriately
focus on something that is not really the contested issue
offact.
I think, in the context of this court trial,
I would overrule the relevance objection. But you also
suggested that there was another objection, and that is
foundation.
Foundation-MS. TAYLOR: Foundation-
TIIE COURT: You said that there was an affidavit
attached to the exhibit, that Mr. Charney contends is an
authenticating affidavit under Rule 902 of the Rules of
Evidence, and you dispute that contention, Ms. Taylor.
MS. TAYLOR: It doesn't contain the necessary
elements. It just says, I'm an appraiser and attached is
my appraisal.
TIIE COURT: Okay. Now, it doesn't contain the
language about, this is a true and correct copy of the
appraisal that I did, and I keep it in the ordinary
course of business, and this is the kind of stuff that we
rely on, the professionals in my profession rely on in
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signed. I have my yellow copy. It was in early
September.
MR. CHARNEY: I don't know -- what's the relevant
portion, because I don't think there was anything in
there that said that we're no longer going to abide by
the stipulation they entered into November of last year.
THE COURT: But your objection would be relevance;
right?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, exactly. My objection is
relevance. The affidavit did not authentio;ate it as a
business record. I don't think it's relevant. He was
appraising it for purposes of the development costs, for
the bank. It was done long after the tram.action was
entered into, about a year and a half after the initial
transaction. So I don't think it's relevant.
The Knipe appraisal, I don't think I can make
that argwnent because it's valuing it at the time it was
purchased, and our appraiser will give his value at the
time it was purchased.
But this was done in December of 2003. It's
an appraisal value as of March of 2004. i<\nd I just don't
see its relevance to a transaction that happened in 2002.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, relevance is not a
difficult standard to overcome. I mean, maybe standard
is the wrong word. But even something that is -- you
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making these -- in rendering these opinions, that sort of
thing; right?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And Mr. Williams will not
be here as a witness.
TIIE COURT: Okay. I guess, then, it boils back
down to whether or not you should be sort of estopped
from challenging the fundamental requirements of this
exhibit, because of your letter fi'om last year where you
said, we will not be objecting to the admission of this
particular appraisal report.
Is there any contention that this is not the
same appraisal report?
MS. TAYLOR: No. There isn't, Your Honor. But,
at that time, I assumed that Mr. Williams would be here
as a witness to testify, and I would be able to
cross-exanline him. Now that I know he won't be here as a
witness, I think that -- that just introducing it in a
vacuum, in light of my questions on relevance, makes this
very different from the Knipe appraisal.
And I have located the l.mguage from my
pretrial memorandum, under -- at the bottom of page 4,
Mr. Charney. Under stipulated facts, what I stated was,
prior to this Court's ruling on the beneficiaries's
motion for summary judgment, the parties had agreed that
the appraisal report of Tim Williams would be admitted as

c.
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Mr. Charney's letter saying that he would not be there as
a witness. I only recall a request that we stipulate to
admission. Ifhe can pull that letter out, I'm perfectly
willing to be proven wrong on that, but that is not my
recollection.
THE COURT: Well, let's hold off on 19, for now
then. And maybe during the next break you can see if you
can get Williams down here to testify. But I'm keeping
all of my options open and all of my considerations.
This trial is only going to go for three
days. We have to fmish with our evidence tomorrow
because -- well, I suppose I could consider, you know,
bifurcating the trial or something, if we had to. But I
don't want to do that because we have attorneys from out
of town.
And I am not able to spill into next week, I
just can't. I've got a big med mal case going, and I
have to be out of town for half a day. It's not going to
work.
So the time consideration is terribly
important in this case, and I want the parties to know
I'm taking that into account, too. If bringing
Mr. Williams in to lay some foundation and subject him to
cross-examination would, in my view, unreasonably extend
the length of the trial, I'll take that into

I
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an exhibit. It is the Plaintiffs position that the
appraisal is not relevant to the sole deiense
deJense issue
remaining, which is the value of the improvements, nor
4 the value of the underlying real property. So, I believe
5 that gave him notice that we were not longer stipulating.
6
THE COURT: Okay. How difficult would it be to
7 get Williams in here?
8
MR. CHARNEY: To establish the -- well, actually,
9 a couple points first.
10
The letter that I sent Ms. Taylor last year
11 clearly stated that we were not going to be calling
12 Mr. Williams, and because we had the authenticating
13 affidavit.
14
The affidavit that's appended to Exhibit 19
15 is not the authenticating affidavit. Thf: authenticating
1 6 affidavit, I believe, is in the Court file, which does
1 7 contain that 902 language that is required. And we can
1 8 spend some time, later on, digging that out instead of
1 9 wasting time, here at this point.
20
I don't know how difficult it would be to get
21 Mr. Williams here or not, because I hadn't anticipated
22 the objection.
23
And it appears that the objection, from the
2 4 memorandum, to the extent that there is one, is on
25 relevance grounds, not on hearsay grounds, that this is
_.
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not what it purports to be. So, if that is the
objection, and now she's just sort of bootstrapping and
saying, well, it's hearsay and just trying to find
another way, I don't think that's reasonable, given the
tenor of this case. And I would ask you to accept the
exhibit.
THE COURT: All right.
if! allowed in No. 19,
And, Ms. Taylor, ifI
admitting a particular piece of evidencle is -- you know,
speaks to its admissibility, obviously, and not
necessarily to its weight.
You would still be able to make the argument
that the Court should give, perhaps, no weight at all to
that particular exhibit, because it's so marginally
relevant.
Do you see what I mean?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I do see what you mean,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: I want to find out too, Ms. Taylor,
did you -- you actually did receive the Williams
appraisal report some time ago, so you've had an
opportunity to look it over; right?
MS. TAYLOR: Oh, yes. DefiniteIy.
TIlE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: But, Your Honor J[][ do not recall

ti
W
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consideration in ruling on the admissibility of what may
be -- or at least what is arguably a marginally relevant
document, for purposes of the issues confronting this
I
Court.
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: So let's hold off on 19, for now. And
during the next break, you can see if you can get ahold
of Williams, see ifhe might be available to come down
and lay some foundation for the admiss,ibility.
But as far as the relevance objection, I've
ruled on that one. I find that it's relevant. How much
weight I am going to put on that appraisal, that opinion,
is -- I suppose that's subject to argument later.
MR. CHARNEY: All right. One other --THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CHARNEY: -- matter very briefly. Exhibit
No. 129, from the Plaintiffs, was a lettf~r
lettf!r from
Mr. Maile to Mr. Hoagland. It clearly stated, on the top
of it, that it was a privileged communication. I had not
seen that, and I mistakenly stipulated to its
admissibility yesterday.
Mr. Maile -- and as the Court is aware, I
stepped into this case kind of late, given the whole
tenor of the case. And I did not know that that letter
had ever been disclosed. And Mr. Maile testified about I

Ii
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it yesterday, but we spoke immediately aftetwards and
were troubled by, how did they get their hands on this
letter?
Nevertheless, we do claim privilege with
respect to that letter, and are going to ask the Court to
strike the letter from the exhibit binder and to strike
any testimony relating to Mr. Maile's discussion about
that letter.
And I don't know --
THE COURT: Has there been testimony already about
the letter?
MR. CHARNEY: There was.
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion, to the
extent that the cat's out of the bag. It \\>ould
\\'ould be -- I
think it would be too difficult for me to, you know,
purge from my own mind any testimony, and so forth, any
notes that I have taken and that kind of thing.
So, like it or not, you stipulated to the
admissibility of certain exhibits. This particular one,
that you now claim is privileged, was among those
exhibits. It's in.
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
MR. CHARNEY: For the record, it wasn't an
inadvertent stip.
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THOMAS MAILE,
the witness at the time of the evening recess herein, was
examined and further testified as follows:
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. CHARNEY::
Q. Mr. Maile, the bailiff has handed you
Exhibits 20 and 21. Do you recognize those exhibits?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What are those exhibits?
A. Well, as -- as discussed yesterday, my fonn
file had changed a few years prior to the release and
reconveyances that Steve Shearer ultimately signed in
this case, which he signed in January and February of
'04.
So Exhibit 21 is an example of that release
and reconveyance fonn that I had started using, as I
indicated, a few years before. And it is one that I was
able to locate, because it also had Steve Shearer as
signing that document, on March 28, 2001, in a
transaction that was involving my wife and I granting a
deed of trust to Hope Land and Livestock Company.
And that related back to a 1992 deed of trust
that was ultimately, as I recall, paid off earlier, but
we never got the release and reconveyance done.
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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHARNEY: So, I will recall Mr. Maile to

10

21.
discuss Exhibits 20 and 2l.
THE COURT: Now, before you do that, Ms. Taylor,
do you have anything else, preliminarily, before we wrap
up Mr. Maile's case in chief?
MS. TAYLOR: I do not, Your Honor. I was planning
to let Mr. Charney know -- we got busy -- I believe that
I can narrow my case down to only calling three witnesses
today.
TIfE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: I planned on, perhaps, five. So as
far as planning our time frames, I can never anticipate
how long cross-examination may be. But I -- in my mind,
I think we could be done before 2:00 o'clock today.
:,ee what we can do
THE COURT: Okay, great. We'll :'lee
then. Okay.
Now, go ahead and call -- Mr. Maile, you're
still under oath. You may retake the stand.
And you may inquire of your wimess whenever
you're ready, Mr. Charney.
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(Exhibits No. 20 and 21 handed to the
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And then, we went to refinance our home, in
ninety -- in 2001, and I think the title company said,
hey, you've got to get a release and reconveyance for
that. So that's what 21 is representing. It has Exhibit
A on the bottom, which was created because it was
attached to an affidavit that was filed in one of these
pleadings.
Exhibit 20 is the same form as 2: 1, which is
also the same fonn of the other releases and
reconveyances. And it related to a deed of trust from my
wife and I, again, where Steve Shearer was a trustee, and
it's a 1997 document. But this deed and reconveyance,
again, was needed to be filed for, I think, refinancing
on a piece of property back in 2003.
So that form continued to be uSf:d by my
office for deeds of reconveyance, releases and
reconveyances.
Q. Had you used that same fonn £~r other,
unrelated clients, as well?
A. I believe I have.
Q. All right. In other words, you didn't create
that particular fonn for this case?
A. No.
Q. All right.
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
.....
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IiIi
THE WITNESS: Nor the other relt:ases
rell:ases that were
1
A. No, I really didn't. No. Our family is very
I
talked about yesterday.
2 close.
3
Q. All right. So these wt:re not entered into in
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
THE WI1NESS:
WIlNESS: Obviously, this is unrelated to this
4 the same situation that the ones in this transaction were
5 entered into, were they?
case.
THE COURT: Okay. So you're moving the admission? 6
A. Now say that again? I'm sorry.
MR. CHARNEY: Oh, yes. I will offer 20 and 21.
7
Q. The situation on these releases was not
Is that right?
8 comparable to the situation in this case, were they?
THE COURT: Yes, 20 and 21.
9
A. Well, it involved a deed of trust. In
Ms. Taylor, do you have any objections?
10 both -- all these examples involved reconveyances on a
MS. TAYLOR: I do not.
11 deed of trust, so they are similar. Not the same
THE COURT: All right. Then 20 and 21 are
12 entities, of course. Not the same individuals, of
admitted.
13 course.
14
Q. Right. And you have never provided -- or you
(Exhibits No. 20 and 21 admitted.)
15 have not provided a release and reconveyance with this
1 6 type of language where anyone other than Steve Shearer
THE COURT: Anything else?
1 7 was the trustee?
MR. CHARNEY: No, Your Honor.
18
A. I had not provided anything else to you, and
THE COURT: Would you like to cross-examine the
1 9 I had tried to explain that these are easier for me to
2 0 locate because Steve Shearer was involved on these. But
witness on this small point?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Very briefly, Your Honor.
2 1 I know that I have used some forms similar to this for
THE COURT: Go ahead.
22 other clients, involving other trustees.
23
,;
III
Q. And at the time these exhibits, No. 20 and 21
III
24 were prepared, you hadn't received a letter from your
III
25 daughter, or your development company, saying that the
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RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR::
Q. Mr. Maile, in both of these exhibits, No. 20
and 21, you and your wife are the grantors?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the release and reconveyance you
prepared in relation to this matter, you and your wife,
or your LLC, were the grantors?
A. Just the LLC was the grantor. We
inadvertently -- our office inadvertently put Tom and
Colleen on the first release.
Q. Okay. So you have not provided the Court
with any documents like this that don't relate to a
transaction in which you were the grantor?
A. That's true. I testified there probably are
others, I just couldn't locate them.
Q. Youjust couldn't find them? Okay. And in
each of these cases, the beneficiary of Ihe deed of trust
was an entity that you were very close to; correct?
A. Well, one entity was our daughter. And the
other entity was our construction company.
Q. Right. And you hadn't -- you didn't have any
daughtt:r or your
reason to think that either your daught{:r
construction company would be bringing a lawsuit against
you, did you?
"

,""'",

,

transaction was being challenged, had you?
A. No.
3
MS. TAYLOR: No other questions.
TIIE COURT: All right.
4
5
Any redirect at all?
6
MR. CHARNEY: No redirect.
7
TIIE COURT: Very well. You may step down, then, I~
8 Mr. Maile.
I'
TIIE WITNESS: Thank you.
9
I'I
10
10
THE COURT: And I'll take those from the bailiff.
11
12
(The witness left the stand at 9:28 a.m.)
13
14
TIIE COURT: Does the Counter-Claimant have any
15 additional evidence or testimony, Mr. Charney?
16
c~Ul reserve ruling on
MR. CHARNEY: As long as we c~Ul
17 Exhibit 19.
11
18
TIIE COURT: Yeah. Fair e
nough.:
enough.
19
Ms. Taylor, any problem with doing it that
II
I
20 way?
MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. If I can talk to my'·'
21
my "
j
22 client a little, I -- we may be able to work something
23 out.
24
TIIE COURT: Okay.
25
MS. TAYLOR: Mayl?
MayI?
1

2

II

IiI

"",''''','

61 (Pages 247 to 250)

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208)

345-3704

f9ff8113-6848-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c
001201

Taylor v. Maile

10/11/2006
Page 253

Page 251

1
2
3

THE COURT: Sure.
(Conference between Plaintiffs and Counsel.)
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MS. T
AYLOR: Your Honor, we don't want to take a
TAYLOR:
chance of delaying the trial. We will stipulate that
Mr. Williams would be able to lay the foundation to meet
the business records exception to the hearsay rule and
agree to admissibility, subject to the Court advising us
that we obviously have the ability to argue, either in
verbal closing or written closing, as to the relevance.
THE COURT: All right. And that is the ruling.
The Court will admit, then, counter -- Defendant's
Exhibit 19. As I say, I do find that it has some
relevance.
And in reviewing the matter, and in taking
the entire thing in context, which obviously,
Ms. Taylor, you'll have an opportunity to do in your
argument and by presentation of other evidence -- I mean,
you just have that -- you are aware of your right to do
that, that admitting this does not mean, necessarily,
that the Court is swallowing it whole, or putting too
much reliance on it.
Now, Mr. Chamey is certainly free to argue
that this is the Holy Grail, in this case, and that this
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DAN GROBER,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff,
having been first duly swom, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
BY MS. TAYLOR::
pllease.
Q. Would you state your name, pJlease.
A. Dan Grober.
Q. Spell your last name for the record.
A. G-R-O-B, as in boy, E-R.
Q. Mr. Grober, we have retained you as an expert
witness in this case; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And what opinions are you here to testify to?
A. I'm here to testify to opinions as to
attomey standard of care, ethics implications of
attomey conduct, those sorts of things.
Q. Can you give the Court a little bit about
your educational background.
A. I have a bachelor's degree in English and
joumalism, from Eastem Illinois Unive:rsity. I have a
Master of Arts Degree from Boise State University. And
Universi~y of Idaho.
my Jurist Doctorate from the Universi~y
Q. What has been your professional work

Page 254 ~
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document proves a lot. And both of you have the
opportunity to do that.
3
But it just seems to me that, in a court
4 trial, the Court can exercise, you know,just a little
5 bit more leeway, especially on the relevance issue,
6 because the likelihood of it causing confusion for the
7 trier of fact is less; okay?
8
MS. TAYLOR: We don't want to delay, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Based on all
10 those considerations, Exhibit 19 is admitted.
11
12
(Exhibit No. 19 admitted.)
13
14
THE COURT: Okay. With that, Mr. Charney?
15
MR. CHARNEY: With that, the Defendants will rest.
16
THE COURT: Very well.
Are you ready to call your first witness,
1177
18 Ms. Taylor?
19
MS. TAYLOR: I am, Your Honor. I will need to go
2200 get him.
21
THE COURT: Okay.
22 III
23 III
24 III
25 III
2
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experience?
A. When I initially began practice:, I was
involved in general practice in the Twin Falls/Magic
FallslMagic
Valley area for a time. I also spent some time as the
Jerome County Public Defender.
Thereafter, in October, early to mid-October
of 1989, I became Assistant Bar Counsel for the Idaho
State Bar, and I held that position until, I believe,
October 31 of 1996. Whereupon, I left Bar Counsel's
Office, moved to Homedale, where I have since that time
been engaged pretty much in a general practice oflaw,
locally.
Q. What were your duties when you were Assistant
Bar Counsel?
A. Essentially, my duties as Assistant Bar
Counsel involved investigating complaints of alleged
attomey misconduct, prosecuting many of those
complaints, if it was determined that rules of
professional conduct were breached.
I was also -- shared responsibilities with
Chief Bar Counsel for providing ethics advice to Idaho
attomeys, and was -- also shared responsibility for
traveling around the state, giving ethics seminars, so
that attomeys in the state could meet their CLE
requirements.
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Q. Okay. After leaving the Idaho State Bar, has
your practice continued to have any component involving
attorney disciplinary matters?
A. Yes. I -- a rather significant part of my
5 practice, since going back into private practice in
6 Homedale, involves disciplinary defense work in State Bar
7 proceedings.
8
Q. As part of your professional practice, to you
9 handle real estate transactions?
l O A . I do on a regular basis.
11
Q. And what documents, in general, have you
12 reviewed in forming your opinions in tbjs case?
13
A. I have reviewed at least some of the
1 4 pleadings. I have reviewed at least excerpts of
15 depositions. I have reviewed various correspondence and
1 6 various exhibits provided to me.
17
I think I've detailed the majority of those
1 8 in an affidavit that I have submitted in this case.
19
Q. And as a result of your investigation, did
2 0 you reach an opinion as to whether Mr. Maile met the
21 standard of care required for attorneys in the state of
22 Idaho in relationship to the Johnson transaction?
23
A. Yes. I have reached an opinion.
24
Q. What is that opinion?
25
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
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Q. Okay. Are there any special considerations
you look at when it's a business transaction between an
attorney and someone they have represented?
A. Yes. And those concerns, again, I hinted at
those as being conflicts of interest because, clearly,
conflicts of interest exist when an attorney begins doing
business with a client, and most especiailly when the
attorney has been involved with the matters, representing
that client, that lead to the business transaction.
Q. And your investigation showed that that had,
in fact, occurred in this case?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; leading.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Did your investigation
indicate that there had been a previous transaction in
this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you explain that to the Court.
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay and foundation.
THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain the objection on
the ground of lack of foundation.
You can lay some additional foundation, if
you care to.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grobe:r, as part of your
investigation in this matter, did you review documents

----11

258,
Page 258

Page 256

1
2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the
objection. I believe that the -- well, I'm just going to
leave it at that.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
THE COURT: I'm going to give you leave to lay
additional foundation --
MS. T
AYLOR: All right.
TAYLOR:
THE COURT: -- if you're able to do so.
MS. TAYLOR: I am able to do so.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grob~~r,
Grobl~r, let's talk more
in detail about the items you looked at in reaching your
opinions in this matter.
First of all, what concerns did you have when
looking at the initial purchase between Mr. Johnson and
Mr. Maile?
A. My concerns, when I looked at the initial
purchase agreement were, first and foremost, conflict of
interest issues and whether or not those conflicts were
properly dealt with.
I also had other concerns with the contract,
because I found language in -- and I believe -- excuse
me. I've been fighting a cold. I found language in a
paragraph, as I recall, which was captioned attorney
fees, but had all kinds of other -- other provisions in
there.
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from Franz Witte?
A. From -- I'm sorry?
Q. From a Franz Witte, relating to a purchase
offer on the Linder Road real property?
A. Yes. I believe I did. He, through his
counsel, as I recall.
Q. Were you done with the answer?
A. You asked me if I had reviewed documents.
Yes, I had.
Q. And what knowledge did you have, from your
review of the documents provided, as far as the prior
transaction on the Witte property -- or on the
Linder Road property?
A. As to the Linder Road property, I reviewed
documents that indicated, as I recall, that Mr. Johnson
had received an offer to purchase the Linder Road
property, as I recall, for a figure of $400,000. I think
that offer came through Mr. Witte's counsel. I believe
that was Eric Haff.
And I recall a letter from Mr. Maile, I
believe, back to Mr. Haff, indicating that the $400,000
purchase price was -- I think the language was extremely
low or very low.
Q. But what concern does that raise in your
mind?
..

...............................
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A. Well, the concern in my mind arose when the
materials I reviewed subsequently told me that Mr. Maile,
3 in fact, offered to purchase, and ultimately purchased,
4 the property for that same amount.
5
Q. Does that raise ethical implications, in your
6 mind?
7
A. Well, yes, it does. Would you like me to
8 elaborate on --
9
Q. Yes.
10
l O AA.
. Any time an attorney begins to do business
11 with a client, significant ethical red flags are raised.
12 Conflict of interest red flags, clearly.
13
And that is one of the -- one of the reasons
14 why, if attorneys are going to do business with a client,
15 such as this, they need to make absolmely certain that
16 they have properly dealt with the conflicts, such that
17 the client, if the client chooses to go ahead with the
18 transaction, has had all of the implicati:ons
implicatJ:ons fully
19 explained and has waived any conflict, so that the client
2 0 is fully aware of all of the implicatiom: and aspects of
21 that transaction.
22
Q. As part of your review in this matter, did
23 you see a letter from Mr. Johnson's accountant,
24 Imogen Hetherington, to Mr. Maile, dated May 24, 2002?
25
A. I did.
1
2

1
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to Mr. Johnson on how to detennine a purchase price on
the property?
A. If there's -- I'm sorry?
Q. Do you recall the advice Mr. Maile has
indicated he gave to Mr. Johnson on how to determine a
fair price on the property?
A. I believe that there was correspondence, or
communication, to -- to Mr. Johnson regarding maybe
111
having -- looking at comparables or having the property
iI
appraised.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Maile saying that he should
get three comparables and some appraisals and average
them?
A. Yes. I -- that's what I alluded to in my
previous answer.
Q. Is it a concern, in your mind, ifan attorney
gives different advice on valuation, ifhe is buying the
property, than he did when a third party was looking at
buying it?
MR.
MR CHARNEY: Objection; leading. The question
should be, what are his concerns based on the evidence
reviewed?K
that he has reviewed?
THE COURT: All right. I'll sustain the
objection.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: What are your concerns, based
Page 262 i'
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Q. Did that letter raise any concems or ethical
implications?
A. Again, as I recall the letter -- and
certainly the letter will speak for itself. But as I
recall the letter, the letter informed Mr. Maile that the
property in question was worth $1 million, based upon
comparable sales to developers.
Q. And that letter has been admitted as
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. Ill.
What concern does that letter mise?
A. Well, to me, the concerns are somewhat
obvious. Looking at that letter in the context of the
things [ have already testified to, we have a situation
where Mr. Maile, on the one hand, informs Mr. Haff, with
respect to the Witte offer, that $400,000 is very low or
extremely low.
Mr. Maile appeared to have that letter from
Imogen Hetherington, I believe was her name, that tended
to substantiate the fact that that offer was very low.
But then, as I recall, within a manner of
just a few
ofjust
weeks, maybe six weeks or so, Mr. Made ended up as a
party to a purchase agreement for the same property for
23 that very price.
24
Q. In reviewing the documents provided to you,
25 do you recall what advice Mr. Maile has indicated he gave
~l',;,;;,

,co,-._.__,

"

f:
on the evidence you have reviewed?
A. My -- my concerns are that it seems highly -
-I:
the transaction, to me, appears highly suspect when the
attorney advises the client of the wisdom of obtaining
appraisals and averaging, and then the attorney, himself,
I:l:
in this case, ends up purchasing the property without
those -- those safeguards. I saw nothing that those
safeguards had been done, that the appraisals had been
given and averaged.
Q. And you mentioned before concerns that you
had, as far as the terms in the earnest money agreement.
Can you elaborate on those? That is Plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 116.
A. Excuse me. If I could take a minute and get
a drink of water.
Thank you. Could you repeat the question,
please.
Q. Yes. I was going back to something you had
mentioned earlier, about terms in the earnest money
agreement that you may have had some concerns on. Can
you elaborate on that?
A. As I recall, I recall a provision in the
23 earnest money agreement which -- I'll tJy
tty to recall each
I
24 of these -- which again, it was under, as I recall, a
I.
.1. titled Attorney
A
Fees.
.•
25 paragraph
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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12
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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And yet, within that paragraph, there was a
provision that purported to waive jury trial if there was
any ultimate litigation involving the transaction. It
purported to shorten the statute of limitations to one
year. It indicated that, I think, arbitration would have
to be sought rather than, or prior to, litigation.
And I think it also -- there was language in
that same paragraph, as I recall, that indicated that
venue for any litigation would be proper in -- in
Canyon County, I recall.
And my -- my concerns, when I read those
provisions, were several. First of all, each of those
terms appeared, to me, to be greatly disadvantageous, or
at least potentially, greatly disadvantagf:ous, to the
sellers.
I was also concerned that each of those
provisions again, as I recall, were -- were lumped into a
paragraph captioned Attorney Fees, and were positioned in
the contract such that absent extreme, and very cautious,
and careful explanation about those terrns, and pointing
those terms out to the sellers, that -- thaI: they could
be totally unaware that those provisions were in the
contract.
Q. Is there a particular Rule of Professional
Conduct that this raises concerns about?
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II

have cited, did you make a determination as to whether
!:
this transaction was fair and reasonable?
A. I did.
:1
Q. What is your opinion on that fact?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
TIIE COURT: Can you articulate that objection in a
little more detail, Mr. Charney?
MR. CHARNEY: The question as to whether or not --well, actually foundation and relevance. As far as
I··
foundation goes, this individual isn't caned as a
witness to testify as to whether or not th,e transaction
was fair or reasonable. That's ultimately, I think, for
the Court to determine.
But as far as the foundation goes, he -- his
expertise isn't in whether or not this was fair and
reasonable. We understood he was being called to testify i
that there were Rules of Professional Responsibility that
were violated by Mr. Maile, and that that somehow bears
on the question of unclean hands.
But the question of whether it's fair and
reasonable is the ultimate question for you to decide,
and not for this witness to opine on.
TIIE COURT: Any response to that argument,
r:
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. The affidavit of

i
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A. Primarily Rule 1.8. And I -- I think it's
Section A. That rule, I think, delineates specific
conflicts of interest for an attorney. And, in fact, I
contlicts
think the caption refers to them as prohibited
transactions.
If a lawyer is going to engage in -- in this
type of business arrangement with a client, that rule
clearly requires that, among other things -- and it would
be helpful if I looked at the Rule -- but among things,
that the terms and conditions ofthe deal be -- be, you
know, fair to the client on their face, that they all be
explained to the client any -- any -- the issues of the
conflict between the lawyer doing business -- the lawyer
contlict
doing business with the client in that tnillsaction be
fully explained, and that the client consent to the
transaction in writing.
I found nothing, in the materials that I
reviewed, to suggest to me that those requirements were
met.
Q. And in looking at whether a transaction with
a client meets the standards in Rule 1.8, what time frame
do you look at?
A. The transaction is to be objectively viewed,
at the time of the transaction.
and the rules you
Q. SO, based on your review ~~.the1"llles

Ii
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Mr. Grober that was submitted goes into this in great
detail as the whether the transaction was fair and
reliable. We believe it's relevant, to show the issue of
clean hands, whether Mr. Maile entered into this
transaction initially with clean hands, as well as the
conduct following the transaction.
And expert witnesses are allowed to give
opinions on the ultimate questions of fact.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, here's what I'm going to
rule on on this issue. I'm going to overrule the
objection, but I want to let you know why.
Any expert witness is called, in a trial, to
assist the finder of fact in determining a question that
is technical and so forth. It may be difficult for the
trier of fact to figure out without some expert
testimony.
And I want to point out that it's important,
in this case, to recall that this case is being tried to
the Court, without -- without the benefit of a jury.
And because the subject matter is -- the subject matter
that Mr. Grober is testifying to happened to be the
Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility,
Responsibil.ity, that require
attorneys to deal fairly with their clients, in all of
their proceedings, I think that Mr. Grober --Mr. GrOlJ",
••
thus
Grober's" expertise, that has been established
, n:,;:;m;;;m:~'8::~
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far, makes him the kind of expert witness whose opinions
can assist the trier of fact in this regard.
Now, certainly, the Court is not bound by any
opinion that the Defendant may render today.
MR. CHARNEY: The witness, you mean?
THE COURT: I'm sorry, the witness. I meant the
witness. I misspoke, sorry.
No. Obviously, the Court is not bound by the
witness' opinion. But the question is whether or not
it's relevant, within the meaning of Idaho Rules of
Evidence, and specifically Rule 702, the expert witness
rule.
Because of the nature of the issues in this
case, I do think that it's relevant. And keep this in
mind. Mr. Charney, your argument is well understood, in
that if I believed that this witness was being asked a
is-question just to determine, hey, what do you think is-
do you think this was fair or not, if it were not already
in the context of the Rule that he has talked about,
which says hey, look, there's a specific rule for
attorneys which absolutely requires thf:m
thf:rrl to deal fairly
with their clients, his -- I think his testimony, or the
question that is being asked, is properly coached in
terms of a connection to that very specific rule.
So I'm going to overrule the obj ection and
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THE COURT: Oh, good point. Good point.
MR. CHARNEY: Some of them had changed. I don't
know if the one we're talking about now had changed or
not. But I think you're looking at the cun~ent book, and
that mayor may not apply. I know that the Rule, with
respect to the disclosure being required to be in
deftnitely changed.
writing, or not, has definitely
THE COURT: Okay. That's a real good point. I
was -- I'm just being looking at the official publication
of the Idaho State Bar Association, which is the desk
book directory. And I was -- I had that in front of me,
open to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, which
were adopted in 2003.
I think that the Idaho Supreme Court adopted
the ABA Model Code of Responsibility, probably with a few
little tweaks here and there, sometime after the
transaction in question here. So it may be necessary to
take a look at that.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm sorry to intenrupt,
but both versions of the Rules are in the book, they're
in back-to-back. The old version is what we will refer
to, but they are both contained in there.
THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Well, your
comment is noted, and the record will reflect that the
Court does have, in front of the Court, you know, that
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allow him to answer the question. And you'll certainly
have an opportunity to cross-examine him.
Hang on just a second. Hang on for just
about 30 seconds. We're going to grab a book here.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we were just confmning
that there were witnesses present in the room, and we
don't have any objection to that.
THE COURT: Okay. I noticed that there are people
in the room who I thought might be called and witnesses,
and there has never been a motion in this case to exclude
witnesses. And I suppose what you're telling me,
Ms. Taylor, is that's because the parties have agreed
that they're not going to make any such motions?
MS. TAYLOR: It hadn't become an issue until now,
but we've agreed we're not making the motion.
THE COURT: Very good. Okay. ll1ank you. Give me
just one more second here.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, may I approach the
witness and give him a statute book to use as a
reference?
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, as you're looking at
that, I want to note for the record -- I want to make
sure that the Court is looking at the same rule that was
of this transaction.
in effect at the time ofthis
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particular Code of Professional Responsibility, which
1'11 allow both of
apparently contains both versions, and I'll
you folks to flesh that out for the Court; okay?
You may continue, Ms. Taylor.
MS. TAYLOR: I would ask the Court reporter to
read the question back.
THE COURT: Okay. Court reporter?

,I.

1.
;

:.

(The requested portion of the reeord was
read.)

I

THE COURT: Okay. You may answer the question.
Did you understand it?
I;
THE WITNESS: My opinion is that the transaction
was not fair and reasonable.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you just briefly
summarize the basis of that opinion?
A. Okay. Again, it goes back to the things to
which I have testified. Rejecting an offi;:r of $400,000
for the property, on the one hand, as being very low, and
turning around and buying the property, or entering into
a sales agreement, within just a matter of weeks, to
purchase the property, from your client, at that same
amount.
The provisions that I testified to, that
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appeared in the attorney fee paragraph of the fee
agreement, did not appear to be fair and reasonable for
the client, were certainly disadvantageous to the client,
or potentially disadvantageous to the client.
Q. Mr. Grober, I would like to turn your
attention to an assignment that was entered into this
case. It is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 117.
In forming your opinions in thi::;
thi:, case, did
you have an opportunity to review that assignment of the
earnest money agreement?
THE COURT: I don't think the witness has that
exhibit in front of him.
THE WITNESS: It would help -- if you're going to
refer to it, it would help if! could look at it.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm not sure what
happened to our exhibits. May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.

117
7
18
19
(Exhibit No. 117 handed to the witness.)
20
21
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The record should reflect I'm
22 handing this witness Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 117. Would
23 you like a few moments to look it over, Mr. Grober?
2244
A. Yes. Just a moment, please. Okay.
25
Q. Is this one of the documents you reviewed in
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Berkshire had no assets, from the materials I reviewed,
gave me further concern about the fairness, or the
~
reasonableness, of the transaction and potential
disadvantage to the seller.
Q. Turning your attention to the se:cond page of
that assignment, what, if any, concerns did you have
about the fact that it included a novation of the Mailes
from personal responsibility for the debt?
A. Well, that was -- that was my concern, not
only that the fact of this assignment was not disclosed
to the seller, but that the transaction was entered into
theMailesandthenwasassignedto;illLLCwhich.as
by the
Mailes and then was assigned to ;ill LLC which, as I
understand it, had no assets and raises the issue of
ability to pay for the property.
Q. Now, I will represent to you that Mr. Maile
has testified he did not discuss this assignment with
Beth Rogers. What, if any, concerns does that raise?
transaction
A. Again, in any kind of business Itransaction
with a client, the attorney maintains the fiduciary
relationship with his client, such that it requires
absolute and complete disclosure and -- and candor, with
the client, as to every aspect of the transaction.
Q. In reviewing the documents provided to you,
were you able to reach any conclusions as to whether, in
your opinion, Mr. Maile met the duty to advise the client

I
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this matter?
A. It is.
Q.
Q. What concerns, if any, did it raise?
A. My concerns were these, in order to explain
those. Throughout this transaction, Mr. Maile was
required to -- to meet his obligations, his fiduciary
obligations, to his client, who in this case was the
seller. Part of that fiduciary obligation is full and
complete disclosure of all elements of the transaction.
So, one of the concerns that I had was that
I found nothing, in the information I reviewed, to
suggest that Mr. Maile ever disclosed to the trustees
that everything would be assigned to Berkshire
Investments. He had a duty, in my opinion, to do that.
And then, secondly, my concern was, somewhere
in the materials I reviewed, I believe I learned that
Berkshire Investments had no -- no assets at this time,
which was another concern to me. I do understand,
ultimately, that the purchase price was paid. But in
viewing the conduct at the time it OCCUlTed, it's not a
no harm, no foul.
The fact that the purchase price was
ultimately paid, in my opinion, did not relieve Mr. Maile
of his obligation to disclose that he was going to make
this assignment. And secondly, the concern that
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of conflict of interest and give reasonable opportunity
to seek independent counsel?
A. Was I able to reach an opinion?
Q. Yes.
A. Is that your question? Yes.
Q. What factors did you look at in forming your
opinion?
A. I looked at two -- two or three specific
factors come to mind. As I reviewed the portions of the
record that I was provided, it seems that I recall that
Beth Rogers, who was one of the trustec~s
trustec~s of the Trust,
testified that she was present, with Mr. Johnson, during,
I think, two meetings at Mr. Maile's office.
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to
this, upon assuming facts not in evidence. They were
trying to get this in yesterday, through Mr. Maile's
cross-examination, and I objected. And I'm going to
object again.
THE COURT: Well, the question of the witness was
what facts he took into account in rende:ring an opinion,
and he is explaining what he believed to be the case. Do
you see what I mean?
MR. CHARNEY: I do.
THE COURT: So I'm going to overrule the
objection.
......
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MS. TAYLOR: If the Court has concerns, I do have
the deposition of Beth Rogers. I could open it up and
represent to him that this is what she said. It's the
same passage --
THE COURT: Well, I think the witness has just
testified that he reviewed Beth Rogers' testimony, and I
assume that means he reviewed her deposition testimony;
right?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. You can go ahead and continue.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can lffiswer.
A. Thank you. I believe that Beth Rogers
testified, in her deposition, that there w;:re two
meetings involving she, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Maile, at
Mr. Maile's office. And I believe she said the second
meeting was the meeting where the documents were signed.
And she testified that at neither of those meetings were
the terms of the sales agreement, or anything relating to
the agreement, detailed or explained by Mr. Maile.
My recollection of the deposition testimony
of Mr. Maile, at least that I reviewed, indicated that he
said something to the effect that there may be a conflict
of interest here, so you, you know, havt!
havt: the right, or
you can seek the advice of independent counsel.
That does not go nearly far enough to -- he
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paperwork for the real estate transaction, to which he
:
replied he trusted me with the drafting of the agreement.
Can you comment on whether that language
c
meets the required standard of care?
A. No, it doesn't. And that's the very reason,
~
for example, that Rule 1.8, you know, requires an
explanation of the conflict, and a reasonable opportunity :!
for the client to seek independent -- the: advice of
independent c
o u n s e L lI
counsel.
Simply saying, I've told him there may be a
conflict and he said, that's okay, I trust you, does not
meet the requirement and discharge th~: responsibility, as
a fiduciary, to fully explain.
You have to say, okay, I understand that.
But here are the things I need to disclose to you.
Q. Does the fact that the client, later, did
have an independent attorney look at the documents make
any difference on these duties?
A. It doesn't cure the problem of nondisclosure
and explanation. That was still required. And as J
recall, independent counsel was sought after the fact of
the earnest money agreement, or the sales agreement,
being signed, which was at a point where independent
counsel's advice regarding the transaction was pretty
much too late.
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was obligated to fully explain the conflicts, what those
conflicts were. If he was going to seek waiver of those
conflicts, he needed to provide a meaningful, thorough
explanation of what all the conflicts were.
And then, something tells me that the sales
agreement itself, or an addendum thereto, was -- was only
good -- the offer was good to a specific date. I
understand that to be the very date that the agreement
was signed. And I believe Mr. Maile testified that it
was during that meeting, that the signatures were
obtained, that he advised his client that there may be a
conflict and you may need to seek independent counsel.
The timing is, it doesn't -- it doesn't -- if
the offer is only good until the very day it is signed,
and on that day you give that tersery ((sic)
sic) advice, there
may be a conflict, you may want to seek independent
counsel, it's not really a reasonable time for the client
to decide whether or not they want to seek, or should
seek, independent counsel.
Q. Mr. Grober, I would like to read to you from
the affidavit of Thomas Maile, dated October 20,2004,
follm:ving language:
that was filed with this Court, the follo\)ving
When your affiant was approached by
Ted Johnson, your affiant advised Ted Johnson that if he
~1<;;~."o;; the
wanted, he could have an independent attorney prepare
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Q. Do you recall reviewing a copy of the letter
from Davis Wishney, to Andy Rogers, that has been
admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 7-A?
A. JI recall reviewing the letter, yes.
Q. Did that letter raise any concerns to you?
A. It would help if I could review the letter.
MS. TAYLOR: Let the record reflect I'm handing
7-A to Mr. Grober.
(Exhibit No. 7-A handed to the witness.)
THE COURT: 7-A?
MS. TAYLOR: 7-A, yes.
MR. CHARNEY: What is that? Oh, Defendant's
Exhibit.
THE COURT: Yes. It's the third page of that
Exhibit 7.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Would you repeat the
question, please?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Did that letter raise any
concerns, in your mind, as far as the advice that the
Johnsons had been given?
A. Well, yes, it did. And those concerns were
in part, significant part, the very concerns that
Mr. Wishney expresses in the letter. His concern about

.:
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the agreement has already been entered into, so, you
know, to a large -- to a great extent it's too late.
And then his additional concems about
substituting a more standard form deed of trust.
But yes, those were my concems.
Q. I will represent to you that Mr. Maile
received a message, a telephone message, indicating he
needed to substitute a standard deed of trust, and that
was not done.
Does that raise any issues in your mind?
A. Well, yes. And, again, it's -- it's the same
concern, as I've said, that I shared, that was apparently
Mr. Wishney's concern.
Q. In reviewing the earnest money agreement,
tru.stee on the deed
did you note who was named as the trustee
of trust that was attached as an exhibit to that?
A. I did.
Q. Who was that?
A. As I recall, it was Alliance Title.
Q. In reviewing the documents that were signed
later, did you see anything that caused you concern?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was that?
A. I reviewed -- I recall seeing and reviewing
releases and reconveyances of the property, which were

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8

l30. I would like to
tlO talk, first,
Exhibit No. 126 and 130.
about the release and reconveyance that was signed by
Mr. Shearer on January 9, 2004.
What concerns do you have relating to that?
MR. CHARNEY: Which exhibit is that?
MS. TAYLOR: That is 126.
WI1NESS: Could I view the exhibit?
THE WIlNESS:
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.

9

10
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(Exhibit No. 126 handed to the witness.)
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The record will reflect I
am now handing the witness deposition Exhibits 126 and
l30. Not deposition exhibits, I'm sorry, Plaintiff
130.
exhibits.
THE COURT: All right. 126 and 130?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT: Let me give the witness an opportunity
to review those. We'll take a lO-minute recess.
MS. TAYLOR: All right.
lO:45 a.m.)
(Recess taken 10:28 a.m. to 10:45

23
24
THE COURT: Please be seated. We are back on the
25
2 5 record. And you may continue with your questioning of
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signed by Steve Shearer as the substitute trustee -- as a
substitute trustee, who was substituted in as trustee for
Alliance.
And I believe I saw, or through the
deposition -- depositions that I review~:d, became aware
that Mr. Shearer had, in fact, been substituted in as the
trustee.
Q. What, if any, concerns does that raise?
A. My concerns were essentially these. I found
nothing, in anything that I reviewed, to suggest that the
trustees were made aware of the substimtion of the
trustee. And, again, it's my opinion that Mr. Maile's
fiduciary obligations of, you know, complete candor and
wi th his cl
disclosure in doing business with
c1 ient, would have
required him to have informed them of his intention to
substitute the trustee.
And then, I found nothing, in anything that I
reviewed, to suggest any particular reason for the
substitute trustee. And then, the documents themselves,
I found -- the releases and reconveyances I found
somewhat unusual.
Q. You reviewed those releases and
reconveyances?
A. I did.
Q. Those have been admitted as Plaintiffs
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Mr. Grober.
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, when we recessed,
you were looking at the releases and recollveyances. Have
you had an opportunity to review those?
A. I have.
Q. What, if any, concerns do they raise in your
mind?
A. A number of concerns. First -- the first
concern being that I -- in my experience, ] fmd the
virtual absolute release language unusual and somewhat
troubling, particularly when viewed in light of the
provisions in the sales agreement, the attorney fee -- in
that attorney fee paragraph that I've talked about.
Secondly, as I stated, I found nothing in my
review to suggest any reason for the -- for Mr. Shearer
having been substituted in and asked to sign these, and
that was certainly not, in anything I reviewed, disclosed
to the trustees.
And then, thirdly, I guess it is, the timing
issue of these somewhat disturbed me. And I think I need
to -- we'll need to explain that a bit.
Q. Okay. Just to back up a little bit, what is
your understanding as to whether these releases and
reconveyances, Exhibits 126 and 130, had been shown to or

I~
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discussed with Beth Rogers before the time they were
signed?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation and relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled in both cases. The witness
may answer the question, ifhe knows.
THE WIlNESS:
WI1NESS: I'm sony.
sorry. Could you repeat the
question, please?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In your wview of the
docwnents, did you come to an understanding whether
documents,
Beth Rogers was given an opportunity 10
to review these
releases and reconveyances before they were signed?
A. My recollection of the deposition, her
deposition testimony, is that she was not made aware of
these.
thesl~, was of
Q. What, about the timing of thesl~,
concern to you?
A. Okay. As I recall the timing of these, again
based upon my review, these were submitted -- and I mean
docwnents -- were
by these, the release and reconveyance documents
submitted to Mr.
~. Shearer following Beth Rogers' refusal
to sign them, and at a time that she was represented by
counsel.
And I recall nothing, in my review, that
suggests that Mr.
~. Shearer was made aware of the refusal
to sign these.
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Q. Well, I just --looking at the mutual release
that was attached to the back of that letter --A. Yes.
Q. -- can you comment on any concerns you have
about that release, as compared to the releases that
Mr.
~. Shearer signed?
A. I'm not sure, as I read this, I see any
difference. Maybe I don't understand the question.
Q. Well, I'm not sure it was a very good
question.
What about the timing of submitting this
release, and the executing of the releases by
Mr.
~. Shearer, was of concern to you?
A. I think, if we look at the dates of all this,
I believe that Mr.
~. Shearer may have already signed one of
the releases. And it may have already been recorded at
the time this letter was sent, I believe.
Q. And you're holding up No. 126; is that
correct?
A. 128, it looks like.
Q. I just want to make sure we have our exhibits
straight. Can you tell me the date of signature on the
one you're looking at?
A. The date of the one I'm looking at, well,
it's sent under cover letter dated February 16th of 2004.
Page 286
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docwnentation
Q. In your review, did you see documentation
where Mr. Maile had sent a mutual release to Mr.
~. Harwood?
A. Yeah. I recall seeing a -- what ['['11
11 call a
transmittal letter from
from~.
Mr. Maile, where the document
docwnent was
sent to Mr. Harwood, and he was asked whether or not his
client would sign.
I would need to actually see -- I did review
that letter, but I would need to see it to go any further
with it.
Q. All right.

MS. TAYLOR: May I approach, Your Honor?
12
THE COURT: All right.
13
rumding the witness
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I will be mmding
14 Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 128.
15
16
(Exhibit No. 128 handed to the witness.)
17
18
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, if it would help,
19 I believe I'm only going to focus on the two paragraphs
20 of the letter and then the release that was attached.
21
A. Okay. Okay.
22
Q. Is it correct that the release attached to
23 Exhibit 128 was scheduled -- it had been prepared for
24 Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers to sign?
25
sorry. I didn't hear.
A. I'm sony.
'm,,,,,,",,

""'"

.'."

.... ,'"

,

1
Q. Okay. And then, the other one was dated
2 January 9, 2004?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. And the -- again, the concern as to timing
5 was what?
6
A. My concern, at the time, was that Mr.
~. Maile
7 was asking for Beth Rogers, or Beth Rogers and her
8 husband, as co-trustees, to sign a release and
9 reconveyance, when it appeared to me that he already had :;'1
10
1 0 one signed by Mr. Shearer.
I;
11
Q. Did you see anything in the record to
Q.
12 indicate that Mr.
~. Maile ever disclosed to Beth Rogers';
Rogers':
13 attorney, Mr.
~. Harwood, that he had had Mr.
~. Shearer sign
14 these releases?
15
A. I saw nothing to indicate that.
16
16
Q. In your opinion, does that violate any
17
1 7 standards or ethical rules?
18
A. Well, I -- I believe that it suggests conduct
IiI:
19
1 9 which is dishonest or, perhaps, otherwise deceitful.
20
20
Q. Which Rule of Professional Conduct are you
21 citing?
22
A. 8.1 (c), I believe.
23
Q. Do you have an opinion on whether this
24
2 4 conduct would be an extreme deviation from the standard
25 of care?
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MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In looking at this
4 transaction, did you fonn opinions on whether different
5 aspects of it met the required standard of care for
6 attorneys?
7
A. Yes.
Q. As a result of your work experience, are you
8
9 familiar with the standard of care for attorneys?
l O A . In my -- I'm sorry. Would you repeat the
11 question? I'm having trouble hearing you.
Q. In your work experience, are you familiar
12
13 with the standard of care required for attorneys dealing
14 with this type of transaction within this time frame?
15
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
16
1177
MR. CHARNEY: Can I make a little argument on
18 that?
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
19
20
2a
MR. CHARNEY: The point here is, Your Honor, the
2 1 standard of care seems to be issues relating to
22 negligence, as opposed to deception.
23
THE COURT: Professional malpractice, you're
2 4 saying, as opposed to violations, or alleged violations,
25 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility?

1
2
3
4
5
6

to do with unclean hands.
THE COURT: Right. And have I adequately -- well,
negligence could have something to do with unclean hands,
in a certain context. I mean, competence is an ethical
requirement, as well. But I don't think that's where
they're going.
7
MS. TAYLOR: Actually, Your Honor, it is where
8 we're going.
,I
i
9
THE COURT: Oh.
laMS
10
MS.. TAYLOR: I am intending to dicit testimony
11 that this was an extreme deviation, which we think
12 implies-implies-
13
THE COURT: A violation?
14
MS. TAYLOR: -- brings the ethical rules into
15 play.
THE COURT: Okay. Which violates 1.1. So you're Ii
16
1 7 not saying dishonest, you're just saying c~xtremely
:,1
18
1 8 negligent now?
MS. TAYLOR: Saying both.
19
THE COURT: Right. Okay. I'll Sllstain the
220a
ection if the question is being asked to elicit
21 obj
objection
22 evidence about that issue, because I don't think there
23 has been an adequate foundation laid for this witness to
2244 testify about the standard of care required for an
2 5 attorney practicing in Boise, Idaho, at the relevant

I.

I

,
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MR. CHARNEY: Exactly.
THE COURT: I get the distinction, and I
understand that the tenor of the question has to do with
his opinion regarding whether or not Mr. Maile violated
the quote unquote standard of care required of all
attorneys at the relevant time.
And when we say standard of care, you might
want to rephrase your question or something like that.
I understand that this is not a professional
negligence case. The question is not whether or not he
breached, or did not breach, the standard of care
required of attorneys practicing this type: of law, in the
relevant community, at the relevant time.
The question is whether or not, in this
witness' opinion, Mr. Maile -- Mr. Maik's conduct
conformed with the Rules of Professional Responsibility
or not. That's where you're going, isn't it?
MS. TAYLOR: That is where I was going.
THE COURT: Okay. And that's thl~ understanding of
the Court.
Now, if you have any objection to the witness
answering the question as clarified, I'll h~ar --MR. CHARNEY: Not as clarified. I just don't want
the issues to get confused and this suddenly tum into a
negligence action, because negligence would have nothing
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time, with respect to this type of transaction.
So -- because now we've gone from getting
away from Mr. Grober's expertise on -- as being an expert
on the Rules of Professional Responsibility, and now
we're getting into asking him to render an opinion about
the professional competency of a real estate lawyer, a
II
trust lawyer, in Boise, during the relevant time.
You can lay some additional foundation, if
you like, but I'm not sure if your expert disclosure got
into that. Do you see what I mt:an?
MS. TAYLOR: Well, it did from a negligence
standpoint. I will acknowledge that that was the way we
were looking at it at that time frame.
THE COURT: Okay.
I,
Mr.Chamey?
MR. CHARNEY: I don't believe that there has been
an appropriate disclosure that this witness would come to
court and testify that he has expertise in this
particular area, real estate transactions in this time
frame, and that Mr. Maile's conduct was violative of that
practice.
I don't think that there has ever h~en a
disclosure along those lines. Mr. Grober has always been
called as a witness to testify about the Rules of
Professional Responsibility.

.;","'~,'·:·:·,,(~~~'<:i~,~<%"';"'bP
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TIIE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: These are very separate.
THE COURT: I understand. And I'm going to --
well, keep in mind, I appreciate and I understand the
fact that, to the extent that the Rules of Professional
Responsibility also require professional competence,
failure to be competent is -- can implkate the Rules
Rilles of
Professional Responsibility.
Now that having been said, I don't believe
that this witness has been qualified to testify, as an
expert, on the issue of standard of car(: in these types
of transactions. Do you see what I mean?
And Mr. Charney is also saying that he
doesn't believe that he was adequately notified that this
witness would be called upon to testifY
testify about his
expertise on these -- on, you know, larld sales
transactions during this period.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think he is right on
that count.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: I to believe he is right on that
count. I did not supplement -- I did do a supplemental
disclosure, but I did not get into that. r just sort of,
you know, got that direction as part of the questioning.
THE COURT: Okay.
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testimony, did you become aware of the fact that

Mr. Maile had asserted these releases and reconveyances
were a total bar to any action against h:im?
A I'm sorry. What was your -- what was your
question?
Q. Did you become aware of the fact that
Mr. Maile asserted that the Shearer releases and
reconveyances were a total bar to any action against him?
A I did. I think I saw that in -- in the
answers that included affirmative defenses.
Q. Does that raise any concern in your mind?
A Well, yes. And that concern is that, if, as
I believe, the obtaining of the releases from Mr. Shearer
was, you know, motivated by the intent to deceive and get
this transaction completed behind him, to that extent it
seems dishonest, to me, to assert those releases as an
affirmative defense, if they weren't appropriately
obtained.
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions,
Your Honor.
TIIE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Charney, you may cross-examine the
witness.

III
III
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MS. TAYLOR: So I won't pursue the line of
questioning about negligence.
THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, can you elaborate
5 on the statement you made previously about your belief
6 that this conduct, in your opinion, constillltes
7 misconduct or dishonesty?
8
A I think, viewing the scenario as a whole,
9 which encompasses virtually everything ][j[ have testified

Page 294
1

III

2

CROSS EXAMINAnON
EXAMINAnON
BY MR. CHARNEY::
Q. Good morning, Mr. Grober. How are you?
A I'm fine. Thank you.
Q. Can you hear me okay at this kvel?
A Yes, I can.
Q. You would agree with me that che Rules of
Professional Responsibility that were in place at the
time of this transaction did not require written
disclosure of a conflict of interest; correct?
A That's correct.
Q. That Rule has since changed?
A Yes, it has.
Q. You testified, at your deposition, that you
do not have any particular expertise in real estate law;
is that fair to say?
A I do work in real estate, but I wouldn't
consider myself a real estate expert, no.
Q. In arriving at the opinion that you have
arrived at, have you had a full and fair opportunity to
review Mr. Johnson's medical records?
A No, I have not.
Q. Did you interview family members to discuss
with them how Ted's mental faculties were at the time

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1 0 to to this point, starting with the provisions in the

10
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14
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18
19
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23
24
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12
13
14
15
1166
1177
1188
1199
2200
2211
22
23
24
25

earnest money agreement, and going forward with no
evidence that I've seen that there was the required full
and candid disclosure to anyone, the lack of evidence
that I've seen for any -- for any legitimate reason, for
example, to substitute Mr. Shearer as the trustee, the
fact that there was no -- nothing that I've,een to
indicate that this was ever disclosed, that -- that
entire scenario of events to which I've testified, leads
me to believe that it could not have all been an
unfortunate series of mistaken events.
And, therefore, leads me to the conclusion
that, in order to accomplish what Mr. Maile intended to
accomplish, these acts were more motivated by dishonesty.
Q. Does the fact -- well, let me ask you this.
In reviewing the documents and preparing for your

I~f

I!
;1

II

.
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that this transaction was entered into?
A. No, I have not.
Q. SO you don't know ifhe signed documents on
his deathbed or ifhe was perfectly aleJ1 and capable of
making decisions, do you?
A. No. You're correct.
Q. You would agree that somebody who is
perfectly alert and capable of making decisions --that the situation would be different if Mr. Maile had
approached Mr. Johnson on his deathbed, when he was in a
weary state, and obtained signatures in that manner;
correct?
A. I'm not sure I understand your question.
Q. There would be a difference in those two
situations, wouldn't there? One would demonstrate he was
taking advantage of somebody at a point in time when he
might just sign off on anything, and the: other
demonstrates that he may have thoroughly had the
opportunity to review what he signed.
A. Yes. I would agree, by your question,
there's a distinction there.
Q. And you took no steps, whatsoever, to check
on what Mr. Johnson's mental state was at the time of
this transaction, did you?
A. No. I did not.
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Do you see that?
A. Yes. Just a moment. Yes, I do.
Q. It is this provision that has caused you some
measure of consternation, with respect to whether or not
this was fair and reasonable to Mr. Johnson; is that fair
to say?
A. Yes. That's one of my concerns.
Q.
Q. There is nothing else in this contract that
you have ever said was unfair or unreasonable to
Mr. Johnson; is that fair to say?
A. I think that's correct.
Q. As we look, then, in paragraph 8 now, since
Q.
we can isolate that as your target, we St!e
st:e parties
waiving a trial by jury and agreeing to submit to the
personal jurisdiction and venue in a court in
Canyon County, Idaho; correct?
A. That's correct.
term that I just read to you was binding
Q.
Q. The tenn
on both Mr. Maile and Mrs. Maile, and Mr. Johnson;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q.
Q. SO if Mr. Maile wanted to sue for a specific
performance in this case, he would hav,e been equally
perfonnance
obligated to have a trial by the Court, instead of a
trial by jury?
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Q. You indicated, in your testimony, that some
of the clauses contained in the agreements appeared to
you to be negligent; is that fair to say?
A. Yes. I think that's fair to say.
Q. You were particularly concerned about the
attorneys fees paragraph in Plaintiffs Exhibit -- let me
just refer --MR CHARNEY: Could he be handed the Defense and
Plaintiffs exhibits?
THE COURT: I believe he has them both.
MR CHARNEY: All right.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Let's look at Defendant's
Exhibit No.1.
THE COURT: Okay. That's the smaller one. Could
you give him a hand? That's the -- yeah. That's that
packet.

11
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(Bailiff complied.)
19
20
THE WITNESS: Okay.
21
THE COURT: Those are all of the Defense exhibits,
22 Mr. Grober.
23
Q. BY MR CHARNEY: And the attorneys fees
24 paragraph that I'm referring to starts at the bottom of
25 page 2, and rolls over on to page 3.
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II

Ii

A. Assuming the provision is, you know, is
upheld, yes.
Q. Okay. There is another provision in there
Iii
that indicates that the prevailing party should reimburse
the prevailing party's -- I'm sony -- that the
nonprevailing party would pay the other party's fees,
expenses, and costs.
Is that particularly unusual?
A. No.
Q. There is another provision that says that
there is a one year limitation on the statute of
I,
correct?
limitations; c
o r r e c t ? :,:
Ye
es
s.
.!
:
A. Y
term also equally applied to Mr. a n d :
Q. That tenn
Mrs. Maile; correct?
A. That's correct.
perform on the
Q. SO if Mr. Johnson refused to perfonn
contract, within one year they would be equally out of
luck as Mr. Johnson would be out of luck ifhe didn't
file his action in one year; correct?
A. Assuming the validity of the provision, sure.
Q. And now we have the last sentence, which
obviously has some inconsistency, requiring the parties
to submit to binding arbitration in lieu of court
proceedings; correct?
,,",

«,

--:;
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A. Yes.
Q. SO we clearly have some drafting issues, with
respect to whether or not you're going to go to court or
go to arbitration; is that fair to say?
A. Sure.
Q. Let's assume that the arbitration clause here
is the binding clause. You have opined that that was
fair and unreasonable to Mr. Johnson; true?
THE COURT: Can you reinstate your question.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Is it tme that you have
rendered the opinion, in court today, that the
arbitration provision was unfair and unreasonable to
Mr. Johnson?
A. It certainly was, to the extent it was not
disclosed.
Q. Does page 4 bear Mr. Johnson's signature?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. How can you, then, testify that it was not
disclosed if the contract is, in fact, signed?
A. Because signing of a document, under these
circumstances, does not relieve Mr. Maile from the
obligation to have specifically explained all of the
terms in here. And I found no evidence, in anything I
have reviewed, to suggest that he did that.
Q. And in everything I have revifwed,

-

30111
Page 301

1
Q. In fact, the Idaho Legislature has adopted a
2 set of statutes that talk about dispute resolution;
3 correct?
A. That's correct.
4
5
Q. And the case law that has devdoped,
6 regarding dispute resolution, clearly indicates that
7 there is a preference in the judicial system for people
8 to resort to alternative dispute resolution, if that can
9 be accomplished; true?
l O A . That's correct.
11
Q. SO there is, in fact, nothing that is
12 particularly problematic about submitting this to ADR in
13 lieu of court process; correct?
A. No.
14
15
Q. In fact ADR might have been eheaper for
16 Mr. Johnson, as opposed to long, drawn out litigation?
17
A. That's correct.
Q. And that could, in fact, have been
18
19 advantageous for Mr. Johnson, ifhe was required to seek
20 some form of dispute resolution?
21
A It could have been.
22
which is following
Q. Turning to the addendum, whieh
2 3 the signature page.
24
THE COURT: Which exhibit?
25
MR. CHARNEY: fm sorry.

particularly Rule 1.8, I can fmd no support for your
assertion, in court today, that Mr. Maile had an
obligation to fully and thoroughly explain the terms of
this contract to Mr. Johnson.
-
Can you point -MS. TAYLOR: Objection.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Can you turn to Rule 1.8 and
tell us where that language is?
A No. That specific language is not in the

10 Rule.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Nor is it in any of the comments to the Rule,
is it?
A. It stems from his fiduciary duties to his
client.
Q. Nor is it in any of the comments following
Rule 1.8, is it?
A. That's correct.
ofthe
Q. This is your intetpretation of
the Rule that
is, in fact, not in the Rule and not in the comments;
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. And when we talk about an
arbitration provision, in fact, the public policy is to
encourage alternative dispute resolution, is it not?
A Yes.

,I
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1
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3
4
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7
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1
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Still in exhibit number --- I:;
2 Defendant's Exhibit I, which would be the fifth page in.
3
A. Okay. Give me just a moment.
Q. Sure, take your time.
4
So that we're sure we're looking at the same
5
6 page, does the page you're looking at have some
7 handwriting and some initials on it?
J
A I don't
-
8
don't-Q. In the middle.
9
i.
10
l O AA.
. I don't see that. Yes.
11
Q. I'll represent to you that the testimony was
12 that Mr. Johnson, after reviewing the contract, wrote in
II
1 3 this term so that his tenant, if you will, the farmer
1 4 tenant, could get another year of onion seed from this
I
15 piece ofproperty.
of property. All right?
Now, with that in mind, it certainly would
16
1 7 appear to you that Mr. Johnson was carefully looking over
1 8 this contract, in making the appropriate changes; true?
19
A. It would certainly appear that he did that
19
2 0 provision, yes.
21
Q. And it was signed offby both Mr. Maile and
22 Mr. Johnson; true?
A Yes, it was.
23
Q. You indicated that you had reviewed documents
24
25 from Franz Witte; is that fair to say?
o

,,','

. ......
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A. Reviewed a letter, as I recall.
Q. The substance of that letter was that
Mr. Witte wanted to purchase this parcel of property for
$400,000; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And, then, the history of the case was that
Mr. Johnson brought that offer to Mr. Maile; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Maile, then, didn't immediately tell
Mr. Johnson to reject the offer, did he?
A. I don't know about immediately.
Q. Well, why don't you turn to Plaintiffs
Exhibit 111.
A. I'm sorry. I might have some difficulty
finding that. But I will be --MR. CHARNEY: It should be tabbed.
THE BAILIFF: 111, Plaintiffs Ill?
MR. CHARNEY: 111, yes.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Now, 111 is the one from
Ms. Hetherington, addressed to ToMr. Maile, on
May 24, 2002; is that fair to say?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And the first line says, as discussed, I have
reviewed the tax implications of Mr. Johnson selling his
40 acres of land in Eagle versus holding it indefinitely

1

2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A Yes.
Q. And Mr. Maile advises, I have completed the
review of the real estate contract. I also discussed
your finances with your accountant, Imogen Hetherington,
1.1
last week. He says he is enclosing a copy of her letter.
Ii,'
And then he says, I deem it prudent that you contact our
I
office to discuss the possibility of providing a
counteroffer to the potential purchaser to detennine the
fair market value for the real estate.
[;1
Fair to say?
A. Yes.
Q. Would this be consistent or inconsistent with
his obligation to his client?
YourHonor-MS. TAYLOR: YourHonor-
THE WITNESS: That would be consistent.
MS. TAYLOR: -- I would like to object to
relevance and beyond the scope of direct We didn't
delve into the duties to the client in the Witte offer.
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: And he further advised
som!! due relative to
Mr. Johnson that they needed to do somt:
the buyer's potential and fiscal responsibility; correct?
A Yes.
Q. In other words, he didn't want Mr. Johnson to
get into a contract with somebody that couldn't, in the

Page 304
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10

11
12
13
13
14
14
15
16
17
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

for disposition in his estate; is that fair?'
fair?
A. Yes.
Q. SO, clearly, Mr. Maile had referred the
matter to an accountant to see if this would be a good
deal for Mr. Johnson; true?
A It would appear so.
Q. Would this be inconsistent or consistent with
his obligation to his client?
A It would be consistent with his obligation.
Q. And we get into the next sentence, which
says, before I get into those specifics, I believe the
sales offer for $400,000 is too low. And then she bases
that on another sale from another client.
Do you see that?
A Yes.
A
Q.
Q. Okay. So, then, she goes on to provide
Mr. Maile with some scenarios, regarding taxes and things
like that, to discuss with Mr. Johnson; is that fair to
say?
A. Yes.
Q. SO let's turn
tum to Exhibit 112. Have you
reviewed 112 before coming to court today?
A. Let me look at it again and makl~ sure. Yes.
Q.
Q. I'll paraphrase a little bit, but this is a
letter, from Tom, to Ted; correct?

Page 306
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1
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end, pay; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. SO this was consistent with his duties as an
attorney; correct?
A Yes.
A
IH
Q.
Q. SO let's move to Exhibit 113. 113 is the
letter sent by Mr. Maile, to Mr. Haff, who is Mr. Witte's
attorney; true.
A I'm sorry. I have skipped.
THE COURT: Is this 113? This is Exhibit 113.
THE WITNESS: I've skipped 113.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Have you had a chance to
look over 113?
A I'm doing that right now.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. All right. In that letter, Mr. Maile
represented that Mr. Johnson would be willing to sell his
real property. However, based on comparable values in
the area, we feel your offer is extremely !low;
Ilow; correct?
A That's correct.
Q.
Q. And that nearly parrots the information that
Mr. Maile had received from Mrs. Hetherington --Ms. Hetherington about a week ,md a half prior; correct?
A. That's ('(lITPpJ
correct.

Ii
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Page 307
1
Q. Now, I would like you to take a look at
2 Defendant's Exhibit 22, which will be the last, and
3 there's two page, so it would be the second page.
4
THE COURT: You know, I'm not sure if that form is
5 in that packet.
6
THE WIlNESS:
WI1NESS: The last one I see: here-
here-7
THE COURT: Here. I'm going to give you this one.
WI1NESS: -- is 16.
8
THE WIlNESS:
9
10
(Exhibit No. 22 handed to the witness.)
11
one-12
THE COURT: We need to make sure I get that one-
13 make sure I get 22 back.
14
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Actually, look at the second
15 page of Exhibit 22, please.
16
A. Okay. The print is somewhat small.
17
Q. Do you want me to read it, SinCI~ you're --18
A. Would you, please.
19
Q. I will. This is a letter dated June 7,2002,
20 which follows the June 4, 2002 letter, 113, from
21 Franz Witte to Mr. Maile.

22

Thank you for your reply to my offer on the
2 3 Theodore L. Johnson property. In response to your
24 comments on values, my research shows like properties
25 selling for 10 percent less than this offer.

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

0
1a
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25

THE COURT: All right. Let me have 22 back. 18
is the -- defense Exhibit 18 is the appraisal.
MR. CHARNEY: Correct.
THE COURT: All right.
(Exhibit No. 18 handed to the witness.)
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Grober, you had
indicated that you had reviewed Mr. Maile's deposition,
and you must know that in Mr. Maile's deposition, he
testified that sometime after the Franz Witte transaction
died on the vine, that Mr. Johnson showed up at his
office one day, unannounced, with an appraisal in mind.
Do recall that now?
A. I believe I do, yes.
Q. Now, looking at the first page of 18 -- and I
recognize that the print is small -- but where it -- no,
the cover page.
A. Yes.
Q. Where it says client, it doesn't say
Thomas Maile, does it?
A. No, it does not.
Q. It says Mr. Theodore Johnson; correct?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. The amount of the appraisal, the appraised
Page 310

Page 308

1

I also have concerns over high water tables
and City of Eagle issues that make deve] opment costs
higher. As for my fmancial strength, I believe that is
shown by the $100,000 down payment and the terms of the
loan.
6
I will extend the terms of this offer until
7 June 20th.
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. SO, by this letter, Mr. Witte was saying that
2
3
4
5

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

....

he had actually offered more than he thought the property

was worth and was not going to increase his offer;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You know, from the history ofdhis case, that
Mr. Johnson decided not to sell his propt:rty to Mr. Witte
at that price; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You also know, from the history of this case,
that Mr. Johnson, sometime after this, showed up at
Mr. Maile's office, unannounced; correct?
A. I'm not certain that I specifically recall
that.
Q. All right.
MR CHARNEY: Could he be handed Defendant's
MR.
Exhibit 18?

...

.

I:
I

1 value of the land, at page 5 of this, was $400,000;
!
correct?
3
A. I'm sorry. Page 5.
4
Q. It's the signature page.
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. All right. You were aware that J\1r. Johnson
7 showed up with the appraisal, and told Tom that he would
8 like to sell the property to him for the appraised price;
9 correct?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. You were also aware that, over the course of
12 their relationship, the years that led up to this, that
13 Mr. Maile and Mr. Johnson had talked about Mr. Johnson "
14 selling this property to Mr. Maile at some point in the
15 future; true?
16
A. I think there's deposition testimony to that
17 effect.
18
Q. And, in fact, when the Franz Witte offer came
19 along, Tom didn't try to move in and outbid Franz Witte,
20 did he?
21
A. No. I don't believe he did.
22
Q. In fact, what he tried to do was, he tried to
2 3 extract more money from Mr. Witte, to increase the money
24 that would be paid to Mr. Johnson; correct?
25
A. That's correct.
2

.,
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Q. And even though he failed at that effort,
that wasn't negligence on his part, was it?
A. No. I don't believe so.
Q. SO Mr. Johnson came and said, I'd like to
sell you this property. Will you pay appraised value?
And Mr. Maile says yes, I will. Nothing wrong with that;
correct?
A. No.
Q. There's no indication, in this record or
anything you have seen, that indicates Mr. Maile tried to
get less for the property than the -- tried to get
Mr. Johnson to sell the property for less than the
appraised value; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. He said, that looks like a fair appraisal,
and I will pay you the appraised price; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you find no problems with that; true?
A. No.
Q. And you were also aware that Mr. Maile had no
input, whatsoever, with respect to Exhibit 18? That's
the appraisal.
A. Well, I'm not sure I'm aware of that. I
mean, I have no reason to think that's not true, I guess.
Q. Now, we have the contract that you have some

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
17
18
1199
2a
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mailes' interest in the contract to Berkshire
Investments; true?
A. Yes.
Q. At the time the assignment was signed,
Ted Johnson still owned the property, didn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. SO the obligations that you say the Mailes
relieved themselves of were -- was the obligation to pay
for the property; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. If the Mailes didn't pay, Mr. Johnson would
still have the full benefit of his property, because he
hadn't yet transferred it; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. In other words, it wasn't like they paid
$400,000 for a car that they had first transferred title
to and then were waiting for payment, then an assignment
personalliabiliw; correct?
came relieving them of personalliabiliW;
A. Yeab. That's my understanding of the time
frame.
Q. In fact, Beth Rogers signed, on behalf of
Mr. Johnson, as the power of attorney; true?
A. Yes.
Q. And we also know, by a review of Exhibit 118,
if you can take a look at that, looking at the last

Page 314
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criticisms about paragraph 8. But the bottom line is,
the contract said that Mr. Johnson would sell the
property to the Mailes for $400,000; true?
A. That's true.
Q. Did the Trust receive the $400,000 that was
agreed on?
A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Q. Was the $400,000 received in a timely manner?
A. My recollection is that it was.
Q. You have criticized the use of an assignment
in this case, which is Plaintiffs Exhibit 117. So
please tum to that.
A. Yes. I'm looking at it.
Q. All right. First, the contract itsdf
provided that the term -- that it could be assigned;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was something that w~.s clearly
disclosed to Mr. Johnson, after he had an opportunity to
review the contract; correct?
A. Assuming he read the contract, yes.
Q. And you have no evidence to dispute that he
didn't read it, do you?
A. No.
Q. SO the assignment, then, transfers the

Ii
I;

sentence in the first paragraph, it says, tlle real estate
contract indicates we can assign our interest.
Consequently, we are requesting your notarized signature :
4 on the document and are asking that you return the
5 original to our office.
6
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
7
Q. SO, Mr. Maile wasn't there, with the
8
9 document, saying sign, sign, sign, was he?
10
l O AA.
. No.
Q. He sent it to them, gave them an opportunity
11
12 to look it over, and asked them to mail it back?
A. Yes.
13
Q. Nothing problematic with that, is there?
14
A. No.
15
Q. And, in fact, they did just that, didn't
16
17 they?
A. Yes. I believe so.
18
Q. Mr. Maile also testified that he advised Ted
19
2 a that he could seek the advice of an indep,;:mdent
20
indep,endent attorney
21 with respect to this transaction; correct?
A. Yes. He did say that he told him that.
22
233
Q. There is no evidence, that you're aware of,
2
2244 that proves anything to the contrary, is there?
A. No.
25
1
2
3

Ii
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Page 317

Page 315

Q. SO it's clear that Mr. Johnson simply chose
not to seek independent counsel prior to signing the
contract, and prior to Ms. Rogers signing the assignment;
correct?
A. I'm sorry. I misspoke, I believe, on the
last question.
Q. Please correct your answer. ][ don't want
anything to be confused.
A. It's my understanding, from reading portions
of the deposition, at least of Beth Rogers, that she
indicates that nothing was explained.
Q. That's what Ms. Rogers said?
A. Yes.
Q. True. And, once again, if we go back to the
Rule, we know that there is no support for your
contention that there is an explanation required;
correct?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. The Rule does not support your contention
that an explanation of the document is required; correct?
A. In the black-and-white language of the Rule,
correct.
Q. The black-and-white languag(: of the Rule says
that they should be advised of the opportunity to consult
with an independent attorney; correct?

1 property that appraised at $400,000, are you?
A. No.
2
3
Q. You next cast aspersion at the substitution
4 of Mr. Shearer as a trustee in this case?
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. You do recognize that under Idaho law, and I
7 can't think of the statute off of the top of my head, but
8 there are a few limited people, or entities, that can be
9 trustees; correct?
l O A . Yes, I do.
11
Q. In other words, the marshal, here, couldn't
12 be a trustee, but you and I could because we're lawyers;
13 right?
14
A. That's correct.
15
Q. A bank could be a trustee and a title company
1 6 can be a trustee?
17
A. That's correct.
18
Q. But nevertheless, across the board, the
19 statute requires the same obligations of any person who
2 0 is a trustee, whether they be a bank or a lawyer or a
21 title company; correct?
22
A. That's correct.
23
Q. SO the substitution of Mr. Shearer as a
24 trustee, versus Alliance Title, didn't change the
25 trustee's statutory obligations pursuant to Idaho law,

Page 318 '

Page 316
1
2
3
4
5

A. That's correct.
Q. And there is no indication here that those
people did or did not do just that?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. Let me back -- let me ask that a different
way.
A. Okay.
Q. The indication, here, is that these people,
knowing that, elected to go ahead and sign the documents

.6
7
8
9
10 without f'ITst
rITst consulting a lawyer?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. Later on, they went and saw Mr. Wishney, but
13 prior to that, they had not?
A. That's correct.
14
15
Q. Mr. Maile didn't have to put a collar on them
1 6 and drag them to a lawyer's office, did he?
A. No. He did not.
17

18
Q. And, additionally, Beth Rogers could have
1 9 refused to sign the assignment, couldn't she have?
20
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; calls for speculation.
21
MR. CHARNEY: I don't think that does.
22
THE COURT: Overruled.
23
THE WITNESS: Yes. She could have.
CHARNEY : You are not alleging that
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY:
24
25 it was unreasonable for Mr. Maile topav
to pav $400,000 for

I"

1
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24
25
25

did it?
A. No.
Q. Looking at, then, Exhibits 126 and 130.
THE COURT: And will you hand me back the
appraisal? That's number 22, isn't it? Ob, it's 18.
I just want to make sure the Court's copies are all in
order.
THE WITNESS: What exhibit were you looking for?
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: 126, to stlrt with. Do you
have 126 there?
A. I do.
Q. You're aware that the difference between 126
and 130 is that 126 contained Thomas and Colleen Maile's
name, and 130 had the name Berkshire Investments, because
there was an oversight; correct?
A. I'm aware of that difference.
Q. Other than that difference, there is no
difference between the two documents?
A. There does not appear to be, no.
Q. All right. Now, the release and n:conveyance
does not operate as a release between the Trust and
Mr. and Mrs. Maile or Berkshire lnvestments, does it?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. The release and reconveyance is not a
document that, in any way, operates as a rdease between
. ........
.
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the Trust and the MaiIes; does it?
In fact, Mr. Grober, the release and
reconveyance is the trustee obtaining a release from both
parties, because the trustee is holding money and
property during certain periods, and that's the point of
having a trustee; correct?
A. Right.
Q. SO when the trustee was paid, and then
simultaneously transferred title to the property, the
trustee wants, basically, to bailout of the transaction
and not be held liable any longer; correct?
A. That's true.
Q. He doesn't want to be sued to either convey
title or to be required to pay over money to the party
transferring title; right?
A. That's correct?
Q. SO the releases that are set f0l1h in 126 and
130 are simply an indication, by the trustee, that he is
out of the deal and the property is transferred; fair to
say?
A. Yes.
Q. That is entirely different than the mutual
release that is appended to Plaintiffs Exhibit 128,
isn't it?
A. Let me look at that again, please. Yes, it

Q. And rather than approach the Rogerses
1
2 directly, he approached Mr. Harwood, the Rogerses'
3 attorney; correct?
4
A. He did.
5
Q. And, additionally, he explained in the letter
6 why he wanted the release signed, didn't he?
7
A. That's correct.
8S
Q. The trustees, through their counsel, did not
9 sign the mutual release, did they?
10
l O AA.
. They did not.
11
Q. There was nothing unethical, at all, about
12 Mr. Maile attempting to be released from a lawsuit, was
13 there?
14
A. No.
15
Q. Particularly one that alleged that he paid
16 less than fair market value for the property, when, in
17
1 7 fact, you have opined that he did exactly that; correct?
A. Yes.
18
19
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
20
THE COURT: You may redirect, Ms. Taylor.
21
EXAMJNATION
22
REDIRECT EXAM:INATION
23 BY MS. TAYLOR::
24
Q. Mr. Grober, is the ethical requirement to
25 disclose conflicts of interest and advice to get
Page 322
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IS.

Q. The release that Mr. Maile was seeking to
have signed, by way of Exhibit 128, was, there's this
lawsuit, and he didn't want to be involved in a lawsuit;
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. SO he prepares a release and sends it to
Bart Harwood; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. You know that Bart Harwood is a lawyer;
correct?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. He didn't go straight to Beth Rogers and
Andy Rogers and ask them to sign the release, did he?
A. I'm not sure I understand the question in --in the chronology of events.
Q. I'm not asking about chronology of events.
Mr. Maile wanted to be released from liability with
respect to this transaction?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. There's nothing unreasonable about somebody
wanting to be released from liability, is there?
A. No.
Q. It happens all the time; correct?
A. Absolutely.

I;
Ii

independent counsel limited to people who don't know what
they're doing?
3
A. No.
4
Q. Does the fact that Ted Johnson mayor may not
5 have had his mental faculties about him change your
6 opinions?
7
A. Changed them?
8
Q. Changed the opinions you have stated, as far
9 as Mr. Maile's duties?
hi.s faculties,
l O A . If he mayor may not have had his
11 yes, that's a concern.
12
Q. Do you recall reading deposition testimony
13 wherein Beth Rogers disclosed that Mr. Johnson had lung
14 cancer, and was being treated with radiation, at the time
15 of this transaction?
16
A. Yes. I recall that.
17
Q. Does the fact that the provisions and
18 agreement are binding on both parties change the inquiry
19 into whether they're fair and reasonable?
20
A. No. I don't believe it does.
21
Q. Can you explain the distinction between a
22 fiduciary duty and ethical duties?
23
A. Yes. Some-Some-
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; scope.
24
25
THE COURT: Beyond the scope? Well, I'll overrule
1

2
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the objection. I'll
I'l1 go ahead and let you make your
point.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Could you repeat the
question?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I asked you to explain the
distinction between fiduciary duties and ethical duties.
A. Yes. And there is a differenc'~. All -- all
fiduciary duties are not delineated, enumerated, spelled
out or expressed in the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct. And, in fact, lawyers can violate a specific
Rule of Professional Conduct, and mayor may not have -how do I want to explain that?
Simply saying, I -- I abided by the
black-and-white letter of all the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct does not mean that the attorney has
met all their fiduciary duties.
Q. And, in your opinion, did Mr. Maile meet his
fiduciary duties?
A. No. He did not.
Q. Which of those categories would the duty to
fully explain the provisions of a contract, to which he
is a party, fall under?
A. Clearly, he has a fiduciary duty of absolute
disclm.ure of
candor, forthrightness, absolute disc1m.ure
everything. And it's an affinnative
affirmative -- it's an

Page
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MS. TAYLOR: No. I would represent that that is
.~~
",
the Rule he cited in his affidavit, that has been filed
with the Court.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Counsel talked to you about
the fact that Mr. Johnson agreed to enter into this
transaction.
A. Vb-huh.
Q. I would like to turn your attention to the
letter that Mr. Maile wrote to me, dated July 10th of
ii
2003, and that is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l25.
A. 125?
Q. If it's okay, I'll just read a portion of
that letter to you.
A. That would be fme with me.
Q. The quote I'm interested in is, Mr. Johnson
honored his verbal commitment to me, made years ago, that J
ifhe ever decided to sale his land, he would afford me
first option to purchase the same.
Does that raise any concerns to you?
A. I'm sorry. What was your question?
Q. Does that statement, as regarding Mr. Johnson
ftrst option to
honoring a verbal commitment to give a fIrst
Mr. Maile, raise any concerns to you, as far as ethical
standards?
A. Yes, it does.

il
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affirmative duty.
affinnative
Q. Is it enough to just meet the ethical rules?
A. Oftentimes, it's not. The ethical rules and
fiduciary duties are, in fact, often two different
things.
Q. Did Mr. Maile have an obligation to meet
~M
both?
A. Yes, clearly.
Q. Looking at the letter that Mr. Maile wrote to
Eric Haff, saying that the $400,000 pur,;hase price was
extremely low, does that raise any ethical rules, in your
mind?
A. Does Eric Haft's letter?
v,Tote to
Q. No. The letter that Mr. Maile "'Tote
Eric Haff, is there any duty to third parties?
A. There -- yes. If that were Mr. Maile's
opinion, he clearly needed to -- to make certain that
Mr. Johnson and the trustees were awarl~ of that opinion.
Q. Okay. Is there a duty of honesty to third
parties?
A. Well, there's a duty not to affirmatively
misrepresent anything to third parties. That's clear.
Q. Which Rule is that under?
A. Might be 4.1, I'm guessing.
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Q. What would those be?
A. I think, at that juncture, Mr. Ma.ile was --was under an obligation to explain to Mr. Johnson, and to !i
the trustees, that a promise to sell -- a verbal promise
promise!
to sell that land wasn't binding. And, thl~refore,
thl~refore, you
you!
know, he was not legally obligated to go ahead with the
deal on those terms.
tenns.
Q. Did you see anything in the record to
[i
indicate that he ever advised tht~m of tha.t?
A. No.
MS. TAYLOR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.
You may redirect.
MR..
MR. CHARNEY: Very brief.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR..
MR. CHARNEY:
Q. What indication is there, in the documents
you reviewed, that Tom knew Mr. Johnson was suffering
from cancer?
A. I don't recall, specifically.
Q. In fact, the documents that you reviewed
indicated that Mr. Johnson was pretty vital
vilal and healthy,
almost right up to the point of his death; correct?

...

.. <
THE COURT: Is that i~~ortant?",,~
important?,= "LlktMWL"'U,"0,'u"""
.••
www ...... w.~.:
* ..<.. w~; ... E
. --Iho~~.~gtdon.t
2Z~5,,"~T~,E<?UR~:,~~that
2':"L"'b~:}"'-I hO~~,~~l~don't n~.~all,
r~~all, spe.~i~lcall~:h
spe,~i~'icall~" . ., ".
* . ••
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that issue in the documents.
Q. And Beth Rogers even testifil~d that he was a
private person and kept those types of things to himself,
didn't she?
A. Yeah. I do recall that.
Q. Okay. You then talked about a fiduciary duty
to the client. So let's cover this, just in brief.
When the Witte offer came in, the view of the
documents in question reveals that Mr. Maile tried to get
Mr. Witte to pay more than the $400,000; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. This would be consistent with his fiduciary
duty; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And, at that point in time, we did not have
the benefit of the appraisal that was Exhibit 18, did we?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. SO it was also consistent, with Mr. Maile's
fiduciary duty, to pay Mr. Johnson the appraised value
for the property, wasn't it?
A. I have to assume something to answer that yes
or no.
Q. Assume away.
A. I have to assume the -- the, you know, the
validity of the appraisal, that the appraisal was done at
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the highest value, and use value, and those sorts of
things. I don't know.
Q. You have no indication to suppose that -- or
to come to the conclusion that the appraisal was not a
good appraisal, to you?
A. I have never seen the appraisal until today.
Q. You're also aware that banks, when loaning on
property, usually only will require one appraisal;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You next pointed out -- well, so let's
back up then. If, in fact, the appraisal is good, and
there's no evidence to the contrary, then he was -- he
met his fiduciary duty to his client to pay the appraised
value, didn't he?
A. That part of his duty, yes.
Q. He didn't have to pay him more to meet that
duty, did he?
A. No.
Q. Would you argue that, ifhe had tried to
negotiate something less with Ted, he would violate that
duty?
A. Yeah.
I'1l
Q. SO, in other words, ifhe said, 400 -- I'll
pay you 390, but I won't pay you 400, that would violate

c, c U'_Cc',

",

" " '"

I!

his fiduciary duty?
A. I believe so.
Q. The letter that was sent to Eric Haff was
copied to the clients, wasn't it?
A. To Mr. Haffs client?
Q. No. The letter that Mr. Maile sent to
Mr. Haff, had a CC on the bottom that said --A. Yes, it did.
Q. SO his client was fully advised of what he
was doing; correct?
A. Assuming he got the letter.
Q. You saw no evidence in this record to
indicate that Mr. Johnson said wow, wait a sec. That's
not what I want you to do; correct?
A. No.
Q. Even though the letter that Ms. Taylor
directed you to indicated that there was a verbal
i:1
commitment, from Mr. Johnson, to give Mr. Maile the first I ~"
option to purchase the property, it's clear, from the
evidence in this case, that Mr. Maile did not try to
enforce that, did he?
A. He purchased the property for that amount.
I'm not sure what you mean by didn't try to enforce it.
Q. The Franz Witte offer came in before the
appraisal; correct?
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A. Yes.
Q. There is no indication, in the record, that
Mr. Maile said, wait Ted, you told me you would sell me
this property. So I want to purchase the property, and
you shouldn't sell it to Franz Witte?
I,
A. No. I don't recall reading anything like
that.
Q. SO, in fact, the evidence would tend to
support the claim that he did not try to enforce the
verbal discussion that they had had; correct?
A. I assume so.
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
THE COURT: All right. May the vritness be
excused?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grober.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.
(The witness left the stand at 11 :54 a.m.)

21

22

THE COURT: Are you ready to call your next

23 witness? We can take a five-minute break, if you like.
24

25

MS. TAYLOR: A break would be great.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take five, and then you
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can call your next witness. Are we still on track to end
by 2:00, do you think?
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Pardon?
THE COURT: Do you think we're still on track to
finish by 2:00?
MS. TAYLOR: I believe so, yes.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Charney, do you have a
rebuttal witness?
MR. CHARNEY: Currently, yes. We'll discuss it.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: Thanks.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
(Recess taken 11 :54 a.m. to. 12,:02 p.m.)
15
16
THE COURT: Please be seated.
17
Ms. Taylor, are you ready to call your next
18 witness?
19
MS. TAYLOR: We are, Your Honor. We call
20 John Wood.
21

22
JOHN WOOD,
23 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
2 4 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
2 S as follows:
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Q. What stage of development is this land in?
A. All of them are in fmal plat. Some of them
have been sold over the last year, which was
Covenant Hill, off of Eagle. It was ajoint effort with
Hillview Development.
Q. How does the property Park Hampton already
owns compare geographically to the Linder Road property?
A. It's all within the -- as the City would call
it, is the mile -- the expansion mile property.
We have -- currently we have the property -16 acres of commercial, right across from the new Eagle
Island State Park, that we've been working with the Parks
oflda1lO, with 1he
Department and the State ofldallO,
the Governor's
office, for the new entrance for Eagle Island State Park.
lbis
lhi~re's about
This land continues, goes up. lhi!re's
350 homes behind Eagle High School that is -- some has
already been through preliminary plat, some is through
fmal plat.
And it's probably about less than a half mile
away, this property.
LLC made an offer to
Q. Mr. Wood, has your LiC
purchase the Linder Road property from the Johnson Trust?
A. We've -- we've asked to -- to put in an
offer. But we have not put in an offer, be:::ause of the
litigation, and where it stands with the lis pendens and

4

S
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR::
Q. Would you please state your name.
A. John Wood.
Q. Would you spell your last narnl~.
A. W-O-O-D.
resid(!?
Q. Mr. Wood, where do you residl:?
A. At 3390 Flint Drive, Eagle, Idaho.
Q. And how are you employed?
A. I work for a corporation called .Park
,Park Hampton
LLe.
Q. What position do you hold with Park Hampton?
A. Land acquisition and developm~nt services, in
bringing the projects through the cities.
Q. And What,
what, specifically, are your duties at
Park Hampton LLC?
A. Coordinating with the engineers, the surveys,
the applications to the City, and also pre:,enting to the
City, and getting the properties ready for development,
to be sold to the open market.
Q. And does Park Hampton own ar..y
ar.,y properties in
the Eagle area?
A. It owns approximately -- about E.E, hundred
and -- just shy of 100 acres.

I'
Ii,.
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the timing of the market of this property.
Q. Okay. Had you previously submitted an offer,
through Doug Crandall's office?
A. Yes, we have.
Q. What was the amount offered?
A. 1.8 million.
Q. And that offer did not disclose Park Hampton
as the purchaser, did it?
A. Normally, none of the properties that we buy
will ever disclose Park Hampton from its initial buying.
Q. Why is that?
A. Because of the price of the land. When we
bought it -- Flynn Estates, we had to buy ten 5-acre
parcels in order to own the CC and Rs. There was 14
pieces of property. And as people know who is buying it,
or actively looking at that, a lot of times the price
will change. Whether it's a Wal-Mart coming to town --you'll never know it is a Wal-Mart until the property has
already been bought.
Q. SO it's not unusual to make the offer through
somebody else?
A. Alot of times. It's always
I)':
al ways done through
attorneys, as a client, attorney-client privilege to -'
to be able to make the offer.
"J,
Q. If you acquire this property, what would your
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plan be to do with it?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Well, no. I think it is relevant,
tmder
under this -- tmder
under the context. Go ahead. I'll
overrule the objection.
Q.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can go ahead and answer.
A. The plans with this property would be to -fIrst, to go ahead and get it resurveyed, get the -- fInd
out the water rights and the land use. Right now, in the
county, this property is dedicated
City of Eagle and the COtmty,
to fIve acres and above. It's on what they call -- north
of Beacon Light and East of Linder, which will all be
staying 5-acre parcels.
Then, what we would do is, we would go in and
redesign the property. We would -- righ
rig1:t now, the
current plat is long, pinwheel, narrow lots.
Q. Okay. And there's a copy of that in the
notebook up there by you, if you would turn to Exhibit
No. 122.
(Witness complied.)

22
23
Q.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you explain to the Court
2244 what you mean by your reference to pinwheel lots.
A. If you look the way the lots are designed in
2255
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likely will not use any of those improvements, as -- so
that we can know how to maximize our dollars and be able
to improve the best value for the land.
Q. SO does the offer, as it sits, include
additional value because of the improvements?
;1
A. No. It does not.
Q. Is this offer any more than you would pay if
it were just raw land?
A. No. It would not.
turn to the
Q. I would like to have you tum
photographs that are at Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 133.
fotmdation, have you b~:en to this
To lay a foundation,
property recently?
A. Yes, I have.
thOS(! photos and
Q. Can you just look through thOS(l
Ii
tell me if they're a true and accurate depi.ction of the .condition of the property?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. SpecifIcally, does the barn that's on the
Q.
property now add any value to it, for your purposes?
A. No. The preliminary look of the barn,
there's no value to it, nor would it be the type of
subdivision that would allow that type of barn there.
Q. What is the problem with the bam, as you see
___ -'
it?

,I

--
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A. The way it sits on the property imd, also,
the front, they're very narrow in the front and very wide
1
lots in the rear. And for long-term marketability, and
2 it's -- as we all can tell, it's been opened and
for the properties to hold their resale value with the
3 weathered. And it's just in the vvTong placement of the
4 property.
market, 5-acre pieces normally are a -- have to be a
I
square, long entrance.
5
bam at all?
Q. SO is there any value to the barn
When people drive up the driveway, they like
6
A. No, there's not.
Q. Will you have to pay to have it removed?
the feel -- of the marketing side is, they like to feel
7
that they have a large piece ofland, and a -- where
8
Esta1:es, on the
A. Almost all -- like on Flynn Estares,
their home sits as a focal point of the land, and not a
9 parcels down there, that we wili put a sign out front and
narrow driveway with fences bordering each side.
lOaa lot oftimes we can get people to get the stuff moved
10
Q. Is that the reason why you would have the
11 off. They'll come in and move the stuff off for
land replatted?
1122 materials.
A. I would immediately have it replatted, and I
1133
Q. And would you have any objection to Mr. Maile
would make a more of a grand entrance on the front. And 1 4 removing this barn?
redesign the road, and put a loop road in there, and -15
A. No objection.
except a straight road back, formarketahility
16
for marketability and for
16
Q. Okay. I would like to go back to the road.
long-term value, to hold its value.
1 7 Is it Park Hamilton's intention to leave the road where
Q. SO, in making a determination to offer
18 it is located?
$1.8 million for this property, did you take into
1199
A. No. We were -- had a tentative with
I
consideration the improvements that have been placed on 20 Toothman-Orton, have done an initial sketch. It would
it up to this point?
21 be a loop road.
A. Basically, the improvements that are on the
22
Q. This may be obvious, but if you're
property right now -- anytime that we buy a piece of
2233 replatting, will the existing lateral lines for power and
property, or if we buy something that has already been
24 gas, telephone, things like that, be left in place?
25
A. They will be -- try to be, on the new plat.
preplatted, we take an accountability that we more than
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We'll try to keep them, if we can. But more than likely,
with new lot lines drawn and new roads, that they will
have to be moved, maybe 30 feet one way or 30 feet the
other way.
Q. Is -- is your pending offer, wi]
will1it
it remain
open indeftnitely?
A It wil1.
will. The only thing that I am worried --A.
and I believe that most people in this Valley, in
Park Hampton, or Capital Development, or anybody, is
that, especially in Eagle, like Correnta Bello and
Covenant Hill, that the buyers are backing out faster
than -- you know, the lots were reserved -- a lot of the
lots in the new subdivisions that are on line were
reserved nine months, a year ago.
Now that these projects are ftnished,
Covenant Hill's only had ftve close and Brentabello,
I believe had about 20 more builders walk away last week.
So, the market is changing fast. It wasn't like it was
nine months or a year ago, when you had a piece of
property and somebody would come in and buy it.
Q. Is there any possibility that this offer will
Q.
be withdrawn if the litigation isn't concluded so you can
buy it?
A. It depends on the length of the litigation
and the -- the climate of the market.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
17
18
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

correct?

A Correct.
A.
Q. That is consistent with the zoning
requirements in this particular area; cOlTect?
A That's -- yes.
A.
Q. To tum these 40 acres -- it's a little less
than 40 acres, but let's call it 40 -- to tum these
40 acres into almost track housing, if you will, would be
next to impossible under current zoning laws?
A.
A It's -- it's totally impossible, yeah.
Q. SO the best use that you could make of this
parcel, in that area currently, would be 5-acre lots?
A That -- at this point in time, that's the
A.
only thing that is -- and the City of Eagle has been
through two comp plan changes, and it's still there.
Q.
Q. What steps have you taken to check into the
septic requirements that are in this particular area?
A.
A The septic, I have not checked into.
Q. You have no idea about the septic?
A I do know that it's 1.8 acres and above, in
A.
the City of Eagle.
Q. For a requirement; correct?
A.
A For a requirement.
Q. You also know that there is not sewer that
has been brought out to this patticular property yet?
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MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, you may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHARNEY:
. Q. Good afternoon, sir. How are you?
A. Good afternoon.
Q. How long have you worked for Park Hampton?
A. For two years.
Q. Where were you prior to that?
A. My family owned -- we still do -- we own
17 body shops in California.
Q. SO you have only moved to Idaho in the past
two years?
A. Three years.
Q. Three years. I'm sorry.
When this property was sold to Mr. Maile,
then, you didn't even live in this area, did you?
A. 2003 is when we ftrst moved up, yes.
Q. Since you have moved here, you have become
somewhat familiar with the value of property in this
particular area; correct?
A. 90 percent of this area; correct.
Q. The property, as it exits now, is split into
lots that are slightly larger than ftve acres each;
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A. I'm very aware of that.
Q. You don't know anything about the water table
problems that currently exist on this 40 acres, do you?
A. The water table that I do have,][ have
IiI,
actually -- the water table on State Street, which is
down the road from this .-I'I.:
Q. I'm talking about this particular area.
A. Right. This particular area, no.
ofth<! fact that
Q. Okay. You weren't aware ofth<:
Mr. Maile actually designed this pinwheel pattern because
of the septic requirements and the water table in this
area; correct?
A. I -- from my knowledg<!,
knowledg<~, I don't believe that
there is a water table problem up there.
Q. But you don't know this, do you?
A. No. But a friend of mine owns the property
across the street.
Q. SO, you are speculating, now, on what some
friend of yours told you about the property; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. So, your knowledge --.
professional.
A. And he's a professiona1.
Q. SO, your knowledge, sir, is you don't know
anything about the septic requirements or the water table
issues on this particular parcel of property, do you?

"::i..,;;.D• • ::~",,::;';:!"%l;Y,,#~;»k;i:m;-~;;c·.'::::c·.:;.~;Si:imd"-,,,,-:-.,,-.,·.:::""·i:.~::.,,,".',:::·,:,_.. :
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1
2
3

A. No. I do not.
Q. You don't know that Mr. Maile chose the
pinwheel design to accommodate the high water table and
4 the septic requirements for this area; correct?
5
A. No. I do not.
6
Q. You also don't have any guar:mtee, from the
7 City, that you, in fact, would be succe:;sful in
8 replatting this property to fit the 5-acn: lots that you
9 envision would be more saleable?
l O A . That's false. I've spoken to the City many
11 times on this property.
12
Q. And they've guaranteed you you could replat
13 it that way?
14
14
A. Correct.
15
Q. Okay. And you've got documentation to back
16 that up?
17
A. No. But I -- I'm at the City on a biweekly
18 basis.
19
19
Q. Okay. Once you replatted this, what would be
2 0 the value of the lots?
21
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance, beyond the
2 2 scope of direct.
23
MR. CHARNEY: He's talking about he wants to come
2 4 in and rip this whole thing apart and start from scratch.
25 So, I would like to know why this individual would choose

I)
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Q. But, nevertheless, you're saying current
value of these lots is 250 to 275,000. And if you were
successful in replatting, you could sell them for 350 to
450?
A. Correct.
Q. SO, roughly about 100,000 more per lot, give
or take?
A. Well, the main thing here is -- I think what
you're missing is, it's the resale value. You can buy
something, but it's to have the people that can build the
estate home on the property, so they could get the proper
value down the road.
Q. You've made no application, though, to the
City, to actually have this replatted; correct?
A. No.
Q. And you don't know where, if you were to
replat this into these lots that you envision, the septic
would have to be required on each lot; correct?
A. The septic will be required on each lot.
Q. Right. But you don't where, on each lot, the
septic would wind up having to go; correct?
A. Well, I've -- I've spent -- I don't want to
get exact, but huge amounts of dollars with
finn here in
Toothman-Orton, which is an engineering firm
town, and all the way up to Floating Feather.
Page 346
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to do that as opposed to selling it in its:;urrent
condition.
3
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.
WI1NESS: The -- the target market would be
4
THE WIlNESS:
5 about 350 to 450, depending on -- on the lot. The
6 problem, now, anytime that you do a subdivision, say down
7 Beacon Light, now Osprey or any of the others, is your
8 resale.
9
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
l O A . Right now, the resale value, tht: way these
11 are designed, would be very, very tough sales at the
1 2 current design of it.
13
Q. But you don't know whether or not somebody
1 4 would or would not purchase these lots currently, do you?
15
A. Right now it would be a very tough sale.
16
Q. You're saying that once you have replatted
1 7 it, that the lots would be worth anywhere from $350- to
18 $450,000?
19
A. Correct.
20
Q. What's the current value of the lots?
21
A. At the current value, we're probably looking
22 about -- probably the 250, 275. But that is also with
23 improvements which, if you look how long the certain
2 4 properties are, the fencing and the buffeIing
25 requirements would eat a ton of that to start out.
1

2
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And just with doing Covenant Hill, next to
the middle school up there, we have had no seepage or
water issues, anything, from about the high school up
north.
Q. Okay. So your view is, you could replat this
into squares, as opposed to a pinwheel, and you could get
a septic permit for each lot?
A. Unless there was something out there that we
did not know.
Q. We'll talk about that later.
MR. CHARNEY: Thank you. No further questions.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Now, hang on a second sir.
Do you have any redirect examination?
MS. TAYLOR: I don't.
THE COURT: May the witness be excused?
MS. TAYLOR: He may.
THE COURT: All right, sir. You are excused.
Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: And you can just leave those right
there. Thanks.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.

I
I

24

25

(The witness left the stand at 12:21 p.m.)
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THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, you may call your
next witness.
MS. TAYLOR: Call Terry Rudd.
TERRY RUDD,
ROOD,
called as a witness by and on behalf a f the Plaintiff,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR:
Q. Would you state your name, please.
A. Terry Rudd, R-U-D-D.
Q. Mr. Rudd, how are you employed?
A. A real estate appraiser.
Q. Can you give the Court the background on your
real estate appraisal experience.
A. Well, I started in 1957 for the Forest
Service. And, in 1963, I went into business with
Mr. Torn Clifton, here in Boise. We bad an office here
on State Street and one in Lewiston. And we started
appraising timberlands, highways, right of ways, power
lines.
And, eventually, he retired and I took on

1
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Q. Mr. Rudd, are you familiar with the property
located on Linder Road that is currently owned by the
Johnson Trust?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you first become familiar with that
property?
A. Someone from your finn, either yourself or
Torn, asked me to appraise the property, which involved a ,;
trip to Boise. I went out and inspected the property,
property,'.•~
with Dallan Taylor. And I contacted realtors, went to
the MLS and looked at comparable sales, and then carne up
with a value determination.
Q. And are -- is the contact with rc::altors and
looking at comparable sales in the MLS the type of
information that appraisers normally rely on in forming
their opinions?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you prepare an appraisal report as a
result of your review of the property?
A. I completed the appraisal. And then I
verbally relayed the information to your firm. And then
it was requested that I produce a minimal report, which
is a restricted use report.
Q. Okay. Do you have that report with you
today?
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another partner and worked, in the '70s, on lands
throughout the Idaho, Washington, Idaho, Montana area.
Obtained an MAl designation. Kept appraising counties
all across the United States; Tennessee, Nashville,
Mobile, Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho.
. Then sold that business, in 1988, and went
into appraising, with myself and my son, which I've been
doing ever since out of my home in Clarkston.
Q. And during the course of that, ha ve you had
continuing education?
A. Oh, I've taken 15 to 20 classes. They
require -- well, the initial education for the MAl
designation was about 200 hours of classroom education,
plus demonstration reports and exams. And then, since
then, I have been obtaining about 16 to 20 hours per
year, as required by all three states, for education.
Q. And what states are you certified in,
presently?
A. Idaho, Washington, and Oregon.
Q. Have you also taught continuing education
classes?
A. Well, I've taught three different courses;
one at the University ofIdaho, another for Lewis Clark
State College. And the other was a private course that I
gave on bell curve appraising.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
25

A. Yes.
THE COURT: Will he be needing l:he Plaintiffs
exhibits that are in the notebook?
MS. TAYLOR: Maybe a couple of them. I'll
probably have him look at the plat and the photos.
THE COURT: Okay. As long as they're kept all
together, they're fme.
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to work out ofthe
exhibit book or out of my file?
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: No. I was just asking if you
have the report with you.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Was this report prepared in the course
of your ordinary business dealings?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it prepared near to the time that you
actually did the work?
A. Yes.
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would move for
exhibit -- for admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 135.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor; foundation. The
report is actually quite vague, because it doesn't even
say anything about the value as to what date, nor have
they tied it to any relevance issue in the case at this

i
i
i
,
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1 point
point.
2
TIIE COURT: All right
right. I'll sustain the
3 objection, at this time, and give you leave to lay
4 additional foundation.
5
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
6
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, what was the
7 effective date of your appraisal?
8
A. January 10, 2002.
9
Q. And why was that date selecti~d?
selecti~d?
10
l O AA.
. I'm sorry?
11
Q. Do you -- are you aware of why that date was
12 selected?
13
A. Only in general terms.
13
14
Q. And what was your understanding?
14
15
A. That it was a date mutually agreed on between
1 6 the parties involved in this case.
17
Q. SO is this your appraisal of the value of the
18 Linder Road property as of July of 2002?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Okay.
21
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I believe the relevance
22 is clear. We're-We're-
23
THE COURT: Okay. Now, this is July 10,2002; is
2 4 that what you said?
25
MS. TAYLOR: Correct
Correct.
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this opinion existed, which I don't think it even did at
the time, and that he, in violation or knowing violation
of what this report says, engaged in conduct to the
contrary.
THE COURT: Good argument. However, what I'm
going to do is overrule the objection. I'm going to
allow it, for what relevance that it has. And if, as
Mr. Charney contends, the Court should discount the
exhibit because you failed to tie it in, Ms. Taylor, I'll
take it into account as well.
But I'm going to overrule the objection and
admit, now, Plaintiffs Exhibit 135. It is admitted.
MS. TAYLOR: All right.
(Exhibit No. 135 is admitted.)

Thankyou.
MS. TAYLOR: ThankYOtl.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, before we get into
I.~
detail on your appraisal I would like to ask you, have
you viewed this property recently?
11
A. Yes.
Q. And in addition to your appraisal report, are
you prepared to testify as to whether there is any value
to the improvements on the property?
A. Yes.
Page 354
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1
MR. CHARNEY: You said January, I thought
thought.
2
THE COURT: I wrote down January. I thought
3 that's what he had said, as well. Is it as of July 10th
4 or January 10th, Mr. Rudd?
5
THE WITNESS: July.
6
THE COURT: July 10, 2002.
7
MS. TAYLOR: And that effective date is on the
8 face of the appraisal that they have.
9
THE COURT: Okay. And it's your contention,
10 Ms. Taylor, that you have -- that this witness -- that
11 the property that we're talking about is the Linder Road
12 40 acres that we -- that is the subject matter of this
13 litigation?
14
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And that we have two other
15 appraisals already admitted relating to it.
16
TIIE COURT: All right
right.
17
Go ahead. What's your objection,
17
1 8 Mr. Charney?
19
MR. CHARNEY: The objection would be relevance.
20
2 0 Unless the Plaintiffs in this case can tie knowledge of
21 the information contained in this appraisal to Mr. Maile,
22 it would not support their doctrine of unclean hands
23 defense to the unjust enrichment claim.
24
So, I think that there would need to be
25 additional foundation laid, that Mr. Mail
Mailee was aware that

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
1133
1144
1155
16
17
17
18
19
20
20
21
22
23
24
25

I'

MR. CHARNEY: Well, we'll object to that, because
iI
that has never been disclosed.
MS. TAYLOR: Actually, it was.
!
"
THE COURT: Go ahead, tell me how.
MS. TAYLOR: Supplemental disclosure of witnesses
dated September 22, '06. The Court will recall that
discl!osure,
they -- they got leave to extend their discJ!osure,
I:
THE COURT: Right.
MS. TAYLOR: Specifically states, on Terry Rudd,
in addition to testimony from prior affidavits and his
deposition, Mr. Rudd would be called to rebut the
opinions of Joe Corlett, as set forth in Defendants'
discovery responses and his -- Corlette's appraisal, and
to testify to his expert opinion as to the value or lack
thereof of the Defendants' improvements to the Linder
Road property.
MR. CHARNEY: That doesn't satisfy 26(b)(4)
disclosure. That was practically the same disclosure
i read to the Court yesterday about Joe Corlett, and
you struck all that testimony. That does not satisfy the
26(B)(4) disclosure, if that's what they're talk -- going
to start talking about is the specific dollar value.
TIIE COURT: Well, your objection was not that
it -- that -- your objection was that the quc:stion
qut:stion that
was asked this witnesses was beyond the scope of the
1
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disclosure, not that it was too thin.
Do you see what I mean? Not that -- the
objection that I hear you making, now, is there's not
enough data that was -- you know, that was disclosed.
Is that your objection now?
MR. CHARNEY: Well, it depends on what they
actually intend to elicit from the witness. If they're
going to try and elicit from the witness that the value
of the raw land is X, in today's dollars, and the value
of the developed land is X, as it exists today, or
that -- then that's exactly what you struck yesterday on
nearly an identical disclosure.
So there -- he has provided no data
supporting that, he has provided no actual figures for us
to come to trial and be prepared to defend against. And
maybe they're not intending to go there, but I'll make an
appropriate objection when they attempt to cross that
bridge.
THE COURT: All right. I think that the
disclosure that was made, on the expert witness
DefendlmtJ
disclosure, did properly notify Defendlillt!
Counter-Claimants, the Mailes, that this witness would be
testifying about the -- his opinion on the value of the
improvements.
Now -- but you're saying the value -- he is
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A. Yes.
Q. Can you look at the photographs that are in
the Plaintiffs Exhibit notebook, up there, under 133,
and just flip through those, please.
A. Okay.
Q. Do those appear to be a fair and accurate
depiction of the current condition ofthl~ property and
the improvements?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I would like to start with the value
of the barn. In your opinion, a5 the bam sits, what
value does it have?
A. It would have two values, depending upon
whether we include it with the sale of the property, in
that case it would be negligible, or whether we sold the
improvements separately.
Q. Okay. I'll represent to you that the
prospective purchaser of the property was here just
hl~ is concerned,
before you and testified that, as far as hc~
the barn has to be removed.
A. Well, that would be the case -- in its
contribution to sale, that would most likely be the case.
Q. Okay.
A. It's a negligible part of the whole property
value. It's not situated as the average person would
Page 358

Page 356
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
23
24
25
•

"

here to rebut Corlette's testimony. And if Mr. Charney
1
2
is correct, and I struck all ofCorlette's lestimony,
then what is there to rebut?
3
MS. TAYLOR: We didn't strike Mfr. Corlette's
4
testimony about the value of the improvements.
5S
THE COURT: Right.
TIIE
6
MS. TAYLOR: And we were not planning on asking
7
Mr. Rudd any questions on the current value of the
8
9
property. We'll only question him on hi s opinion on the
value of improvements, to rebut Mr. Corlett, and on his
10
appraisal of the value as of the time thal the
11
transaction was entered into, and that is to rebut the
12
appraisals that the Defendant has entered into evidence.
13
MR. CHARNEY: That's okay with me.
14
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
15
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
16
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, I would like to
17
start with the improvements that have b(:en
bt:en made to the
18
property, if that's okay?
19
A. Okay.
20
Q. Can you tell the Court when you visited this
21
property.
22
A. The first time was in the early fall of 2004,
23
September, 2004.
24
Q. Have you been back since that time?
25
..

..

.......

c.

,

......

...

,,,

1

locate it. It is a typical type of barn for that
neighborhood, however. I disagree with that design, but
it's -- it's somewhat typical. So, in a sale, the
contribution would probably be next to nothing.
Q. All right. I will also ask you to assume
that the prospective buyer has indicated that he intends
to have this property replatted. Are you familiar with
the manner in which the property is currently platted?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe that is in your exhibit book under
116.
Oh, wrong number.
MS. TAYLOR: If I can have a mOffil~nt, Your Honor?
TIIE COURT: All right.
THE
MS. TAYLOR: 122.
TIIE WIlNESS:
WI1NESS: I have it.
THE
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In your -- can you tell the
Court your opinion on this type of platting and the
valU(: of the property.
impact it would have on the valU(~
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
TIIE COURT: If the witness understood the
THE
question, he can answer it. I'm going to overrule the
objection.
Did you want to be heard?
MR. CHARNEY: Just a little.

I'c'

.....
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THE COURT: All right.
1
1 occurring.
2
MR. CHARNEY: If you factor in the governmental
2
Q. SO, based on the assumption that this would
3 requirements and the issue regarding the high water table
3 be sold to someone who would completely replat it, what
4 value would you put on the road as it s:its?
4 and the septic, that would have to be part of his
5 opinion.
5
A. Very little. It would only be the salvage,
let him render an opinion.
6
THE COURT: Well, I'll
I'111et
6 and in sale, probably no contribution. But, salvaging
7 I think there has been sufficient foundation laid for his
7 it, there would be the electrical pedestals. I don't
8 know that pulling up any of the sewer line, the
8 rendering an opinion, within the scope of Ms. Taylor's
9 question. You certainly have an opportunity,
opportllllity, on
9 irrigation system, there may b(:
bf: a pump, there, in the
10
1 0 cross-examination, to attack that opinion.
10 reservoir, you know, that could be salvaged out. But it
Go ahead.
11
11 would be strictly a low value proposition, something no
If! could answer in this way, the
12
THE WITNESS: IfI
12 more than 20-, 25,000.
13 market, today, would not accept this layout, because of
13
Q. Mr. Corlett expressed the opinion that these
14 the configuration oflots. They're narrow, triangular,
14 improvements are currently worth $220,000. Would you lj
15 long fencing, it would be placing the houses too close to
15 agree with that assessment?
1 6 each other. But it was an inexpensive way to develop the
16
A. He may be viewing that strictly in the cost
1 7 approach manner. And the cost approach only applies if
1 7 road system and then, later, to distribute the irrigation
18
1 8 water. And in previous years, more back towards the date
18 the market is going in that direction. And I don't think
19 of the appraisal, it was more accepted than it would be
1 9 the current market is.
19
20 today.
20
It was, perhaps, a little more so at the
1,1
21
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: How has the market changed? 21 time -- the appraisal, back to 2002. But even then, i
it t i '
I!
A. People are more desirous, they found out
22 was an in expensive way to layout the subdivision, but
2222
2233 because-
because -i,
23 it wasn't bringing about its highest and best use or
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation. He's not
24
24 price.
25 talking about this market.
He is not tying it to this_ _ _-+_2_5
And the developer
who__testified
you____ II
2 5___Q.
1-2_5_ta_lkin_·_g:::.-ab_o_u_t_thi_·s_mar
__k_e_t._H_e_is_n_o_t...:tym_·..;g:::...i_t_to_thi_·S
Q.::.._An_d_th_e_d_ev_e_lo-o!p'
-e_r_w_h_o
t_es_h_·fi_e_d__before
b_e_fo_r_e.:..y_ou

I;

I
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particular market, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the
objection. As I understand the witness" testimony, he is
comparing -- he is talking, specifically, about the
market for this type oflayout in 2002; :;s
::s that correct,
Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule the
objection.
THE WITNESS;
WITNESS: I looked at about 10
lO or 15 different
subdivisions on the west side of Eagle, and that's the
basis of my opinions. I drove into them, looked at the
places, and I did see some of this vintage, that were
laid out similar to this.
But the fencing and the problems that I
mentioned have become apparent to the people that have
lived there, and the homes have becom(:
becomf: more valuable.
People are building $800 to a million dollar homes on
these properties, and they want a little more room away
from the road. They want the estate looking -- coming up
to their place, and they want some -- some side room to
the adj acent homes.
So the patterning has changed in the layout
currently. That was what I noticed along Linder and I
noticed west of Linder where the newer developments are

I
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felt that this layout would have an adverse impact on
resale possibilities. Would you agree with that?
A. Well, the market is so hot that anything
would sell there. But these lots would definitely sell
less, you know, both today and then, as a result of that
layout. In fact, I'm not too sure the first lot --well, I won't say any more. I just think one of those
lots might be way reduced in value because of its
location.
Q. Well, go ahead and finish that thought.
A. Well, II just thought it was strange that the
barn would have been situated on that northern lot, and
it was not -- well, I guess not much more than five
acres. And that kind of spoils the development for
everyone else, when all the other homes that are west of
Eagle, like this, have the barns behind the home, and
they're better quality, better construction, and a better
appearance.
It's just sort oflike having the bam in
front of your house, the cart beD)re
beD)[e the horse.
Q. Okay. In looking at the condition this bam
is in, can you describe it to the Court.
A. It's a low-cost, frame pole constlUction,
with wood siding, asphalt shingle roof. It's a broken
Gambrel design, with hay storage above, in part, but not

'

I',
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1 all of the interior of the bam.
2
It looks like the stalls would be
3 constructed. One-third of the concrete floor was in, the
4 other two-thirds had the rebar in and the grade, but they
5 weren't finished. All the siding wasn't finished. The
6 electrical was roughed-in, but not completed.
7
I didn't see the main doors on. I didn't see
8 any side paddock doors. I didn't see any other finish,
9 or the restrooms, or things that you would expect to find
10
1 0 in a building like that. I don't know the status of a
11 septic field, or a well for the water for it.
12
I did see the road coming into it. We had to
13 drive across the field to get to it. Willing to walk,
14
1 4 but I wanted to see how they were getting in there.
15
Q. There is not a road to the barn, is there?
Q.
16
MR. CHARNEY: Objection, she's testifying.
16
17
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Is there a road to the bam?
18
A. I didn't find one. But there must have been
19 one, because there's quite a few materials there. But it
20
2 a wasn't completed; it wasn't graveled. However it's laid
21 out was contrary to the design of the lot.
22
The roof was in good condition, though. The
23 roof was the best part of it.
24
Q. Did you notice any deterioration in the
25
2 5 building?
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interior ponding area. I didn't Imow the lot layout at
that time.
And I took pictures of the surface, looked at
what -- how it had been cropped before,. the lay of the
land, the level general elevations. And then I drove
around the immediate neighborhood. I looked at the other
properties, what was being developed, what kind of values
were being implanted into homes.
Then I stopped and talked to several
--I'd
realtors -I'd get into more detail on that, as
necessary -- asked them about what property values were
in 2002. Of course, what they were at the time I looked
at it, in 2004.
They gave me comparable sales off the MLS.
They gave me some listings, which subsequently sold.
Some I included in the appraisal, some J hadn't. I also
looked at lots that had sold, what kind of prices, what
their sizes were.
And then I drove into the field, looked at
all the comparable sales that I had. Drove to each one
of them. Later called and talked at least one or two of
the owners, the buyers or sellers, picked up fliers on
other lots for sale, other homes that had sold, different
subdivisions.
And then I came home -- actually, I was doing
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A. The siding was a minimal pan,eling. And, of
course, without insulation, without haying the inside
finished, and I didn't see Tyvex on it, il's starting to
deteriorate. But nothing major, yet.
Q. Okay. In Joe Corlette's apprahal, did you
haddone
see any indication that he had
done any depreciation or
accounting for the deterioration?
A. I don't remember seeing it. It may be there,
but IJ didn't see any.
Q. Okay. I would like to move on to your
appraisal now. We're looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 135.
-
Can you describe to the Court -A. I don't have 135.
Q. Well, that's your appraisal.
A. Oh, okay.
Q. I haven't put it in that book yet.
A. Okay. Well, I've got that, of course.
Q. All right. Can you describe to the Court the
steps you went through in determining the value for this
property as of July of 2002.
propeny. I drove
A. I went out, I viewed the propet1y.
around the edge of it. Drove down the canal on the north
and the east sides. I walked in part of it. And then I
met DaHan Taylor, and he showed me the road and the

,
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III

some of -- a lot of this by phone and contact, although I
did meet approximately three of the realtors in person-
person -'i
and verified what the values wt:re, at the time, f o r i
various properties, how hard they were :to
to develop, where
the water and the sewer was, what they planned to do for
for'
roads, how they were going to develop and lay them out,
and discussed even the subject property" about what its
value was back in 2002, what values were in 2002 in the
marketplace.
And then I prepared a graph in which I
I'
plotted the sales that I had researched, by acre.
I
I,
Q. Can you give me a second to catch up?
Is that graph included in your appraisal
report?
A. It's the last page, before the cun"iculum
cun'iculum
vitae.
Q. Okay. I'm sorry, I interrupted you.
A. No, that's okay.
Q. Can you explain to the Court what this graph
is.
A. That page shows all the sales that I obtained
and investigated, to various degrees, and located on here
by size and price per acre. And then I drew a median
line through the sales, and I prepared a sale analysis,
which was based on six sales.

Ii
Ii
I!
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I then abstracted three, that I discussed.
No. I discussed all six in the appraisal. And I had
adjusted them in a grid, which I don't see a copy of in
the appraisal, but that I described, in narrative, in the
appraisal, percentage adjustments of 1hose sales back to
the subject property.
And the range that I arrived at was from
$19,000 to $23,000 per acre for the subject property, as
of September of 2002.
Q. Well, the cover page says it's July of 2002;
is that --
A. Yes, I'm sorry. Right, July of 2002.
Q. All right. So, in your report, using the
value by acreage sale, what value did you reach for this
property, as of July of 2002?
A. $20,600 an acre.
Q. And that would be how much for this parcel,
how much total?
A. Well, assuming there's 40 acrl~s
acrl~s -- and I know
there's a difference of opinion. I did not personally
surveyor measure it -- I came out with $820,000.
Q. I note that some of the comparables you have
used are for either larger or smaller parcels. How to
you factor that into your analysis?
A. This graph did all the work. I've made
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the property. How does that play into valuing it?
A. Most of the people it didn't, to any great
degree. Because the City -- and I talked with the mayor
yesterday -- they have a particular idea and a plan in
mind. And they will change the zoning, because they
have, within their area of impact --MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
~
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Let me narrow the question
down a little bit.
In looking at comparable sales, is it
important to look at ones that are -- that were zoned in
the same category as this property?
A. Yes and no. Generally, it's quite important.
In this particular case, the location seemed to be as
much, or more important, because the two general zones,
RR, rural residential, and RUT, urban transitional.
So, although there is a difference in the
allowed size, the City's desire to have the properties
developed in a certain manner was the most important
objective.
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: All right.
Mr. Charney, you may cross-examine the
Page 370
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hundreds of them, in communities all across the
United States.
By plotting the size and the price, then the
larger parcels, I usually have them on the right,
progress to smaller parcels on the left, and the price
just climbs,
This graph doesn't show it, but [he one in
the appraisal report shows the median line, shows how the
prices climb as acreage becomes smalkr. And that's
quite typical in almost all real estate markets.
Q. Do you also enter an adjustment, depending on
the availability of sewer?
A. In general. But in most cases, the buyers
were only generally aware of how far the sewer was from
the property. And a lot of the properties weren't
percing, so the sewer became fairly critical, in some
people's minds. In others, septic systems and drain
fields were acceptable and didn't really influence the
price as much as did the particular zone, the size of the
parcels that would be allowed at that 101;ation.
lo';ation.
The view of Bogus Basin seemed to be the
biggest concern, the fact that they were in the Eagle zip
code and within its area of impact, even back to 2002,
seemed to be the main concern.
zoning on
Q. You talked about considering the zonin~

1
2

witness.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. CHARNEY::
4
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I

Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Rudd. The report that
you prepared was prepared for Ms. TayIor;
Tayllor; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. This was not prepared at the request of a
bank or anybody who is not a party to litigation trying
to convince one side or another about the value of the
property; true?
A. True.
Q. You have also done other work for the Taylors
in the past; is that fair to say?
A. Yes.
Q. And for this law finn, their law finn, in the
past?
A. Yes.
Q. Your primary area of work as an appraiser is
not this local area; true?
A. Incorrect.
Q. Your primary work is the Treasure Valley?
A. No.
Q. Your primary --A. It's part of my primary area.
Q. Right. Your primary area is northern Idaho,

I

I

"
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Washington, and Oregon; correct?
A. Montana.
Q. And Montana?
A. Right.
Q. In fact, you have done only a few appraisals
in the Treasure Valley area in the course of your career;
true?
A. True. But my son, who opened an office --
Q. Answer my question. Is it true?
A. Partially.
Q. All right. You used -- or you came to an
opinion that the value of the property was $820,000 at
the time of the sale; correct?
A. I did.
Q. However, when you appraised that property,
and you came to that conclusion, that includes the
development costs of the property, doesn't it?
A. It includes -- it's as existing that date.
Q. But it included the costs of getting it
developed into 5-acre parcels as well?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. All right. So when you testifi,ed at your
deposition, you were questioned as follows: When you
appraised this Linder property -- Linde:r Road property,
does that appraisal include what you p,erceive
p1erceive the
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MS. TAYLOR: Counsel, can you give me a page
number and line, please?
MR. CHARNEY: It would be page 47, it would be
line I to 3.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Was that the question and
was that the answer?
A. Well, now you're confusing mc~. That was my
answer.
Q. All right.
A. And I think that was the question.
you:!
Q. And later on was the question posed to you:
And does your appraisal reflect the value of that
additional cost?
And your answer: In theory, through the eyes
of the market it does.
And then the question: But you can't put a
finite dollar value on it?
And your answer: I could have. I wasn't
asked to do that; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Your comps that you utilized, you did
not look at those comps to find out what their proximity
was to the sewer and other typ($ of facilities, did you?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's reflected in your report, then,
Page 374
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1

development costs would be?
2
Your answer being, it does, but undefmed and
3 undetermined.
4
Was that the truth then, or is it the truth
development costs are induded or not?
5 today, that the deVelopment
6
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; argumentative.
7
TIm COURT: Overruled.
THE
8
Did you understand the question?
9
-
THE WITNESS: I understood his question. But I -lOin the deposition, I didn't fully understand what that
11 attorney was asking me.
TIm COURT: All right.
12
THE
13
lliE WITNESS: So.
14
TIm COURT: Well, I'm going to ask you to restate
THE
1 5 your question, Mr. Charney.
16
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
17
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: You were asked a question,
1 8 when you appraised this Linder property -- Linder Road
1 9 property, does that appraisal include what you perceive
2 0 the development costs would be? And your answer was, it
undetermined.
21 does, but undefined and undetemllned.
22
Was that the question and was that the
answer-
23 answer-24
Counsel-
MS. TAYLOR: Counsel-25
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: -- yes or no?
.........

1

'I

isn't it?

2
A. I did.
3
Q. No. Is that reflected in your report?
4
A. Yes, it is.
5
Q. All right. And let's take, for example, sale
6 No.1. 10.5 acres, sold September 5, '02, from Below to
7 Mahaffey, for 283,500. And then you go on to talk about I:I
8 it, but there's no indication in there as to it's
i
9 proximity to sewer; is t
there?
h e r e ? "I:,
10
l O AA.
. This was not required in the report.
Q. Okay. So, my question is, nowhere in your
11
12 report do your comps reflect their proximity to sewer, do
13 they?
14
A. It's not stated there. But that doesn't mean
15 I didn't do it in the appraisal, which is a separate
16 function.
117
7
Q. No, no. It's not even found anywhere in
18 you're report, is it?
19
MS. TAYLOR: Objection.
20
THE WITNESS: It doesn't matter. It's in my -- I
2211 did it in my appraisal.
22
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Sir, I'm not asking you --23
THE COURT: Hang on a second, Mr. Charney.
24
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
25
THE COURT: I have to entertain this objection.

I:

I:

.
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1

Go ahead.
MS. TAYLOR: I would like to object. He's
mischaracterizing the report. If you look at sale No.2,
sale No.3, they both talk about being close to sewer.
MR. CHARNEY: No. He doesn't --
THE COURT: They both talk about what?
MS. TAYLOR: They both talk about whether it is --
how close it is to sewer, whether the price has been
adjusted, depending on the proximity to sewer. He's
mischaracterizing the report.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know
knOVI ifhe is or not,
but let's do this. I'm just going to ask you to slow
down, somewhat, Mr. Charney.
MR. CHARNEY: All right.
THE COURT: And if there is an objection to a
question, Ms. Taylor, interpose the objection, and then
I will instruct the witness not to answe:r the question
if an objection is interposed, so I can handle that;
okay?
So, Mr. Charney, go ahead and take another
run at this line of questioning, if you care to.
MR. CHARNEY: I will.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: As far as your appraisals
go, none of the comps that are reflected in there talk
about a specific distance from sewer, do they?
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Q. SO, if it has been split, it's got its
entitlements; right?
A. Well, I don't know. It depends on what you
consider entitlements.
permit to build a house there?
Q. A pennit
A. Well, maybe there is ~md maybe there isn't.
Q. SO you don't know?
:r
to:]
A. I didn't invest -- it's not require:d to
know.:
investigate. I don't know.
I
Q. Sir, I'm not asking you what is or isn't
entitled,!
required. I'm asking you, are these properties entitled
or not? That's a fair question. So, you're saying you
don't know with respect to No.1.
property;
Let's move to No.2. Was this property
entitled or not?
me-A. Well, define entitled to me-
Q. Going through the --A. -- so I know for sure.
Q. Going through the process of obtaining the
appropriate permits, platting from government agencies,
so that one can actually construct a home or some other
structure on the property.
A. Every single property will be able to
construct at least one home.
Q. Okay. The question being -- is, which of

1
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A. Are you referring to the report or the
appraisal?
Q. Whatever this exhibit is, sir, appraisal
report.
THE COURT: Exhibit 135?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Okay. The repOlt doesn't.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: All right. The comps that
you have utilized are also ones that have already been
split and have entitlements; correct?
A. No. Many don't.
Q. Which ones of the 1 through -- you have
skipped 4 and 5 in your report. It goes 1, 2, 3 and then
6,7,8.
Which of these properties were not entitled?
A. Comp No.1 was a 1O.5-acre tnmsaction.
Q. Yes. Was it or was it not entitled?
A. May be split once.
Q. Do you know that for sure, or are you
guessing?
A. No. That's stated right in the M[LS
MlLS report.
Q. That's appended to this report somewhere?
A. No. It's right on the appraisal, light on
the MLS report.
'"
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these have been split in a manner that has increased
their value, so that you can have higher density?
A. None.
Q. All right. So, in other words, No.2, the
78 acres, has not been split?
A. No.
Q. It has no entitlements. It's raw land that
sold for $20,536 an acre?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. And you're convinced of that fact?
A. I know for a fact. I talked to the buyer.
Q. Okay. Now, I noted the absence of an 80-acre
parcel, in your report, that was only four miles from the
Linder property, that sold at about the same time.
Are you familiar with that property?
A. I have no idea what property you're talking
about.
Q. I would be talking about the other 80 acres
that were owned by Ted 10hnson
Johnson at his death, that was
sold to these -- one of them, these other individuals
that were sitting in court.
A. That's the piece that was questioned -- I was
questioned about in the deposition.
Q. Yes. The 80-acre parcel that sold for
$425,000. Why isn't that factored into your-
your--

,

.
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1
MS. TAYLOR: An 80-acre parcel that sold for what?
2
MR. CHARNEY: For $425,000.
3
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: You didn't include that sale
4 in your report, and I'm curious to know why?
5
A. I don't know if the parties -- I thought the
6 parties were a family --7
And-Q. And-
8
A. -- affair. Well, family transactions, in the
9 appraisal world, are considered to be prejudiced and not
10
a fair reflection of the market itself. TIley
They mayor may
lOa
11 not be.
12
Q. SO these individuals, you assumed, did not
13
1 3 pay fair market value for 80 acres, and so you didn't
14
1 4 include that in your report?
15
15
A. At the time --16
16
MS. TAYLOR: Judge, I will object on relevance.
17
17
THE COURT: Overruled. I think it's fair enough.
18
THE WI1NESS: I'm not sure, at the time -- Dallan
18
19
1 9 mentioned the sale to me, but he said it was a family
20 sale. So I didn't really investigate the terms or the
21 price.
22
Q.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: What is a family sale, in
23 your view?
24
A. Well, it's a sale from a father to a son, or
25
2 5 brother to his sister, or some relation where there's

A. I never went to the transaction that you're
1
2 referring to.
Q. No, no, no. I'm talking about your comps.
3
4 You seem to be concerned about four miles being a long
5 ways away, so it can't fit in. You seem to be concerned,
6 well, this is four miles away, how could I know?
7
Comp No. I is 5 miles east, isn't it?
8
A. Well, yes.
9
Q. Okay.
10
l O AA.
. But I obtained --11
Q. That's my question.
12
A. -- the sale.
13
Q. No.2, one mile south; correct?
14
A. The mileage is nothing, the mileage isn't
IS5 what my concern was.
1
16
Q. Sir-
Sir-17
A. Ijust didn't happen to go by this other
18 property you're talking about, because it was four miles
19 away.
20
Q. Okay.
21
A. If it was closer, DaHan
Dallan probably would have
22 taken me.
23
Q. Well, let's give you some basic facts about
24 the property. It's four miles to the west, it's twice
just like the
2255 the size, and it's undeveloped farmland,.just
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often other consideration; love, affection, and some
other consideration that goes into the sale, other than
the actual price.
Q. All right. So based on your analysis here,
that these 40 acres were worth $820,000, and assuming
that they paid $425,000 for twice that amount of
property, 80 acres, would that have been a fair market
value price for that property?
A. I don't know where the property was. It may
or may not have been.
Q. 80 undeveloped acres, four miks to the west?
A. Well, four miles is quite a ways.
Q. SO this property --A. I didn't go to it, and I don't know where
it's at.
Q. SO you can't answer the question, if that was
fair market value or not --A. No, I can't.
Q. -- just four miles away?
A. I can't answer it.
Q. Yet, how far away are these other subject
properties?
A. Well, I just -- in other words, I didn't go
to the sale property you're referring to.
Q. You never went to the Linder Road property?
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I::
Linder Road property.
Was it worth more than $425,000, or was that
a fair price?
A. I could not even offer an opinion, if -- ifI
if!
wanted to, because I'm required, by USPAT and appraisal
law, to view the subject property, determine its
condition, it's characteristics, and then, with market
data, which I have here, arrive at a value.
I could go out there right now and do it.
But I wasn't there, I didn't see it, ,md I can't do it.
Q. That's for pwposes of an appraisal. I'm
talking about for pwposes of cOUltroom te:>timony.
A. Well, that's the same thing.
Q. Knowing that the property is in the same
general type of area, that it is twice the size, and that
it falls well within the circle of your comps, was
$425,000 a fair price for that property or not?
A. Cowtroom or not, there is -- my law -- our
laws are not absolved in the Courtroom.
I
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to ask you to
direct the witness to answer the question.
THE COURT: I believe he already has.
MR. CHARNEY: I think he has, too.
THE COURT: He says he could not render an opinion
one way or the other.
94
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Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Are you familiar with
Marshal Valuation?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that an acceptable fonn
Q.
form of valuing
improvements made to properties?
A. No.
Why not?
Q. Whynot?
A. It's a cost approach estimate to valuing
properties, to which depreciation needs to be added
before a value estimate can be stated.
Q. How do you depreciate the value of, say, a
sewer line?
A. Well, you estimate if it's in the right
location or not.
valUi~ of electric
Q. How to you estimate the valUi~
line?
A. A what line?
Q.
Q. Of underground electric?
A. Well, the same answer.
Q. Can you use Marshal Valuation as a basis for
doing so?
A. Yes, you can. As a cost estimate.
Q. And is there a multiplier for particular
areas and particular times?
A. For cost estimate, yes.

Page 385

1 a barn,
bam, it has no benefit whatsoever?
2
A. To that particular individual in the
3 marketplace, although the marketplace may differ from
4 that.
5
Q. Okay. And if something has no personal
6 benefit, does the cost of it matter in analyzing the
7 benefit?
8
A. In the market itself?
9
Q. That was a horrible question. I don't even
10 think I could answer it. I apologize.
11
Ifwe are trying to detemrine the benefit of
12 an improvement, does the cost of it make any difference?
13
A. Yes, it can.
14
Q. Is that based on a presumption that it will
15 remain in place as it exists?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. Okay.
18
MS. TAYLOR: No further questions.
19
THE COURT: Thank you. May the witness be
20 excused?
21
MR. CHARNEY: One moment, Your Honor. I have no
22 further questions of this witness.
23
THE COURT: All right. May the witness be excused
24 from the subpoena?
25
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
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Q. And have you used Marshal Valuation, in the
regular course of your business, for cost valuation
analysis?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that an acceptable way to perfonn
perform cost
valuation analysis?
A. Yes.
MR. CHARNEY: No furtherquesdons.
THE COURT: Redirect.
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11
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
12 BY MS. TAYLOR::
13
Q. Mr. Rudd, were the comparables that you
14
1 4 looked at within the City impact zone?
15
A. Yes.
16
16
detennining the value of
Q. Is that relevant in determining
17
1 7 properties?
18
A. Yes.
19
Q. Can Marshal's book tell anything about the
20 benefit of improvements?
21
21
A. No. And they don't intend that.
22
Q. Is it fair to say that specific improvements
23 would have a different benefit to different people?
24
A. That would be in the marketplace, yes.
25
Q. For example, if you're planning to tear down
.. "',-'-'-;;;'."-'-":;":";':':.:."':

!

THE COURT: Very well. Sir, you are excused.
Thank you.
THE WITNESS: May I have a second to put my --THE COURT: Yes, you may. I think the only thing
that you had -- I think the only thing we had up there
was the binder, wasn't it? Okay. I think everything
else is the witness'.
TIlE WITNESS: It'll just take me a second.
1HE
TIlE COURT: Sure. Yes, I have 135 right here.
1HE
(The witness left the stand at 1:13 p.m)
MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, previously, I had made
an objection that his testimony would not be relevant as
to the value of the land at the time of the purchase,
because there was no evidence tying it to Mr. Maile and
his knowledge of that particular issue.
And I think on an unjust enrichment claim,
and on the unclean hands defense, his testimony should be
stricken, at least as to the value of the property -- of
the $820,000 estimate that he provided for the property
as of the date that it was sold, because they haven't
indicated that Mr. Maile knew, or should have even known
that.
And, therefore, I would ask the Court to
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reconsider my objection and strike that testimony.
THE COURT: Well, it's obvious that as of
September 22nd, when the report was prepared and the
opinion was arrived at, that it was sort of
retrospective.
This witness, as I understand it, was not
called to establish that Mr. Maile had actual knowledge
that, you know, after the transaction, that he would, you
know, that he would know that later on an appraiser would
praise the property at $820,000 at the time. That's not
the purpose of the testimony.
And you may very well be comect
COIT<~ct in your --and I'm not prejudging this particular bsue -- but you
may be correct, Mr. Maile (sic), that without being able
to establish that Mr. Maile was actually aware that
another appraiser had an opinion, or IDly
IDlY have later had
an opinion, that the thing was worth $820,000, that it's
irrelevant and the Court shouldn't consider it.
However, I allowed the testimony to come in,
for what it's worth. I think that the party calling the
witness has a right to present the evidence that she
believes is relevant, and can tie it in sufficiently. So
that's why I left it in and that's why, at this time at
least, I'm not going to strike it.
You will have an opportunity to make that
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THE COURT: You may call your first rebuttal
witness.
MR. CHARNEY: We'll have rebuttal. My first
rebuttal issue, though, is a request for the Court to, if
you will, unstrike that portion of Mr. Codette's
testimony that you struck yesterday. The reason being
is, I would like you to treat it now as rebuttal
testimony, to rebut Mr. Wood's claim that the current
of the lots, in their current condition, is $250
$250value ofthe
to $275,000.
Mr. Corlett opined that 1hey were: much higher
than that, and I would like to offer that as my first
piece of rebuttal evidence, without actually having to
recall Mr. Corlett for that point.
THE COURT: Interesting.
Ms. Taylor, what's your -- do you have any
input on that request?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes,Ido, Your HOl1or. Mr. Wood was
not here as an expert witness. He was just talking about
facts he is aware of as a developer on this land.
It doesn't -- his testimony doesn't change
the fact that Mr. Corlett was not disclosed as an expert
witness on the underlying value of the land. That
situation has not changed.
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argument in your closing argument, though. Do you see
what I mean?
11R. CHARNEY: I do.
THE COURT: Now, do you have lilly additional
evidence or testimony, Ms. Taylor.
MS. TAYLOR: We do not. ThePlaintiffs rest.
TIlE COURT: All right.
Does the -- do you have any rebuttal
testimony, Mr. Charney?
CHARNEY; Yeah. I think we do, but I need to
MR. CHARNEY:
consult with Mr. Maile about how to trim it down.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's take a few minutes.
Who would you intend to call.
-
11R. CHARNEY: Certainly Mr. Maile, and unless -well, certainly Mr. Maile, Mrs. Maile maybe for a brief
question or two, and then I need to discuss with the
Mailes whether or not I think we need anything else.
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Now -11R. CHARNEY: Can we take until 1I :30?
THE COURT: Okay. We'll take 10 minutes, and then
we'll reconvene with the rebuttal testimony.
11R. CHARNEY: Without any doubt, we'll be done
tomorrow.
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(Recess taken 1:16
1:16 p.rn. to 1:28 p.rn.)
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THE COURT: Luckily, 1I ean
can defer making an
decision on that request. Of course, your -- I take it
that ifI
if! deny that request, then you would want an
opportunity to call another witness; right?
11R. CHARNEY: A rebuttal witness, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And I take it that what you're
telling me is, that's the witness you would call?
11R. CHARNEY: He is.
THE COURT: Okay. And how do you respond to
Ms. Taylor's contention that he was nevler-nevl~r-Mr. Corlett; right?
11R. CHARNEY: That's correct.
THE COURT: -- that Mr. Corlett has never been
disclosed as an expert on that issue?
11R. CHARNEY: Well, he certainly was disclosed as
an expert with respect to -- that he would opine
regarding the value of the property. The question was
the recent information that I had received regarding the
exact numbers.
Now, I explored, on cross-examination, I will
agree, the question as to the value. But it was for the
sole point of establishing that this witness might not be
credible. In other words, why go in thene
then~ and rip this
whole place up if, in fact, the lots can be sold for a
good profit right now, without having to rip the place

,_:'~;:"
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up.
And so, he then offered the opinion that he
thinks they're worth, like I said in their current shape,
somewhere between 250- and 275,000. And that testimony,
left unchecked, would not be appropriate.
Now, the Court is aware that rebuttal
evidence doesn't necessarily have to be disclosed,
although Mr. Corlett has been previously disclosed and
think,
most of his testimony has been. But this, I think.
coming in as a rebuttal testimony, would not require the
strict compliance with 26(B)(4), that he would be
required to -- that we would be required. to comply with
for our case in chief.
THE COURT: What -- remind me. I had -- and you
can tell me this, I suppose, by way of art offer of
ifI allowed Codette's testimony on that
proof -- ifl
subject, Mr. Charney, what would that testimony be,
essentially, with respect to the present value of those
lots?
MR. CHARNEY: About $66,963 1m acre, or $347,700
per lot.
THE COURT: Okay. This last witness was
Mr. Woods; right?
MR. CHARNEY: The second-to-the-last witness. The
last witness was Mr. Rudd.

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Okay. You may call your witness.
DALLAN TAYLOR,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defense,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHARNEY::
Q. Will you please state your name and spell
your last for the Court reporter. Be careful. Pull that
lid all the way, or it will pour all over your lap.
There you go.
A. Dallan Taylor, T-A-Y-L-O-R.
Q. Mr. Taylor, were you related to Ted Johnson
in any way?
A. He's my uncle.
Q. Was he your -- was he sister or brother to
your -- in other words, describe the relation a little
bit more. I'm sony.
A. He's my mother's brother.
Q. All right. That's what I was looking for.
After Mr. Johnson passed away, were you involved in the
purchase of the 80-acre parcel, near Star, that
Mr. Johnson owned prior to his death?
A. The parcel in Star was 74.6 acres.
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MS. TAYLOR: Rudd, yeah.
THE COURT: I'm going to allow it, for this
reason. There was evidence presented during the
Plaintif£'Counter-Claimant's case in chief, wherein an
expert rendered an opinion as to the present value of
each lot, at roughly. 250 to 275, I think was the
testimony, in its present status.
The testimony that I had previously stricken
because it was not disclosed, was sworn testimony
nevertheless, taken lIDder oath during thi::; proceeding.
And this fellow, Corlett, was subject to
cross-examination as I recall; was he not?
MS. TAYLOR: Well, not on that issue, Your Honor,
because I moved to strike it and it was stricken. So I
didn't cross-examine him.
THE COURT: Well, there you go.
MR. CHARNEY: We can bring him back, so she can
cross-examine on that point. He'll be here at 9:00
tomorrow.
THE COURT: Okay. Do it. Bring him back tomorrow
morning, and he can be cross-examined on that opinion.
MR. CHARNEY: He will be.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: All right. Our next rebuttal
witness will be Dallan Taylor.
.....•
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Q. Okay. With that clarification, were you
involved in the purchase of that 74.6 acres?
A. Yes.
Q. How were you involved in that purchase, sir?
A. I was a partner with my brother and his sons.
Q. Which brother?
A. Reed Taylor.
Q. And where is Reed?
A. Lewiston, Idaho.
Q. Who did you purchase the property from?
A. The Trust.
Q. Uncle Ted's Trust?
A. Yes.
Q. On that property, was there also a home?
A. Yes.
Q. Describe the home.
A. It's approximately 16-, 1,700 square feet,
two level, brick home.
Q. Is that where Uncle Ted lived?
A. Yes.
Q. How much did you pay the Trust for this
particular piece of property?
A. We paid them $425,000.
Q. For the full 80 acres.
A. 70-some acres.

I

97 (Pages 391 to 394)

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho,
www.etucker.net

(208)

34.5-3704

f9ff8113-684E:-49f3-bbf2-ff824a94236c

001237

Taylor v. Maile

,~

10/11/2006
397;
Page 397

Page 395
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1177
118
8
119
9
20
2211
22
23

24
25

Q. The 76 acres? Is that yes?
A. That's right.
Q. Was this property fanned in a. manner similar
to the Linder Road property?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it approximately four miles away from the
Linder Road property?
A. I think it's a little bit more than four
miles.
Q. Not much more, though?
A. It's about five miles.
Q. In addition to the 425,000 that you talked
about, was there also a promise that you would make a
Ted'~, name?
FFA
contribution to the FF
A in Uncle Ted'~.
A. That's true.
Q. The promise was you would pay $50,000 to the
FF
A, in Uncle Ted's name; correct?
FFA,
A. That's true.
Q. And, in fact, you wound up only paying 10;
correct?
A. No. I paid $16,600 and some dollars.
Q. To the FFA?
A. Right.
th,e sale of this
Q. Okay. Was the contract for th·e
property negotiated with Beth?
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Q. Mr. Taylor, can you describe the negotiations
!l
leading up to your eventual purchase of this property?
A. Yes. The reason -- originally, the man,
Sam Rosti, was trying to buy the prope11y from Ted. He
offered $325,000, the original price.
Ted went back to him and says well, I've g
got o t i
to have more than that, because the house is worth 50 or
something. So he raised it to $375,000.
I was in Italy at the time my uncle passed
away. And my brother was down here at the funeral, and
he talked to Beth --MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay and scope.
:!
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the
r:
objection on -- to the extent that you are objecting as
to the scope. I think the negotiation is fine. I think
•..
that's just exactly what you were getting after, too, was
filir market value or some
the -- whether or not this was TIlir
other consideration, and that's okay.
However, I would just admonish the witness
that you're not to say what somebody else told you; okay?
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: So don't say what your sister said, or
your brother, or anyone else. And I'll sustain the
objection on that ground.
You may ask your next question.
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And the sisters.
Which sisters?
Other beneficiaries.
Who had the final say, though'.'
though"
The trustees.
Which trustees?
Beth and Andy Rogers.
Q. They were the ones that eventually signed the
real estate contract?
A. Yes.
Q. Then the $425,000 that you paid went into the
Trust and was distributed among the trustees; right?
A. That's right.
Q. Did Beth Rogers obtain court approval to
close that contract?
A. I'm not aware of what happened, what they did
to -- whether they did approve it or didn't approve it.
I'm not aware of that.
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
THE COURT: Would you like to cross-examine the
witness, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Very briefly, Your Honor.
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MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Was the Trust prepared to
sell this land for less money than you paid?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you, and your brother, and his
children essentially outbid the other buyeT?
A. That's true.
MS. TAYLOR: I have no other questions.
THE COURT: Any redirect?
l
MR. CHARNEY: No redirect.
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank
you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
II
(The witness left the stand at 1:41
1:41 p.m)
THE COURT: You may call your next witness,

Mr. Charney.
MR. CHARNEY: We'll recall Mr. Maile.
THE COURT: Mr. Maile, I would remind you, you're

still under oath.
22
THOMAS MAILE,
23
2 4 recalled as a witness at the instance of the: defense,
25 having been previously duly sworn, was examined and
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further testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Contd)
BY MR. CHARNEY:
Q. Mr. Maile, a couple of brief rebuttal
questions. There has been, I guess, criticism cast at
the manner in which you designed the lots in question, it
being a pinwheel design.
Can you explain to the Court why the pinwheel
design was chosen for this 40 acres?
A. All right. As I said yesterday, we did water
testing in the calendar year 2003, when the irrigation
system was running. And that was required by various
State agencies, to determine if septics would work on the
40 acres.
And we determined, through those tests and
-working with Braun Consulting, which was our water -
retained water expert that worked with the Department of
Environmental Quality, that it was touch and go as to the
depth -- or to the height of the water, especially in,
perhaps, the one -- the southwest one-third of the
40 acres.
It ranged, in a ground water level, of
do\\'n to four and a
three and a half feet, at its highest, down
halffeet. Engineering folks, Joe Canning, who was
retained through B and A Engineering, said well, that's

1-
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where it's at, because of the water table.
Also critical to the layout was what we
considered to be advantageous.,
advantageous" that the homes could be
located to best take advantage of the view of
Bogus Basin. This 40-acre parcel is doVlI1 in like a
little bowl.
And even though there may be surrounding
areas, south of us and to the west of us, and even to the
east of us, that didn't have water table problems,
this -- this 40 acres was in a little bowl, a little dip
area. And it also was theorized that there might have
been rock obstructions that retained the ground water and
made it come back up on to this 40-acre: parcel.
So, there were a couple of different theories
that everybody -- the professionals felt this was the way
that we had to go, in building the road and laying out
the lot design.
-And that, combined with trying to assess -
take advantage of each lot having a view, the CCRs that
were being worked out was even -- we'n:l
we'n:! structuring
issues in the CCRs to build homes so that the views
weren't obstructed, which was another fc~ature of those
longer lots, in addition to the water problems.
So, it was a well thought out design. And we
felt that the -- because of the testing that had been
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going to create problems with DEQ for septic. You can't
perc. You have to have perc tests for septic systems,
when you're not hooked up to the sewer.
So, the only way that we felt we could get it
to work was to enlarge the southwest comer lots. And
there were two or three that are longer, :,Q
:3Q that the
homes could be built somewhat away from this high water
table, closer to the center of the 40 acres, thereby
alleviating the problem with berming, for example, that
may -- that could have been used as a solution to high
water tables. You put your septics up higher and they're
more costly.
Also, the road was an issue with ACHD.
Because of the water table, ACHD has more -- although it
has to be constructed to meet ACHD regulations and
requirements, ACHD somewhat goes beyond those
requirements, if they're going to accept the road.
So, making it a private road, although it met
ACHD requirements, the engineering staff felt that by
putting the road away from this high water area, would
create less problems than having it accepted and approved
by -- excuse me -- approved by ACHD.
And if ACHD didn't have to accept it, to
maintain it for perpetuity, a private road would be
better there. So we went with a private road, located
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done on the property, and B and A Engineering staff, who
had worked in the area and felt very comfortable they had
the expertise to do this, that yes, this was the design
that was going to work best, out of necessity. So that's
why it was done that way.
,
r.
I might add, it -- they were very marketable
lots back when I -- we still had title, because I was;
,:
listing -- I was trying to sell the propertie$, and they
were all very well received, very well received.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, the public -- I had become:
become::: an active
MLS broker, again, to try to market these lots. And
they -- I was getting numbers of calls on people. I
think, as we prepared for last year's trial, I had two or
three different contracts that I could not dose on
because of the lis pendens.
So those lots were, even though they were
long and designed the way they were, they were still very
marketable. It was a very, very good response by the
general public. We could have sold them rather quickly,
all of them, if we chose to.
Q. There was also criticism of your placement of
the barn on the property.
A. Right.
Q. Can you discuss that.

1
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A. Well, the Court has exhibits that show
Classic Cottage. Well, we just had a professional that
helped design the layout of where the house was to be.
Q. Okay. And as far as the barn goes, there was
some thought that maybe the barn was winding up in front
of the house, as opposed to behind it; i.s that accurate?
A. No, no. Larry Brown, with Classic Cottages,
did a -- you know, the site plan that's required for
Ada County Developmental Services, to just layout the
conceptual layout of where the house would go and where
the barn would go. And, also, we knew from Eagle City,
that you couldn't put a barn -- Eagle City had standards
that you couldn't put a barn in front of a house.
So, it was designed to have the house out in
front, so you would access the house off of Cornerstone
Road. The bam was also designed not to interfere with
other people's views. And it was also located next to an
irrigation canal that really couldn't be used, because it
had to be maintained and had to be open for use by the
irrigation district.
So all those considerations, Larry and my
wife and I considered, in designing the barn and laying
out the barn.
Q. Okay.
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
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We, obviously, will have argument as to how much weight [:1
should be put on his testimony.
THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you. I'll
note that for the record.
Having that concession, Mr. Charney, are
you -- if you want to call Rory Jones -- I saw him in the
courtroom today. If you wanted to call him as a rebuttal
witness, I will certainly give you an opportunity to do
that. But you have also indicated to me, now, that you
are leaning against.
MR. CHARNEY: Me personally. I need to talk to
Tom about it. For what it's worth, Your Honor, I mean,
when somebody gets on the stand and challenges your
professional reputation, you want someone to stand up for
you.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CHARNEY: And I don't blame Mr. Maile for
lmow, I guess it's a
that. But I'm wondering -- you lrnow,
wher{: is this case
question of asking you, you know, when:
going in your head? You know, I guess I'd just -- not
asking you for a ruling, but if there's something that
you're sitting there saying, this is completely
unimportant, I don't want to waste your time with it.
On the other hand --Well-THE COURT: Well-

Page 404
1
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, do you have any cross?
2
MS. TAYLOR: No cross.
3
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Maile, you may step
4 down. Thank you.
5
6
(The witness left the stand at 1:48 p.rn.)
7
8
THE COURT: Mr. Charney, do you have additional
9 evidence or testimony to put on at this time?
10
MR. CHARNEY: Can we recess tiLtil
mtil the morning?
11
THE COURT: Is it your intention only to put on
12 one additional witness, and that would b<: mister --
13 remind me of his name.
14
MR. CHARNEY: Corlett.
15
THE COURT: -- Corlett, in order to give
1 6 Ms. Taylor an opportunity to cross-examine him, given the
1 7 Court's ruling on the now admissible evidence that the
1 8 Court had previously stricken; correct?
19
MR. CHARNEY: I may call Rory Jones on the -- to
2 0 rebut Dan Grober, but I'm -- personally, myself, I'm
21 leaning away from that.
22
THE COURT: Okay. But go ahead, Ms. Taylor.
23
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I have talked with my
24 client. And rather than drag this out any longer, we're
25 willing to waive our right to cross-examine Mr. Corlett.
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MR. CHARNEY: You see my dilemma.
THE COURT: I do. Maybe I should mention one
other thing, too. I see Mr. Grober has come back into
the Courtroom. Mr. Grober was called as an expert
Prof,essional
witness on the issue of the Rules of Prof<essional
Responsibility that existed at the time this transaction
took place. His testimony is there to assist the finder
of fact.
Now, I think, particularly in a case like
this, I wonder -- and always, obviously, the Court is not
bound by any expert opinion, the [mder
fmder of fact is never
bound by the testimony of an expert, whatever it may be, I
and whatever subject it may be.
And not to, you know, use a cliche just for
the sake of using a cliche, but this is, as they say, not
rocket science. And I don't mean that it is, therefore,
you know, real, real easy.
But the expertise which Mr. Grober opined
about was in an area that the Court and, frankly, anybody
who is licensed to practice law, would have some
familiarity with. And I think that the parties are
probably aware -- and I've kind of struggled with how to
approach this -- I have some experience in the area of
these professional responsibility issues myself.
When Mr. Grober was Deputy Bar Counsel, I
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1 was on the Bar Commission. And, you know, the Bar
2 Commissioners are the ones that ultimately -- well, not
3 ultimately, ultimately it's the Supreme Court. But we're
4 the ones who pass on these accusations and allegations of
5 misconduct.
6
So having said that, I don't know what else
7 to tell you, Mr. Charney. It's up to you whether or not
8 you want to call that rebuttal witness. We certainly
9 have time. What we're faced with, right now, is the
1 0 possibility that we could save a day, for whatever that
11 is worth, but we don't have to.
12
MR. CHARNEY: Can we come back here about, maybe,
13 ten after 2:00, five after 2:00? I'll consuit with the
14 Mailes and see.
15
THE COURT: I think that's worth it. Let's give
1 6 it until five after, and I'll tell you why.
1 7 Judge McLaughlin is in -- on a long-awaited vacation, and
18 I'm going to cover his mental health court calendar at
19 3:00. Staffmg is at 2:30, and that's a really important
20 part of it. So I'm absolutely -- I have to be doing that
21 at 2:30. Inga's going to cover for Judge Wetherell.
22
So, let's do this. We'll come back in at
23 five after, and the only question will be whether or not
if you
2 4 we want to come back tomorrow. Perfec tly okay ifyou
25 want to, but -- and I've given you, I think, about as
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THE COURT: Have you had a full opportunity to
consult with your clients about your decision?
MR. CHARNEY: I have. And we're going to rest at
this point.
THE COURT: Okay. Now -- thank you.
Ms. Taylor, do you have any sUlTebuttal?
MS. TAYLOR: Oh, my gosh, no.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. TAYLOR: No.
THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Here's what we'll
do, then, folks. We have finished, essentially, a day
early. But we don't have time, at this point, to listen
to closing arguments. So this is, sort of; typically
what I do in a, what I consider, pretty complex Court
trial.
I'm going to do this. I'm going to set forth
a schedule, sort of a briefing schedule. And what I'm
going to want from each of the parties is as follows.
Defendant!Counter-Claimants, the
I want the Defendant/Counter-Claimants,
Maile parties, to present written closing arguments and
proposed fmdings offact and conclusions oflaw. I'm
PlaintifflCounter-Defendants, the
going to give the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants,
Taylors, the same opportunity to present written closing
arguments and proposed findings offacI and conclusions
oflaw.
Page 410
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1 much as I can, Mr. Charney.
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MR. CHARNEY: I understand. I just -- you know, I
just don't want to belabor the Court with something
that's not really important for your consideration.
That's my primary concern.
THE COURT: Okay. But that's still your -- it's
your call, and I want you to know that, that I'm giving
you leave to run your case the way you want to.
Now, we'll come back in at five after. And
if we don't have any -- if we don't come back in for
evjdence and testimony tomOIrow, what I intend
additional evidence
to do is just sort of layout for you -- because we're
going to be out of time for oral closing arguments and so
forth, and I would probably be asking the parties to
submit written fmdings of fact and conclusions oflaw
anyway -- I've sort of worked out a schedule that I'll
advjsement
give to you so that I can get everything under advisement
in fairly short order, so that I can render a decision in
due course.
We'll come back here at five after, by that
clock; okay?
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
(Recess taken 1:55 p.m to 2:08 p_m.)
p.m.)
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Now, ordinarily then, what I would allow, if
this was a jury trial or, frankly, if it was a Court
trial where I was taking, you know, just oral closing
Defendant!Counter-Claimants,:
arguments, I would give the Defendant/Counter-Claimants'l
..
the Mailes, an opportunity, then, to make a rebuttal
closing argument, because, it seem to me, it's their
of proving the elements and the amounts of damages
burden ofproving
on the unjust enrichment claim.
But, in this case, I don't see where there
would be any harm to do it this way. I'm going to allow
PlaintiffiCounter--Defendants, as
the Counter-Defendants, PlaintiffiCounter·-Defendants,
well, to present written rebuttal closes, and they'll be
simultaneously due.
So, I'm going to give the parties a week,
until a week from Friday, at close of business, which
would be -- yeah, tomorrow's the 13th -- no later than
5:00 o'clock, October 20th, which is one week from
Defendant!
tomorrow, to present, simultaneously, the Defendant/
Counter-Claimant's written closing arguments and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1NI1tten
The PlaintiffiCounter-Defendant's 1Nritten
ftndings of fact and
closing arguments and proposed fllldings
conclusions oflaw are due at the same time.
One week after that, which will be
December 27th --I'm
-- I'm sorry -- October 27th, at 5:00
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o'clock, each of the parties can give the Court a
rebuttal close, just to rebut what the otb.er parties have
given us, given the Court, and that's it. I'm going to
limit the -- I'm going to put a page limit on the
post-trial briefmg material.
Do the parties believe that they can get by
with just 25 pages each?
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that includes I~verything. So you
every:hing in four or
can -- if you think you can cover evety1:hing
five pages, feel free. But if you need more than that,
I'm going to give you up to 25 pages apiece.
MS. TAYLOR: In both of our --
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
THE COURT: Yeah. Just written closing argument
and proposed fmdings of
fact and conclusions of
law, 25
offact
oflaw,
pages grand total. Then, I'm going to limit each of the
parties to no more than 10 pages on your rebuttal close,
and those will also be simultaneously made.
That way, I will consider that I'll have
this matter fully under advisement end of business
October 27th, two weeks from tomorrow. And I will issue
a written decision on all matters before the Court in due
course. And, of course, I have the 30-day rule. So
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to tell me what you have to tell me about that.
other que,"on,
questions about what it
Are there any oth..is that I'm looking for? I want to have this thing
completely
comp~etely done, so that when
wh~ I -- so that I have no more
questlons, so that I'm not looking around for any more
I··
questions,
more: argument at that
factual information, not taking any mort::
point. I'mjust basing it on all of the facts, and all
of the law of the case, and all of the history of this
case and, finally, on the arguments of the parties, and
render a final decision which will be, obviously, an
appealable decision at that point.
MR CHARNEY: Okay.
MRC~Y:Ob~
MS. TAYLOR: I have only one concern, Your Honor,
on the attorneys' fees issue. Without disclosing any
amounts, I think it's safe to say that we have made an
offer ofjudgment.
of judgment. Obviously, your fmal decision will
need to be looked at, and our attorneys' fee issue on the
unjust enrichment will be greatly dependant on your final
decision.
THE COURT: Okay. And what you can do, then --are you telling me that you want to -- you don't want to
of judgment was;
disclose to the Court what the offer ofjudgment
right?
MS. TAYLOR: I don't think we're supposed to.
THE COURT: I don't think you should, either. So,

Ii

I

Page 412

you'll have it sometime in November.
I can't tell you exactly when I'll do it,
because I have a big trial starting Wednesday that will,
4 you know, take most of my time through about
5 mid-November. But I'll do the very bel;t I can, and
6 certainly get it out, you know, because [realize this
parties.
7 matter is terribly important to all partie;;.
concl~rn ourselves with
8
MR. CHARNEY: Would we concl~rn
-
9 attorneys' fees in this -laTH
E COURT: Yes, I'd like you to, because that's
10
THE
11 going to be an issue, as well.
12
MR. CHARNEY: All the old arguments, or just as
1 3 relates to this portion of the case?
14
THE COURT: Well, that's a good questions. I
15 would like to have this matter completely under
1 6 advisement, so that -- what I've been planning to do is
1 7 write a decision that covers absolutely everything.
happ~med up to this
18
And we're aware of what's happ~med
1 9 point, up to the time the Supreme Court rendered its
2 0 decision, then the subsequent ruling that I made, you
21 know, after their ruling. And I really do want to take
22 up everything, including attorneys' fees and costs
23 issues; okay?
24
There's also the issue of, I know, the
2 5 prejudgment interest. That would be an appropriate time
1
2
3

Page 414

1 what you might do then is mention that fact in your
2 closing arguments --3
MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
4
THE COURT: -- in this post-trial material.
5
MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. And we -- there would be the
6 potential to come back with that'?
7
THE COURT: Which would be okay, as well.
8
MS. TAYLOR: All right.
9
THE COURT: I'd be all right with coming back and
1 0 taking some additional argument and so forth on the issue
11 of costs, and fees, and interest, and everything else, if
12 we need to; okay?
MR. CHARNEY: Are you wanting a memorandum of
13
14 costs and fees at this point, or we should wait --IS
THE COURT: Oh, we should wait. We probably
15
1 6 should wait. So, I guess what I should ten you is I
1 7 should -- we really should, I guess, leave costs and
1188 attorneys' fees off.
MR. C~Y:
19
CHARNEY: Okay.
THE COURT: Is that what both parties are sort of
20
21 suggesting?
MR. C~Y:
-
22
CHARNEY: I prefer just to address
address-THE COURT: Yeah.
23
MR. CHARNEY: -- what the amounts on this part
2244
25 would be.

.
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1
THE COURT: Which is exactly what you would be
2 doing if I just took oral argument, here, at the end of
3 the
~cu~
case.
4
MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
5
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I think I'm ready to go
6 on this. I think the way I'll approach lhis is to sort
7 of -- just so that you know, it might be helpful in
8 preparing your proposed findings and conclusions and
9 arguments -- I think what I'll try to do is -- what I do
10 sometimes, in a case like this -- and what I mean by that
11 is a case with a nwnber
number of complex issues and quite a
12 complicated history -- I will sort of set
sel: up an
13 analytical grid that would be consistent with the way I
14 would advise a jury in post-proof
post-proofjury
jury instructions, if
15 this case were going to be decided by a jury.
16
1'I'll
11 try to frarne the questions that way and
16
17
1 7 analyze them, you know, in that manner.
18
MS. TAYLOR: Kind oflike a proof chart?
19
THE COURT: Yeah.
20
MS. TAYLOR: The elements are -21
THE COURT: Something like th2t.
th2et. Okay. I think
22 that's it. I want to compliment both sides. I think it
23
2 3 was
wu a well-tried case. I'm glad -- I know that all you
24
2 4 folks are somewhat relieved by the fact that we finally
25 got this case to trial. This, I understand also, is just
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BOISE, IDAHO
April 2, 2007, 3:09 p.rn

i

;

Court will
w:i11 take up Taylor vs.
THE COURT: The Cowt
Maile, Case No. CVOC 040043 D.
This is a hearing on a request for additional
records to be included in the appellate file; correct?
Ii1
MR.
it. t . ' !
MR.. MAILE: Yes, Judge. That's pmi of i
THE COURT: Okay. And what else? Oh, sanctions? ,(~
MR.
well. e l l . !
MR.. MAILE: Yes. There is that as w
i
THE COURT: What else?
i
MR. MAILE: Then there's a motion to reconsider
memorandwn decision dated November 29,2006, and aaii
the memorandum
motion to strike and objection to clerk's record.
.~
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Maile, you have a motion to
t o lI.i
reconsider that was filed on December 8th, a motion to
strike pleadings filed by the respondent on the 14th of
Iii."
February, and the objection to the clerk's record.
MR. MAILE: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Okay. I'll hear your
argwnent, Mr. Charney -- I mearL Mr. Maile.
argument,
11
MR.
MR.. MAILE: That's okay.
I!
THE COURT: Mr. Charney was just in here a few
!i
minutes ago.
i,
MR. MAILE: Well, he's on this case, as well, so I
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sort of a pause in the action, probably. But I do want
to compliment both sides on being exceptionally
well-prepared, on both sides, and in handling this in a
very professional way. And I do appreciate the
importance, to both sides, of the imp011ant decision
that's facing the Court.
So if your written material is consistent
with the professionalism with which you both presented
your cases, and conducted yourselves during the course of
this trial, I'll be real well-prepared to make a
decision.
Thank you very much. Court will be in
recess.
(The proceedings concluded at 2: 18 p.m.)
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can understand the Court's issue.
of hearing properly set
Judge, our notice ofhearing
forth the three items that we're asking this Court to
address today, and the Court has just indicated those
issues are on the table.
of the -- the first thing that we need to
One ofthe
have the Court address is, back in November 29, 2006,
Court entered its memorandum decision and order.
this Cowt
And that was ultimately fought -- a judgment was entered,
as a result of that memorandum decision and order, on
December 11, '06.
On December 8th of '06, we had filed our
motion to amend that memorandum decision and order. And
the issue that we're asking the Court -- it looks as
though, from our reading of the memorandum decision, the
Court did not address the issue of prejudgment interest.
And if -- if the -- I don't have the ex1libit
numbers with me, but there were two different documents
provided at the hearing, the trial, that related to the
payments made to the trust, totaling -- $400,000 worth of
payments were made.
We made a mistake in calculating the
.'
trial.
interest, by compounding it on the first day of tria!.
The second day of trial, we recalculated it and the
,nnrmnt on simple ;ntprpct
14? 0') 1 11.
amount,
interest, is ,II:$142,021.11.
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That -- both of those exhibits were admitted
into evidence. And it just hasn't been -- it wasn't
addressed in the memorandum decision. We're asking the
Court to either say yeah or nay to that issue and enter
the appropriate order on that.
So that -- we think it's rather simple and
straightforward. I do have a case, a recent case, cited
as Michael "Doc" Holiday vs. Mark Lindsey, and that's a
2006 opinion, No. 57-A, by the Court of Appeals. But
it's not a complicated issue.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Supreme Court's prior decisions that simple interest is
due and owing on amounts that are reasonably calculated
as liquidated or undisputed. And the record is clear,
receive:d. It's a
here, that those payments were receivt::d.
liquidated amount and we think this Court should allow
prejudgment interest.
The second issue that we have before the
Court, from our perspective, is that we initially filed
an objection to the Respondent's request for additional
records, dated February 15,2007. And upon reading the
appellate rules, we felt -- and cited that
thai -- cited the
appropriate appellate rules in our motion, which was
filed on February 21,2007
21, 2007 -- that there are time limits
imposed on augmenting the record.
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We think that the rules are straightforward.
I can appreciate where the Respondent is coming from,
based on their response to the objection and request for
sanctions. But I think -- if the Court wants me to hear
that now, I'll address it. Otherwise, I'll wait for
response, whatever the Court wants me to do.
TIIE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and cover the
whole field at this point.
MR. MAILE: Sure. I can't imagine this Court
being in a position of saying, you're sanctioned because
Rules., It seems rather
you followed the Idaho Appellate Rules"
far-fetched, but I've been wrong before.
And the response submitted by the Appellants
in this case, there isn't any authority cited for their
proposition that this Court is in a position, or has the
jurisdiction or power, to augment the record. So, we
think it's simple and straightfon'lard. I don't want to
belabor the point. But we think both of our motions are
meritorious and should be granted.
Thank you, Your Honor.
TIIE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, Mr. Maile.
And, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'll start with the
request to augment the record, if that's okay with the
Court.
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Respondents-
And it's the position ofthe Respondents-Appellants in this case,
excuse me, the position of the AppellarLts
the Respondents did not timely move. Under the Idaho
Appellate Rules 21 and 19, they had 14 days to request a
motion -- or request to augment the record. They didn't
do that. And the rules are directly on point, from our
perspective, as to their failure to do the same.
What's the redress for the Appellants -- or
the Respondents in this case, really it's not a
jurisdictional issue. But the Court, in our opinion,
does not have the authority, now, to look at that.
THE COURT: Only the Supreme Court can do that.
MR. MAILE: Only the Supreme Court has that.
THE COURT: I see.
MR. MAILE: So that is our position, based on the
rules.
That was filed. It wasn't noticed up for
hearing. And then, shortly thereafter, th~ clerks's
record, on March 1Ist
st I believe, was created, and we had
28 days to file our objection to the clerk's record. The
clerk's record does, now, include those items that
weren't timely requested.
So we have filed an objection to the clerk's
record, and that was file stamped March 20, 2007,
nOlJl UUl
reiterating our position as we stated on February
20th.

I,
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Our response does, indeed, cite Idaho
Appellate Rule 29. Under that, we have 28 days from the
date the clerk's record is received to request additional
documents or to object to documents that are included.
What happened in this case is, WI~ received a
notice of appeal that gave the impression of citing
everything that could possibly be relevant to the issues
raised on appeal. There were 98 different records cited.
cited,
In going through them more closely, we discovered that
the Appellate systematically omitted everything that the
plaintiff had submitted on the issues that were relevant
to the appeal.
I think the issue is whether the
Supreme Court will have the appropriate record as exists
before it, or if we'll have to do a motion to augment.
The Supreme Court will see to it that it has the
appropriate record. I think that the Appellant has a
duty to submit that, and that it is inappropriate, and
unethical, and sanctionable to intentionally omit records
that are required for the Court to review -- for the
Supreme Court to review this Court's decisions.
It, basically, was an effort to invite error,
saying, this is the record, you need to malce the
decision, knowing that he hadn't included very, very
relevant documents.

,

'.
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But our request was, if anything, early.
Under IAR
JAR 29, we had 28 days from the date we received
the record. It has been submitted. We ask -- and as I
read 29, this is the Court that issues the order settling
the transcript. That's why this hearing was noticed
before you. So you have the authority, under that rule,
to say, the transcript, as it has been submitted, is or
is not appropriate.
We didn't ask that anything be included that
should not have been included in his notice of appeal,
and leaving it out was just improper.
THE COURT: What about the other motion, the
motion to reconsider on the interest issue?
MS. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, our basis for
sanctions on noticing that up is that the motion said
that oral argument was not requested. We should not have
had to fly here and incur all of the expense for a
hearing on a motion that they had said ~ley didn't want a
hearing on.
All they needed to do was bring it to the
Court's intention that they had not requested a hearing
and hadn't gotten a decision on it. We briefed this
issue six different times, literally, from beginning to
end, upside down, every -- every which way. They're not
entitled to prejudgment interest because they didn't get
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that you agree with Mr. Maile, to the extent that he says
it doesn't seem to have been addressed at all.
Is that fair enough?
MS. TAYLOR: I think that's fair enough, Your
_.. it was -- a
Honor. In my -- in my opinion, it was _.,
denial of a motion for prejudgment interest was inherent
[.'
in refusing to grant a judgment.
But if -- I don't want there to be a
question. I don't want us to have to go up and come back
on just that one issue.
I
TIIE COURT: Sure.
THE
MS. TAYLOR: It seems to me like it's kind of a
I
Ii
housekeeping measure.
TIIE COURT: And I think Mr. Maile would agree,
THE
probably.
MR. MAILE: Well, I think it's housekeeping. But
I do believe that -- I do believe that this Court -- the
appeal has been involving the issue of the beneficiaries'
II
claim for summary judgment. And I think this Court still I!
has jurisdiction. Once we filed a motion to amend a
Ii
memorandum decision and order, this Court has continuing
jurisdiction on that narrow issue, until it's either
denied or granted or clarified; housekeeping, whatever
you want to call it. So I think this Court still has
jurisdiction to degree the issue raised.

:.
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a judgment.
-
THE COURT: Do you think that I should, though -I mean, obviously you don't think: that they're entitled
to anything. But, procedurally, do you think I still
have the jurisdiction to make a ruling on the motion to
reconsider the interest issue after the appeal has
already been filed?
MS. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, they have listed
the failure to grant prejudgment interest in the notice
of appeal. I would like to see the Court issue an order
denying the request for prejudgment inten:st, just so we
don't get into a situation where the Supreme Court fmds
that it isn't ripe for appeal --.
THE COURT: Oh, I see.
_. because there isn't a decision.
MS. TAYLOR: -,And it could be.
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. .And
I mean, I suppose that the Court -- the Court has limited
jurisdiction after an appeal has been filed. There are
certain things the Court still has the jurisdiction to do
and certain things that the trial court can't do,
obviously.
And it sounds like both parties are :;aying,
that from your reading of the Court's memorandum decision
and order that Mr. Maile is referring to, that I could
-
have, at least, been clearer, or that perhaps mister --
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Now, granted, it was -- we listed it as a
motion that did not need oral argument, but for some
reason it never got addressed.
THE COURT: Well, let me just suggest this.
Perhaps the best way to handle the interest issue is just
simply approach it as a -- I mean, I could say one of two
things. I could say, look, this Court intended to
address that issue and intended that the court order that
I issued previously covered that particular issue. And
the fact is, I denied it, in just -- in an abundance of
caution.
But it seems to me, if I were to come back
and say, you know, I denied it, but on second thought,
I'm going to grant it. Then I might not ha.ve
jurisdiction to do that. That's the way I would look at
it.
Do you see a what I mean?
MR. MAILE: I see your -- I see your logic.
THE COURT: So I think what I'll do -- is there
anything else that either of the parties want to bring
up?
MS. TAYLOR:
T AYLOR: Your Honor, I just had one brief
comment on the merits.
They have only argued for prejudgment
interest under 28-22.104. Our'
'"'. cites why those
Our briefing
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sections don't apply in this case.
On the Holiday vs. Lindsey case, that's the
only Idaho case in which they address prejudgment
interest in an unjust enrichment claim, which is where we
are at this point. And in that case, what the -- I can't
remember if it was the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals -- but the Court held that in an unjust
enrichment claim, the only way you can get prejudgment
interest is if you can show that the money which was
obtained wrongfully was invested, and 1hat
lhat the defendant
in that case had actually received intereBt on it, if you
see what I mean.
You can't get prejudgment inten:st in an
unjust enrichment unless you show that the person who had
the money actually received interest the:nselves.
THE COURT: Oh, I see.
MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. That's wha1
whal the Holiday
case -- and there was no testimony, no evidence of any
kind, in this case, that that occurred. So, under that
case, they wouldn't be entitled to prejudgment interest.
THE COURT: Let me look at that again. That was
Judge Sticklin's case involving a fairly recent appellate
decision.
Do you remember -- of course you do,
Mr. Maile, if it was Court of Appeals or Supreme Court?
Page 428
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It must have been Supreme Court.
MR. MAILE: No. It was Court of Appeals.
THE COURT: It was Court of Appeals?
MR. MAILE: Judge Lansing.
THE COURT: Okay. I'll take a look at that one
again. Okay. I'll take a look.- Let me take this under
advisement, and I'll issue a written decision on both of
the issues, on the augmentation or objection to the
record, and then the jurisdictional issue of -- on the
interest, prejudgment interest issue, as well. And I
will issue an opinion real quickly.
MR. MAILE: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, folks. The
Court will be in recess.
(The proceedings concluded at 3:24 p.m.)
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
flkJa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED
BY DEFENDANTS AND IN
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W.
TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

The plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney of record, Thomas Maile IV,
and provide this Supplemental Memorandum BriefIn Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
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Summary Judgement, and provides:
1. The Extend of Pleadings in Case Cv 2004-00473d Has No Bearing in the Present
Matter.

The defendant Connie Taylor's affidavit of April 1,2009, has attached the Idaho
Repository printout from case CV 2004-00473D. The attachment serves no purpose for the
court's considerations in the pending motions. The plaintiffs can not be held responsible for the
defendants' action in committing a fraud upon the court and criminal acts some two years into
the prior litigation. It was the action of the defendants which led to the court entering the
"Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" in July 2006. It was this act which gave rise to the
damages sustained by the plaintiffs and the claims for relief which ripened upon the entry of the
judgment. The record if anything established the breadth of the defendants' misconduct.
2. The Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged a Legal Malpractice Claim Against the
Defendant Attorneys.
The defendant attorneys have briefed the point oflaw that there can be no claim oflegal
malpractice against Clark & Feeney and their attorneys. The plaintiffs have properly alleged a
count of negligence against the professional defendants.
The claim of negligence against all the defendants did not accrual until there were

damages which only resulted upon the entry of the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim". There
was not any objective proof of actual damage until that occurred. See Fairway Development Co.
v. Peterson, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993); Chicoine v.
Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,487,835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). To hold otherwise "would foment
future litigation initiated on sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely
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consequence of seeing actions barred by limitations." City of Mccall V. Buxton
(2009-10-0126.114); Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986).
There is no allegation that the plaintiffs had any attorney-client relationship. To establish
a claim for professional negligence, a claimant must show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part ofthe lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that
duty; and (4) the failure to perform the duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
the client. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623,627 (2004) (citing
McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004).
In the present matter the plaintiffs claim among other things, the defendants were

negligent in misrepresenting to the court their clients' status as beneficiaries under the trust,
when in prior sworn pleadings and prior testimony it was established that the individual Taylors'
mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust as a result of the Disclaimer Agreement. The
attorneys prepared the documentation containing the perjured testimony, had previously prepared
documents containing the true facts, filed pleadings asserting facts the attorneys knew were not
true, and had participated in court proceedings establishing the true fact that the individual
sole beneficiary of the trust.
Taylors' mother was the sale

The allegations of the amended complaint, allege conduct and an agreement between the
defendants to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an
unlawful manner. Such a civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief. The essence of a
cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the objective ofthe
conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1 PO

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS - Pg 3

001249

(2007). Such wrongful conduct give rise to a number of civil remedies, to wit: (1) the defendants
and their attorneys committed wrongful acts that are prohibited under the Idaho Racketeering
Statue (Count Eleven); (2) the defendants committed acts that constitute abuse of process (Count
Five); (3) the defendants committed a fraud upon the court (Count One); (4) the defendants
committed wrongful conduct in filing a verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an
earlier verified pleading previously submitted by the defendants before another tribunal,
requiring an imposition of a constructive trust (Count Two); (5) the defendants committed acts
constituting negligence and/or gross negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) the defendants
committed acts which constitute equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or judicial estoppel,
(Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve).
The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and
(4) damages. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (2004). As a
general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and not to
someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship. Harrigfeld v.
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698,838 P.2d 301
(1992). Our Supreme Court has indicated that a claim can exist between a non-client and an

attorney for a claim of negligence. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,
321 (2003).
The wrongful conduct on the part of all the defendants is actionable by acting in unison to
perpetuate a fraud upon the court and the commission of criminal behavior to accomplish an
unlawful objective. Without their active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would
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not have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum Decision and
Order, on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K), establishes
that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the trustee, Beth Rogers
demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. In addition, Judge
Wilper had previously ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and
equitable estoppel and its claim oftortuous interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13, 2006 (attached to
the Amended Affidavit In Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008, Exhibit "B"). The
trust could not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to
the trust. The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. The unlawful objective
was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by misrepresenting their status
as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. By misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries
the court restored the property to the trust. The plaintiffs were deprived by such actions of the
defendants in putting forth their proof of damages as allowed by Judge Wilper and defending the
monetary claims of the trust. As can be been seen from the transcript annexed to the Affidavit of
Thomas Maile Part 5 and the testimony contained therein, the plaintiffs had legitimate issues and

facts surrounding the claims of quasi estoppel, equitable estoppel, and tortuous interference of
contract claims against any claims ofthe trust. The plaintiffs sustained damages as of July 21,
2006 as a result of the entry ofthe "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims".
3. There Has Been No Determination on the Merits of the Defendants' Criminal
Activity or the Fraudulent Representations.
The plaintiffs raised the issue of the Taylors' standing in the prior ligation before the
SUPPLEMENT AL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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Idaho Supreme Court. The contention was simple, the Taylors and their counsel of record
committed multiple criminal acts and committed fraud in representing their status as
beneficiaries. When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues
raised, but upon the party who is seeking the relief See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho
635,641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985
P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues ofthe fraud
and misrepresentation of the Taylors and their counsel before the district court. The Idaho
Supreme Court did not have to consider the same on its merits, since as the Supreme Court
determined the Taylors had standing in case CV 2004-00473D reserved by an "interest in the
litigation" as set forth in the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15,
2004. The material misrepresentations and the criminal behavior committed by the defendants
have not been considered on the merits. As stated, there are five factors required for collateral
estoppel to bar re-litigation of an issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against
whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided
in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented
in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party
against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Ticor
Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. There has been no determination of the issues of
fraud and criminal behavior of the defendants. There has been no determination on the merits of
the defendants' fraud and criminal behavior. The plaintiffs had no claim for relief until they
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sustained damages, (entry of "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims"). There is no bar to the
plaintiffs' claims based upon res judicata or collateral estoppel.

CONCLUSION
The various claims of the plaintiffs must withstand summary judgment including the
claims of negligence against the professional defendants. The defendants' motion to dismiss
and/or their motions for summary judgment must be denied as to all counts as neither res judicata
nor collateral estoppel apply to the present matter.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2009.

~E'N

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-Maile
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SUPPLEMENTAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS AND IN RESPONSE TO
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, together with (2) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART 5 by
having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by depositing the same
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384
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CLARK and FEENEY
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HELEN TA
nOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
TAnOR,
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make this affidavit from personal knowledge.
knowledge,
2,
2. I make this affidavit to reiterate and clarify my intentions as to the real property on Linder

Road, Eagle, IdahoIdaho.
3. This property was originally ovvned by my brother~
brother, Theodore Johnson, then transferred
into the Johnson Trust before being purchased by Ted Johnson's attorney, Thomas Maile IV, and

his m.fe
taken_by my sons ~ohn,
obn, Dal~an!.
Dal~an!.
~fe Colle~n.
Colle~n. It was my intent and understanding that all actions taken.by
and Reed in relation to the lawsuits trying to recover that property were done on behalf of all the
beneficiaries, including myself
myself.
When other members of the family decided they did not want to be involved in the lawsuit',

all the beneficiaries except my children and I rusclaimed
dtsclaimed their interest in the lawsuit against Maile,
All of the Taylor beneficiaries reserved the right to pursue that lawsuit. My children did ask that the
trustee's attorney include a provision which would allow my share of the cash in the trust to be
distributed to me, as all the other sisters has already been paid.
It has always been and remains my understanding and intention that the tenns ofmy
of my brother's

the Linder Road property. Under that Trust Agreement, I am entitled to
trust will be followed as to tile
inc'orne-from
myaeathtneproperty -wi1l1,-ass-to·
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shares. This was the understanding at the time of the signing ofthe
and has remained my understanding and intent through all proceedings in this matter.
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofldaho
ofIdaho and a member of
1

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson
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13

'7111 day of April, 2009.

14
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Notary Public ~ an? for the State of Idaho.
Residing at (l.,tfJiSJn1
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17

My commission expires:
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1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day ofApril,
of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addtessed to the
following:

2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

Thomas G. Maile, lV
380 West State Street
Eagle,ID 83616
Mark Prnsynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
10
10I1 S Capitol Blvd., 101h Floor
PO Box 829
Boise,ID 83701

o
o
D
~

o

o

o

K

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
939~1001
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939~1001

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
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11

12

Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants
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14
15

16
17

18

19
20

21
22

23
24
25
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SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 4837

4
5

IN TIm OISTRlCT
DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO~

6

7

8

REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

9

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

10
VS.
YS.

11

12

13

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
wife) THOMAS
MAILE, husband and wife,
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

14

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

15

)

16

)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )

17

TRUST,

18
. 19

20
21
22
23

24

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR
Re: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT

)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.
YS.

THOMAS MAlLE, IV and COLLEEN,
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----~-------~)
--------~--------------~)

EXHIBIT

25
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j

A
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)
) 58.

County of Nez Perce

)

1

R. JOHN T AYLORl being fust duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
2

3

4

1.

I am over the age of 18 years and make this Affidavit from personal knowledge.

2.
2,

After this Court's May 15,2006 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, I

5

contacted a banker and received preliminary approval for a mortgage on the property for $400,000.

6

The Trust also had a pending offer to purchase the property for $1,800,000.00 as soon as the litigation

7

if this matter had
was finished. We would have been able to return the purchase price to him promptly ifthis

S

not been appealed.
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

3.
3,

On May 18, 2006, Mr. Maile recorded a Lis Pendens against the Linder Road property

with the Ada County Recorder's office.
4.

After 1v1r. Maile appealed the order returning the property to the Trust, the prospective

purchaser ofthe
of the property withdrew his $1,800,000.00 offer because he was not willing to wait for the

appeal to be resolved.
S.

On March 25, 2008, Mr. Maile recorded a new Lis Pendens against the Linder Road

16
property after filing a lawsuit against all the Plaintiffs and their attorneys in this matter.

17

18

4.
4, After receiving the Supreme Court's opinion affirming that Judgment on January 30, 2009,

19

I again contacted the banker. I was advised that they are not able or willing to lend any money on the

20

removed. We have been approached by several parties
property \U1til the Lis Pendens is removed,

21

in making an offer

22

jnterest~'
interest~'

on the property, but have not
., received any firm offers because of the pending

litigation.

23

,.)

,

I i
i \

24

25
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day of February, 2009.

1

Nok). Public ilJ~d for the State of Idaho,
Residing at UU)/ r 1
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6
7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )~q day of February, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of this docwnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

8
9

10

Thomas Maile
Attorney at Law
380W. State
Eagle, ill 83616

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

o
o
o

e-t"!light Mail
Tele ! py (FAX)

11

12
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'-=

.•

Conme W. Taylor
Attorney for Plaintiffs

13
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1
2

3

4
5
6
7

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, Dallan Taylor
Trost
and the Theodore Johnson Tmst

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9

10

11

12

INVES1MENTS, LLC, an
BERKSHIRE INVESlMENTS,
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV OC 0723232
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

13

Plaintiffs,

14
15

vs.

16

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.

17

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendants.

18
19

Defendants Jo1m Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trus4 (referred 10

20

collectively as "Taylors") by and through their attorney of record, submit this memorandwn in

21

opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.

22
23

24
25

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
SUM:MARY
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUM:MARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS

1
I

26
I.AW OFFICE:5 OF
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L£WIS,.ON. lo,o.HO
L£WIS,.ON,
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001265
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NO, 1506
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I
SUMMARY OF FACTS
of 40 acres ofland
of land on
This is a second lawsuit relating to attorney Thomas Maile's purchase of40
1
2
3

$400,000. Mr. Maile filed this action
Linder Road in Eagle, Idaho, from his tenninally ill client for $400,000,

v, Maile, Ada C01.Ulty
04while an appeal was pending in the initial suit, Taylor v.
County Case. No. CV OC 04

4

00473D. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 2008, and an amended Motion to Dismiss

5

2008, The motions have two bases: first, there is
and/or for Summary Judgment on October 10, 2008.

6

bert.veen these Plaintiffs and the Johnson TrustJTaylors as beneficiaries; and
another action pending bet\.veen

7

judicata,
second, that the present case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
8

9

v, Maile. The
On January 30, 2009 the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Taylor v.

10

Supreme Court once again held that the Taylors had standing to pursue the suit against Maile, and

11

affrrtned the judgment which quieted title to the Linder Road land in the name ofthe
of the Johnson Trust.
affirmed

12

As a result of that ruling, the Taylors and the Johnson Trust filed an Amended Answer and

13

title, abuse ofprocess,
of process, intentional
Counterclaim on February 17,2009, asserting claims for slander of
oftitle,

14
15
16
17

18

19

interference with a prospective economic advantage, and seeking an award of fees and costs. Mr.
behalf of the defendants Clark
Prusynski filed a mirroring Amended Answer and Counterclaim on behalfof
and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and Paul Thomas Clark on March 12, 2009.

lV1r. Maile fIled his Motion for Swnmary Judgment regarding the counterclaims on March
lV1r,
17ll 2009, asserting that "the claims set forth in all of the defendants' counterclaim [sic] are barred
17

20

dispute,"
as a matter of law, and there are no material factual issues in dispute."
21
22
23

24
25
26

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS
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ARGUMENT

The Defendants' counterclaims are based on the assertion that the Mailes' claims are totally
1
2

of res judicata. Mr. Maile argues that it is entirely appropriate for him to file
barred by the doctrine ofres

3

this second lawsuit attempting to regain title to the Linder Road property, while the Taylors claim

4

that seeking to relitigate these issues is wrongful, has no basis in either law or fact, and is beillg done

5

for the purposes of harassment and to delay and increase the cost of litigation.

Because the

6
7

this point for Maile to seek swnmary judgment.
8

9

2.

There are genuine issues of material fact

10

The overriding issue of material fact in regard to the counterclaims is whether the current

11

action is frivolous because it is barred by the doctrine oires judicata, Now that the Idaho Supreme

12

of the case also applies. There is a genuine issue of
Court has issued its ruling, the doctrine oflaw ofthe

13

ofthe Linder Road property, or whether
fact as to whether Maile has a colorable claim to o-wnership
o'WUership ofthe

14

15
16

this lawsuit
laWSuit was flied
fLIed merely out of malice and for purposes of harassment.
A.

Slander of title. The Plaintiffs argue that the filing of a lis pendens can not

17

support a slander oftitle
of title claim, because it is merely notice that a lawsuit is pending. TIl at argwnent,.

is

of title when there has been
however, is overly simplistic; a lis pendens may be found to be a slander oftitle

19

a detennination that the party who recorded it did not have a colorable claim
claim. to 0'"nership in the real

20

property. See, for example, the folloVting
follov.,ring cases:
21

22
23
24

25
26

(1) Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007). There are several alternative
of relief in the case of
of process;
avenues ofreliefin
ofaa wrongful lis pendens filing, including a claim for abuse ofprocess;

:MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS
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~--"

the wrongful filing of a lis pendens can also be remedied through actions claiming slander of title
and intentional intetference
interference with contractual relationship.
relationship,
1

Bricknerv, OneLandDeve/opmentCo.,
OneLandDeve/opmentCo'l 742N.W.2d706(Minn.Ct.App.
(2) Bricknerv.

2
3
4

2007). Filing a document concerning ovmership of real estate known to be inoperative constitutes
a false statement for pw-poses of a slander of title claim.

5
6

7

Pond Place Parmers, Inc.
Inc, v,
(3) PondPlace
v. Poole, 351 S,C. 1,567 S,E.2d881 (Ct. App.
2002), The wrongfully recording of an unfounded claim against the property of another generally
2002).
is actionable as slander of title.

8

(4) Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 669 (Wis. App.

9

10

2000). There is a cause of action for slander of title if a false, sham, or frivolous lis pendens is

11

filed.

12
13

who places lis
(5) Exparte Boykin, 656 So.2d
So,2d 821 (Ala. App. 1994). One Who
pendens notice on property without a colorable claim of right to or interest in the teal property

14

subjects themselves to a claim for slander oftitle.
of title.

15
(6) Coventry Homes,
HomeS Inc. v.v, ScottscomPartnership, 745P.2d 962 (Ariz. App.
I

16
17

Div.l,1987). Notice of lis pendens was subject
sUbject to real property statute, which would render

18

person asserting a groundless interest in real property liable for damages.

19
20

(7)

tlul

Miceli v. Gilmac Developers, Inc., 467 So.2d 404 (Fla. App.2.

Dist.,1985). An intentional, wrongful filing of notice of lis pendens will support an action for

21

22

slander oftitle.

23
24

25
26
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(8) Shenefield v. Axtell, 274 Or. 279, 545 P.2d 876 (1976). Complaint
Compla.int for
slander of title stated a cause of action where it alleged the defendant maintained on county records
1
2

claim of
title to land he held in trust for plaintiff. The claim that plaintiffs had buyers ready, willing
oftitle

3

and able to purchase the property but that they were unable to sell property to them because of

4

defendant's recorded claim
claim. was a sufficiently specific allegation of special damages.

5
6

There is also a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mr. Mailes' filing ofthis lawsuit
ofmaterial
and the associated lis pendens was malicious. Because he is licensed as both a real estate broker and

7

an attorney, he must be held to lIDderstand the impact of placing a cloud on the title, as well as the
8

9

legal doctrines of res judicata and the law of
the case. A number of courts have taken the view that
ofthe

10

the malice or bad faith necessary to support an action for slander of title based upon wrongful

11

recordation may be implied from the lack of foundation
fOlmdation for the claim recorded, in the absence of

12

countervailing evidence affirmatively establishing the defendant's good faith. Malice merely means

13

lack of legal justification and is presumed if the disparagement is false,
false) caused damage, and is not

14

privileged. Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st
1st Dist. 1965) See also Fountain v.
15
16

Mojo, 687 P.2d 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (property owner's title was slandered by recording of lis

17

ofpurchase
pendens, in lawsuit agreement for breach of
purchase where malice of purchaser, an attorn?)'., was

18

shown by recording of lis pendens, in action for damages only, p\.lIchaser
ptlIchaser refused to release lis
Hs

19

pendens until return of earnest money and deposit offunds
of funds in escroW by owner, and where owner's

20

attorney's fees in removing lis pendens constituted special damages); Contra Costa County Title Co.

21
22

23
24

25

26

v. Waloff, 184 Cal. App. 2d 59, 7 CaL Rptr. 358 (1st Dist. 1960) (On evidence that documents

clouding title were filed in attempt to pressure seller into consenting to modification or rescission
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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of contract, where it appeared that buyer was experienced in legal and real estate matters and had
threatened suit in attempt to coerce seller, malice was properly found.)
1

2
3

There are genuine issues of material fact on the cOtUlterclaim
cOl.U1terclaim for slander of title which
preclude summary judgment.
B. Abuse of process

4
5

6

The Defendants have alleged (and the Plaintiffs have denied) that the Plaintiffs have
affinnativelyused a legal process (this second lawsuit) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose

7

outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was not
8
9

designed (i.e. keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of his loss in Taylor

10

v,
Maile),
v. Maile).

11

to Affidavit of COlUlie
Connie W. Taylor in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on

12

13

The Affidavit of John Taylor filed in the Taylor v. Maile case (attached as an Exhibit

Counterclaims) shows that the Taylors have lost an opportunity to sell the property for $1.8 million,
and have lost additional opportunities to sell the property because of this litigation.

There is a

14

15

16
17

18
19

of the process," a fact which will
genuine issue as to whether filing this second action was a "misuse ofthe
be decided when this court rules on the Defendants' pending motions and request for sanctions under
Rule II.

C. Intentional Interference with a prospective economic advantage.

There are also genuine issues of material fact as to the counterclaim for intentional

20

interference with a prospective economic advantage.
21
22

23

The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage
are as follows: 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2) lmowledge of the expectancy

24
25

26
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on the part of
the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing texmination
tel1llination ofthe
of the expectancy; (4)
ofthe
the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that
1
2

the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to

3

the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Idaho First National Bank v,v. Bliss Valley

4

Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-85,824 P.2d 841,859-60 (1991).

5
6

The trial court rulings in Taylor v. Maile, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, establish the
the Taylors' ownership of the land, and it cannot be questioned that Mr. Maile has been
validity of
ofthe

7

painfully aware of these rulings and has intentionally prevented the Taylors from selling the land.
8
9

The Defendant Clark and Feeney also has an o'WIlership
o'Wllership interest in the land by virtue of their

10

contingent fee agreement. The Affidavit of John Taylor referred to in the preceding paragraph

1l
11

shows that the Taylors have been damaged through the lost opportunities to sell the property because

12

ofthis
Mr. Maile's interference is for an improper purpose
of
this litigation. The Taylors have alleged that M!.

13

and through improper means - wrongfully filing a second lawsuit in an effort to relitigate issues

14

15

16

which he has already raised repeatedly and lost on, repeatedly. As an attorney. he must be held to
the highest ethical standards, and required to comply with Rule 11, which requires that pleadings be

17

fact. warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
filed only when they are well grounded in fact,

18

fot the extension, modification, Or reversal of existing law, and not interposed for any improper

19

purpose, such as to harass 01' to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation.
of litigation.

20

ofwhether
The question of
whether there is any merit whatsoever to this lawsuit creates an issue offact

21
22

which precludes summary judgment on this counterclaim.

23
24

25

26
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CONCLUSION
1

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore
2
3
4

5

summary judgment
Johnson Trust respectfully request that this court deny the Plaintiffs' motion for summaryjudgment
counterclaims,
on the Defendants' counterclaims.
Q1~1
c;lf~l

DATED this...ll..this...il- day of April, 2009.

6
7
8

9

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11

12
13

~ day ofApril,
of April, 2009 I caused to be served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -C:Lcorrect copy of the foregoing docwnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
(?,tn

14

15

16

O. Maile, IV
Thomas G.
380 West State Street
Eagle,ID 83616

17

Mark Prusynski

18

19
20

MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10lblh Floor
POBox 829
Boise, ID 83701

o
o
D
~
~

o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Ovem' cr~-PdUII'l'1
T copy (F ) (208) 385-5384

o
o
~

,(

21
22

Co ,'e W, Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

23
24
25

26

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
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ISBA No,
No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
DaHan Taylor
John Taylor, Dallan
and the Theodore Jolmson Trost
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IJEP'
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IN TIm DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF mE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

10
11

lNVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
BERKSHIRE :INVESTMENTS,
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAlLE husband and
wife,

12
13

14

15
16

17
18
19

Case No, CV OC 07 23232

Plaintiffs,
W, TAYLOR IN
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W.
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
FORSU~RYJUDGMENTON
CONNIE WRlGHT TAYLOR, flk/a CONNIE COUNTERCLAIMS
DALLANTAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
T. CLARK an individual;
partnership; PAUL T,
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RlGHT
TO POSSESSION
vs.

20

Defendants.

21
22

23

STATE OF IDAHO

)

of Nez Perce
County ofNez

) ss.
)

24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

1
LAW OFFICE;5
OFFICE:S OF"

CLARK

AND
ANO

FEENEY

e.~SOI
LEWISTON, fCAHO e~501

001273

APR, 8, 2009 2: 45PM

CI

AQK

NO, 1507

& FEENEY ATTY

p,P. 3/12

TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
CONNIE TAYLOR,

1, I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofldaho and a member of
1

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants JOM Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson
2

3
4

Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal
knowledge.

5

2, I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Affidavit ofR. John
2.

6

Taylor Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Payment of Judgment filed in the Taylor v. Maile case

7

Ada County Case No. CV DC 04 00473D.

8

9

DATED this

--.i!!:.. day of April, 2009.

10
11

12
13
14

15

16
17

Co

e aylor

!/'
7

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Lf !,day
Aday of April, 2009.
.....-.,._..-...~

/"f

! fl!)114KA

( t"all( )

Notary Public 'n and for the State ofIdaho.
Residing at
I
therein.
My commission expires: d3 01.1" 'Z, ,

18

19
20

21
22
23

24
25

26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

2
LAW OFFle!:5
OFFICE:5 OF'

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWI5TON, IDAHO 83501
001274

APR, 8.2009
8,2009 2:45PM
APR.

CI

'~K

& FEE~IEY ATTY

NO. 1507

P,P. 9/12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofApril,
of April, 2009J I caused to be served atrue
a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

2
3

Thomas G. Maile
Maile~ IV
380 West State Street
Eagle
Eagle~ ID 83616
J

4
5
6
7

8

9

J

Mark Prusynski
MOFFAIT mOMAS
10 I S Capitol Blvd
Blvd.•.• 10
lommFloor
101
POBox 829
Boise, ID 83701

o
o

o

1"
1"'
o

o
o

r'

~'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
385..5384
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385..5384

11

12

Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23
24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

3
!.-AW 01"1'1<:£:8 OF
I,.AW

CLARK

AND

FEENEY
001275

I..E:WI5TON. IDAt-lO
IDAI-lO 931501
9.31501
I.E:WI5TON,

APR. 8.2009 2:45PM

Cl~DK

&FEENEY

ATTY

NO. 1507
NO,

--

P. 10/12

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1

1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285

2

Lewiston,
Lewiston~ Idaho 83501

3

Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 4837

4

5

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE

6

7
B

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

)
)

Case No. CV DC 0400473D

)
9

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

10

\IS.

11

12
13

DefendantslCoWlter-Claimants.
15

17

18
. 19

20
21
22

23

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR
Re: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

COMPEL PAYMENT OF .nJDGMENT

MAILE~ IV and COLLEEN
THOMAS MAILE,
)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
)
MAJLEREAL ESTATE COMPANY,
and BERKSIDRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )

14

16

)

)
)
)

)
THEODORE L,
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
TRUST,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)

VS.

)
MAlLE~ IV and COLLEEN,
THOMAS MAILE,
MAILE) husband and wife, and

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

24

EXHIBIT

I A

25

26

AFFIDAVIT OF R.. JOHN TAVWR

1

iJ,W OFf"II:E:5
OFf"II:!!:5 OF
IJ,W

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON. IDAHO &3501
LEWISTON,

001276

APR, 8,2009 2:45PM

STATE OF IDAHO

Cl6~K

&FEENEY

ATTY

NQ,1507
NO,
1507

P,11/12
P.11/12

)
) SS.

COWlty of Nez Perce

)

1

R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
2

3
4

1.

I am over the age of 18 years and make tms Affidavit from personal knowledge,

2.

After this Court's May 15,2006 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs,

5

contacted a banker and received preliminary approval for a mortgage on the property for $400,000.
$400,000,

6

The Trust
Trost also had apending offer to purchase the property for $1,800,000.00 as soon as the litigation

7

was finished, We would have been able to return the purchase price to him promptly ifthis
if this matter had

8

Dot been appealed.
9

10
11
12

3.

On May 18,2006, Mr. Maile recorded a Lis Pendens against the Linder Road property

with the Ada County Recorder's office,
office.
4,

After Mr. Maile appealed the order returning the property to the Trost,
Trust, the prospective

13

purchaser ofthe property withdrew his $1,800,000.00 offer because he was not willing to wait for the

14

appeal to be resolved.

15

S.

On March 25~ 2008, Mr. Maile recorded a new Lis Pendens against the Linder Road

16
property after filing a lawsuit against all the Plaintiffs and their attorneys in this matter.
17

18

4,
4. Afterreceiving the Supreme CoUlt's
Court's opinion affinning that Judgment on January 30, 2009,

19

I again contacted the banker. 1was advised that they are not able or willing to lend any money on the

20

property until the Lis Pendens is removed,
removed. We have been approached by several parties interes4

21

in making an offer

22

on the property,
property~ but have ~ot rec~ived
rec~ived any finn offers because of the pending

litigation,
litigation.

23
24
25
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

.2

26
I,.AW
I"AW Ojl'jI'ICC5
OI"I"'CCS OP

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

L.e:WISTON, IDAHO 6~$OI
6~$O'
I.e:WISTON.

001277

APR. 8.2009
8,2009

2: 46PM

NO. 1507

CI !OK & FEENEY ATTY

-'

P,P. 12/12

C'I~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of February, 2009.
1

No~ary Public iUand for the State of Idaho.
{,.(,dJl1[} 1
Residing at
U,IiJli[}
therein.
My commission expires: u75!G&/' 2tJi '-/

2
3

4

5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2009.
2009, I caused to be served a tIUe
true
and correct copy of this document by the method indicated below•.
below,. and addressed to the following:

7

(.;Y

8

Thomas Maile

9

Attorney at Law

10

380 W. State
Eagle, ill
ID 83616

~

o
o
o

11
•• r
,r'

12

Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Plaintiffs

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21

22
23

24
25

AFFIDA vrr OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

-~.--'lI-----~.--'I~-

3
LAW OFFICES

CLARK

AND

O~

FEENEY

LE:WI5TON. IDAHO B31501

001278

21'2
P.p, 2/'2

1m 1507

& FEENEY ATTY

CI'~K

APR, 8,2009 2:43PM

NO.----~~~~~d_:_AM
FUJP._.M

<.'

ORIGINAL
1
2

3
4
5

6

APR 08 20ml
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cle
By DARLENE

W, TAYLOR
CONNIE W.
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants

BOVlt~K
BOVlt~1<

DEPUT'I
DEPUT"

John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8

9
10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTNIENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE,IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

12

Plaintiffs,
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

13
14
15
1~

17

18

19
20

vs,
vs.

CONNlE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/klaCONNIE
TA YT nR. 'all inrlhrinll'al; n~ TT
T T ~l\TT~ YT Ill?
i;Ul Iml1v1l1ul;Il;
Imllvil1ui;ll; CLAltK lUll! rt~~Ne"r",
:rt~~l{~"r", 11
partnership; PAUL T.
T, CLARK an individual;

THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.

21
22

Case No. CV OC 07 23232

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) S6.
SS,

23

County of Nez Perce

)

24

25

26

TIIIRD SUPPLEMENTAL

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

1
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY
001279

LEWISTON.
LEWISTON, IDAHO BaSOI

8,2009
APR, 8.2009

2: 43PM

C[AQK
CIAQK

NO, 1507

& FEENEY ATTY

P.p, 3/12

I.
CONNIE TAYLOR} being first dilly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney duly
dUly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member (If
1

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson

2
3
4

Trust in the above entitled matter. The infonnation contained herein is of my own personal
knowledge.

5

2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Motion for Order

6

of Sums Due and Owing and Interest filed by Mr, Maile in the Taylor v.
v, Maile
Compelling Payment ofSums

7

case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D.

8
9

DATED this

~ day of April, 2009.

10

11

'onnie Taylor

12
13

14
15

16

17

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
,

_
_-,/

6E/hth day of April, 2009.
,rf
.rf

!I«tlilLi' It(

Lf"'UfLU
Lf"'ttfLeJ

Notary Public' and for the State of Idaho.
Residing at ~=,-!/'IJ.L¥....J..,I..~I-+-_""'"
/,
therein.

My commission expires: ------=f-f.'-~~~-I

18
19
20

21
22

23
24
25

26

THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY
001280

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

APR, 8,2009 2:43PM

Cl~QK

&FEENEY

NO, 1507
NO.

ATTY

P.p, 4/12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise) 1D 83701

o
0
o
0
o
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

o0

U,S, Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385~5384
385~5384

~\

D

rr
o0

10
11

12

annie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23
24

25

THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

3

26
I"AW QFFICO:$ OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
IOAI-IO e3501
LE:WISTON, IOAI-lO
eS501

001281

APR,
APR. 8,2009
8.2009 2:44PM

&FEENEY

ClAOK

From~oa93S1001
From~oa93S1001

Page: 1/11

mOMAS G. MAlLE; IV
moMAs
Attorney at Law
380 WeS't.'State
WeS'r.·State Str~et· ,', ",
." '
Eagle, Jdahu
Idahu .s3616
'83616 .. ". ;;,, '"'.',
Telephone; (20~l939-1,OOO
(20~l939-1.O00
Pacsimile: (20Sy'939--1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

NO, 1507

ATTY

P.p, :i/12

Date: 211mOQ9
211m009 8;1~ AM

.'

:

Attorney for DefendiRts~Counte~,.paimants
DefendiRts~Counte~,.paimants
IN

m DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REEO
REED TAYLOR; DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOI-IN TAYLQR~
TAYLQR~ \
, Plaintiffs/Coun~J:'-Defendants,
,
v.
.' ·':;i.': r • '"

'"

'"

I'

•• ',

'II

••

I

',

THOMAS:MA:TiE IV and COLLEEN

MAlLEl,hu,sband
mOMAS
MAlLEl.hu,sband and, wife, maMAs
MAttE ~ ESTATE
esTATE COMPANY, and
MAlliE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LtC,
•

I

I

MOTION FOR ORDER
).JAVMENT OF
COMPELLING lJAVMENT
SUMS DUE AND OWING AND
INTEREST

j

•

04-00473D
Case No. CV OC 04..Q0473D

"

DcfetidiU1tS/Counter-Claima~ts .,
..

.
,
.,

.".".
.
',',

,",
,",

,

[.
c'

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUS~
TRUST,

', ,.

PlaintifilCouJ1ter":defett~an.t" .,
PhuntifilCouJ1ter-:defett~an.t"
't'

v,
v.

~.

j

.'

.'

•

moMAS·iMt\tu:;'tV a~d COliiEN
mOMAS'iMt\tu:;'tV
MA:lLE, 'huspapd'
'huspapd' an~ wife, and BERKSHIRE

ac.
lNVEStMENrS;
u.c.
.
~. '. ~ .;':
~

.

. " . .'

DefriiidintS/GounteI-cl,~im~l1ts.
•

•

"
I
.

I

I

".
"
,,
'

the i:;~fe~datJtrj&~~ter~C]aimants,
i:;~fe~datJtrj&~~ter~C]aimants,Tholnas
Thottlas Maile, Colleen Maile, and Berkshire
'the

Investments, Lie., by and throll~h their attorney, Thomas G. Maile, TV, and moves this
InveStments,
• ~
,

,

"

,

..,' .~. :.
','

. ! ,; :

I

I

•

" .

I'

MOTION FOR ORJ)ER
ORnER COMPELLtNG
COMPELLtN'G PAYMENT OF SUMS DUE AND OWING AND
INTEREST .:~~p',1.
.' ' "'.
.:~~p.l, " ,.
EXHIBIT
. ".' .
FA)<maker fax server. For more information, visit htlp:/fwww,gfLco
This fax was received by GFI F,ty<maker
http://www.gfLco
I

",

.,

"

j

A
001282

APR, 8,2009

2:44PM

CI

& FEENEY ATTY

AOK

From~089391 001
From~089391

NO, 1507

Page: 2111

Date: 211712009

P,p, V 12

8:'~ AM
8:1~

.

""

CQrnpelling the plaintiffs to pay the sums due and
HOnota~l~:Coutl: for the entry ofan Order CQtllpelling
.,

"

,

"

'~onditions imp<?sed by th~ courl,
court, as of July 21, 2006, together
owing putsu'antl:O the'tet1ns aM '~onditions

with interest
.. theteon until paid if! fl111.
"

puri:;ri~nt I,A.R.
I.A.R. Rule 13(1))(10) (13), and Idaho Code 28-22-104,
This Motion is-made pUri:;ti~nt

Mem~randum Brief in
together W'ith tne Affidavit ~f Th~~~s' Maile in support of the Motion, tbe Mem~randum
.
I.
.

'
,''
',

I,.
I,.

II

II

Support of Moti,on for Order Compelling Payment of Sums Due aDd Owing and Interest, filed
concurrently herewi.th together
'Ji]e herein.
togetber with' tht ,~cc:ord and 'file

OltAL AROUMENT IS REQUESTED UPON THE MOTION.

J1
day QfFebru~ry, 20 9.
.

riAtEth,his

'

•

I

'.J

;:

1
II
1 •"'

"
'f

•

":'~'~

,IV., Pro Se,

..

. ,
•

"

,,~,
"~'

,

••

ants/Counter-Claimants

"'1

, CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE

.~

\

of.February, 2009 t I caused a tl1le md correct
I Im~13r ~~pFY 111~t on, ~bis t1day of.February)

coPy of the foreg6irt
foregOirtg (1) ~OnON FOR O~gR COMPELLING PAYMENT OF SUMS nDE
AND OWlNG AND INTEREST, (;Z) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOnON
COMPELLiNG r AYMENT OF SUMs DTJ'E
DT.JE AND OWING AND INTEREST,
FOR ORDER' COMPELLING

(3) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAlLE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER
COMPEtt~G PAYMEm
PAYMEm oj"",~l :rt1~ DUE AND oWiNG AND lNT.6REST and (4) NOTICE
COMPEtt~G
HijAR.~G, to ttc (leJivered, add;'~~:M~~!l:~
add;'~~:M~~!I:~ follows: .
OF HijA:R~G,

Conn1c'~:,T~YI~r'
Connic'~:,T~YI~r'

()

CLARK and F'EBNBY' .'" ;'
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Lewiston)
74(j..9~6~
Facsintile: (208~ 74(j..9~6~

' (X)
()
,( ),
,(

•

.
I

I

I,

.,'

."

~".

,

~~

-

I

"III'~:

U. S. Majl
MajJ
V,
Facsimill; Transmission
Hand Delivery
Ovemight Deli.very

.

O. MA
" THOMAS G.
N to 50,
Defendants/Counter.Cla.imant,s
, Attorney 'for Defendants/Counter-Claimant,s

,'

.

I.

",'.

Mori<J:R>{?(»)t ORDERCOmELLlNG PAYl'mNT
PAyl\mNT OF SUMS DUE AND OWlNG AND
Mon<J:R>{?(»)t
INTEIRES,T~
INTEIRES,T~ ~
;

.;
• I

R"~
"

'Page 2 ":i:,

,'I""
"I""
\

I

.
",

.,

.'

'

I

'
'"

This fax MS r~cei"ed
r~cei"ed by GFI FAXmaker fEll( server.
server, For more information,
information. visit http://wv..w,gfi,com

001283

04/08/2009 16:36 FAX

-

2083855~Q4
2083855~Q4

1

MOFFATf THOMAS

-

@002l004

NO.

'---IAFii'LEi'ro;--s----
-------.A~~~D,-t5--·-----'p.M
__

A ..

A ..
____
M . M -_
-

APR 082009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By E. HOLMES
DEPUTY

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nmICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

JOINDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, ika CONNIE
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK. and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.

JOINDER-t
JOINDER-l

1184 783.1
Client 1184783.1

001284

)4/08/2009 16:37 FAX

2083855~Q4
2083855~Q4

-

1

MOFFATI THOMAS

141003/004

COMES NOW the Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark
and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark, and join in the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
For Summary Judgment on Counterclaims filed by Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and
the Theodore Johnson Trust, on the grounds stated in said defendants' motion, memorandum of
law and affidavits.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2009.
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &

os, CHARTERED

arry C. Hun r - Ofthe Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

JOINDER-2

Oient1184783.1

001285

04/08/2009 16:38 FAX

-

2083855~Q4
2083855~Q4

1

~ 0041004

MOFFATI' THOMAS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JOINDER to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE

380 W. State St.
ID 83616-4902
Eagle, ill
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY

1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 386-5055

JOINDER-3

IV, P.A.

(
(
(

) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
) Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail
( x ) Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( x ) Facsimile

Client:1184783.1

001286

--...'

RECE'VE~'

1

2

3
4
5

APR' 3 2009
Ada County c\er\(
c\er\<
CONNIE w. TAYLOR

J,

n:~\lH) i\LA.\lt,:-=~:~~), C-:\~!'~-f_
:~I,I f.... c!~,,_!< ~ c-:
i',.

CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
Dallan Taylor and the Johnson Trust

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

7

8
9

10

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS,
INVES TMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

11

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
12

13
14

15
16

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through

17

their attorney of record, submit this responsive memorandum in support of their motion asking that

18
19
20
21

22

23

this Court enter an order dismissing this action in its entirety and seeking an Order for Rule 11
Sanctions for the filing of this frivolous lawsuit.

I. UPDATE OF RELEVANT FACTS
Since the Defendants filed their Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment in October 2008, the following events have occurred in Taylor v.

24

25
26
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'Maile, Ada County Case CV OC 04-00473D, which is the action that has been pending since 2004

between these Plaintiffs and the Johnson Trust and its beneficiaries:
1

1.

On January 30, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in the latest appeal

2

3

of Taylor v. Maile (2009-ID-0202.l67). For the sake of clarity, that opinion will be referred to as

4

Taylor II In that opinion, the Supreme Court ruled, again, that the Taylors had standing to bring

5

an action against Mr. Maile and his LLC.

6

The Court ruled that the Disclaimer, Release and

Indemnity Agreement had specifically reserved the Taylors' ownership interest in the lawsuit against

7

the Mailes, and that summary judgment against the Mailes was proper. I I have attached a copy of
8
9

10

the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement hereto as Exhibit A for convenience of the court.

2.

On February 17, 2009, Mr. Maile filed a Motion for Entry of Order Compelling

11

Payment of Sums Due and Owing and Interest in Taylor v. Maile - i.e., seeking to enforce the very

12

judgment that he claims in the present action should be set aside. 2

13

That Motion was argued on

April 6, 2009. Judge Wilper denied the motion, ruling from the bench that the Taylors have no duty

14

to return the purchase price to Mailes as long as there are lis pendens which make the property
15

16
17

unmarketable. Judge Wilper will be issuing a written opinion which we will forward to this court
as soon as we receive it.

18

19
20

II. ARGUMENT

The Plaintiffs' filings in response to this motion give this Court a small taste of the last five
years of litigation in Taylor v. Maile. 3

Fortunately, it is not necessary for this Court to determine

21
22
23

I

A copy of that opinion was attached to the Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor dated February 5, 2009.

2 A copy of that motion is filed as Exhibit A to the Third Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor
dated April 8,2009.

24
3

25

26

See Idaho Repository attached to Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel dated April 1,2009.
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whether there is any merit to the multitude of
claims filed by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Mailes' own filings
ofclaims

1

abundantly illustrate that every fact raised in this current action either was or could have been raised

2

in Taylor v. Maile.

3

A.

4

5
6

7

There is no factual basis for the claims of misrepresentation or fraud on the
court in Taylor v. Maile

The Mailes' lawsuit seeks an order setting aside the judgments entered by the trial court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Taylor II.

•

8

The lawsuit is based on two allegations:

The Taylors (through their attorneys) misrepresented their status as beneficiaries
when they filed their Amended Complaint in Taylor v. Maile on March 2, 2006.
2006 . and

9
•

The Taylors (through their attorneys) wrongfully filed an action on behalf of the

10

11

Trust before they had been formally appointed as trustees.

4

12

1. Amended Complaint. In support of the assertion that the Taylors misrepresented their

13

status as beneficiaries when they filed their Amended Complaint, Maile points to a single line in a

14
15

single document - a Petition for Appointment of Trustees in the Johnson Trust filed on November
15, 2004 in Ada County Case No. SP OT 0400874M.

A copy of that petition (without the

16
17

attachments referred to therein) was attached to the Mailes' Amended Complaint filed in this case

18

on March 25, 2008. That petition contained a typographical error; it stated that Helen Taylor was

19

ofthe
the Theodore Johnson Trust by virtue ofthe
of the terms ofa
of a Disclaimer,
"the sole remaining beneficiary of

20

Release and Indemnity Agreement," when it should have stated that she was the sole remaining

21

direct beneficiary.

As the Supreme Court ruled in Taylor II, under the language ofthe Disclaimer

22
23

24

4 As a result of the order granting the motion for summary judgment in the beneficiaries' lawsuit, no
judgment was ever entered in the lawsuit filed by the Johnson Trust. Any claims relating to that complaint are
therefore moot, but will be addressed nonetheless for the sake of providing a thorough response to the Plaintiffs'
claims.

25

26
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Agreement, all ofthe Taylors had reserved the right to pursue the lawsuit against the Mailes and their
LLC.
1

What Mr. Maile has consistently failed to address is the fact that the typographical error was
2

corrected in an Amended Petition filed with the probate court on April 19,2005. 5 That document

3

4

clarified the fact that Helen Taylor's children were beneficiaries of the Johnson Trust.

5

Amended Complaint filed nearly eleven months later in Taylor v. Maile correctly stated that the

6

The

Taylors were beneficiaries of the Trust, a fact which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

7

There was no misrepresentation, no fraud on the court, no crime, no conspiracy, no theft, and no
8

negligence.

9

2.

10

Johnson Trust Complaint.

There was no misrepresentation or fraud on the

11

court relating to that Complaint. In the Disclaimer Agreement, all of the beneficiaries agreed that

12

the successor trustees would resign and the Taylors would take over as Trustees of the Johnson

13

Trust.

When Mr. Maile pointed out the need for court approval, the Taylors sought formal

14

appointment and it was granted over Mr. Maile's objection. 6
15
16

B.

17

In his appeal of the trial court's order granting summary judgment, Mr. Maile has already

18

Mailes unsuccessfully raised these same issues in Taylor v. Maile

unsuccessfully argued these same issues. 7

19

He argued that the initial petition filed in the probate court constituted a judicial admission

20
21
5 A copy of the Amended Petition is included as part of Exhibit T to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part
Three dated December 3 1,
I, 2008.

22
23 .
I
1

6

Defendants ask that this Court take judicial notice of the court file in Ada County Case. No. SP OT

0400874M

24
7

25
26

See Appellants' briefing attached as Exhibits X and Y to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four.
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that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the Johnson Trust and that the Taylors had

1

misrepresented their status to the lower court. 8

A copy of the initial Petition was attached as an
In the appeal, just as in the present

2

exhibit to that brief, which was dated November 14, 2007.

3

action, Mr. Maile did not acknowledge or discuss the fact that the petition had been amended long

4

before the Taylor beneficiaries filed the Amended Complaint which he claims was a

5

II, Mr. Maile argued
misrepresentation and fraud on the court. In his reply brief in Taylor v. Maile Il,

6
that the filing ofthe Amended Complaint constituted a violation ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional

7

8
9
10
11
12

Conduct, specifically stating "The Taylors, and Mrs. Taylor as their attorney, verified statements of
fact under oath that were misleading to the court and to this tribunal."g
tribunal.,,9
Maile also argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the trial court had erred when it allowed the
Taylors to amend the Trust's complaint after their formal appointment as trustees, and ruled that the
amendment related back to the time of the initial complaint.

10

13
14

c.

This action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion

15

The undisputed facts set forth above show that not only is there another action pending

16

between the same parties, that action arises from the same set of operative facts and has already

17

addressed the issues which the Plaintiffs claim support this lawsuit.

18

As noted in our prior memorandum, the elements of claim preclusion are: (1) same parties;

19

(2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d
20
21
22

23

See pages 7 - 10 of Appellants' Reply brief (Exhibit Y to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four).
9

See Exhibit Y, Appellants' Reply Brief, pages 34-36.

24
10

See pages 35-36 of Appellants' Opening Brief(Exhibit X to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four)
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613,618 (2007).
1

Same parties. Claim preclusion bars the presentation of the claim in a subsequent lawsuit

2

between the same parties or their privies. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir and

3

Canal Co., 123 Idaho 634, 637,851 P.2d 348, 351 (1993). This suit involves the same parties as

4

Taylor v. Maile, with the exception ofMr. Maile's addition of the Taylors' attorneys and their law

5

firm. The law firm defendants appear by virtue of their activities as representatives of the Taylors,

6
which has been held to create privity.

7

8

The application of claim preclusion to attorneys for a party was addressed in Simpson v.

9

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 693 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 2005). The Simpsons had sought a new trial

10

of their products liability claim. After the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that

11

motion, they brought a second action against the tool maker, and also named the tool maker's

12
attorneys as parties under the premise that the defendants had failed to produce all ofthe
of the surveillance

13
14

tapes that Simpson was entitled to receive via discovery. The trial court granted defendants

15

summary judgment and awarded sanctions against Simpsons. The North Dakota Supreme Court

16

affirmed both the summary judgment and the sanctions, specifically finding as follows:

17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24

The only difference between this case and Simpson is the addition of Chicago
Pneumatic's attorneys as defendants and the alternative theories pled to justify
recovery...
recovery
...., Here, the alleged wrongful conduct of the defendants involves the
attorneys' response on behalf of their client to discovery requests and orders. Under
these circumstances, privity exists between Chicago Pneumatic and its attorneys in
the underlying action for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See, e.g.,
Geringer v. Union Elec. Co., 731 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo.App.1987) (law firm which
represented client in underlying action was in privity with client in the prior
adjudication and could assert collateral estoppel as bar to relitigation of issue
resolved in previous lawsuit); Merchants State Bank v. Light, 458 N.W.2d 792, 794
(S.D.1990) (lawyer who prosecuted and directed prior litigation was in privity with

25
26
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client for purposes of res judicata); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 691 (1995), and cases
collected therein.

1

2
3
4

5

Simpson, 693 N.W.2d at 617. A similar result was reached in the following cases:
1. Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 234 S.W.3d 278,283 (Ark. 2006) (holding that attorney-client
relationship is sufficient to establish privity for purposes of res judicata analysis)

2. Chaara v. Lander, 132 N.M. 175,45 P.3d 895 (Ct.App.2002) (holding that wife's divorce
attorney was in privity with wife, thus res judicata barred husband's subsequent suit against
attorney).

6
7
8

9
10

3. In re EI San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6 (1st
(lst Cir.1988) (holding that trustee's attorney
was in privity with trustee, thus res judicata barred a subsequent action against attorney accused of
facilitating a wrongdoing);
4. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F
.2d 1228, 1235 n. 6 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that
F.2d
res judicata barred suit against bank's attorneys for alleged misconduct in prior lawsuit)

11

Same claim. As discussed in paragraph II.B
n.B above, all of the Plaintiffs' claims in this case

12

stem from the allegation that the Taylors and their attorneys misrepresented the Taylors' status as

13

ofthe
the Johnson Trust. Those issues were raised unsuccessfully in Taylor
beneficiaries and Trustees of

14

11, and claim preclusion bars the Plaintiffs from using those same allegations as a springboard for

15
their claims in this case. Other than the legal negligence allegations, the present claims are largely
16
17

18

identical to their counterclaims in Taylor v. Maile.
A. In this case, Mailes have alleged the following causes of action:

19
20

1.

Quiet title, seeking return of the title to the Linder Road property to
Berkshire Investments

2.

Constructive Trust

3.

Tortiuous [sic] Interference with Contract

4.

Tortiuous [sic] Interference of Prospective Economic Advantage

21

22

23
24

25
26
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5.

Abuse of Process

6.

Legal negligence of Connie Taylor and Tom Clark

7.

Legal negligence per se of attorneys Connie Taylor and Tom Clark

8.

Gross Negligence of attorneys Connie Taylor and Tom Clark

9.

Equitable estoppel

10.

Quasi estoppel

]1.
11.

Civil Racketeering action based on allegations of a conspiracy
between Clark and Feeney and the Taylors/Johnson trust to commit
theft, perjury, and obtaining property by false pretense

12.

Judicial Estoppel

1

2
3
4

5

6

7
8

9
10

B. In Taylor v. Maile, the Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaims dated March

17, 2005 11 contained the following:
1.

11

12

13
14

15

16
17

18
19
20

21

22

Affirmative defenses:
a.

Failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted

b.

Venue proper in Canyon County (based on the Ernest [sic] Money
agreement which was attached as an exhibit)

c.

Plaintiffs not real parties in interest

d.

Mandatory binding arbitration under the Earnest Money Agreement

e.

No jury trial available under terms of Eamest Money Agreement

f.

Lack of Consideration

g.

Lack of contractual privity

h.

"Latches" [sic]

1.

Equitable estoppel and/or Quasi-estoppel

j.

Failure to mitigate

k.

Unclean Hands

23
24
II

Exhibit A to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008
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1.l.

Release and Reconveyance

m.

Accord and Satisfaction

1
2.

Counterclaims as follows:

2
3

a.

Tortious interference with contract

b.

Tortious interference with prospective economic advantage

c.

Slander of title

d.

Wrongful cloud on title

e.

Civil conspiracy

f.

Breach of contract

g.

Equitable estoppel

h.

Quasi estoppel

1.

Breach of good faith and fair dealing

4
5
6

7

8
9
10
11

l2
which added the
C. On September 7,2005, the Appellants filed an Amended Answer 12

12
following counterclaims:

13
1.

Fraudulent conveyance

2.

Unjust enrichment (based on work the Mailes had done on the real property)

3.

"Indemnification agreement" (Referring to the Disclaimer, Release and
Indemnity Agreement between the Trustees and all beneficiaries).

17

4.

Breach of peace and quiet enjoyment of deeded property

18

5.

Breach of warranty deed, and

19

6.

"Continuing tort"

14
15
16

20
21

l3
On February 13, 2006, the district court entered an order 13
dismissing the Appellants'

counterclaims for tortious interference with the purchase contract, tortious interference with

22

23

12

Exhibit A to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14,2008

13

Exhibit B to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss.

24
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prospective economic advantage, slander of title, wrongful cloud of title, civil conspiracy, breach

1

of contract, good faith and fair dealing, indemnification agreement, breach of peace and quiet

2

warranty deed, failure to join indispensable parties, and accord and satisfaction.
enjoyment, breach of
ofwarranty

3

In that order, the court repeatedly stated that the Mailes had failed to present even a scintilla of

4

evidence to support the counterclaims.

5
6

On March 15, 2006, the Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Beneficiaries'

7

Amended Complaint incorporating by reference all of the "affirmative defenses, requests for

8

attorney fees, prayer for relief
and counterclaims contained in all ofDefendants/Counter-Claimants'
reliefand

9

previous answers to the various complaints and amended complaints filed in the matter of Taylor v.

10
Maile, et aI, and in the matter of
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust v. Thomas Maile, et al."
ofthe
11

12

13

The Answer added the following affirmative defenses:

1.

Failure to join indispensable parties

2.

Plaintiffs' claims barred by the release of the successor trustee from liability [based
on the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement]

16

3.

Defendants were bona fide purchasers

17

4.

Majority of beneficiaries consented to the sale of the Linder Road Property.

18

After granting summary judgment to the Taylors 1l 4,
\ the court on June 27, 2006 entered a

19

judgment which quieted title to the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust and dismissed all of

14

15

20

the Appellants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses other than unjust enrichment.

21

22

23
24
14

Exhibit C to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss
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After a bench trial, Judge Wilper entered a Memorandum Decision's
Decision 1s on November 29,2006 which

1

2

denied Maile's claim for unjust enrichment, specifically ruling:

1.

The Trust was not unjustly enriched by Maile's expenditures after the purchase;

2.

Maile's expenditures conferred no benefit upon the Johnson Trust, the trustees, nor
the beneficiaries.

3.

Even if the Trust had received a benefit, it "certainly did not do so under
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without
paying Mr. Maile."

4.

The fair market value of the property as of November 29, 2006, was $1,800,000,
which is the same fair market value of the property with or without any expenditures
or improvements made by Mr. Maile.

5.

In spite of Mr. Maile's testimony at trial that he had advised Mr. Johnson to seek
independent advice about selling him the land for $400,000, "the Court is not
persuaded that Mr. Maile so advised Mr. Johnson."

6.

12

There was ample evidence in the record to support the contention that Mr. Maile
engaged in "sharp practices" in drafting the documents connected to the transaction.

13

Appeal l6 which listed 16 separate issues, including the following:
ofAppeal
Mr. Maile filed a Notice of

3
4

5

6

7
8

9
10
11

14

(e) Was the Court correct in denying Appellants' Motion to
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the role of the
successor trustees not obtaining judicial appointment prior to filing
suit on behalf of the trust?

15
16

(f) Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents as
beneficiaries of the trust had standing to pursue the claims which
were ultimately granted by the Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary
Judgment?

17

18
19

(k) Did the Court err in failing to consider the effect of the
Disclaimer and Indemnification Agreement executed by the
Respondents and the successor trustees and the other beneficiaries of
the trust relating [to] the claims against the Appellants?

20
21

22
23
IS

Exhibit D to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss

16

Exhibit BB to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four.
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(n) Did the Court err in not allowing the counterclaims of the
Appellants to proceed to trial?

1

(0) Did the Court err in determining that the Theodore L. Johnson
Trust was entitled to amend their complaint and relate back the
complaint to the date of filing, when the successor trustees had not
been properly appointed by Court Order as required pursuant to I.C.
68-101 or 68-1
07?
68-1017

2
3

4

The briefs which the Mailes filed in Taylor 11
JJ argued each of these issues in some detail.

5
6

7

8

The fact that they were not all addressed individually in the Supreme Court's opinion does not
change the fact that the issues were litigated in the trial court and may not be raised again.
The prior adjudication "extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series

9
of transactions out of which the cause of action arose. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119Idaho
10
11

146,150,804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). A cause of action can be barred by a prior adjudication even

12

though the theory of liability and supporting evidence differ from the cause of action actually

13

litigated in the prior lawsuit. Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437-39,849

14

P.2d 107, 110-112 (1993). The new theories under which the Plaintiffs claim the Johnson Trust

15
property should be returned to them are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
16
17

18

Final Judgment. The trial court's judgments have now been affirmed by the Idaho Supreme

Court, definitively meeting the "final judgment" requirement.

19

20
21

22

D.

Judicial estoppel.

Just one week ago, the Plaintiff in this action asked Judge

Wilper to enter an order compelling the Taylors to pay the judgment in Taylor v. Maile, which
ordered the return of the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust and the return of the $400,000

23
24

25
26
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purchase money to Mailes. 17

This position is diametrically opposed to the position taken in the

present action, which is that the judgment should be set aside.
1

2

Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and

3

then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,

4

178 P.3d 597 (2008). The policies underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of the

5

orderly administration of
justice and regard for the dignity ofjudicial
ofjudicial proceedings. McKay v. Owens,
ofjustice
6

7

i

130 Idaho 148, 152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343,

8

!

94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.
I 996)). Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing
Cir.1996)).

7

9

fast and loose with the courts. !d.

10

Under the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, these Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking to enforce
ofjudicial
11

12

13

ajudgment in one action while simultaneously insisting that the very same judgment be set aside
in this proceeding.

14
15
16

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore

17 '

Johnson Trust respectfully request that this court enter an order dismissing this cause of action with
18
19

20

prejudice and enter an Order finding this action to be a violation of Rule 11 and imposing costs and
attorney fees as a sanction.

21
22

23
24

17 Motion is attached to Third Supplemental Affidavit of Connie Taylor in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment
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DATED this
1.

J1L

-'

day of April, 2009.
CLARK and FEENEY

2
3

By-----.l~~~~~~__
By~~~~~~-=
_ ______!""""""':::::...____!L~:....::::......___
~~~~~~~__

4

Connie W. Taylor, a member of the finn.
Attorneys for Defendants.

5

6
7

8
9
10
11

12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21

22
23
24
25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

2
3
4
5
6

7

8
9

E

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2009 I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616
Mark Prusynski
MOFF
ATT THOMAS
MOFFATT
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

~

o
o

~/
~
o

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Teleco (FAX) (208) 385-5384

10
11

f

Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
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DISCLAIMER~

1.

RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT

Disclaimers.

1.1
Disclaimer of Claims by Certain Beneficiaries. Except for those
Ll. each of the beneficiaries of the
individuals identified in the last sentence of this Section 1".1,
Theodore L. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"),
hereby disclaims, in favor of the Trust, any ownership interest he/she may now 'or in the future
have in any claims or causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust against attorney
Thomas G. Maile, or his successors or affiliates, including, without limitation, Thomas
Maile, IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company and Berkshire Investments, LLC,
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any'
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of such
Claims. The following beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Taylor, Reed J. Taylor,
Dallan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. J~bn Taylor.
].2

c

of A 11 Other Interests.
Disclaimer ofAII

1.2.1
l.2.1 Fisher. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth J. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford,
~isclaim all interests whatsoever in the
comprising all of the children of Hazel Fisher, hereby ~isclaim
of their mother, Hazel Fisher, and
Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor oftheir
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fisher.
1.2.2 Seely. J. David Seely, Karl J. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S.
Denison and Nathan 1. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of
their mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely. .'
DaHan J. Taylor, Mark 1. Taylor, Gloria
1.2.3 illJm:.
illlQr. Reed J. Taylor, Dallan
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all o(the children of Helen Taylor,
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever i,n the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and
Taylor, AlI.of
All ,of the individuals identified in 'this
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor.
.
Section 1.2.3 are sometimes hereafter referred to as "Taylors".
I

.'

2.
Receipt in Full -Income Tax. The undersigned aCknOW[dge receipt in ful.l of all
he/she is entitled to receive fro Andrew T. Rogers and
property, money and benefits which helshe
J, Roge~s,
Roge~s, in .their capacity as trustees of the Trust. Th.is
Th,is include a full share of the fin~l
Beth J.
rece]ved m 2004 from the sale to Thomas' G. Mal1elBerksh
MallelBerksh re Investments, LLC, In
payment recelved
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to the extent they.
they, are
retaining a beneficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further expectation of
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not
Pit id income tax on the final payment rec~jved
rec~jved in 2004 and that he/she will receive an IRS fonn
Pilid
K-I
hislher share of such tax, which is to be included on the beneficiary's owL) federal
K-1 indicating his/her
and state income tax returns for 2004.
.

(
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - I
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3.
Release of Trustees - Estimated Expenses. The undersigned hereby release and
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 1. Rogers from all claims or causes of action, whether
known or unknown, he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of the Trust, or
(ii) arising in any way out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further
acknowledge that the trustees have distributed, and he/she has received, all of the property,
money and benefits to which he/she is
IS entitled under the terms of the Trust, except an amount
which shall not exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), which has been retained for the sole
purpose of paying accounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust. Any surplus in
such retainage will be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionately. The undersigned
will constitute a final accounting; and
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received wi11
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting.
4.
Resignation of Trustees. The undersigned understand Andrew T. Rogers and Beth
J. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust the Claims described in
Section I.I
l.l above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The lindersigned further
understand and agree that the successor trustee, Garth Fisher, will decline to serve as trustee, and
that Reed J. Taylor, Da:llan
Da:tlan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor will be nominated and appointed to
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust.
.
5.
Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and
hold harmless (i) Andrew T. Rogers 'and Beth J. Rogers, and (ii) all
al1 of the other beneficiaries
beneficjaries of
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney',s
attorney'·s fees, losses or monies that they may
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their
successors, 1?ased
l;>ased upon the Claims, including, without limitation, any third-party claim or
counterclaim advanced by the defendants.
'
.
I

'

6.
Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This will certify the twenty-five (25) individuals
identified below as signators constitute all of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is
a graphical depiction of the relationship ofthe signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest
of Blair Johnson therefore lapsed.
7.
Binding Effect. This instrument shall be effective as of the latest signature by all,
and not less than all, of the signators indicated below; and this instrument shall be binding upon
'
the heirs and successors of the parties.

8.
Attorney's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against
the other party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be entitled to an
award of hislher/their legal costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable
".. attorney's fees as determined by the court. The prevailing party(ies) shall be that party receiving
substantially the relief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgment or not.
9.
Counteroarts and Facsimile. This instrument may be executed in several
counterparts and all so executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties hereto,
all the parties are not s~gnatories
s~gnatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed
even though aJl
document transmitted by fax shall be the equivalent of execution and delivery of an original
signed document.

DlSCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - 2
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10.
Entire Agreement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prior or
contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, warranties and statements, oral or
written, are superseded.

11.
Further Assurances. The parties agree to perfonn such further acts and to execute
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of the signators
warrants and represents that in executing this instrument he/she is dealing with hislher sale and
separate property.
12.
Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State ofIdaho.
ofldaho.

13.
ModificationlWaiver. No modification, waiver, amendment or discharge of this
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signed gy all parties.

r

HAZEL FISHER

Dated

GORDON E FISHER

Dated

GARTH J. FISHER

Dated

JUDITIl FCRAWFORD
FCRAWFORD

D~ted

JOYCE SEELY

Dated

DOROTIiV S DAYTON

Dated

J DAVID SEELV
SEELV

Dated

(
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.' .,.,
KARLJ SEELY

Dated

NATHAN L SEELY

Dated

JANET S DENISON

Dated

BRENT B JOHNSON

Dated

BETH J ROGERS

Dated'

SCOTI' B JOHNSON

Dated

D GRANT FARNWORTH

Dated

LU DAWN FARNWORTH

Dated

LAURIE DUNKLEY

Dated

REED 1. TAYLOR

Dated

c.
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - 4
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HELEN TAYLOR

Dated

DALLAN J. TAYLOR

Dated

GLORIA RYDALCH

Dated

MARKJ. TAYLOR

Dated

VIRGINIA PORTER

Dated

R. JOHN TAYLOR

Dated

/

DISCLAIMER,
D]SCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - 5
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EXHIBIT A

f'

/'

'
'-

* Family contact

,.J.
"

(
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNJTY AGREEMENT - 6

001307

12DB1469160
12081469160

T-289
1-289 P.D03/00B
P.003/DOB F-BG4
F-BG4

KARL)
KARL J SEELY

Dated

NATHAN L SEELY

Dated

JANET S DENISON

Dated

BRENT B JOHNSON

Dated
Da.ted

.BETH J ROGERS .

Datecl
Dated

seon
scon B JOHNSON

r".
~.

D GRANT FAllNWORTH

Dated .

LUDAWN FARNWORTH

Dated

LAURIE DUNKLEY

Dated

KARLA FARNWORTH

Dated

RUTH F STEPHENS

Dated

Dated

DISCLAIMER.RELEASE
DISCLAlMER., RELEASE && INDEMNITY
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT -- 44
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07-15-2004
or-15-,004

10:2Qam
10:,Qam

r om-CL ARK
From-CLARK~1

MEl.

T-2S9
T-2a9

lZ0S14SEI60
lZ0S146EI60

P.004/00B

F-BS4

~~luv
t>Uf;'
p1.,
1Ww~tv
Pl!f/P~
TAYLOR
HELEN TAYLOR
7 I Dated

..

»ALLAN J. i AYLOR

Dated

GLORJA RYDALCH

bated

MARKJ.TAYLOR
MARK
J. TAYLOR

Dated

VIRGINIA PORTER

Dated

'R. J.OHN TAYLOR
"R.

Dated
,.
"

__

.. _ . ,.,
...

--_._------ --- ......
.......

-

DlSCLA1MER,
D1SCLA1MER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - 5
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12081469160

T-7B9
T-7S9

P.OD5/00e
P.ODs/ooe

F-864
F-8S4

GLORIA RYDALCH

Dated

MARKJ. TAYLOR

Dated

VIRGINIA PORTER

Dated

R,
R. JOHN TAYLOR

Doted

DI SCI..AJ MER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT- S
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12067469\&0
120674691&0

T-282

P.006/00B
P.DOS/OOB

TA ';{LOR
HELEN TA';{LOR

F-BB4

Dated

Dated

/./

~.

'

MARK J. TAYLOR

Dated

VIRGINIA PORTER

Dated

R.JOHN TAYLOR

Dated

DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMN1TY AGR£EMBN1'- 5
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120874691 sn

~~
~~

T-,89
T-Zag

P.D07/DD8

F-96~
F-96~

HELEN TAYLOR

Dated

DALLAN J. TAYLOR

Dated

GLORlA RYDALCH
GLOIUA

Dated

~~
~
MARKJ.T()R ~
MARKJ.T()i

'"

I~t;f'
Dated

Dated

Dated

DISCLAfMER,
DISCLAfMER1 RELEASE &.INDEMNlTY AGREEM'ENT - 5
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~I
~I

I~ ~¥y~
~¥y~
I~

,u;;u~m
,u;;u~m

IJUI !.1I,
!.U.
., IJUl

.

''oj,
•• ''oj,

~Utl...
...
~Utl

utu-\'I.I\~~t
r JJ UlU-\oI.I\~~t
~~.~
~". ~

~~OI~OV~~~
~ijo I ~OV .!S':":l

lZOe7~6916U
lZOa7~6916U

.,...,
rr .,....

,-'"

.C>'i~
.e>'i~

U-M1\
t.l.M1\ ANLJ ~~ !:1:Nl:.'1 LAw

i~28S

p,oOa/OOB
p,ooa/nOB

F-ab~
F-Bb~

ira JUN. 2004 18:57
18:5'7

IJ#;E
/J#;E

P;iig, 2
P;iig.2
87

•

-

~~-::----=---------~~~~~--------------------------HELmrAYLOR
HELmrA\'l..OR

DAU.AN J.l. TAYLOR

Dated

GLOR!.A
GLORI.A RYJ)ALC.H
RYJ)ALCH

Dated

Da.ted

TAnOR
R. JOBN TAnOR

"

"

(
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....... ,,

.,.

~--:'~
~--:'~

u'!... -- uq

U 1
U),

J.;:::/-'
= J.;:::I-'

P.02

E~.c,:.simi\e. 111is instrument mn)'
mny be ex~cutcd
ex~cutcd in several
CQunlerpurls and E~.c,:.simile.
binding on nil tho parties
1hough ull Ihe p3rties are nol
not signatories
signalories to the
(he (lriglnal or lhe same
hereto, even though
(runsmitled by fa:< shall be the equivalellt of execution
cOllllterpart. A :ih:~ncd document Lrunsmltled
and delivery ()fnn original signed document.

9.

counterpurL~ !tilL!
!lilt.! [Ill so ~xecuLed
~xecuLed shall constilute one instrument,
counterpurL~

10.
1~l.1tirc
lO.
l~ntirc Agreemcl\t.
Agreemcl\\. This agreement. {ogcth~r with nil exhihilc; uttnchcd
other ugrcemcnls find
nnd written muterials und documents
documenls expressly referred
rererred \0
hereto nnd olher
herein. cnnslillllcslhc
cnnslillllcs1hc entire llgreement
Ilgreement hctwccnlhe
hetwccnlhe pnrties
pru·ties with
wilh respect to the mat1crs set
herein,
forlh herein. All prk1f
prklf or cunlemporaneous
cuntemporaneous ElgreemenlS,
ElgrcemenlS, underslnndings,
understnndings, representations,
f"rlh
uper:;eded.
and stutemenls, oral or WI'iltol1. FIre 5liuper:;et.ied.
warranties lInd
v.ur~)er
v.ur~)er Assurances,
Assurances. 'l1lC }larties
Jlarties agree to perIunn such further acls
aclS nod lo
to
instruments as may be rensuoably
deliver flllCh <lcJdililJnDI documents and inslruments
jn order to carry QlIllhe
QlIl the pn.wisiuns: ofthis instrument·und
instrument·and the inlention
intention of the
required in
Ench of\hc
of the signator6
signators wnrrnnlll
wnrrnnl:l and represents Iha~ in executing this inslrwncnt
insLrwncnt
parties. Each
scpamlc property.
he/she is deuling with hIs/ncr sole and scpamte

:
J [.
exc~ule am.I

12.
O~v.~rJllnB
O~v.~rJIlnB l.&~.
l,&~. 'J11is agreement /lllal!'
!lllal!' be c<)vernecJ. c()n~lrued
c()n~trued and
IlcconhlOce with Lho lows urtbe
urtlle State of Idaho.
enforced in llcconhlOce
. 13.
MOI.liOcnthm/WnJvcr.
MOI.liOcnlhm/WnJvcr. No modilication. Wlliver,
WlIiver. amendment or discharge
orthiB instrument shall be valid unless the snme
orthis
~1ing and signed by nil parlies.
parties.
same is in ~ting
I

..~

,4. I.~

......

ll~
l.~

.J

.' .f.;

,•.J;
,•

,

,./flJ'l L

r' ..
r'.·
,')
.') - ') 'I ~ (: t.l
t./

J2;;a
5-1b·~7
J::L;;a
5-1b·~f
. GO~;~;:'.!9~~mRID~ted/)
GO~~~'~~L)
.

,~~.~)

~

(J~..
&ii~U"'o.:"'d
:~-:-.2.~-Oi··
;,-:-. :1..'1'. 0 i
DuLed

't \. ) C?
Z/UL ~J.l ~0.o/Af
~0- 1) ;j
... .. 't\.)
{?7.IUL~J.l

U})ITtl F
0."
'."

''00'"
0-",

..
..
..
..
.
.

CRA~rO~~:~.~.Dated

JOYCE SEELY

Dated
Datcd

DOROTHY S DAYTON

Daled
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~
~

"

.

,'

executetl in several
9,
Counterparts and FacsImile. 'This
TIlls inStrument may be executet.l
aU 80 executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties
oounterparts and all
hereto, even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same
counterpart. A
A signed documel1t
dOCUIDerlt transmitted by fax shall
equivaIent'of execution
sha.ll be the equivaJent'of
and deli~ery
deli~ery of an original signed do~ument.

10.
Entire Agreement. This agreemetlt, together with all exhibits attached
hereto and other agreements and written materials and ~ocuments
~ocuments expressly :referred to
constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set
herein1 constit.utes
forth herein. All prior or contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations,
wausnties end statements, oral or writt~, are superseded.
11.

Further Assurances. The 'parties olgree ~ perfo~ such further' acts and to

execute and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably
of the
:required in order to carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention ofthe
parties: Each of the signatorS warrants and represents that in executing this instrument
he/she is dealing with hislher sale and separate property.

Lnw. This agreell'!ent shall be governed, construe'd
12.
Govenung Law.
construe"d and
enforced in accordance with the Jaws of the State ofJdaho.
;
' II

13.
ModificationIWaiver. No modification, widver, ainendment or dlschafge
Ill] parties.
ofthis instrUment shall be valid unless the samo is
iB in wdti,ng and signed, by all

l-lAZEL FlS.HER
FlSfIER

Dated

GORDON E FISHERDated

GARTH J. FISHER .,Dated
Dated

JUDITH F eRAWFORp
eRAWFORp

J2 ' .,J

c;m~ESEE~

sted

Dated

5--'2p
5--:Zp

o~

~at~
~at~ S-'4>.-o,/
S-~'-0'l
(
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3

/1)1
Dated

2-7 ( "?aD
'1
'?OD'1
'.!

NATHAN L SEELY Dated

JANET S
DENISON Dated
SDENISON

BRENT B JOHNSON-Dated

BErn J ROGERS

Dated
//

.'

JOHNSON Dated
SCOTT B JOHNSONDated

.DGRANTF.ARNWORTH
Dated'.
.D
GRANT FARNWORTH Dated

fAill'tWORTH Dated
LV DAWN fARl'tWORTH

LAURIE DUNKLEY Dated
., LAURIEDUNKLEY

KARLA FARNWOR.TH

c

'Dated

RUTH F SrnHENS Dated

001316

'-'

J DAV1D SEELY

r>ated
f>ated

KARLJ SEELY
/1 -.,
..
-.",

Dated

iI"t.
u't

",,"

~----.
.~ ~.
NATHAN L SEEl.Y

C.

,:j1l.JJ(

61t
tilt

D~I,cd

JAN fIT S OnNtSON Dated

C.

BRENT a JOl-1NSONOatcd

BHTl{ J ROUEltS
BHTl-t

/

Unled

scorr 13 JOHNSON Daled
scorf

n GRANT FARNWOR11I

Dated

ARNWORTH Daled
LU DAWN r ARNWORTII

IA'l.jiiIED\.INKUW
IA'l.iiiIEDtlNKLlW natcd
KARLA. f ARNWORTH

(

Dated

Sl'EPHHNS Daled
Rl)TIJ .F STEPHHNS

20'd
20"d
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","

J DAVID SEELY

Dated

KARLJ SEELY

Dated

NATHAN L SEELY Dated
".,.(

..
' . (\

~ ')c(~\C1'-14.9~
\,c(~\c1'-14.9~

JANET S DENISON Dated

/\
I

~~ ? ~ 'Z-oo 'i

,
BRENT B JOHNSONDated
JOHNSOND~ted
I

BIrrU J 'ROOERS.
.BIrrU
·RQO~.

DAted

scenT B JOHNSON Dated

D.GRANTFARNWORTH Dll1ed·
D!l1ed·

LU DAWN FARNWORTII Dated
,.
II

I

fared .
LAU\UBDUN~Y Fared

LAtJ(UE PUNrurr

---_.,

KARLA FARNWORTH

Dated

RUTIi F STEPHENS Dated
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--,.--....,~-~

....

U.J,: .1...3..J,...3r

P.DS
P.OS

NATIl AN L SEELY

l)nt(;d
l)nlt;d

c

/
-'

SCOTT

n)01
JOI JNSON Dated

DGRANT FARNWORTH

Doted

LV
LU I)AWN FARNWORTH Daled

,.
"

RUTH F tiT'EPHENS Outed
Dllted

(,
(.

2'd

BfilF:85S20l.
BfilF:85920l.
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,-.

DAV1D
J DA
V1D SEELY

bated

KARL J SEELY

Dated

NATHAN L SEELY Dated

JANET S DENISON Dated

BRENT B JOIillSONDated

n·

JOHNSONDated
SCOTT B JOHNSONDatecI

D GRANT FA

_

ORTII . Dated

/ ' S}Y/oY

LV DAWN FARNWOR~

--~:ted

,.I.:.

LAURIE DUNKLEY Datea

KARLA FARNWORTH

Dated

RUTH f STEPHENS Dated

(
~

~~

... '--

'

...... ,'"'"

.'

.,'

"" .... .
....................--..........-....... ..-....
-.... .,-,.".,
"
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-

P.D3
P.03

I
i

J DAVID SEELY

l':>ated

K,ARL J SEELY

Dated

NATHAN L SEaY .Dl,rlcd
.Dl.r1cd

JANET S DENISON Dated

:BRENT
BRENT B )OHNSONDated

BETH J ROGERS

. ....£~

Dated

~

3 J"
....,,~ J.bCCf
J"""u.

r~HNSONOatr;d
r~HNSONOatr;d

D GRANT FARNWORTII

t>a~

UJ DAWN FARNWORTH Dl1tt!d
I

LAURlEDU~Y
rated
LAURlEDUN~Y r"ted
KARlA
FARNWOR,TIl
KAR1..A FARNWOR,TIl

Datl!d
Datt=d

. RUTI-I f STEPlIENS Dated
.RUTI.J

(
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-

P_08
P_08

J DA
V10 SEEL l'
DAV10

Dated

KARL J SEELY

Dated

NAhlAN L SEELY Da1ed
.1
.1

JANET S DENlSON Dated.

,
BRENT 13 iOHNSO'NDate4

BETH 1 ROGERS

Dated

SCOTT B JOHNSOl'-fDlltcd
scOTT
JOHNSOl'iDlltcd

9-u~·
jLu~· 'fc-fo~
'f'-fo~
D GRANr f ARNWORTH

lJated

iUDAWN
LUDAWN FARNWORTH Dated

.KARLA FARNWORTII

.

Dated

RUTH F STEPHENS Dated
Dated
Rum

(
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J DAVID SEELY

Dated

KARL I SE£LY

Dated

BEELY Dated
NATHAN L BEELY

DENISON Dated
JANET S DENiSON

BRENT a JOHNSONDated

.BETH] ROGERS

Dated
/

SCOTT a. JOHNSON Dated

D GRANT FARNWORTH Doted

_
_-

..

.

LV DAWN
DA WN FARNWORTH Dated

--------
;{1-J
tl._
---------~
~;{1-.L
CAt5fRlE
D~~'-'7
CAttffRlE

.,"
"

DUNKLEY

-

' 6 / o f joY

KARl.A
KARLA I-'ARNWORTH

Dated

RUTH F STEPHENS Dated

YVV/soO

®
XVJ oC:Cu 'lU~/Ll/CO
'lU~/Ll/CO
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P.07
P.07
......--

• • __ .....
0', ."..~.
.....__ .
."..~. 1M
1M

--......-.:",;--'
-.:-;--"
_........ --

J DAVlD
DA VlD sF-aY
Y

Dated
Dated

'KARt
KARL J SE:ELY
SE:ELY

Dilled

NATHAN L SEELY Dated

JANET S DENISON Datoo

BRENT B JOHNSOND~ted
\,
..

,--:..

BETH Jj ROGERS
BEW

Dated

scorr B JbHNSOND~ted .
SCOTT
... D GRANT fARNWORTIl

Datea
Dated

LV DAWN FAR.NWORm . Dated
LU
LAU~E DLJN.KLE~/
Dated

\.J

~.
ev

'1. (

i-.

0.,

RTIJ

'U-tvrrlBZ· .
D"'ed $"-J.1- 0

'f

RUTH F STEPHENS Dated

(
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

AYLOR, flkla
CONNIE WRIGHT T
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust~ JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RELATING TO THE
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' COUNTER
CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

The Plaintiffs submit their Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment and provide the following.
REPL Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
REPLY
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1
IfiI~"W>\BERKSHIItINY<J.""_pW
lfiI~"W>\BERKSHIItINY<J.""_pW
C"""""'_I .......
C"""""'_I.......

........., . . . , . , . . _...
_... Lwpd
.........,
,wpd

001326

lJ .

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1

The Memorandum Submitted by the Plaintiffs and the Affidavit of R. John Taylor
Contain Hearsay Evidence, Conclusory Statements, and Assertions That Have No
Proper Foundation Before the Court and must Be Stricken from the Record.
The Affidavit ofR. John Taylor is before the court through the Affidavit of Connie

Taylor dated April 8, 2009. The defendants' Memorandum Brief makes reference to the
Affidavit ofR. John Taylor (p.7) as supporting the proposition that the Taylors have sustained
damages. The Affidavit ofR. John Taylor, contain impermissible hearsay and conclusory
statements, conjuncture or have references to facts which are not part of the record and must be
stricken.
Rule 12(F) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or
upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the evidence submitted in
opposition must be admissible evidence. There is no record before this court of any alleged
ascertainable damages allegedly sustained by the Taylors and/or Clark & Feeney. The Affidavit
ofR. John Taylor, contains hearsay testimony including statements allegedly made by a banker
and/or an pending offer. The case of Homes Corp. v. R. Herr, 142 Id. 87, 123 P.3d 720 142
(C.A. 2005), provides:
In order to be considered 'On a summary judgment motion, affidavits must be
based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence

REPL Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
REPLY
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
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at trial, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the stated matters.
LR.C.P. 56(e). In determining the admissibility of evidence, trial courts are given
broad discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. State, Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Altman, 122 Idaho
1004,1007,842 P.2d 683, 686 (1992); Bakerv. Shavers, Inc., 117 Idaho 696,
698, 791 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1990).
Idaho courts exercise free review ofthe standards of the admissibility of evidence on
summary judgment motions, and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of
discretion. An examination of the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor reveals a lack of foundation
relating to the alleged feasibility of a loan and/or a pending offer. Supporting and opposing
affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated. Tri-State Nat. Bank v. Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543, 447 P.2d 409 (1968).
There is no supporting foundation for such assertions and any such reference should be stricken
from the record as hearsay and lack foundation under the Rule of Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 901,
902. Likewise the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor contains statements from alleged potential buyers
but this in and of itself does not establish a basis of damages, which constitute hearsay and must
be stricken.
2

The Defendants Have Failed to Rebut Unconverted Facts in the Record and There
Is Nothing in the Record to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material Fact in Dispute.
The defendants have offered no evidence by way of deposition testimony, affidavits, etc.,

which demonstrate a dispute of material fact. LR.C.P. 56(e), demonstrate that when faced with a
motion for summary judgment the party against whom it is sought may not merely rest on
allegations contained in his pleadings. Rather, he must come forward and produce evidence by way

REPLY
REPL Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
3C....,......
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 3c._
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of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164,45
164, 45
issue of material fact. Dulaney
Dulaneyv.
P.3d 816, 820 (2002). A trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that
jUdgment is required
may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment
to bring that evidence to the court's attention. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990)Esser
(l990)Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc.,
145 Idaho 912,917, 188 P.3d 854,859 (2008). There is nothing in the record to establish any
genuine issue of material fact in dispute that would prevent the entry of summary judgment for the
plaintiffs.

3

The Affidavit of Helen Taylor Must Be Stricken from the Record as it Fails to
Demonstrate Material Issues of Fact in Dispute and is Not Relevant.
The Affidavit of Helen Taylor dated October 15,2008 has been filed with the court,

however, it is silent as to whether it is being used by the defendants' in their motions for summary
judgement or whether it is being offered in opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. I.R.C.P. Rule 56 requires that all supporting affidavits be filed 28 days prior to the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Obviously, the filing of April 8, 2009 does not
comply with the Rules and should be stricken. In addition, the testimony of Helen Taylor has no
relevance as to the determination of the defendants' misrepresentations to the court which
ultimately resulted in the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". A trial court has the discretion to
decide whether an affidavit offered in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment
is admissible under Rule 56(e), even if that issue is not raised by one of the parties. Rhodehouse v.
Stutts, 125 Id. 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). There must be an objection for the court to determine

REPLY
REPL
Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
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-"
the admissibility of the affidavit. If there is no timely objection, the trial court can grant summary
judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e). State, Dept. of Agric. v.
Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 86 P.3d 503 (2004). The plaintiffs request that such affidavit
be stricken from the record as not relevance to the ultimate determination of the criminal activity
and the misrepresentations of the defendants in obtaining the "Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claims".
4

The Defendants Have Failed to Rebut the Verified Pleadings, and Other Evidence in
the Record, consequently the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must Be
Granted.
The defendants have taken the position, that since the issue of res judicata has not been

addressed, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment cannot be entertained. We know from
established case law in Idaho, that res judicata is not a bar to a claim for relief, premised upon an
independent action to set aside a judgment based upon fraud. Compton v. Compton, 101 Id. 328,
334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes
that courts have the inherent power "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court". Rae v.
Bunce, (S.C. 2008 Docket No. 33996).
The defendants have failed to rebut their own judicial admissions before the probate court

contained in the verified petition filed November 14th 2004. There is no dispute that Connie
Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 2004, wherein her then husband
stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate court, at page two "the petitioner's
88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the
terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". Immediately above the signature the

REPL
Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
REPLY
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
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verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing
petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and belief'.
Nor have they rebutted the sworn testimony before the probate court in May 2005 (
Annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the reporter's transcript from the
hearing dated May 25, 2005 before the Honorable Christopher Bieter, Judge of the Probate
Court.
Relevant portions of the testimony and statements before the probate court provides commencing
at page 14, In 4:
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve? 6
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim."
page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that,
based upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that
the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same
agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the
proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the
proceeding." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court
hearing Exhibit "A").
Nor have they rebutted the fact that defendant Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit of the
Taylors in negotiating the terms of the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement,
drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to
give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual
Maile ...
statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile...
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing

REPLY
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.......
deposition exhibit 39).
The understanding of Helen Taylor as set forth in her October 15,2008 affidavit has no
bearing on the defendants' sworn testimony before the probate court. The defendants have failed
to provide any relevant evidence by way of their own affidavits, or other sworn statements which
would rebut their established judicial admissions which are the cornerstone of their subsequent
perjured testimony.
Idaho Code section 18-5410 states:
SUBORNATION
SUBORNAnON OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another
person to commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in
the same manner as he would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.

CONCLUSION
The defendants have failed to provide competent, relevant evidence in the form of
affidavits, testimony, etc., to deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The filing of the
lis pendens to protect the plaintiffs rights both as to the remedies pled and for the repayment of
the monies that are still outstanding which are lawfully due and owing to Berkshire Investments
is proper. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as to all counter
counterclaims raised by the defendants.

DATED this 14th day of April, 2009.

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-Maile
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of April, 2009, I served the foregoing (1)
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

()
(X)
(
)
()
(
)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
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U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT,
MOFFAIT, THOMAS,BARRETT,
THOMAS,BARREIT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th
lOth Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17l36.0306
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV-OC-0723232

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
flea CONNIE
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite several supplemental memoranda and affidavits in multiple parts,
plaintiffs still have not shown that the claims raised in this lawsuit were not raised in the earlier
litigation between the same parties or why they could not have been raised in that litigation.
Rather than contribute to the repetition contained in the briefing in this extensive litigation, these
defendants defer to the briefing filed by co-defendants, who are much more knowledgeable
concerning the facts and issues in both cases.
These defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on October 9,2008.
Although the case was stayed, the Supreme Court issued its decision, the stay was lifted, and
many pounds of paper have been filed since October 9, none of this refutes the arguments raised
in these defendants' memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. All of plaintiffs'
verbiage can be condensed into three incorrect arguments: (1) plaintiffs confuse collateral
estoppel with res judicata; (2) plaintiffs confuse their opportunity to raise an issue in the first
litigation with the fact that they raised the issue and lost; and (3) plaintiffs' claims are not
"independent actions for fraud" that escape res judicata.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Res Judicata Bars All Claims that Might or Should have been Litigated in the
First Suit.
Plaintiffs repeatedly cite the standard for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.

The standard is clearly different for res judicata and bars re-litigation "not only on the matters
offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should
have been litigated in the first suit.'" Ticor Title Go.
(,0. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d
613,620 (2007). Plaintiffs apparently understand the distinction, because they seem to argue

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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that they were unable to raise the existing claims in the earlier suit. Their own briefing, however,
shows that plaintiffs raise the issues, but those claims were rejected by the courts. Therefore,
they not only had the opportunity to raise the issues, they raised the issues and lost. Res judicata
precludes a second opportunity.
B.

Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims Accrued During the Course of tbe Earlier
Litigation.
Plaintiffs make obtuse arguments concerning the accrual of a cause of action and

whether they exercised due diligence in discovering fraud. Assuming these arguments were
intended to explain why the fraud claim could not have been raised in the earlier litigation, they
simply do not apply to the facts of the case. In addition, plaintiffs' argument that the cause of
action for fraud did not occur until they were damaged by the entry of the judgment is directly
contrary to Idaho law.
Plaintiffs' fraud claim is based upon the alleged misrepresentation by defendants
that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary. Although plaintiffs struggle to explain how an
allegation in a pleading that was later amended rises to the level of extrinsic fraud that would
preclude the application of res judicata, it is clear from plaintiffs' pleadings that the
misrepresentation was known to them and argued by them in the earlier case. On Page 6 of
plaintiffs' "Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Response to Supreme Court Opinion Filed
2009," plaintiffs state:
February 4, 2009,"
The Plaintiffs brought the facts surrounding the misrepresentation
to the Idaho Supreme Court in their briefing as they alleged that
the Taylors had insufficient standing as beneficiaries to rescind the
transaction as the Taylors acknowledged under oath that they were
no longer beneficiaries and that their mother was the sole
beneficiary. Plaintiffs had a right to have that detennined as an
issue of standing. Standing is an issue that can be raised at any
time at either the District Court level or at the appellate level. The

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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Plaintiffs legitimately raised that issue and the Idaho Supreme
Court chose not to address that issue and that issue remains
unresolved at this date.
The above quoted argument by plaintiffs shows that the issue not only could have
been raised, but was raised by the plaintiffs in the earlier decision. The fact that the Idaho
Supreme Court chose not to address the issue does not preclude the application of res judicata.
Plaintiffs argue that the misrepresentation related to standing in the earlier case,
but claim that it was a fraud issue in this case. This does not allow for re-litigation of the
"misrepresentation" issue. The application of res judicata does not require that "the precise
point or question in the present action be finally resolved in the prior proceeding." Farmers

Nat 'i'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70,878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994). The issue of who was the
appropriate beneficiary was litigated extensively in the first lawsuit and was the sole subject of
the first Idaho Supreme Court opinion. Characterizing the same issue as a fraud claim, does not
avoid the application of res judicata.
In spite of the fact that they raised the misrepresentation issue in the prior
litigation, plaintiffs now claim they did not have the opportunity to raise the misrepresentation
claim because it has not yet accrued. They argue both that the claim did not accrue until they
were damaged by the judgment entered by Judge Wilpur, and that the claim was somehow
suspended by the application of the discovery exception for fraud. The "some damage" rule does
not, as contended by plaintiffs, extend the running of the statute of limitations until a judgment is
entered. Some damage accrues once the plaintiff expends attorney fees in an attempt to correct
the error. The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there
is no damage until an adverse judgment is entered. B & K Fabricators, Inc. v. Sutton, 126 Idaho
934,894 P.2d 167 (1995). There is no question that plaintiffs in this case incurred substantial

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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''attorney fees in attempting to correct the "misrepresentation" concerning the status of the
beneficiaries. Therefore, their claim accrued, if at all, when they first began litigating the
standing issue that was the subject ofthe "misrepresentation."
Plaintiffs argue they exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud, but do not
explain how their diligence or lack of diligence has anything to do with whether the fraud
allegation could have been resolved in the first lawsuit. Mr. Maile drafted the trust agreement
and should have understood immediately who the beneficiaries were. He should have known
immediately whether the allegation that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary was accurate. In
fact, he argued against it. The discovery exception for a fraud claim has nothing to do with
whether plaintiffs had the opportunity to raise the fraud claim in the earlier litigation. They
discovered all of the facts upon which they based their fraud claim as soon as the relevant
pleadings were filed.

III.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS FOR AN INDEPENDENT
ACTION FOR FRAUD.

Plaintiffs' argument that the claim of extrinsic fraud is not barred by res judicata
is a complete red herring. Plaintiffs cite Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175
(1980), in support oftheir argument that res judicata does not apply to judgments obtained by
fraud. Plaintiffs ignore several relevant holdings of the Compton case, however. The court
stated, ''The term 'fraud upon the court' contemplates more than interparty misconduct, and, in
Idaho, has been held to require more than perjury or misrepresentation by a party or witness,
even where the misrepresentation was made to establish the court's jurisdiction." Id. 101 Idaho
at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181. Here, plaintiffs claim that the misrepresentation was made to establish
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standing. Compton seems to say that such a misrepresentation does not rise to the level of a
fraud upon the court. The Compton court also stated:
Among the non-conclusory points we' can make are that the
independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy, available
only rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances. It is
most certainly not its function to relitigate issues determined in
another action between the same parties, or to remedy the
inadvertence or oversight of one of the parties to the original
action. It will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of
fraud.

!d., 101 Idaho at 335,612 P.2d at 1182.
The plaintiffs here are attempting to do precisely what the court in Compton
prohibited, relitigating issues determined in another action between the same parties. Finally,
plaintiffs fail to note that the Compton court refused to find that the claims of fraud allowed an
independent action for relief from the judgment. Similarly, plaintiffs' claims here do not show
anything more than an allegation that was later remedied by an amendment. There was certainly
no fraud, nor was there any evidence of egregious conduct that would allow an independent
action to set aside an otherwise valid judgment.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have failed to make any cogent arguments against the application of res
judicata. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of all defendants.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2009.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
MOFFATI,
FIELDS, CHARTERED

BYM:J~~£'
BYM1Z::~£'

Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-7

Client:1192116.1

001340

04/15/2009 14:36 FAX

208385~~84
208385~~84

1

~ 009/009

MOFFATI THOMAS

-'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-100 I

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY

1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 386-5055

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
}pvemight Mail
( }Pvemight
(-1 Facsimile
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ))})vemight
})vemight Mail
(0'Facsimile

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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J. DAViD NAVARRO, Clerk
By KATHY J. SIEHL .
CEPVTY

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFA
IT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
MOFFAIT,
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor flea
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

No, CV-OC-0723232
Case No.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO COMPEL

Plaintiffs,
vs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, tka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN T
AYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 1

C1ient1197514.1
Client1197514.1

001342

.

04/20/2009 15:49 FAX

2083855~R4
2083855~R4

._'
'-'

1

141 003/004

MOFFATI' THOMAS

On April 6, plaintiffs sent a notice of hearing for their motion to compel.
Plaintiffs are requesting a hearing on April 22, at 3:30 p.m., the same time as the hearings
scheduled for defendants' motions for summary judgment that were noticed on February 24,
2009, and March 2, 2009. On March 17, 2009, plaintiffs also scheduled their motion for
summary judgment regarding defendants' counterclaims for the same time. Defendants ask that
the Court defer hearing on the motion to compel until after a decision is made concerning the
pending motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs' motion to compel was filed on October 20,2008. It was originally
scheduled for hearing on November 6, 2008, and was accompanied by an affidavit and a motion
to continue the summary judgment hearings that had been scheduled for November 6,2008. The
parties eventually agreed to vacate the November 6 hearings and stay the case until after the
Idaho Supreme Court decided the companion case.
Because this Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment may resolve
of the discovery irrelevant or limiting the
some or all of the issues in the case, thus making all ofthe
scope of permissible discovery, defendants believe that the Court's and counsels' resources
would be saved if the Court would defer argument on the motion to compel until after a decision
on the motions for summary judgment.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2009.
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
MOFFAIT,
FIELDS, CHARTERED

------'JA=----~------'JA=------~-

By_/l--t-'
BY_/!--t-'

Mark S Prusynski - Of th inn
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor tka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV

LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
380 W. State St.
ID 83616-4902
Eagle, ill
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ill
ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( t-fFacsimile

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
) 9vernight Mail
( )9vernight
( 1Facsimile
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349

By KATHY J. BIEHL
DEPUTY

MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor flea
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO COMPEL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, tka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 1

Client 1197514,1
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Apri16,
On April
6, plaintiffs sent a notice of hearing for their motion to compel.
Plaintiffs are requesting a hearing on April 22, at 3:30 p.m., the same time as the hearings
scheduled for defendants' motions for summary judgment that were noticed on February 24,
2009, and March 2, 2009. On March 17,2009, plaintiffs also scheduled their motion for
summary judgment regarding defendants' counterclaims for the same time. Defendants ask that
the Court defer hearing on the motion to compel until after a decision is made concerning the
pending motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs' motion to compel was filed on October 20, 2008. It was originally
scheduled for hearing on November 6, 2008, and was accompanied by an affidavit and a motion
to continue the summary judgment hearings that had been scheduled for November 6, 2008. The
parties eventually agreed to vacate the November 6 hearings and stay the case until after the
Idaho Supreme Court decided the companion case.
Because this Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment may resolve
some or all of the issues in the case, thus making all of the discovery irrelevant or limiting the
permissible discovery, defendants believe that the Court's and counsels' resources
ofperrnissible
scope of
would be saved if the Court would defer argument on the motion to compel until after a decision
on the motions for summary judgment.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2009.
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
MOFFAIT,
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By
____-7____~__~~~_______
__
By----t--'O:""--.....c...;;;=--h£
Mark S Prusynski - Of th inn
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor flea Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA
W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P
.A.
LAW
P.A.

380 W. State St.
8t.
ID 83616-4902
Eagle, 10
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ill
ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(t-{Facsimile

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
) 9vemight Mail
( )9vemight
( -{Facsimile
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

g:oI'~~_
: g:oI'3~._
MAY 61 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cieri<
By J,
J. FlANOALl
OIPUTY

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
PLEADINGS

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G.
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules

PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PLEADINGS - Pg 1
(,:~,*;ld'-"".-lliles\a\o\D\BF.RKSIIIR.[t.'V'I;:I.rkfeency~b"njudiaaJ~l.vryd
(,:~,*;ld'-"".-lliles\a\o\D\BF.RKSIIIR.[f'<'V'I;:I.rkfeency~b"njudiaaJ~l.'IIpd
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.......
of Evidence, Rule 201, requests that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of the following
pleadings from the records, and court file from the Ada County the consolidated case captioned
Taylor v. Maile, et. aI, case No. CV OC 04-00473D, to wit:
1.

Verified Amended Answer and Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial filed
September 7,2005 (attached to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss
dated May 14, 2008 and filed in this proceeding).

2.

Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 13, 2006
(attached to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008 and
filed in this proceedings).

3.

Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (filed June 7, 2006 and attached hereto).

4.

Memorandum Decision and Order (filed July 21,2006 and attached hereto).
hereto),

5.

First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (filed July 21,2006 and attached
hereto).
In addition the plaintiffs requests that this Court take judicial notice of the Registry of

Actions relating to the probate proceeding captioned, In the Matter of the Registration of the
Revocable Trust of Theodore L. Johnson, case number CV-TR-2004-22118 (copy attached).

This Motion is based upon the upon the file and record in this matter and further
pursuant to LR.E. Rule 201. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 1st day of May, 2009.

THOMA G.MA
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-Maile
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PLEADINGS - Pg 2
\o.\AD\BERKSHIR.'NVd.d;j~lionjudia.lno;>lm:l.wpd
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DEPtJly

3
4

5
6
7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9

ED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
nd R. JOHN TAYLOR,

10

Plaintiffs,

11
12

13
14

15
16
16
17

18
19
20
21

22

23

vs.
HOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
AILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
AILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
d BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES'
CLAIMS

11------------------./

HEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
RUST,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
HOMAS MAILE IV, and COLLEEN
)
AILE, husband and wife, and
)
ERKSHlRE
ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
)
)
Defendants.

24

25
26

UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS
~~\':.
~~\":.

CLA~gJ;~~EY
CLA~gl~~EY
001350
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........

This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald 1. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for

1
2

ummary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions
flaw contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

3 udgment on Beneficiaries' Claim,

4

5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
ollows:

6
1.

The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson

7

8
9

10
11
12

of the Linder
evocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchase ofthe
oad property which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment, and all subsequent
ocuments relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law.
2.

The title to the property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" and

ore particularly described in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted to the Theodore L.

13

14

ohnson Revocable Trust, in fee simple.
The Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows:

15

3.

16

The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North,
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho

17
18

19

4.

of which were
The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich

ased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering with

20 he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those
21

laims are as follows:

22
A.

Counterclaim I (tortious interference with contract between Defendants and

23
their lending institution)

24
25
26

B.

Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel)

UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
001351
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

1

2
3
4

5.

C.

Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer)

D.

Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment)

E.

Affirmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Unclean Hands.

The Plaintiff~efiCiaries
Plaintiff ~efiCiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter.
DATED this

day of June, 2006.

RC»-J ~JJ) .J W6t.PEA

5
6

The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper

7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of June, 2006, I caused to be
he served a true and
orrect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
2 ollowing:

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14

Thomas Maile, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616
Connie W. Taylor
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouster
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83702
Dennis M. Charney
Attorney at Law
951 E. Plaza Drive, Suite 140
ID 83616
Eagle, 10

d
o
0
0o

d
0o
0o
0o

d

0o
0o

J

0o
0o
0o

U.S. Mail
u.S.
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

,t. flAVID Nb.Vl\nRn
15

CLERK OF THE DISTRtCTJ;CQURT
./
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"'Al

16
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST
2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

3
4

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and R.
JOHN TAYLOR,

5

Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CVOC0400473D

vs.
THOMAS MAlLE, N and COLLEEN MAILE,
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

6
7

8
9
10

Defendants/ Counter-Claimants.

11

12

THEODORE 1.
L. JOHNSON RECOV
ABLE
RECOVABLE
TRUST,

13

Plaintiff,
14
15

16
17

vs.
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAlLE,
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENT, LLC,

18
19

Defendants.

20
21

This matter came before the Court on A) Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims;

22

B) Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(f) Certification; and C) Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs'

23

Proposed Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. The Court heard oral arguments on the

24

motions on July 17, 2006 and took the matter fully under advisement at that time.

25
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 1
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._.

I. BACKGROUND
2

On May 15, 2006, the Court entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

3

Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. On June 7, 2006, the Court entered its corresponding Judgment.

4

On June 20, 2006, the Court entered an order denying the Defendants' motion to reconsider and

5

clarifying its findings as set forth in the June 7 Judgment. Plaintiffs have submitted a proposed

6
7

amended judgment incorporating the Court's June 20 findings.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS

8

The Court finds that the Defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment, as it currently stands
9

on the record, sufficiently preserves the Defendants' ability to adjudicate their claim that the Plaintiffs
10

II

have been unjustly enriched by improvements made by the Defendants on the Linder Road property.

12

As a result, Defendants' motion to amend their counterclaims is hereby denied.

13

III. MOTION FOR RULE 54(b)
54 (b) CERTIFICATION

14

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) pennits some partial judgments to be appealed earlier

15

than they otherwise could have been appealed. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185,189, 125 P.3d

16

lO61, 1065 (2005). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the 'single judicial unit theory' which
1061,

17

seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim actions by forcing them to
18

await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every matter in controversy in it' before being allowed
19
20

to appeaL"
Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 892, 556 P.2d 366, 368
appeal." Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Indus.}

21

(1976). The decision of whether to issue a Rule 54(b) certification is within the discretion of the trial

22

court. Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818,822, 718 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 1986).

23
24

25
26

The Court finds that a certification of final judgment at this time would not serve the interests
contemplated by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification is hereby denied.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 2
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IV. OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED AMENDED JUDGMENT
2

A. Effect of the Court's Finding that the Sale Violated I.e. § 68-108(b)

3

The Court finds that the trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to

4

Idaho Code section 68-1 08(b) rendered both the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole

5

void, rather than voidable, as a matter of law.

6

B. Rightful Holder of Title in the Linder Road Property

7

The Court finds that the effect of the Court's imposition of a constructive trust on the Linder

8

Road property is the reconveyance of the property to the Trust and the quieting of the title in favor of

9

the Trust. See Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that

10

a party upon who a constructive trust is imposed "is treated as if he or she had been an express trustee

II

from the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey the property to the plaintiff'); see

12

also I. C. § 6-410 (describing an action to quiet title as that "brought by any person against another

13

who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of

14

determining such adverse claim").

15

Co Unjust Enrichment Claim
C.

16

The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' proposed amended judgment wrongfully

17

disallows Defendants' claim of unjust enrichment is well taken. Defendants' Counterclaim XI for

18

unjust enrichment shall not be dismissed.

19

V. CONCLUSION

20

Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims is hereby denied.
21

54(b) Certification is hereby denied..
Defendants' Motion for Rule S4(b)
denied ..
22
23

24

The Court will issue in due course an amended judgment in confonnity with both its findings
set forth in its June 20 order as well as its findings set forth above.

25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 3
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this ;)
2

-

/.5 day
d:ty of ~ ( -t

I

2006.

3
4

5

6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17

18
19

20

21

22
23
24
25

26
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2 1 2006
JUL 21
~K)-W~;nf1.U, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
2

RECEfVED
RECEIVED
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4

STRICT OF

.Jl1l 2 5 2006
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and R.
JOHN TAYLOR,

&. FaUSER
GJORDING &
PLL.G
'

5

Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants,
Plaintiffs/

Case No. CVOC0400473D

6
7

8
9
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husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
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10

Defendants/ Counter-Claimants.

11
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vs.

THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAILE,
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENT, LLC,
Defendants.

20
21

This cause came before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for

22

Summary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of
23

law contained within the Court's May 15, 2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
24

25

~

Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim,
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
2
3

follows:
1. The trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to Idaho Code section

4

68-108(b) rendered both the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole void,

5

rather than voidable, as a matter of law.

6

7

2. The property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" is more particularly
described as follows:

8
9
10

11

The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township
5 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
3. The Linder Road property kcurrently being held in constructive trust by the current title
holders for the benefit of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust.

12

4. In relation to the interests asserted by the Defendants therein, the title to the Linder Road
13

property shall be quieted in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust.
14

15

5. Defendant Berkshire Investments shall be entitled to repayment of the $400,000 purchase

16

price paid for the Linder Road property, less any amount proven to be entitled to the

17

Defendants pursuant to their counterclaim for unjust enrichment.

18

19
20

6. With the exception of Counterclaim XI Unjust Enrichment, all of the Defendants'
remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses are hereby dismissed.
7. The sole issue remaining to be adjudicated in this case is Defendants' Counterclaim XI

21

Unjust Enrichment.
22

23
24

25

26
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
2

Dated this

£

~,

;::]"'kv ( ---I
day of ~

/

2006.

3
4
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9
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JUL 0 2 2009
J. DAVID NAVARFlO, Clerk
By JENNIFER KEI\lNEDY
KEI\JNEDY
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

. BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual;
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST,
an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 1I
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
Defendants.

1.

Facts
The plaintiffs Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Birch-

Maile filed this lawsuit after receiving an adverse judgment in two other consolidated cases.

1

Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Birch-Maile (collectively the Mailes) are husband and wife.

I

Ada County District Court cases CV-OC-0400473D
CY-OC-0400473D and CV-OC-0405656D.
CY-OC-0405656D.
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Berkshire Investments, LLC (Berkshire) is owned by the Mailes. Dallan Taylor and R. John
Taylor are Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. These three defendants
were parties to one or the other of the previous cases that were consolidated. For
convenience, these defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as the "Trust
defendants." The other named defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark
and Feeney partnership represented the other current defendants as the lawyers in the previous
cases. For convenience, these defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as the
"Lawyer defendants." The original cases involved a real estate transaction between the
current plaintiffs and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("the Trust").
Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's (Johnson's) attorney. Mr. Maile's
representation included drafting the trust agreement for the Trust and overseeing its
administration. After Johnson's death, Mr. Maile represented Johnson's estate.
The underlying transaction that spawned this case and the earlier cases is a land sale
between Johnson, then trustee and settler of the Trust, and the Mailes. Johnson, acting on
behalf of the Trust, and the Mailes entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase

by the Mailes of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho owned by the Trust. The purchasers' interest in the
contract was later assigned to Berkshire. Mr. Maile acted as both the attorney and realtor for
the transaction. Johnson died before the sale closed. The deal was consummated by the
successor trustees, who were also beneficiaries of the Trust.
When the other beneficiaries discovered the purchase price, they filed a lawsuit to set
aside the sale. On January 23,2004, three of the beneficiaries, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor,
and R. John Taylor (collectively the Taylors), filed the first lawsuit, alleging three causes of
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action seeking damages or rescission of the sale. On April 23, 2004, the district court, Judge
Wilper presiding, dismissed the claims based upon lack of standing. The Taylors appealed.
The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded.
While the first case went up on appeal, the original trustees purportedly transferred
their status as trustees to the Taylors. The rest of the beneficiaries disclaimed interest in the
property and Trust, save one group of beneficiaries who retained an interest in the claims
against the current plaintiffs. On July 22,2004, the group of beneficiaries executed a
Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity agreement and filed a new suit in the name of the Trust
against Berkshire and the Mailes. Judge Wilper consolidated the two cases on September 29,
2004.
In November of2004, Magistrate Judge Bieter entered an order in the pending

Johnson probate appointing the Taylors as co-successor Trustees. He later set aside the order
on April 13,
l3, 2005. After a hearing, in May 2005, he again appointed the Taylors as Trustees.
He did so over Mr. Maile's objection, but declined to make the appointment retroactive as
requested by petitioners. The circumstances surrounding the petition for appointment as
trustees filed in Judge Beiter's court plays a central role in Berkshire's claims made in this
current case.
On December 30, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the first appeal. Taylor v.
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (Idaho 2005). The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the

case back to the district court for trial. The district court allowed the Trust and the Taylors to
amend their consolidated complaint to conform to the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion.
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On May 15,2006, Judge Wilper granted both the Trust and the Taylors' motions for
summary judgment that, combined with an earlier ruling granting partial summary judgment,
gave plaintiffs in the consolidated case judgment on all of the counterclaims and affirmative
defenses, except the counterclaim for unjust ell1ichment.
emichment. The ruling also invalidated the sale
of the property as a matter oflaw.
A court trial in October of 2006 determined that the Mailes and Berkshire were not
entitled to any relief on the only remaining counter-claim, unjust enrichment. Judge Wilper's
final judgment ordered the Trust to repay the purchase price and Berkshire convey title back
to the Trust. This case was also appealed. The judgment was affirmed. Taylor v. Maile, 146
Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (Idaho 2009).
In the wake of the previous lawsuit, Berkshire and the Mailes2 filed the current action

on December 31, 2007 asserting numerous claims against the Trust and the Taylors on a
number of legal theories: quiet title, constructive trust, tortious interference with contract,
tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, abuse of process, negligence,
negligence per se, gross negligence, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, violation of the title

of Idaho Code (RICO), and finally, judicial estoppel. In addition, Berkshire
18, chapter 78 ofldaho
added several new parties to this action, Connie Wright Taylor, the law firm Clark and
Feeney, Paul T. Clark, and any John Doe claiming any right to possession ofthe disputed
property. In this case, Berkshire requests the Court to convey title to the property back to
Berkshire, impose a constructive trust, or money damages. All defendants have

For convenience, the Mailes and Berkshire will be referred to collectively as "Berkshire" for the balance of this
opinion.

2
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counterclaimed for slander of title to the real estate at issue and for abuse of process. The
Taylor defendants have also counterclaimed for intentional interference with a prospective
economic advantage. There has been no attempt to name or serve any of the John Doe
defendants.
All of the current defendants moved for summary judgment on Berkshire's current
claims because the causes of action are bared by the operation of res judicata or LR.C.P.
12(b
)(8) (another action pending). In addition to making a motion for summary judgment, the
l2(b)(8)
current defendants asked the Court to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the Mailes and
Berkshire. Finally, Berkshire moved for summary judgment on each of the defendants'
counter claims.
II.

Standard of Review
The Trust defendants originally styled their motion as a motion to dismiss. It was

supported by an affidavit. Plaintiffs objected to this procedure and moved to strike and filed
an amended "Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment." An amended
affidavit was filed in support of this motion. All parties have filed extensive briefing.
Berkshire has filed several hundred pages of affidavits in support of its motions and in
opposition to the defendants' pending motions.
If a trial court considers factual allegations outside the pleading on a Rule 12(b)(
6)
l2(b)(6)
motion, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Fonte v. Board
of
Managers q[Continental Towers Condominium.
ofManagers
Condominium, 848 F.2d 24 (2nd Cir.1988); Rose v.
Bartle. 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.1989). Furthermore, if a court considers matters outside

pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6)
l2(b)(6) motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for
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summary judgment and the proceedings thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice
requirements of Rule 56. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Id. Ct.
App.1990). Since it was necessary to consider materials outside of the pleadings, the Court
will treat this as a motion for summary judgment.
All parties have treated the amended motion as a motion for summary judgment. All
parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their version of the case through the
affidavits and briefing. The Court will decide the case as submitted on cross motions for
summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.' "Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87,
996 P.2d 303,306 (2000).
The fact that both sides moved for summary judgment does not in itself establish that
there is no genuine issue of fact. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387
(1979). The Court must analyze the case from the perspective of each motion, granting the
opposing party the benefit of any inferences that may be drawn in its favor. Ifthere is a

genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied.
III.

Privity
A threshold question that must be addressed is whether the Lawyer defendants can

raise the defenses they have put forth. Both res judicata and LR.C.P. 12(b)(8)
l2(b)(8) require that the
party raising it have been a party to a previous action with the plaintiff or in privity with a
party to the previous action. For res judicata purposes privity exists between a party and its
attorneys where the defendant attorneys are named as a result of their prior representation in
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the transaction that gives rise to the litigation. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d
1228,1235
AT&
TCorp.,
1228, 1235 n. 6 (7th Cir.1986). See also, Plotnerv.
Plotner v. AT
& T
Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10 Cir.
2000). For purposes of this case, the Lawyer defendants are in privity with their clients, the
Trust defendants. The following analysis applies to all defendants.
IV.

Analysis -- Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Rule 12(b)(8)

All defendants suggest that Rule 12(b
)(8) bars the present action. At the time this case
12(b)(8)
was filed, the final judgment entered by Judge Wilper in the consolidated cases was pending
on appeal. The appeal has since been remanded with Judge Wilper's decision being affinned.
The detennination of whether to proceed with a case, when a similar case is pending
elsewhere and has not gone to judgment, is discretionary. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds, NBC Leasing Co.
v. R & T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). Once the other action has gone to
judgment, the case should be evaluated on resjudicata grounds. Klaue v. Hem, 133 Idaho
437,988 P.2d 211 (1999); Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 101 Idaho 522, 616 P.2d 1058 (1980).

Since the cases before Judge Wilper went to judgment, this case will be analyzed under res

judicata principles. Defendants' Rule 12(b
)(8) motions are denied.
12(b)(8)
B. Res Judicata
The defendants also move to dismiss this lawsuit based on the doctrine of res judicata.
There are three fundamental purposes served by res judicata:
First, it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against
the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results. Second, it serves the public interest in
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protecting the court against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it
advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive
claims. Hindmarsh v Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (citing
Aldape v Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 256,668 P.2d 130,132 (Ct. App. 1983)).
Res judicata is shorthand for two distinct legal concepts - issue preclusion (collateral

estoppel) and claim preclusion (prohibition against splitting a cause of action). Compare
Stoddard v. Hagadone, 2009 WL 982693 (2009) with Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho

119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007).
Both doctrines are implicated here.
a. Issue Preclusion
The doctrine of issue preclusion exists to prevent the re-litigation of an issue
previously determined when:
(l)
(1) the party against who the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case;
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented
in the present action;
(3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation;
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation, and
(5) the party against who the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the litigation.
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 2009 WL 982693 (2009), (citing Rodriguez v. Dept. of
Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001)).
Examination of Berkshire's answer and counterclaims in the consolidated cases
eliminates many of the claims in this case. These are the claims Berkshire brought in this
action that were counterclaims in the previous case, i.e. the claims for quiet title, tortuous
interference with a contract, tortuous interference with a prospective business advantage,
equitable estoppel, and quasi estoppel. Berkshire had a full and fair opportunity to present
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 8
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those claims before Judge Wilper. Each claim here is identical to the one pleaded in prior
litigation. Judge Wilper decided the claims to be without merit in granting summary
judgment. A final judgment on the merits was entered and sustained on appeal. The parties in
this case are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the previous lawsuit. Plaintiffs'
claims for quiet title, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with a
prospective business advantage, equitable estoppel, and quasi estoppel are dismissed.
b. Claim Preclusion
Claim Preclusion, "bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same
claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp.,
2009 WL 982693 (2009); (citing Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d
613,617 (2007)). A claim is barred ifit could have been brought, regardless of whether it
was brought. For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements:

(1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho
119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007) (citing Hindmarsh v.l'vfock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002);
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994)).

In this case, the remaining claims must be dismissed based on claim preclusion. In the
current action, the parties are identical to, or are in privity with, the parties in the prior case.
The first element is present.
In determining whether the claim is the same, it is not the legal theory espoused by the

plaintiff that controls. The issue is whether the new complaint arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose. Ticor Title Co. v.
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Stan ion, supra. See also, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) and the
commentary thereto.
Berkshire strenuously argues the new claims are not barred because the damage caused
by the alleged fraud did not occur until the earlier cases were lost. For this proposition
plaintiffs cite Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633 (1991). Fuller is inapposite as it
concerns collateral estoppel, not claim preclusion. The question presented in Fuller was
whether certain damages had been determined in a prior case. The Court held they had not.
In so holding, the opinion does not discuss claim preclusion.

Plaintiffs' remaining claims are abuse of process, negligence, negligence per se, gross
negligence, and violation of the title 78, chapter 18 ofIdaho Code. A comparison of the facts
alleged in the present case to the facts alleged in the prior consolidated cases leaves no doubt
that these claims relate to the same transaction that gave rise to the first cases. Berkshire
makes much of the supposed fraud perpetrated by defendants. The core fact upon which
Berkshire's case is built is an alleged misrepresentation made to Judge Beiter in the
application to appoint new Trustees. The Taylors filed a verified petition for appointment as
Trustees. The petition contained a statement to the effect that "Helen Taylor is the sole
remaining beneficiary of the Trust." The petition was later amended to reflect that she was
not the sole beneficiary. In Berkshire's view, the first allegation was true and the second
false. Consequently, when the Taylors later caused the Trust to file suit against Berkshire
alleging they were beneficiaries ofthe Trust, this was a false statement under oath. Likewise,
the amended complaint filed in the consolidated cases after the first appeal contained this
same false statement. Not only could any issues arising from this alleged fraud have been

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 10

001372

raised in the earlier case, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Maile II reflects this issue was
argued in the most recent appeal and rejected. Dressing the claim in the language of RICO
and other new legal labels does not change the fact that this claim, the extent it was not,
should have been presented to Judge Wilper. The second element is present.

Finally, the earlier suit resulted in a final judgment adverse to plaintiffs here. The
third element of claim preclusion is present. The balance of plaintiffs' claims must be
dismissed.
c. Plaintiffs Other Arguments
Although the argument is not always easy to follow, Berkshire's claims presented here
all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors and their counsel committed a fraud on Judge Beiter
by filing a petition for appointment as Trustees that contained a false statement. This
statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing
to bring the suit which ultimately led to Judge Wilper's determination that the underlying real
estate transaction was void. This led to the loss of the property. The loss of the property, in
tum is what caused the damages in this case. Since those damages only arose after Judge

Wilper's final judgment, this action could not have been brought earlier. Therefore, it is not
barred by res judicata. In other words, the loss of the prior suit gives rise to the cause of
action in this case.
Berkshire does not attack the correctness ofJudge Wilper's decision. The argument
seems to be that, but for the alleged fraud on Judge Beiter and the alleged false statements in
the complaint filed by the Trust, the case before Judge Wilper would have been dismissed on
standing grounds. But, Berkshire asks this Court to do what the Supreme Court declined to do
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 11
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- set aside the judgment entered in the prior case. That decision held that Berkshire was not
entitled to the property in the first place. If this were grounds for liability, every losing
defendant would then have a cause of action against the successful plaintiff and the winning
plaintiffs counsel.
Fundamentally, Berkshire misses the point. The underlying series of transactions in
this case is the original real estate transaction between the Berkshire parties and the Trust. It
is not whatever representations mayor may not have been true in the previous litigation. It is
all of the claims that could have been brought arising from that transaction that are precluded.
Berkshire straightforwardly asks this Court to set aside the judgment in the prior
consolidated cases based upon fraud on the Court. In doing so, they rely on Compton v.
Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980). Compton reiterates the statement in Rule

60(b) that a court has the inherent power to entertain an independent action in equity to set
aside a judgment. Assuming for purposes of this motion that the allegations in the complaint
are true and the actions ofthe Taylors and their lawyers, as pled in the verified complaint,
constituted a fraud on the Court, the conduct is not, in this case, sufficient to justify this Court
setting aside the Judgment of Judge Wilper.
"[T]the independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy, available only
rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances. It is most certainly not
its function to relitigate issues determined in another action between the same
parties, or to remedy the inadvertence or oversight of one of the parties to the
original action. It will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of fraud.
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,335, 612 P.2d 1175,1182 (1980).
In this case, it is undisputed that the conduct of which Berkshire complains was known to

Berkshire long before the judgment was entered in Judge Wilper's Court. Berkshire should
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have brought the alleged fraud to Judge Wilper's attention under IRCP 60(b), rather than
requesting this Court to second guess Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court.
V.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims
In the answer, the defendants filed several counterclaims against Berkshire including

slander of title, abuse of process, and intentional interference with a prospective economic
advantage. Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on all these claims. Just as
plaintiffs are entitled to have all reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts drawn in
their favor when opposing summary judgment, so to are defendants. Plaintiffs have moved to
strike the affidavits of Helen Taylor and Connie Wright Taylor. The affidavit of Helen Taylor
is not germane to this Court's decision on these motions. It appears to be directed to
interpretation of the Disclaimer Agreement. That is not an issue here. Her affidavit is not
hearsay, but will not be considered because the Court does not perceive it to be relevant to the
counterclaims. The Connie Wright Taylor affidavit incorporating the affidavit ofR. John
Taylor is hearsay. It will not be considered in ruling on the counterclaims.
A. Slander of Title

It is undisputed that a lis pendens has been filed in this case. Depending on the

circumstances, the mere filing of the lis pendens may constitute slander of title. There appear
to be other genuine issues of fact regarding this cause of action. It is simply not possible on
the current record to find the claim without merit. Summary judgment on this issue is denied.
B. Abuse of Process

Given the Court's ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment, this claim
cannot be dismissed on this record. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and Judge Wilper's
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 13
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several decisions in the prior consolidated cases. Taken together with the pleadings, briefs,
and affidavits filed by Berkshire in this case, it cannot be said that this claim is without merit.
There remain factual issues to be determined before this claim can be determined on its
merits. Summary judgment on this issue is denied.

C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Advantage
Again, when the information set forth in Judge Wilper's decisions is taken together
with the information found in plaintiffs' voluminous filings in this case, there are simply too
many factual issues needing determination before the Court can determine the merit, or lack of
the same. Summary judgment on this issue is denied.
VI.

Rule 11 Sanctions and Attorney Fees
Given that this case had not been concluded, but remains to be tried on the

counterclaims, the Court will reserve ruling on attorney fees, whether under Rule 11 or
otherwise. Rule 11, in particular, is intended to grant courts the power to impose sanctions for
discrete pleading abuses or other types oflitigative misconduct. Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22,
23,773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct.App.1989). It is also this Court's opinion that Rule 11 sanction

motions should be free standing and not combined with other motions as has been done in the
instant case. Such practice inevitably leads, in a hotly contested case, to every motion
containing a Rule 11 request, diverting the energy of the parties and the Court from the real
issues in need of determination. Where the corrective power of Rule 11 is needed, a separate
motion and hearing that clearly delineates the facts and issues is more useful. In some

respects, the issues in a Rule 11 request are duplicative of the abuse of process claims that
remain to be litigated in this case.
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Just so there is no misunderstanding, the Court is not precluding an award of attorney
fees in this case in the future, including fees under Rule 11 based on pleadings filed up to this
point. The Court is simply preserving the issue for another day.
VII.

Summary.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted. Plaintiffs' complaint is
dismissed for the reasons set forth above. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
denied. The Court reserves ruling on the request for attorney fees under Rule 11.
Counsel for the Trust defendants is requested to provide a form of Order for entry by
the Court. The discovery motions pending at the time of the hearing on the motions decided
here may be re-noticed for hearing by any party choosing to do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

1-

July 2009.
day of
ofJuly

District Judge
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54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed
July 2, 2009, containing the language, as provided, to wit:
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.c.P., that the court has
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order
shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules
That in addition, and in the alternative the plaintiffs herein request that this court enter an
order pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(x) and I.A.R. Rule 12, granting the plaintiffs a permissive
appeal of said Order. This Motion is on the grounds set fort above and the record and file herein,
and the Affidavit of Thomas Maile and the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed concurrently
herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2009.

THOMAS
AIL, V
Pro Se and coun
or Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-Maile
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Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed
July 2,2009, and in the alternative to allow a permissive appeal pursuant to the Idaho Appellate
Rule 12.
1. A Central issue for appellate review consists of the application of Res
Judicata in light of the wrongful conduct of the defendants.
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128,212 P.2d 1031,1034 (1949».
Commencing at page 128 of 70 Id. Reports, the Supreme Court declared:
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud
offraud or collusion a
judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies on all issues which
were (or should have been) litigated in the action....
action ....
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be
extrinsic or collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. It is not sufficient to charge only
intrinsic fraud, or that which is involved in the issues tried, such as the
P .2d
presentation of perjured testimony. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 74 Cal.App.2d 391, 168 P.2d
770; Metzger v. Vestal, 2 Cal.2d 517, 42 P.2d 67; Kasparian v. Kasparian, 132
Cal.App. 773, 23 P.2d 802; Stout v. Derr, 171 Okl. 132,42 P.2d 136; Zounich v.
Anderson, 35 Idaho 792, 208 P. 402; Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600,88 Pac.
82, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 524, 10 Ann.Cas. 444; Scanlon v. McDevitt, 50 Idaho 449,
296 P. 1016; Harkness v. Village of McCammon, 50 Idaho 569, 298 P. 676; Boise
Payette Lumber Co. v. Idaho Gold Dredging Corp., 56 Idaho 660, 58 P.2d 786;

Moyes v. Moyes, 60 Idaho 601, 94 P.2d 782; Keane v. Allen, 69 Idaho 53, 202
P.2d 411; 49 C.J.S., Judgements, §§ 269, 270, pp. 486-490; 31 Am. Jur. 228-243;
L.R.A.19l7B
L.R.A.1917B (note) 409-512.
Our Supreme Court has confirmed that the principle that a party committing fraud will
not be afforded the protection of Res Judicata. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 P.2d 329
(1995), Stoddard V. the Hagadone Corporation (2009-ID-04l6.158
(2009-ID-0416.158 Docket No. 34335). There is
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ample evidence in the record, that the defendants committed peIjury in their verification
surrounding the amended complaint filed in 2006. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 537, Fraud or
Collusion provides:
Fraud by a party will not undermine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the
fraud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine of
res judicata will not shield a blameworthy defendant from the consequences of his
or her own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be
invoked to sustain fraud, and a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may not
be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
The defendants' misrepresentation under oath purportedly gave them a basis to contest
C. 68-106, which resulted in the
I.C.
the lack of court approval of the real estate closing pursuant to I.
real estate sale be voided. But for their peIjury there would not have been a voided real estate
transaction. Once again the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled that the trust itself could not
rescind the transaction.
50 c.J.S. Judgments § 532, provides:
§ 532. Fraud, collusion, or peIjury

A judgment may be collaterally attacked on the ground of fraud where the fraud
goes to the jurisdiction of the court. Where the fraud alleged was inherent in the
cause of action, or in the character or procurement of the instrument sued on, it

does not furnish a legitimate ground for impeaching the judgment in a collateral
proceeding; and, as a broad general rule, where the court has jurisdiction, it is not
permissible for a party or privy to attack a judgment in a collateral proceeding
because of fraud, such a judgment being voidable only, and not void.
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances,
and subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the
record or goes to the method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment
may be attacked collaterally where fraud bas been practiced in the very act of
obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the judgment was rendered,
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so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case.
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks
on judgments is defined as fraud which is collateral to the issues tried in the case
where the judgment is rendered.
There are substantial controlling legal issues involved in this litigation. A certification of
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed July 2,2009 and any subsequent orders
relating to the same would promote judicial economy.

2. Our Supreme Court has not determined the effects of allegations of
perjury, aiding and abetting perjury, and obtaining money by false pretenses
in the application of Res Judicata.
There have been no reported Idaho cases involving the issues of criminal conduct and the
application of Res Judicata relating to the Idaho Racketeering Statutes. The case of State v.
Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A. 2007) provides relevant standards involving a criminal case of
peIjury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P
.3d Reports, the Idaho Court of Appeals provides:
P.3d
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it
is material to any proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his
credibility. The degree of materiality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which
quoted I.e. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding
(emphasis added).
The Taylors actively participated in the global disclaimer agreement between the
beneficiaries of the trust and the successor trustees. The Taylors obtained control of the trust and
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'-'
were no longer beneficiaries of the trust. Our Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (2) so indicated
"In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust property in favor of their

.. " (Page 3 of opinion). As a matter oflaw as determined by our Supreme Court the
mother. .."
Taylors were not beneficiaries in 2006 as they verified under oath in their amended complaint.
In addition the record establishes that defendant Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart
Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as
beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an
affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an
agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate
tax returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B"
referencing deposition exhibit 39).
Finally, the testimony of R. John Taylor before the probate court provided verification of
their state of mind, " my mother is the beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will
eventually win on this claim." During that same hearing Mr. Clark provided in his closing
argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 provided: page 17, In 12:

MR. CLARK: "Yes.

-Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -

they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that
same agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the
proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding."
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A").
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The record is ample for an immediate appellate review under LR.C.P. Rule 54(b). This
court has ruled that Res Judicata applies, which consequently defeat the claims ofthe plaintiffs
and results in a potential trial based upon the defendants' counter-claims, which is driven by
application of Res Judicata to the plaintiffs' claims. There could be no trial on the countercounter
claims ifldaho Law precludes a party committing fraud and/or criminal activity in obtaining the
prior judgment. A certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) would aid in the affective administrative
of justice.
ofjustice.
The plaintiffs have now offered to the defendants to release their lis pendens. In addition
the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the lis pendens in the
prior proceeding was warranted during the appeal. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of
Motion for Certification/Motion for Permissive Appeal). There can be no prejudice to the
defendants in allowing an immediate appellate review as the defendants can do what they so
desire relative to the real property that has been the subject ofthese proceedings.
As stated in the case of Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Id. 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005):
The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to liberalize the appeals process by permitting
some partial judgments to be appealed earlier than they otherwise could have been
appealed. Merchants, Inc. v. Intennountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d

366 (1976). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the 'single judicial unit theory'
which seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim
actions by forcing them to await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every
matter in controversy in it' before being allowed to appeal." Id. at 892, 556 P.2d at
368.
The legal issues presented by the plaintiffs involve substantial issues involving the
integrity of our judicial system. The certification under Rule 54(b) will produce an efficient,
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orderly determination of
justice for all parties.
ofjustice

3. In the Alternative the Plaintiffs Request That the Court Enter its Order
Allowing a Permissive Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 12.
The plaintiffs believe that a certification pursuant to I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. 54(B) is a sensible approach
to the litigation. The plaintiffs in the alternative request an order allowing a permissive appeal
pursuant to LA.R.
I.A.R. Rule 12.
LA.R.
I.A.R. Rule 12 provides:
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory
order or decree of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an
interlocutory order of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable
under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of
the litigation.
The parties would be best served by having the appellate court consider the issue which is
central to this litigation, to wit: the affects of the doctrine of Res Judicata. This one legal issue
controls the remaining claims contained in the counter-claims of the defendants. Idaho Law has
not specifically ruled on the affects of criminal behavior under the Idaho Racketeering Statute in
light of Res Judicata. Our appellate courts have not examined facts similar to the allegations
raised by the plaintiffs relating to the defendants' misrepresentations to the court as to whether
such facts are a "fraud upon the court". OUf Supreme Court can provide guidance as to whether
the plaintiffs' allegations of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, and aiding and abetting
perjury constitute such facts amounting to "tampering with the administration ofjustice'
of justice' as to
suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.'" Compton v.
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Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175,1181 (1980). The facts of this case warrant an
examination by our Supreme Court to determine the integrity of our judicial system.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have offered to release any and all lis pendens filed which may affect the
subject real property. The defendants are free to deal with the subject real property in any
manner they choose. The Honorable Judge Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the Lis
Pendens in the prior case was warranted during the appeal process in the prior proceedings.
There remains a controlling issue of Law, to wit: the affect of Res Judicata in light of the
defendants' alleged wrongful behavior, that can be addressed by the Supreme Court. Our
Supreme Court should provide their guidance as to whether the conduct of the defendants
constitutes a "wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public." Our
Supreme Court should determine whether Res Judicata is a bar in light of the allegations of the
criminal behavior of the defendants.
DATED this 13th day ofJuly, 2009.

~"""-~J"n..,shire
~"""-.o.K.<Jln..shire

Investments, LLC
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CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
T AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE
54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDERIMOTION
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE
12

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54 (B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDERIMOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 1
(':~Q.;I>IKkI\j;cn'erIIiIes\lll\AD'.BERKSIIIRJNVd.rk.J.~\affidavlIllIOlloru:rtifiC8tion.wpd
C':~Q.;hlKkl\.l;cn'erlliles\lll\AD'.BERKSIIIRJNVd.rk.J.~\a.ffidavllmolloru:rtifiC8lion.wpd
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County of Ada

)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
of this matter.

2.

That the following pleadings were filed in the captioned matter known as Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile,
Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, to wit: Exhibit "A" is a true and correct
copy of the Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens; Exhibit "B" is a
true and correct copy of the Memorandum Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiffs/CounterClaimants' Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens; Exhibit "C" is a
true and correct copy of the Order entered March 1, 2007 relating to the Motion for
Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens, all of which are made a part hereof as if

set forth in full herein.
3.

Annexed hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of a letter to Connie Wright
Taylor dated July 9,2009, together with the enclosures referenced therein and the same is
made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 2
'1-:'-wr!files\lll\AD\BERKSHIRINVw;I.~ffidaV\tmotimu=rtifill!l.uonwpd
7-:"-wrlfiles\lll\AD\BERKSHIRINV'cl.~ffidlV\tmotimu=rtifiU!luonwpd
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DATED this )jday of July, 2009.

,I

THOMAS G.
ILE
,pro se and
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
....

/3

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
day of July, 2009.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

-~Cf~
.
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 3
C:\haalyblldhacll \.""".",-llilesla\AD\BERK.<;HIR.INV\dal1dlllll"leYlallidavllJmbolUll1llicabOn.
\.""".",-1 filesla\AD\BERK..''lHIR.INV\da.t.leeneyIaJlidavilJmbolUll1llicabOn.wpd
C:\haaIybBdr.hBcll
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1

2

3
4
5

PAUL THOMAS CLARK
CONNIE WRIGHT fA
TA YLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
PIa int iff's
Attorneys for Pia
The Train Station, Suite 201
20 I
13th and Main Streets
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB# 1329
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUR,],II
FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND !"C)R
H)R TIlE COUNTY OF ADA

6
7

8

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

10

12

13

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

)

9

11

)
)

VS.

)
)
)
)

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATI: COMPANY,
and BERKSHIRE INV
JNV ESTMENTS, LLC,
LLC

)
)
)

MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND or
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS

)

)

14

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)

)

15
16

)

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,

17

18

Plaintiff:
vs.

)

MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
TIJOMAS MAILE.
MAILE, husband and wife, and
I3ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

21

22

23
24

)
)
)

)
)

19

20

)

Defendants.

)

)
)

)
)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan.
Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the
Beneficiary Plaintin:,,'·).
of record, Connie Wright Taylor of the tirm
Plaintin:'l'·). by and through their attorney orrecord,

25
26

J\IOTION
I'lOTION FOR AJ'PLH
AJ'PE.-\I BOND or
ur
Uhl)LH Ht::J\IOVING
Ht::J\/OVING LIS I'L'IDENS

EXHIBIT "A"
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''-

of Clark & Feeney and. pursuant to I.A.R.
LA.R. 13(b)( 14) and 13 (b)( 15), move this Court for an order
1

2

requiring the DetCndants to either deposit with the court $1.8 million in cash or post a supersedeas
bond in the amount of $2.448,000 as a condition or
oj" pursuing their appeal.

3

This motion is made on the grounds and I'or the reasons that the Defendants have recorded

4

a lis pendens (a true and correct copy of which is attached to this motion). This lis pendens was not

5
6

7

8
9
10
11
12

filed with the Court. nor was a copy of it sent to opposing counsel. The lis pendens is the equivalent
of a unilateral stay or
of this Court's order dated July 21. 2006 returning title of the real property at
issue to the PlaintiJTs.

sLich a stay may be obtained only upon
Under the Idaho Appellate Rules, such

the posting of security.
In the alternati ve. Plaintiffs move for an order removing the lis pendens from the Ada County
Records and precluding the Defendants from tiling any subsequent lis pendens relating to the real
matter without posting security.
property at issue in this maller

13
14

15

Oral argument is requested.
C!/i
C!li

DATED this

r
\!/1~'

/j~~. day of January, 2007~
/l~~.

16

, -,
)

.

\/<J~'
~
-----

17

f---=:;=-L-.-f---

Wright Taylor,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
COlllllC

18
19
20
21

22

23
24

25
26

110'1> or
I\IOTION FOR APPEAL 110'1)
OUDEU
I~EI\10VING LIS I'L'DENS
ORDEn I~EI\10VING
"['DENS

2

LAW OFFICES OF
OF"

CLARK AND FEENEY
001394
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

'.~,
'.~,

CERTIFICATEOF
OFSERVICE
SERVICE
CERTIFICATE

11

22

/"

-. /1'

I'}
:-.: I'}

HEREBYCERT1J-'Y
CERTIl"Ythat
thaton
onthe
the~
-Li__
dayor
or.lanuary,
2007,IIcaused
causedtotobe
beserved
servedaatrue
trueand
and
I IHEREBY
__ ~~ day
January, 2007,
correctcopy
copyof
oflhis
documentby
bythe
themethod
method indicated
indicatedbelow,
below,and
andaddressed
addressedtotothe
thefollowing:
following:
this document
correct

33
44

55
66

77
88

99
10
10
11
11

ThomasMaile
Maile
Thomas
Attorney
Law
A110rney atat Law
380 W.
W. State
State
380
Eagle,
ID
83616
Eagle, ID 83616

LlCJ

[J[I
0D

Overnight
Overnight Mail
Mail
Tclecopy
(FAX)
Telecopy (FAX)

[J
[J

U.S.
U.S. Mail
Mail

[[l1
U
U

;.1
}-1

lland
I land Delivered
Delivered
Overnight
Overnight Mail
Mail
'J'clccopy
Tclccopy (FAX)
(FAX)

[]
[]

U.S.
U.S. Mail
Mail

U
[J

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Tclecopy (FAX)

.xf
.Kf

Jack S.
S. Gjording
Gjording
Jack
Gjording
Fouskr
Gjording && Foush:;r
P.O.
Box
2837
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID
ID 83702
83702
Boise,

U.S.
U.S. Mail
Mail
JIland
land Delivered
Delivered

Dennis Charney
Charney
Dennis
A
ttorney
at Law
Law
A110rney at
951I E.
E. Plaza
Plaza Dr.
Dr. Stc.
Stc. 140
140
95
Eagle,
ID
83616
Eagle, ID 83616

K(
XC

12
12

/

/
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/
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13
13
14
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~

;'

Conl1lc Wright Taylor
ConnIe
Attorncy 1'01'
ror Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
Attorney

15
15

,

~
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16
16
17
17

18
18

19
19
20
20
21
21

22
22
23
23
24
24
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26
26

I\IOTION
I\IOTIONFOR
FORAI'PEAL
AI'PEALBOND
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LEWISTON.IDAHO
IDAHO83501
83501
LEWISTON.

ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO
AMOUNT 8.00
3
BOISE IDAHO 05118106 04:10 PM
DEPUTY Bonnie Oberbillig
III 1111111111111111111111111111111111
RECORDED - REQUEST OF

'rhome. Malle

THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
836) 6
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

106078472

W1d Berkshire Investments, LLC
Attorney for Colleen Maile and

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/CoWlter-Defendants,

vs.
THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband Wld wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
TRUST,
)
)
PlaintiffiCounter-DefendW1ts,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants,
)
)
)
vs.

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 1
Z:IAILO'MAIlEITAYLOKILISPENl).NOT Moy II. ~006
Z:IA\LO'MAII.EITAYLOKILISPEND.NOT

.;....;., . ..
:i'::~.;,£.~.. '-... :i'::~.;,£.~'.'-"
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THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)

TO:

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES

RE:

LITIGATION AFFECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BETWEEN AND
AMONGST THE ABOVE-REFERENCED PARTIES
The nature of the action supporting the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claim to

the legal and equitable rights in the real property hereinafter described is a quiet title action, declaratory
ofldaho, including a claim
judgment, estoppel, filed in the above captioned matter in Ada COWlty, State ofIdaho,
for damages, detennination of title and interests to the real property, costs and attorneys fees.
The above Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claims an interest in said real property or properties
fo.llows:
described as follows:
Lots I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Block] of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho,

recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also
known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest ]/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
this l.rf;y of May, 2006.
DATED thisl.rf;y

V., individually, and as
Managing member of Berkshire Investments L.L.C.

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 2
l:\A\I.O\MAII.E\1AYlO\t\usPEND.NOT
lI.lOO6
l:\AILQIMAII.E'irAYlo\t\usPENDNOT M.y
~ 11,2006

. :",.

.

~

...
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) S5.

County of Ada

)

On this ~day of May, 2006, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the managing member of Berkshire
Investments L.L.C., and the individual, and further known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same
for Berkshire Invesime,lts L.L.c., and for himself individuaily.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the day and year last above

written.

t
PUbl~raho
Residing at
, Idah
Commission E ires:

J/t9It) 1
'ZJIL9

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 3
Z·\A\LOIMAIlf\TAYLORIUSPfND.NOT
lI.lOO6
Z·IA\LOIMAII.f\TAYLORIUSPfND.NOT Moy 11.'006

.- .... ~.",'.
~" ...

···~...&;..i

••

-J,.'
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No.4074
No.4J74

p. 1/9

DENNIS M. CHARNEY, ISB #4610
JACOB D. DEATON, ISB #7470
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES

951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 938-9500
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,

)

)
) Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
)

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

DEFENDANTS/COVNTERDEFENDANTS/COVNTER
CLAIMANTS'MEMORANDUM
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
) APPEAL BOND OR ORDER
. REMOVING LIS PENDENS
) .REMOVING
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
)
)
)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
)
TRUST,
)
)

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

)
)

v.

)

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC,

)
)
)
)

Defendants/Counter~Claimants.
Defendants/Counter~Claimants.

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 1

EXHIBIT "B"
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4:~,4PM

No,4074

p,

2/~

The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, by and through their attorney of record, Dennis M.
Charney, provide their Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants'
Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens.
ST
ATEMENT OF ISSUES
8TATEMENT
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have filed their motion for an appeal bond and/or an

order striking the Lis Pendens which was filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office on
May 18, 2006. The Defendants/Counter-Claimants
Defendants/Counter~Claimants filed their Notice of Appeal on December 23,
2006. The appellate court has retained jurisdiction of the above-captioned matter with the

exception of certain post-judgment matters which are set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 13.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A.

The Defendants/Counter-Claimants Are Entitled to tbe Continuation of the Lis
Pendens Filed With the Ada County Recorder's Office, Without Any Requirement
ofa Bond
ora

The relevant portion ofIdaho Code Section 5-505, provides:

5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or
the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff at the time of
filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing his
answer, when affinnative relief is claimed in such answer, or at
any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the
COllilty
COtUlty in which the property or some pm1 thereof is situated, a
notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the
of the
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description ofthe
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall
shaH a purchaser or incumbrancer of
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against parties designated by their real names.
Id (emphasis added).

The present matter before the court requires this Court to construe the plain meaning and
intention of Idaho Code Section 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 2
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No.4074

which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share

v.

P,
,

0 10

v;,

V;'.JJ

Idaho Public Utilities Comm 'n,

113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107,109-10
107,109·10 (1988). When interpreting a statute, the primary function
of the court is to detennine and give effect to the legislative intent. George W.
w: Watkins Family v.

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). Such intent should be derived from a reading
of the whole act at issue.

Id. at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. If the statutory language is

unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body must be given effect, and there
ofthe
is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property

Ovtmers
In v. Board of Cornm 'rs
Irs a/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477, 483(1999).
O»mers Ass 'n
The plain meaning of a statute, therefore, will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results.

George W. Watkins Family v.

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540,797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990); Driver v. Sf Corp., 139 Idaho 423,
429,80 P.3d 1024, 1030 (2003).
The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a lis pendens is straightforward. There is no
additional language contained in the statute that would defeat the Defendants/CounterDefendants/Counter
w

Claimants' rights to rely upon their properly recorded notice to the world that litigation is
pending which may affect the rights of the parties to real property involved in the litigation.
There is nothing in the statute that supports any of the contentions of the Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants in their present motion before the court that the lis pendens should be stricken or that
a bond needs to be filed.
As stated in the case of DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 176, 505 P.2d 321, 324
(1973):
In making such a statutory interpretation or construction, it is a
'c ••• Wliversa1
"...
Wliversal rule of statutory construction that a statute must be
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 3

001401

No,4074

p, 4/9

.. '

'",-

construed in the light of its intent and purpose." Jorstad v. City of
Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 125,456 P.2d 766, 769 (1969).
The primary function of the appellate court in construing a
statute is to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect thereto.
Knight v. Employment Security Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 398 P.2d
643 (1965); Messengerv. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382P.2d 913
(1963); Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d
1066, 89 A.L.R. 640 (1933)."
Idaho Public Utilities
Commission v. VI Oil Co., 90 Idaho 415, 420, 412 P.2d 581, 583
(1966).
Furthermore, if possible, it is incumbent upon a court to
give a statute an interpretation which will not in effect nullify it.
Filer Mutual Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,
76 Idaho 256, 261, 281 P.2d 478 (1955)."
"We adhere to the cardinal rules of construction which
require that courts should not nullify a statute or deprive a law of
potency and force unless such course is absolutely necessary;
meaning and effect should be given to every section of a code in
all its parts, if possible to do so." Sampson v. Layj;o..n,
LaY1;o..n, 86 Idaho
453,457,387 P.2d 883 (1963).

Id at 176-77, 505 P.2d at 324-25.

The above authority clearly establishes that our Idaho legislators chose the wording of
Idaho Code Section 5-505 to include the right to maintain a lis pendens throughout the judicial
process. Idaho Code Section 5-505 demonstrates the legislative intent and clearly establishes the

right to the continued protection of a filed lis pendens during the entire judicial proceeding.
The case of Joseph

c.L. U Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146

(CLApp.
(Ct.App. 1990), provides:
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a
claim affecting certain real property. See I.e. § 5-505; Suitts v.
First Security Bank of Idaho, NA., 100 Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d
53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by itself, to
establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing
of a lis pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting
the property, thereby inducing an extra measure of caution by

DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 4
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No,4074

.......

P, 5/9
p,

potential purchasers or lenders until the litigation is concluded.
concludedBut this does not mean that any underlying legal rights have been
altered.
ld. at 557-58, 789 P.2d at 1148-49.

The Joseph case authority establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not "change
'<change the
legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the world that
litigation has been instituted which may affect the underlying property.
In short, Idaho Code Section 5-505 permits a plaintiff or defendant to file a lis pendens
with the county recorder as notice of the pendency of the action. A lis pendens remains in effect
for the duration of an action including any appeal. See Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho,
100 Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 53 (1979).

In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that absent a

statutory stay, a defendant could protect himself against the "transfer of the property in question
to a bona fide purchaser during the pendency of the appeal by filing a lis pendens." ld. at 559.
This is so because "[t]he effect of filing a lis pendens is that a person who purchases or acquires
rights in the subject matter of the litigation during the pendency of the action (which
encompasses appeal) takes subject to the final disposition of the case."

ld. ; see also

Radermacher v. Daniels, 64 Idaho 376, 133 P.2d 713, 715 (1943); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d
1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996) (holding lis pendens was proper during appeal, as outcome of case
would be detennined after appeal).
Other jurisdictions are in accord. See generally Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631 (Alaska

1985) (lis pendens remains in effect where appeal is taken, so that posting supersedeas bond or
moving to continue lis pendens pending appeal is not necessary); Kennedy v. Dawson)
Dawson, 296 Mont.
430, 989 P.2d 390 (1999) (notice of appeal and lis pendens effectively preserves the status quo
pending appeal); Gardner v_
v. Perry City, 994 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 2000) (ordering reinstatement
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRlEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 5
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of the lis pendens because the appellant's interest in the subject property depended upon the
outcome of the case on remand); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996)
(holding lis pendens was proper during appeal as outcome of case would be detennined after
appeal).
Here, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be removed
because it is ''the equivalent of a unilateral stay of the Court's order" and that such a stay "may
be obtained only upon the posting of security." Both assertions are wrong. Nothing about the lis
pendens prevents the voiding the contract between the parties or prevents the title from being
quieted to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. The lis pendens merely provides notice of the
pending litigation. As such, the lis pendens should be left in effect until the Defendants/CounterClaimants' appeal has ended.
Further, as the court noted in Suitts,
Suit/s, a lis pendens is available absent a statutory stay. The
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have not provided any other authority or basis for their claim that
such an effect can only be obtained through a statutory stay. An examination of the relevant
authorities supports the opposite conclusion. Further, there is no statutory authQrity requiring the
lis pendens to be stricken during the appellate process. Idaho law authorizes the continuation of
the lis pendens on appeal without the necessity of any bond.
B.

13(b)(l4) and (15) Require the Posting of an Appeal Bond
Idaho Appellate Rules 13(b)(14)
Only if a Party Seeks a Stay of Execution
During the pendency of an appeal, a district court's authority is limited to the extent set

13(b).
out in Idaho Appellate Rule 13
(b). See Desfasses v. Desjosses,
Des/osses, 120 Idaho 27, 813 P.2d 366
13(b)(l4) and (15) grant a district court the authority to stay execution or
(Ct.App. 1991). Rules 13(b)(14)
enforcement of any judgment "upon the posting" of an appeal bond. However, a district COUJt
cOUJt
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAiMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR

ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDE~S
PENDE~S -• 6
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has the authority to require the posting of a bond only if a party seeks a stay of execution. See

(CLApp. 1987). In Bernard, the court
Bernardv. Roby, 112 Idaho 583, 589, 733 P.2d 804, 810 (Ct.App.
noted that the posting of an appeal bond is not a requirement for appeal and that a failure to post
an appeal bond merely exposes an appellant to execution of the previous
judgment. Id. at 589.
previollsjudgment.
Here, Defendants/Counter-Claimants are not seeking a stay of execution from this Court.
The present motion is being brought by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, the prevailing party
on their own motion for sUIIumuy judgment. If, on one hand, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

are requesting this Court enter a stay against their own judgment in an effort to require the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants to post an appeal bond, such a request would be nonsensical. If,
on the other hand, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request is not a request to stay the
previously entered judgment, but rather a unilateral request for an appeal bond, such a request
should be denied because an appeal bond is not a requirement for taking an appeal. It appears
that Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request to require a multi-million dollar appeal bond is, in
reality, an attempt to prevent Defendants/Counter-Claimants from taking their rightful appeal.
This Court should reject Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request. The posting of an appeal bond

should only be required when a stay is requested by the appealing party. Since that is not the
case in the motion before the Court, Defendants/Counter-Claimants need not post an appeal
bond.

C.

Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(lS) Is Inapplicable Because the Judgment in the Present
Case Is Not a Money Judgment
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15)
13(b)(l5) grants a district court jurisdiction to hear a request to

"[s]tay execution or enforcement of a money judgment."

l.A.R 13(b)(15).
13 (b) (1 5).
LA.R

Black's Law

Dictionary defines a money judgment as "[0 ]ne which adjudges the payment of a sum of money,

DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 7
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'

transferred. "
as distinguished from one directing an act to be done or property to be restored or transferred."
BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY, 5th ed. p. 757 (emphasis added). Further, Idaho courts have noted

that judgments affecting the right to property are not money judgments. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Buffalo Pitts Co., 6 Idaho 519, 57 P. 267 (1899); Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, l38, 74 P.2d

J., dissenting) (citing with approval Black's Law Dictionary's
1289, 1326 (1986) (Bistline, 1.,
definition ofmoney
of money judgment).
Here, the judgment entered by this Court from which Defendants/Counter-Claimants'
appeal is taken voided the contract between the parties. No award of money was granted. Thus
13(b)(15) does not
the judgment was not a money judgment. As such, Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15)
apply to the present motion. Even if the Court determines that the previous judgment is in fact a
money judgment, the analysis found in Section B precludes this Court from granting
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request.

CONCLUSION
Thus, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request that an appeal bond be required or that the
lis pendens be removed should be rej ected for three reasons:

(1) Idaho law authorizes an
(I)

appellant to maintain a lis pendens in effect for the duration of the appeal; (2) an appeal bond is
not a requirement for the taking of an appeal and the Defendants/Counter-Claimants have not
requested a stay of execution from the Court; and (3) the judgment previously entered by this
Court is not a money judgment. As such, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' attempt to prevent
Defendants/Counter-Claimants' rightful appeal by requiring the posting of a multi-million dollar
appeal bond should be rejected.

DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER~DEFENDANTS'
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER~DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS - 8
001406
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Further, without a statutory basis or a rule that allows this Court to exercise jurisdiction
as requested by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, no basis exists to grant the relief sought by
Plaintiffs/CQunter~Defendants.
the Plaintiffs/CQunter~Defendants.
th
14th day of February, 2007.
DATED this 14

DENNIsdi

Defendants/Counter~Claimants
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th
14th
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14
day of February, 2007, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

Connie W. Taylor
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
746~9160
Fax: (208) 746-9160

( )
( )
( )
(X)
eX)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Gjordjng
Jack S. Gjording
Gjording and Fauser
Fouser
509 West Hays Street

e( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
e( ) Hand Delivered
e( ) Overnight Mail

Post Office Box 2837

eX) Facsimile

Boise, Idaho 83701
Fax: 336-9177
Thomas G. Maile, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Fax: 939-1001

( )
( )
( )
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

DEFENDANTS/COUNTERftCLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERftDEFENDANTS'
PENDENS" 9
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS·
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RECEIVED

DENNIS M. CHARNEY, ISB #4610 FEB

2S
6 2007

JACOB D. DEATON, ISB #7470 Ada. Cm.mtv Clerk.
CllARNEY AND ASSOCIATES
.
951 East Plaza Drive,
Drive. Suite 140

NO_-.--_---=""=--_ _ __
NO,_-.---_--=-=--

/r2}t~~M---A.M I/r2}t~~M---,

Eagle, Idaho 83616

Telephone: (208) 938-9500
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504
Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TA YLO~ DALLAN TAYLOR, and.

)
)

R. JOHN TAYLOR,

) Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
)

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

)

v.

) ORDER

mOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAlLE, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE

)
)
)
)

REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

)
)

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)

)
THEODORE,L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE

)

TRUST,

)
)
)

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

)

v.

THOMAS MAll.E, N and COLLEEN
MAILE,
BERKSIDRE
MAILE. husband and wife, and BERKSHlRE
llfVES~S,LLC,
llfVES~S,LLC,

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

ORDER-l

EXHIBIT "C"
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The Court, having considered the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' motion to release lis

pendens, or, alternatively, motion to require the Defendants/Counter-Claimants to post an appeal
bond hereby denies both motions.

SO ORDERED this

-e,(,
111;of F-el,

J

,2007.
2007 .
7

cz"ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L
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2007~

.•,-1,
I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of /J;I" 1Iff-1,
correct copy of the foregoing document
docll1llent to be served ~thod indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

Connie W. Taylor
Paul Thomas Clark

Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewimon,DD 83501
Fax: (208) 746-9160
Thomas G. Maile, rv
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street

Eilgle. ID 83616
Fax: 939-1001

Dennis M. Charney
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Fax: 938·9504

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaia.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
M Facsimile

( ) u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
\xl Facsimile
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(yJ
(yY Facsimile

J. n

NAVARRO
.
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'LAw OFFICE OF

TJHIOMA§
TJHIOMAS

MAIllE, IV, P.A.
G. MAKlLE,

380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616
(208) 939-1000/
939-1000 I Fax (208) 939-1001

July 9,2009

BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
TO (208) 746-9160
Clark and Feeney
Attn: Connie Taylor
1229 Main Street
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Re:

Johnson Trust, Taylor v, Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
Our File No. M04-5109.0

Dear Ms. Taylor:
of Judgment related to the costs outstanding on
Please find enclosed a proposed Satisfaction ofJudgment
the above captioned matter, together with a propose Release ofLis
of Lis Pendens. Berkshire Investments,
my wife and I will execute the Release of Lis Pendens on all current Lis Pendens upon receiving a
certified check for the balance owing from the $400,000.00 minus costs and interest awarded which
is referenced in the enclosed Satisfaction of Judgment. If you would calculate the interest on the
judgment and the appellate costs, please provide my office with your calculations. I see no reason
why the exchange of monies and the appropriate release cannot be handle as a typical real estate
closing transaction, to wit: simultaneously.
Please make the appropriate arrangements to obtain the certified funds payable to Berkshire
Investments, LLC along with the executed Satisfaction of Judgment. We will file,
contemporaneously with the exchange of the same, our proposed Release of Lis Pendens.

TOM/mp
\'I>m'~"flJlk';II
[D'~I·\lLE\T"\YU)R'c"lV1i~IiJ ..I"r
II....
\·I>m'~
.... lJlk';II [D'~I·\lLE"T"YU)R'c"lV1i~liJ
l"r II....

""I'd
wpd

Enclosures
cc: Mark S. Prusynki via fax (385-5384)

EXHIBIT "D"
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RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., on behalf of and as attorney for
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH
BIRCHMAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that certain Notice
of Lis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18,2006, as Instrument Number 106078472 at the
offices of the Ada County Recorder, State ofIdaho, as well as that certain Notice of Lis Pendens
dated and recorded March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598 at the office ofthe Ada
County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real property described as The
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
DATED This _ _ day of July, 2009.

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., Individually and as
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

On this
day of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known or acknowledged to me to be the
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

001411

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
KNOW ALL THESE PRESENTS, that the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants above-named
do hereby certify that the costs awarded in the Order entered on April 6, 2007 by the Fourth
Judicial District Court in the amount of$12, 424.04, together with the appellate costs in the

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT - Page 1
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_.,
amount of $514.00, together with interest thereon against the above-named Defendants/CounterClaimants and in favor of the above-named Plaintiffs in the said District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada, is fully paid, satisfied and
discharged.
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, Taylors and Theodore L. Johnson Trust, release and
forever discharge the Defendants/Counter-Claimants from any and all liability associated to any
and all Judgments and Orders entered awarding costs together with interest thereon, relating to
the above captioned matters.
DA TED this _ _ day ofJuly, 2009.
DATED

CONNIE WRIGHT-TAYLOR
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
County of _ _ _ _ )
On this _ _ day of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
WRIGHT-TAYLOR, known or acknowledged to me to
said State, personally appeared CONNIE WRIGHT-TAYLOR,
be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
My Commission Expires: - - - - - - - - -

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT - Page 2
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2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

12

Plaintiffs,

13

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

14

vs.

15

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.

24
25
26

ORDER DENYING PLAn\JTIFFS'MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501
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Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw contained within this Court's July 2,
2009 Memorandum Decision and Order,
1

2

3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:

4

l.
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

5

2.

The Defendants' request for attorney fees and costs, as well as sanctions under Rule

6

~
--:-J

11, is reserved.

o;J_rJ

7

-----F_---1C
DATED this& day o;J_-----F_---1L-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

8
9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

12

Plaintiffs,

13

JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS

14

vs.

15

f/k/a CONNIE
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
TA YLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a

16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23

partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Based upon the findings offact and conclusions of

24

law contained within this Court's July 2,2009 Memorandum Decision and Order,
25

26

JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
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k

-NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1
2

3

4
5

1.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

_._._._
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JUl2 1 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile

DepUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TAYLOR,
CONNIE WRIGHT T
AYLOR, flk/a
TAYLOR,
CONNIE TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

SUPPLEMENT AL AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDERIMOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE
12

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDERIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 
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County of Ada

)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
ofthis matter.

2.

That attached hereto as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Lis
Pendens, recorded July 13, 2009, the same incorporated herewith by reference herein as if
set forth in full herein.
DATED this

7) day of July, 2009.
AlLE, IV, pro se and
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile

;l /

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
day of July, 2009.
Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDERIMOTION FOR PERNIISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 -
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U

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the
day of July, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, (1) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., Pro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDERIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 Pg 3 C:IN~dd>-.d.I\a:rverlfiJe:.\.\AD\BERKSIIIR.INV\cl.Meenr:y\wpplffidllVlloflgm.wpd
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RELEASE OF
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

=
=

c-:i

0

KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS:

:E

...:

That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, N, on behalf of and as attorney for
BIRCH -MAILE and Pro se, whose address is 380 0IlC
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
IlC
W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, does hereby release and forever discharge that certain Notice of Lis "'"
>
"'"
Pendens, dated March 25,2008 and recorded on March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598 :z:
at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real
property known described as follows:

The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

3a
ay
y of July, 2009.
2009 ..
DATED This J
B

(
E, N., Attorney for
THOMJ\ G.
EST-MENTS, LLC, COLLEEN
BERKSHIREEST-MENTS,
BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se
STATE OF IDAHO

County of Ada

- ..

;;;;;;; 9

~

:z
=>

)
) ss:
)

.-a

day ofJuly,
On this
of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said State,
rv, known or acknowledged to me to be the attorney for
personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, N,
BERKSHTREINVESTMENTS,LLC,COLLEENBIRCH-MAILEandProseandtheperson
BERKSHIREINVESTMENTS,LLC,COLLEENBIRCH-MAILEandProseandtheperson whose
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed said
document.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day and
yem tirst above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

I,

PPViD
,-'~\'

~~A/!\h,;(),
F, li[!U "_:~,:'~

/,.

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AMENDED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
JUDGMENT DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMSIMOTION
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE
12

Defendants.

COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G.
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule

AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B)
RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
lc""_.......
ld_~".....fi~"~
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg lc""_.......
IN"".""_~"
I""""lfil.....\JNj.RKSIII1UN""..
I""""lfil.....\INl.R<SIII..

.....

....
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54(b), request certification from the Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims entered July 20,
2009, or in the alternative a request for a permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R.
LA.R. Rule 12, and
incorporate by reference herein as if set forth in full herein the Motion, Affidavit and Brief filed

on the 13 th day of July, 2009 as if set forth in .
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009.

T

~,",J lY .LL1 SG.

erkshire Investments, LLC
Pro Se and counsel
and Colleen Birch-Maile
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 3rd day of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing, (1) AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, together with the (2)
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54 (B)
RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
2C __
_'o......a"'o""
_'o......a"'o'''''
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 2c__''-'....
I " " - ' ....''\IlIllERKSIIlIUNVd.'"'...,.........
"\IlIilERKSIIlIUNVd.""...,.........
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v~
f),

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

~

lo"";~

1., 2009
1"

Ii ;~) " /:
.':
-': (

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
AMENDED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
JUDGMENT DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE
12

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg lc_"""kl_~"'~"\Il\BERKSHlIt"'V'<I''''_~''''''''''lIido''"ft'''",,,,
lc_"""kl_~"'~"\JJ\BERKSHlIt"'V'<I''''_~''''''''''ffido''"ft'''",,.,

001424

County of Ada

)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
of this matter.

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Release of
Lis Pendens filed August 3, 2009 bearing Instrument No. 109090496 and the same is
incorporated herein by reference herein as if set forth in full herein.

3.

That attached hereto as "B" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Notice of Vendee's
Lien filed August 3, 2009 bearing Instrument No. 109090497 and the same is
incorporated herein by reference herein as if set forth in full herein.

thiS~' day of August, 2009.
DATED thisn-o

THOMAS G. M

IL ,IV, pro se and

Attorney for Berks ire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
i~ day of August, 2009.

?;r~~
7:r~~
otary Pubhc for Idaho
Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Residing at Boise, Idaho

SEC( ND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
2CI>o_""'''_~''I~''\R\RERj(S'''R.IN\'''''''''''U_ffi'''''O"",''''
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 2c,,"_""'"_~''I~''\R\RERj(SHlR.IN\''''''''''''U_ffi'''''OIl'''''''
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My Commission Expires July 30,2014

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the J~ of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, (1) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT
OF AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B)

RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK. and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. MAILE, N., Pro Se and counsel for
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMSIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg 3c'••
3c'•• "_'fil~'IRIRERK.''''It''V'd''''''''''''''''''''''ffido",Oft''''
i.I_'fil~'IRIRERK.''''It''V'd''''''''''''''''''''''ffido",Oft'''' ....
M>"__
M>"__

....
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RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

:z:
::E

...:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

0

a:
a:

...:

:>

...:

:z:

DATED This 3rd day of August, 2009.

, f-···/
//"?

T Hl-.I.J.VI-A~ G. MA E, IV., Individually and as
attomey for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE

County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
IY., known or acknowledged to me to be the
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company, Colleen Birch-Maile and by
himself.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day

and year first above written.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

EXHIBIT" A"

-(J'o

-c:;.
=c:;.

------(J'o

=::c:;.

That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., individually, and on behalf of and as
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that
certain Not~ of Lis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18, 2006, as Instrument Number
106078472 at the offices ofthe Ada County Recorder, State ofIdaho, in and for that certain
parcel of real property described as The Northwest Quarter ofthe Southwest Quarter of Section
36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

STATE OF IDAHO

"'o..D
;;;;;::v
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ADA COUNTY RECORDf P , DAVID NAVARRO
BOISE IDAHO 08103109 -,,1
-.111 AM

~~~~~E~i:k~:~~~ST OF
~~~~~E~i:k~:~~~ST

113913913497

Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
/THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,
v.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

TO:
RE:

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES
Berkshire Investments L.L.C., Notice of Vendee's Lien

The nature of the vendee's lien is made pursuant to I.C. 45-804, for the re-payment of the
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.C., to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 1

EXHIBIT "B"

2

1111111111111111111111111111111111111

Investments
Berkshire Inveslments

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

AMOUNT 6.00

001428

Trust. That the principal sum paid was $400,000.00 which is due and owing minus any costs
and interest thereon awarded in the above captioned matter.
Berkshire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or properties
described as follows:
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho,
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also
114 of the Southwest 1/4,
114, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
known as, the Northwest 1/4
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009.

(/~-r---,,--'
(/~-r---"--'_7j~_7¥b,,--,-j_-_~{
_Y~_7¥b,,--,-j_-_~,{_ _ _ _ _ _ __

yfOMAiInvest~nts
yfoMAi
Berkshire

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

G. ¥AILE, N., attorney for
L.L.C.

)
) ss.
)

On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
said state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire
Investments L.L.C., and further known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire
Investments L.L.c.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

J:hLL~-z/L
C~Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014

Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 2
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AUG. 20. 2009 4:46PM

CL~D~

&FEENEY

NO.2472

ATTY

P. 2

NOM·.~_:~(/_FIlED
ANOM·.~_:~(/_FllED
-

. P.M. _ _
_--t
--t
._P.M._

~

AUG 2 1 2009
1

2
3
4

5

CONNIE W, TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743~9516
743~9516
ISBA No, 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
BIEHL
By KATHY J. BIEHL.
DEPUTY

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FOURTH roDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8

9
10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liabilityl
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, N,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and

wife,

12
13

Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR RULE 54(B)
CERTIFICATION

vs,
YS,

14

15
16
17
18

19
20

Case No. CV OC 0723232

TAnOR, f/kJa
flkJa CONNIE
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLO~
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE

trost; JOHN DOES
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust;
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.

21
22

THE DEFENDANTS Theodore L. lohnsonRevocable Trost, Jo1m Taylor and DaHan Taylor,

23

by and through their attorney
record) hereby notify the court and counsel that they do not oppose
attomey of
ofrecord,

24

offinal
entry of a certificate of
final judgment on this Court's order dismissing the claims of the Plaintiff.

25
26

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION

1
LAW O"IC!::Si
O""ICI:;!o OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LE:WISTON, IOAH 0 63'30 I
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AUG. 20. 2009 4: 46 PM

nv
CLf~V
CLf

_.'

&FEENEY ATTY

NO.2472

P. 3

Defendants' position is based upon the following considerations:
1

1.

The Plaintiff has stated unequivocally that he will appeal the order dismissing his

2

claims, and we believe it is in the best interest of all parties to have that appeal

3

concluded as soon as possible. Because this is the third appeal relating to these

4

issues, we believe there is a good chance that the appeal 'Will proceed quickly.

5

2.

The existence of this litigation on the ownership ofthe
of the property must be disclosed

6

to potential lenders, which prevents the Johnson
Jahnson Trust from borrowing the funds
7

necessary to return the original purchase price to these Plaintiffs pursuant to Judge

8

Wilper's judgments.

9
10

3.

11

The Plaintiffs' Fourth Affinnative Defense to the Defendants' cOlmterclaims (see
Reply dated March 17,2009) alleges a failure to mitigate their damages. Defendants

12

are concerned that this Plaintiffwill allege that any failure to cooperate in efforts to

13
expedite the Plaintiffs' appeal is a breach of that duty.

14
15

4.

We are going into the eighth year of litigation involving the Plaintiffs' attempt to

16

purchase the Linder Road property. lfthe appeal ofthe
of the Plaintiffs' claim to quiet title

17

to the property is delayed until after the November 2010 trial of the counterclaims,

18

it will likely be 2012 or later before the title to the property is cleared.

19

For the reasons stated above, the Jobnson Trust, John Taylor, and Dallan Taylor respectfully
20

21
22

request that this Court grant the Plaintiffs' motion for certification under I.R.C.P. 54(b).
DATED this 2I1!day of August, 2009.

23
24

25
26

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION

2
I.AW OFFICES OF'

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

t..e:W'SiON, IDAHO 8:350'
8:3501
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AUG, 20.
20, 2009 4:47PM
AUG.

CLftD~

-

&FEENEY

NO.2472

ATTY

P,P. 4

CLARK and FEENEY
1

By
__~~~~~~~______________
By_---=:::::::,~¢::~~~---~--

2

~onnie

. aylor, a member of the firm.
A meys for Johnson Trust, John Taylor, and DaHan Taylor

3
4

5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
7

8

9

10

'l.dh

following:

o

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

o

¢~

11
12
13

14

day of August, 2009 I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

o

Mark Prusynski

o

MOFFATI THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor
PO Box 829
Boise
Boise,l ID 83701

o

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

2~
~aYIOr
~'Y10r

15

16

Attorney for Defendants

17

18
19

20
21
22

23

24
25
26

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION

3
LAW OFFices 01"

CLARK AND FEENEY
L,"WISTON, IOAHO B31!!Ol

001432

NO·------.Ifl('IT1ll1l"b---'
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
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'112
380 West State Street
C t: I V
Eagle, Idaho 83616
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12 D
Telephone: (208) 939-1QPJ,
I,~") 2009
939-1QPc£
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B 2009
SEP 2 B2009
CJer.~
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cler.~
By JENNIFER KENNEDY
OEPUTY

ijl Clerk

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATIONIMOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR

CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

THIS MA
TIER having come before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs' Motion for
MATIER
Certification/Motion for Permissive Appeal with Thomas G. Maile, IV appearing on behalf of the
Plaintiffs and Connie Taylor appearing on behalf of DaHan Taylor, R. John Taylor and the

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
- Pg 1 C·\hdndybad;b6cl.llocr.....-Jfilc5\o.\BUJERKSH1R.JN\"w;:I.~\
JfilC5\o.\BUJERK.SH1R..JNV'w;:I.~\
C·\hdndybad;b6cl.llocr......
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...rdeu:ertijiallionwpd
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Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and Mark S. Prusynski appearing on behalf of Clark and
Feeney and Connie Wright Taylor and the Court having considered the matter herein and none of
the Defendants having opposed the motion, with defendants Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor and
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust specifically filing their Notice of Non-Opposition to
the plaintiffs' motions, and the court having considered the record and argument of counsel;
IT IS HEREBY ORDER AND THIS DOES ORDER that permission is hereby granted
for an interlocutory appeal of the Judgment entered on July 20, 2009 and the appeal is hereby
authorized and ordered. That an interlocutory appeal of the issues contained in the court's
Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 2,2009 which resulted in the above referenced
Judgment would resolve controlling questions oflaw as to which there are substantial grounds
for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order and Judgment would
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation pursuant to LA.R. Rule 12(a). ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the current scheduling
order and trial date set on the Counter-Claim is vacated pending further order of this Court.
DATED this & day of September, 2009.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CERTIFICATIONIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

032009
DEC 03
2009
,j. DAVID NAVARRO C
,J.

By J. RANDALL'

ler~

OeptlTV
Oept/TV

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,
2009

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND

ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.
COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G.
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed

RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B)
RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009- Pg 1/
"M";"""IlERKS"IRIN\"'''''_'mo''~fi~"""","'''.''''
1 / "n"lI;",.lI11ERKSlIIRIN\"'''''_,mo''~fi~"""","'''.''''
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July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims entered July 20,2009,
containing the language, as provided, to wit:
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order
shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules
This Motion is on the grounds set fort above and the record and file herein, and the
Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas Maile and the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed
concurrently herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION.
DATED this

3

day of December, 2009.

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC
and Colleen Birch-Maile
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the .3 day of December, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, (1) RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF
THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 and (3)
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009 to be delivered, addressed
as follows:

54 (B)
RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B)
RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009- Pg 2, "~,,lI;",,""EIlKSIIlRlN\'ol.""=,ym,"~ifio,"".o.''''''''
"~"lI;L,,.""EI!KSIIlRlN\'oL.M=,ym,"~ifio,"".o
••"'.•'"
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Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
( )
()
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
( )
(X)
(
( ))
(
( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
( )
(X)

., Pro Se and counsel for
THOMAS G. MA E
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile

RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B)
RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009- Pg 31
3, "~"llil".llnf''''''R'''''""~",,,,,,,oo~"c."
"~""il".ln"""'R"'''""~",,,,,,,oo~"c."...~.,,,.,.,
~.,,,.,",
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NO.

AM~--FF'iLFI~:n-M.~Z."'/O-=-"
AM~--FF'iL'FI~:n-M.~Z."'/O-=THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

DEC 03 2009
,J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByJ.
BYJ. RANDAU
OEPIITY
OEPIJTY

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDA VIT IN SUPPORT OF
AFFIDAVIT
RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE:
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,
2009

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
JOHl'l'SON
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHJ-..rSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND

ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009 - Pg 1
I ....... ..-11;1
.... 01.'
11 IJL~J...SfIIR 1)I;\"d;.n.r«n<:\ ... lrNl~«Inl"l.I'~,fic~lion,wpd
lrNl~.~(km'lI,>onom,fic~lion,wpd
I.
Cfllil....
,;t'HIJL~J.;.SfIIR,I)I;\"d;'"'r<'m':\
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1.

Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen BirchMaile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial
of this matter.

2.

That the following pleadings were filed in the captioned matter known as Theodore L.

Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile,
Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, to wit: Exhibit "A" is a true and correct
copy of the Order Denying Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's Lien by Judge Wilper
on October 14,2009, and the same is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein.
3.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Verified Motion for
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed November 5, 2009 and the same is made a part hereof
as if set froth in full herein.
DATED this

DATED this

33

day of December,
day of December,

2~~
2~?----,-==--

_

THOMASG:MAItF,1
THOMAS G. MAI~ pro se and
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
~ day of December, 2009.
Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 - Pg 2
I """·",.!fiI.,,;',,
"""·",.lfil.,.',, IJ IJI,I<:KSHIR
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TPiCT OF
iN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA 1/TPiCT

1
2

COUNTr OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT!

3
4

5

6

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

7

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

8

vs.
9

10
11

Case No. CVOC 0400473D
04004730

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S
LIEN

12

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
13
14

15

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff,

16
17

vs.

18

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

19
20

Defendants.
21
22
23
24

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's
Lien, The Court heard oral argument on Monday, October 5, 2009. Connie Taylor appeared
Lien.

~~;l
C1'Fl r?'O ,.-r;:;J
'1[';'l 'i7 ~\fllf
(~\.'-::l1.I:::l
!~ CI'Fl
(~\.'-::l1..I:::l
LL, \':..1 t..=I

25

[

I

!l.
I

I

26

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER RELEiOOPlIJnF~~'S
RELEiOOPlI:RfF~~'S LIEN - Page I
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telephonically for the Plaintiffs and Thomas Maile appeared in person for the Defendants. At that
1
2

time, the Court considered the matter fully under advisement.

3

Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included drafting

4

the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, overseeing the administration of

5

the trust, and representing the estate after Johnson's death. The underlying transaction in this case is

6

a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson

7

entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase of forty acres in Eagle, rD, which Maile
8

had previously advised Johnson not to convey to a third party. The purchase price was $400,000 and
9

10
11

the property was conveyed by the successor trustee after Johnson passed away. Beneficiaries of the
trust brought suit.

12

Maile fi led a lis pendens against the property on May 18, 2006. On July 21, 2006, the Court

13

held that the land sale was void pursuant to Idaho law and ordered the land be returned to Plaintiffs

14

and the purchase money be returned to Defendants, less any amounts the Defendants may be able to

15

prove in an unjust enrichment counterclaim. On December 11, 2006, the Court entered a judgment
16

in favor of the Plaintiffs on the counterclaim. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's
17

judgment on January 30,2009.
18
19

On December 31, 2007, Maile filed a new complaint against the beneficiaries and their

20

attorneys, once again contesting ownership of the property. Maile filed a second lis pendens on May

21

25,2008. On July 2,2009, the Honorable Judge Richard Greenwood dismissed all of Maile's claims

22

under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. In that litigation, the beneficiaries' counterclaims

23

remain to be resolved. Maile and his related entities have informed this Court of their intention to

24

appeal Judge Greenwood's ruling.
25
26

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2
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On May 7, 2009, the Court entered an Order Denying Motion to Compel Payment of
1

2

Judgment and Interest, holding that it was the intention of this Court in its July 21,2006 order to

3

void the underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the

4

transaction and that because the property had not been returned free of encumbrance, it was not the

5

time to order a return of the purchase money. On August 3, 2009, Defendants filed a release of the

6

May 2006 lis pendens. On that same day Defendants filed a notice of vendee's lien on the subject

7

property.
8

Plaintiffs seeks an order releasing the vendee's lien, contending that the lien is inappropriate
9

10

in light of this Court's ruling that the transaction was void as a matter of law. Defendants counter

11

that Plaintiffs are in possession of the purchase money and that Idaho Code § 45-804 authorizes a

12

vendee's lien to secure the return of that money.

13
14

15
16
17

18

Idaho Code § 45-804 states:
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of
possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in
case of a failure of consideration.
Although there has not been a failure of consideration in this transaction, the Court has
found the transaction to be void and ordered a return of the property and a return of the purchase

19

money to return each party as nearly as possible to the position they would have been in had the
20

transaction not occurred. As a matter of equity, Defendants are entitled to maintain a lien against the
21
22
23

property to secure the return of the purchase price, less costs which have been previously awarded
by the Court. Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's Lien is DENIED.

24
25
26

ORDER DENY[NG MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 3
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The Court finds that the vendee's lien filed August 3, 2009 is sufficient to secure the return
1

of the purchase price. Therefore the Court orders that no new lis pendens are to be filed against the
2

3

subject property in this litigation.

4

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.
6

7

7

Dated this

/,P

~

f
day of October, 2009.

8
9
j

.-

.... .-

,
-
~-~-----~~~-------------------

10

~~d.·.J:Wi
~~d.'.J:Wi

DISTRICT J
11

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23

24
25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

2

3

I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t1'-day
tf'-day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

"tfi U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

4

5
6

Connie Taylor
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ill
ID 83501

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

7
8

t4U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Thomas G. Maile
380 W. State
ID 83616
Eagle, ill

9

10
11
12

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
AdaCount Y

13

By

0

i~,'f1.

;~···:~\.~~._':i~

14
15
16
l7

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25
26
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

r'I'

::

..

I

,

,,',.
,.
~

Attorney for Berkshire Investments LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TA
YLOR,
TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

VERIFIED MOTION FOR
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S
LIEN

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,
v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
COMES NOW, the Defendants/Counter-Claimant, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
by and through its attorney, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and hereby moves this Court for the following
relief as follows:

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1

EXHIBIT "B"
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The above captioned Court has determined the real estate closing by and between the
parties was declared void and a return of the purchase price was ordered minus court costs
Plaintiff s Motion
incurred by the Plaintiff. That this Court as of October 14, 2009 denied the Plaintiffs
For Order Releasing Vendee's Lien. That based upon the same the following is alleged:
COUNT ONE
FORECLOSURE
I.
During all times herein mentioned, Berkshire Investments, LLC, is and was a limited
liability company authorized to transact business in the State ofIdaho.
II.

During all times herein mentioned, plaintiff, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust,
was a duly registered trust under the law of the State ofIdaho and currently holds the legal title to
the real property subject to the vendee's lien hereinafter referenced. That consistent with the
prior Orders, Berkshire Investment has not been paid any portion of the monies due and owing
from the plaintiff "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust". That although repeatedly requested
to do so the plaintiff "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has not paid the $400,000.00 due
and owing and/or paid any sums minus the costs awarded to Berkshire Investments above
referenced.
That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Vendee's Lien in the
litigation above captioned which was recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office on August
3,2009 bearing Instrument No.1 09090497, which is incorporated by reference herein as if set
forth in full herein.
III.

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2
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That the Vendee's Lien filed and is perfected against the real property in the County of
Ada, State ofIdaho. The real property is described as Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8,9, Block 1 of
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457
and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest
114,
1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho ..
IV.

The "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" is the owner or reputed owners of the
certain real property above describe in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho.

V.
That pursuant to the Judgments of record and the subsequent orders entered herein there a
fix liquidated and ascertainable sum due and owing Berkshire Investments LLC from the
"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust". That the sum of$400,000.00, (minus awarded costs
and interest thereon) is the outstanding balance due to Berkshire Investments after deducting all
just credits, payments and offsets, together with interest legal at the rate of twelve (12) percent
per annum from October 14,2009, until paid in full is due from the "Theodore L. Johnson
Revocable Trust".
VI.

Berkshire Investments LLC claims an interest in and to the subject property pursuant to
that Vendee's Lien, and any right, title, claim or interest of the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
Trust" and/or the named plaintiffs (or any other interested party or person in and to the subject
property, if such light, title, claim or interest exists) is junior and subservient to the interest of
Berkshire Investments LLC in the subject property. That Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 3
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to a Decree allowing the foreclosure of its interest against the real propeliy above described and a
detennination of the rights of the parties herein and any others who claim an interest therein.
VlI.

That annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" is one of the letters transmitted to the counsel for the
plaintiffs dated October 21, 2009 requesting payment of the sums due and owing to Berkshire
Investments LLC. There has been no reply from any party or counsel for any party. That
Berkshire Investments LLC, has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law.

IX.
That Berkshire Investments LLC has been required to retain the services of Thomas G.
Mails, IV, to pursue this matter. Pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12-120, 12-121, 12-123,
Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00 if
this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this matter is
contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(e)
54( e) ofthe
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Berkshire Investments, LLC prays for judgment against the plaintiff
"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties or third parties claiming an
interest in the real property as follows:
That Berkshire Investments, LLC be granted Jud,gment against "Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties or third parties in the principal
sum of $400,000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12)
percent per annum from and after October 14,2009, minus costs and interests

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 4
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due and owing "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties,
to and including the date of Judgment and thereafter at the highest legal rate until
paid in full.
2

For Berkshire Investments, LLC's attorneys fees incurred herein in the sum of
$2,500.00 if this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by
the Court if this matter is contested.

3

For Berkshire Investments, LLC's costs and disbursements incurred herein.

4

That the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" be required to set forth herein by
proper pleading the nature of their claims in and to said premises or any part
thereof.

5

That Berkshire Investments, LLC's interest in and to the subject property be
declared senior and superior and that any other claim, right, title, or interest of
the"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any ofthe
of the party (or any other
interested party or person in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim
or interest exists) be declared junior and subservient to the interest of Berkshire
Investments, LLC in the subject property to wit: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8,9,
Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90
of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known
Southwc;:st 114, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range
1/4 of the Southwc:::st
as, the Northwest 114
1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

6

That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that Berkshire Investments,
LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the subject property, and further

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 5
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ordering that the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust", has no right, title or
interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any part thereof and that
each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all persons
having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any
part, parcel or portion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be
barred and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real
property and in and to every part, parcel and portion thereof.
7

That this Court order the sale of the subject real property according to law and the
practice of this Court, and that the proceeds of said sale be applied in payment of
amounts found due and owing to Berkshire Investments, LLC as aforesaid, and for
Berkshire Investments, LLC's costs and expenses of this action.

8

That in the event the proceeds from the sale of said real property be insufficient to
satisfY the amounts due to Berkshire Investments, LLC herein (together with the
costs of sale and other proper charges), that Berkshire Investments, LLC have
Judgment against the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" for such deficiency,
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate until paid in full.

9

For such other and further relief in law or equity that the Court may deem proper
in the premises.

DATED T h i 3 day of November, 2009.

THOMAS G.
IL
Attorney for Berkshire Investments, LLC

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 6
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS O.
G. MAILE, IV., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
He is the attorney for the above named petitioner, Berkshire Investments LLC, in the
above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE
ON VENDEE'S LIEN, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct
to the best of his knowledge and belief and executes the same as attorney for the above named
Berkshire Investments, LLC.
DATED This

3

day of November, ?009.

THOMAS G. AILE, IV., Attorney for
Berkshire Inves
, LLC

this

3

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State,
day of November, 2009.

72J 4'¥·~'~ C/f'r;yClf'r;y4/N'J-.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Eagle, Idaho
My Commission Expires January 21,2009

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 7
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HECOH~
ADA COUNTY RECOR~
BOISE IDAHO 08/03109

DEPUTY Vicki Allen
RECORDED - REQUES,-",
REQlIES,-",
Berkshire Investments

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV-'"
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

D.UU
AMOUNT b.UU

. DAVID NAVAffRO
51 AM

11111111111111111111111111111111111111
109090497

Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plainti ffs/Counter
-Defendants,
ffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/
Co un ter-Claim ants.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
/THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

TO:
RE:

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES
Berkshire Investments L.L.C., Notice of Vendee's Lien

The nature of the vendee's lien is made pursuant to I.e. 45-804, for the re-payment of the
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.e., to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 1

Exhibit "A"
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Tmst. That the principal ~ paid was $400,000.00 which is due and';'wing minus any costs
and interest thereon awarded in the above captioned matter.
Berkshire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or propeliies
described as follows:
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho,
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also
known as, the Northwest 114
1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 NOlih, Range 1 West,
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009.,

/J i.

__
- - -'c- - :7"\f~'-YrJ~(}j~_{
"- - -,
TI-IOMAS G. MAILE, IV., attorney for
THOMAS
" ./'
Berkshire Investments L.L.c.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
said state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire
Investments L.L.c., and further known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within and foregoing instrument,
instrwnent, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire
Investments L.L.C.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

on
'n

r'"f}?
-/J7<C'A-z,L
JJ~2A:-z,L (/~t';-:;(/~t';-:;
Chc.:;sr:~
Mary Sue Chc.:;sr;~
f\IOIARY FlUB!
F'LJ8! Ie
IC;
.sTATE
,sTATE OF i[)l\~-i':)
i[)l\~-i':)

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 2
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LA\Yl OFFICE OF

.. ."

Tli~K01~1[AS
Tli~K01~1[AS Go MAKLE,

N, P.A.
PoAo

EAGLE, IDAHO 83616
380 WEST STATE STREET, EACiLE,
(208) 939-]000/
939-JOOO / Fax (208) 939-1001

October 21, 2009

BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
TO (208) 746-9160
Clark and Feeney
Attn: Connie Taylor
1229 Main Street
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Re:

Johnson Trust & Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
Our File No. M04-51 09.0

Dear Ms. Taylor:
Pursuant to the Court's Order of October 14,2009, we once again request payment of the
amounts due and owing Berkshire Investments, LLC.
Your prompt reply and payment is appreciated.
Sincerely,

//

//'
Dictated and ForWarded Without
Signature to/A<;lid Delay
///

Th6rnas G. Maile
T)1funas
TGM/mp

Exhibit "B"
"'B"
001454

R E C E',...v E D

'-, •

NO'-~--:""'~F:::':'ll';';eD::--------jNO·-----=-~F::::"ll":;";eD::--------1r
A.MI~~...,..
P.M--,---+
~M~~~~-~M--,----1-

DEC 2 t 2009

DEC 2 i 2009

Ada County Clerk

J. DAVID NAVARRO, CierI<
By eARLY LATIMORE

1

DEPUTY

2

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 4837

3

4

5
6

7

Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
Dallan Taylor and the Johnson Trust

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE,
IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband
and wife,

12
13

14

Plaintiffs,

15

Case No. CV OC 0723232

OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION

vs.

16

CONl~IE

WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.

17

Defendants.

18
19

John Taylor, DaHan
Dallan Taylor, and the Johnson Trust object to the Plaintiffs' renewed motion

20
I

21
22

for certification of the dismissal of their claims for the following reasons:
1.

This Court has already considered that motion and denied it on the grounds that the

23

judgment on the Plaintiffs' claim will not be final until the issue of costs and

24

attorneys fees has been addressed.

25
26

OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001455

2.

As shown by the documents attached to the Affidavit of Counsel, Mr. Maile is
seeking to enforce the Judgment entered by Judge Wilper which he claims, in this

1

2

of Plaintiffs' claims will
case, is void and should be set aside. This Court's dismissal ofPlaintiffs'

3

likely be upheld under the doctrine ofjudicial
of judicial estoppel, and it is a waste ofjudicial
of judicial

4

resources to interpose an interlocutory appeal which will only delay the final

5

resolution of this action.
6

7

8
9

3.

Defendants submit that the filing of
this renewed motion is frivolous and request that
ofthis
it be denied.

IX'",. II)II]

DATED this -----'-__
-- ' _ day of December, 2009.

10

CLARK and FEENEY

11

12
13

14

By_ _----=.-.=--..:'-----_---=-_,..-~
~aylor, a member of the firm.
~ Conni
'aylor,
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust
Dallan

_

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25
26

OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501
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1

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
vt11
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_I0_·
of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true
0__
· day ofNovember,
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

3
4

5

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
ID 83616
Eagle, 10

u.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mark Prusynski
MOFF
ATT THOMAS
MOFFATT
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, 10
ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

6

7

8

9
10
11

12

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
ID 83616
Eagle, 10

~

o
o

lZi
til

u.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

13

14

~

15

ie W. Taylor

16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION

3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001457

-

-

RECEIVED

DEC 2 1 2009

DEC 2 1
2009
12009
1

2
3
4

5
6

J. DAVID NAVARRO. CI
By eARLY LATIMORE

Ada County Clerk

I':>I:F'UT'Y
I':>I:F'UT'r

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9
10
11

12

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs,

13

AFFIDA VIT OF COm,HE W. TAYLOR IN
AFFIDAVIT
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION

14

vs.

15

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L: JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

16

17

18
19
20

21
22

Case No. CV OC 07 23232

Defendants.
ST
ATE OF IDAHO
STATE

)
) ss.

23

County of Nez Perce

)

24

25
26

AFFIDA
VIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR
AFFIDAVIT

1
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001458

rl<

-'
CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1

1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of

2

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson

3

Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal

4

knowledge.

5

2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Verified Motion for
6
7

8

Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed in the Taylor v. Maile case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04
00473D.

9

3. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit B, a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Thomas G.

10

Maile, IV, in Support of Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed in the Taylor v.
v,

11

Maile case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D
00473D..

12

DATED this
13

..-/17
'/17
f)f day of December, 2009.
f/f

14

15
16
17
18

I ,

...,
-..,

~
'

//
...._~-..... .....
//"'--~-.....
.....

//
" ,,
/
/"

",/

~A

'--~I.....-'~
'--~I....-'~

Connie Taylor

~

'

"

,r
,r tl7

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thislll
thisll :

/

\._\.,-

' ' <.,

\

.'

.'

day of December, 2009.

19
----~..

20
21
22

/1

/ d/ )Nl[ ;«

()ttnJ

Notary Public in nd for the State ofIdaho.
ofldaho.
'I)
therein.
Residing at _
u~ (Lf'
My commission expires:
(..Lf' I

23
24

25

26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON.
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

2

(1~
of December, 2009, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day ofDecember,
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

---/iJ:.---/JJ:-

3
4
5

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, 10 83616

6

7

8
9

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10
lothth Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

,~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

D
D

¢
D
D
D
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
Te1ecopy

10
11

12

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

13
14
15

,
~,
Connie W. Taylor

I (.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25

26

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR

3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 001460

THOMAS G. MAILE, TV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-100.1
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
j

Att0111Cy
Att011lcy for Berkshirc Invcstments LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TAYLOR,
REED TA
YLOR~ DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
Plainti
ffs/Counter-Defendants

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

v.

VERIFIED MOTION FOR
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S
LIEN

j

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE,. husband and wife,. THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintifti'Counter-dcfendant,
Plaintifli'Counter-dcfendant,
v.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHmE
BERKSHffiE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defcndants/Counter-claimants.

COMES NOW, the Defendants/Counter-Claimant, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

by and through it.s attomey, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and hereby moves 1his
tlris Court for the following
relief a~ follows:

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1
EXHIBIT

I

A
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This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://vvw.v.gfi.co_-----_,
http://VVWN.gfi.co_-----_,

The above captioned Court has determined the real estate closing by and between the
parties was declared void and a return of the purchase price was ordered minus court costs

incurred by the Plaintiff. That this Court as of October 14,
l4, 2009 denied the Plaintiff's Motion
POl'
P01'

Order Releasing Vendee's Lien. That based upon the same the following is alleged:
COUNT ONE
FORECLOSURJ~
FORECLOSURJ~

T.J.
During all times herein mentioned, Berkshire Investments, LLC, is and was a. limited

1i ability company authorized to transact business in the State ofIdaho.
II.

During all times herein mentioned, plaintiff, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust,
was a duly registered trust
tntSt under the law of the State ofIdaho and. currently holds the legal title to
the real prope.rty
property subject to the vendee's lien hereinafter referenced. That consistent with the
prior Orders, Berkshire Investment has not been paid any portion of the monies due and owing
from the plaintiff "Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust". That although repeatedly requested
to do so the plaintiff "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has not paid the $400,000.00 due
and owing and/or paid any sums minus the costs awarded to Berkshire Investments above
referenced.
of the Vendee's Lien in the
That atta.ched hereto as Exhibit ItA" is a tnte and correct copy ofthe
litigation abovc captioned which was recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office on August
3, 2009 bearing U1.strument
b1.strument No.1 09090497, which is incorporated by reference herein as if set
forth in full herein.

m.
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2

This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information,
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That the Vendee's Lien filed and is perfected against the real property in the County of
Ada~ State

ofJdaho. The real property is described as Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8,9, Block 1 of

Fajrfic1d
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457
and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest

1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho..
Idaho ..

IV.
The '<Theodore
"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" is the owner or reputed owners of the
certain rent property above describe in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho.

v.
That pursuant to the Judgments of record nnd
and the subsequent orders entered herein there a
fix liquidated and ascertainable sum due and owing Berkshire Investments LLC from the
''Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust", That the sum of $400,000.00, (minus awarded costs
and interest thereon) is the outstanding balance due to Berkshire Investments after deducting all
just credits~ payments and offsets, together with interest legal a.t the rate oftwelvc (12) percent
antltun from October 14,2009, until paid in full is due from the "Theodore L. Johnson
per tlntltun

..

,.

Revocable Trust",
VI.

Berkshire Tnvestmcnts LLC claims an interest in and to the subject property pursuant to
Licn, and any right, title, claim or interest ofthe "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
that Vendee's Lien,
Trust" and/or the named plaintiffs (or any other interested party or person in and to the subject
jUllior and subservient to the interest of
property, if such right, title, claim or interest exists) is junior
Berkshire Investments LLC in the subject property. That Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled
VERIF1ED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN .. Page 3

This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://vvvvwgfi.com
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to a Decree allowing the foreclosure of its interest against the real property above described and a
detennination ofthe rights of the parties herein and any others who claim an interest therein.
VB.
VII.

That annexed hereto ns
as Exh.ibit "B" is one of the letters transmitted to the counsel for the
plaintiffs dated October 21,2009
21 , 2009 requesting payment ofthe sums due and owing to Berkshire
Investments LLC. There has been no reply from any party or counsel for any party. That
Berkshire Inveshncnts LLC, has no pla.in, speedy or adequate remedy at law.
IX.
lX.

That Berkshire Investments LLC has been required to rctain
retain the services of Thomas G.
O.
Mails, IV, to pursue this matter
..Pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12"120, 12-121, 12-]23,
matter..Pursuant
Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00 if
this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this matter is
contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(e)
54(e) ofthe
of the
Idaho Rule..q ofCivi1
of Civil Procedure.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Berkshire Investments, LLC prays for judgment against the plaintiff
~'Theodore
~'Theodore

1. Jolmson Revocable Trusf' und/or any other parties or third parties claiming an

interest in the real property as follows:
That Berkshire Investments, LtC
LLC be granted Judgment against 'Theodore L.
H

Johnson Revocable Trust
parties or third parties in the principal
Trust" andlor any other pa.rties
sum of $400.000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12)
percent per annum from and after October 14, 2009, minus costs and interests
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 4
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due and owin.g "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" andlor any other parties,
to and including the date of Judgment and thereafter at the highest legal rate until
paid in full.
2

For Berkshire Investments, LLC's attorneys fees incurred herein in the sum of
$2,500.00 if this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by
the Court if this matter is contested.

3

For Berkshire Jnvestments, LLC's costs and disbursements incurred herein.

4

71mt the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" be required to set forth herein by
proper pleading the nature of their claims in and to said premises or any part
thereof.

5

That Berkshire Investments, LLC's interest in and to the subject property be
declared senior and superior and that any other claim, right, title, or .interest of
the<'Theodorc L. Johnson Revocable Trust" andlor any of the party (or any other
interested party or person in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim
or interest exists) be declared junior and subservient to the interest of Berkshire
Investments, LLC in the subject property to wit: Lots 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
Block 1 of Fa.irfield Esta.tes Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90

of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known
a..q, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range

1 WeRt,
West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
6

That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that Berkshire Investments,

LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the suhject prope.rty, and further
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 5
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ordering that the «Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust'" has no right, title or
interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any part thereof and that
each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all persons
having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any
part, parcel or ponion thereof (ei
ther as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be
(either
barred and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real
property and in and to every pa.rt,
part, parcel and portion thereof.
7

That this Court order the sale ofthe subject real property according to law and the
practi
ce of this Court!
practice
Court, and that the proceeds of said sale be applied in payment of
amounts found due and owing to Berkshire Investments, LLC as aforesaid, and for
Berksbjre Investments, LLC's costs and expenses of this action.

8

said real property be insufficient to
That in the event the proceeds from the sale of sBid
satisfy the amounts due to Berkshire Investments, LLC herein (together
(togelher with the
costs of sale and other proper charges), that Berkshire Investments, LLC have
JUdgment against the "T11eodore to
L. Johnson, Revocable Trust" for such deficiency,
Judgment

together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate until paid in full.
9

or equity that the Court may deem proper
For such other and further relief in law
Jawor
in the premises.

DATED

Thi3

day of November 2009.

THOMAS G. " IL ..
Attorney for Berkshire
Ber.kshire Investments, LLC

VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF' VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 6
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VERIF1CATTON

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada
)
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., being fIrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follow,:
He i~ the attorney for the above named petitioner, Berkshire Investments LtC. in the
above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION
MOTTON FOR FORECLOSURE
ON VENDEE'S LTEN, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct
to the best of his knowledge and belief and executes the same as attomey for the above named
Berkshire Investments. LLC.
DATED ThiS.3 day of November. 2009.

-'"'-_;O'O:;""..... A . - f = - . ; . . - - - - - - - -  _ _

THOMAS G. AILE, IV., Attorney for
Berkshire Inves
, LLC

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State,
ofNovember,
this ~ day of
November, 2009.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

L2z~td'0-L2z~td'0-Notary PubHc for Idaho

Residing at Eagle, Idaho
My Commission Expires January
Jauuary 21,2009

FOR~CLOSUREOF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 7
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FOR~CLOSURE
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HeCORr- '. DAVID HAVArtRO
ADA COUNTY ReCORrBOISE IDAHO 08/03/09
08/03109
;M

("

'-

~~~:E~I:~:8~~ST M
~~~:E~I:~:8~~ST
Berkshire Invealmenls

O. MAILE, IV
THOMAS G.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
939-100l
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

AMOUNT 8.00

III 1111111111111111111111111111111111
18'309121497
18'3090497

Attomey for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

.TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, aod
TAYLOR,
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plainti ffs/Counter-Defendants,
Plainti:ffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

v.

NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, mOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
/THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN
MAILE! husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
MAILE,
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants. .
TO:
RE:

2

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES
L ..L.C., Notice of Vendee's Licn
nerkshire Investments L..L.C.,

nahlre of the vendee's lien. is made pursuant to I.e. 45-804, for the re-payment
The nattlre
re~payment of the
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.C., to the Theodore 1. .Tohnson Revocable

Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 1

Exhjbit "A"
Exhibit
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://www.gfLcom
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(
pri11cipal sum. paid was $400,000.00 which is due and owing minus any costs
Trust. That the prh1cipal
and interest tl1ereon awarded in the above captioned matter.
Berbhire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or properties
described as follows:
Idaho~
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, Block] of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho,
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also
as,the NOlihwest 1/4
114 of the Southwest 1/4,
known as,thc
l/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 11. West,
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) S8.

County of Ada

)

atld for
On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in alld
~aid state, personally appeared THOMAS O. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire
InvestmentsL.L.C., and further known t.o me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire
Investments L.L.C.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

'Lh&~cdth=

Mary Sue Chase

NOTARY PUBLIC

Notary Public for Idaho

]

SlATE OF IDAHO

~-""""_'-'~"""""'!l"""'.~".
~-""""'-'-'~"""""'!I"""'.~".

Residing at Boise, Idaho

....

My Commission Expires Jnly 30,2014

Notice of Vendee's Lien ~ Page 2

information. visit: http://www.gfi.com
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LAW OFFICE OF

Trr-JrOMfA.§
Trr-JrOMfA.5

Go MAJLlE, N, FDA.

380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616
Ff.'1;'f (208) 939·1001
(208) 939-1000! Ff.'l;'f
Oci:obef
Oci:ober

21,2009

BY FACSIMTLE TRANSMISSION
TO (208) 746-9160
Clark and Feeney
Attn: Connie Taylor
Attn;
1229 Main Street
Post Oflice Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Rc:

Johnson Trust & Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D
Out .F.il.e No. M04-5109.0

Dear Ms. Taylor:

PUl'suant to the Court's Order of October 14, 2009, we once again request payment of the
Pursuant
amounts due and owing Berkshire Investments, LLC.
repJy and 'payment
Your prompt reply
payment is appreciated.
Sincerely,
ru'dcd Withollt
Dictot.ed f,U1(1 Po w'dcd
Signature t . void Delay

TGM/mp

.Exhibit ".8"
http://wwwgfi.com
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http:ltwwwgfi.com
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rTRAi'ISMISSION
\/ERIFICATrON REPORT
tTRA"ISMISSION VERIFICATrON

r

TIME
NAME
FAX

iEL

SER.#

DATE,TIME

FA>< NO./NAME
.DURATIOI--I
.DURATIOI'-I

PAGE(S)
RESULT

MODE

10/21/2e1eJ9 14:53
10/21/2eleJ9

THOMAS MAILE

1208g391 ElEll
1208'3391
1208939J.600
800H5J484204

HI/21 14: 52
120874E.g150
120874E.'3150
00;130:1g
00;130:1'3
01

OK

STANDARD

http://W\IVW.gfi.com
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
. Idaho State Bar No. 2378
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

Plaintiffs/Counter~Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Counter~Defendants,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAlLE REAL EST
ATE COMPANY,
ESTATE
CaMPANY, and

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G.
'MAILE, IV., IN SUPPORT OF
VERIFffiD MOTION FOR
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S
LIEN

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-def(lndant,
Plaintiff/Counter-defl:lndant,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN
MAU,.,E,
MAU",E, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
DefendantsICounter-claitnants.
STATE OF mAHO
mAliO )
) 55.

County of Ada

)

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED MOTION FOR
FORECl,OSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1] C:~,""dYbo<ka.oltl\.,orv('J'lr.1"'A\MlM""'U~"'AYLOR"'tr1d.v~tr.nwCll~
C:~,""dYbo<ka.oltl\.,orv('J'lr.1"'A\MlM....n_p'\"'AYLOR"'tr1d.v~tr.nwCl1~_ _ _ _ _ _. .
EXHIBIT
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THOMAS G.
L

MAILE~
MAILE~

IV, being first duly swom upon oath,
oath~ deposes and says:

Yom Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defcndants/ColIDter-Claimants
Defendants/Counter-Claimants and
further appears Pro Se, and provides this Affidavit in support of the Verified Motion for
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien. That the infonnation and facts set forth herein are based
upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observation.s and can testify as to the truth
of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial ofthis
of this matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "N' is a true and correct copy of a July 10, 2009 letter from
Connie Taylor to your Affiant and the same is incorporated by reference
refe1'ence herein ~ ifset
forth in full herein.

3.

There are three (3) different Orders/Judgment for costs and attorney fees in this matter
which all are awarded interest at different rates. l1)e first Judgment in the amount of
$12,424.04 was entered on Apri16, 2007 and bears interest at a rate of 10.125% with a
per diem of$3,45.
of$3.45. A second Judgment in the amount of$504.80 was entered on January

17,2006 and bears interest at a.rate of8.375% with a perdicm of$.12. The third
Judgment in the amount of$514.00 and bears interest at a rate of7.625% with a per diem
of$.11.
4.

The total amount owing on all three Judgments as of August 3,
3~ 2009, the date the
Vendce~s
Vendce~s Lien in this matter was filed, is $16,537.76. The total amount owing as of

December 15, 2009, the hearing on this matter, is $17,030.80.
DATED this

ofNovember,
'Z~y of
November, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED MOTION FOR
FORECLOSURE O.F VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2 (:,\hlHl"\'bQ"kbotlcl\'enI...
(:,\hlH1('\'bQ"kbotlcl\'enI... mb\"\MlMAn,li\T"'YI..oR\"lI'1(1ftvi!l~ven<le.~lIen.wpd
mb\"\M\MAn,li\T"'YI..oR\"(\'1(1ftvi!l~ven<le~len.wpd
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO hefore
de. day
da.y of November, 2009.

Mary Sue Chase
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

me, a Notary Public
Publ.ic in an.d for said State, this

"7/J~-:-=-~~,----_~
g-;~o......=..~~'-----~~
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires July 30,2014

CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE
~.

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thistj
thisto day ofNove:mber, 2009. I caused a true and
Con"eet copy of the foregoing (1) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN, to be delivered, addressed
as follows:

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
I-land
I'land Delivery
Ovemjght Delivery

. AIL~, IV., Pro Se,
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

AFFJ.DA
VIT OF THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED
VERTFIED MOTION FOR
AFFlDAVIT
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LTEN
C\hnndyl>nc'<hnckl\j1mttlfile1\n\MlMAILIl\TAYLOll.\nmdovittBmv...d~IIen.""d
d~IIen.""d
LIEN - Page 3 C\hnndyl>nc'<hnckl\jlmttlfile1\n\~MAILIJITAYI.O!l.\ftmdovittBmv
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CLARK AND FEENEY, .

Ell. SWETT
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rAul. T~IOMAS
T~IOMAS CLAR!'t
CLARl't
rAuL.
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JONATHAN O. HALLY
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CHllt:!!.E9. M. ST~oeCHEIN
ST~oeCHEIN ••
CH/lt:!!.E9.
TAYl..O~··
CQNNle TAYl..O~··

July 10, 2009

Sent Via Ftlc.';imUe
Ftlc..;imUe To: (208)

9j9~IOOl
9j9~IOOl

Total Pagef:

iJ
'i'

Mr. Thomas Maile
380 Wost State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

Re:

Berks.hb:e Investments, LtC
LJ..C v. Taylor et. al.

Dear Mr. Maile:
Judgment~
I ha'Ve received yOUl' letter of July 9, 2009, with its enclosed proposed Satismction of Judgment~
ca.se. I am attaching printouts which show
which relates solely to t.he costs in the Tayl{]t
TaY[Qt v. Maile case.
ctUTent amount owing on the three cost awards is $16,449.44, which brings the balance on
that the current
purcbase price down to $383,550.56.
the purchase

In regard to your request that my clients make arrangements to obtain e. certified check, Pm afraid
process ofloanlng
that in the current banking market, a bank would not be willing to even begin the PIOcesS
ofloanJng
all lis pendens have been released. Once that occurs~ it would likely
money on this property unless an
takE! a number of months to get the toan completed.
take
TIle Taylors are willing to discuss a full settlement of all pending matters, including their
coun:rerclaims which ate not mentioned in yom
YOW' letter. Because property values have plummeted
coun:terclaims
ha.ve beon pending, they belie"Je
belie'Ve they will be able to ostablish losses which far
wWle these lawsuits have
exceed the $383,550.5G, In addition, the Ta.ylors have incurred costs and fees 0[$16,305.86
of$16,305.86 in the
inoU.tred by My. Prusynski's
pending law-suit,
la'WSuit, which docs not include the fees and costs inoUtred
Prosynski's office,

fol' costs
As a countc:roffer. the Taylors are willing to dismiss their COlUlterclaims and any claims for
of all Us pendens and your waiver
and attomey fees in the second lawsu.it in exchange for the release ofall
payment,
of any furthet payment.

EXHIBIT "A"
001475
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Thomas Maile
July 10,2009
Pagc2
Page 2

J look forward to hearing from you and bopefully getting this matter finally fesolved.
fesol'Ved.
Sincerely,

CLARK and FEENEY
Dictated /I)' Ms, TaylDr and $P.nt
$P.m
witltaut
witJtaut sign~ttne
sign~tllre tQ avoId delay

By: Connie W, Taylor

CWT:tc
Enolosures
cc:

John Taylor w/enos
.• Via US Mail
w/enos.•
DaHan Taylor w/encs. - Via US Mail
Mark P.tUsynsld w/encs. Sent Via Facsimile ONLY, To: (208) 385-5384 Total Pages: ~

pagss comprioSiHg
comprising thisjaosimile trl1nsmi.ui01t
trl1nsmi.uio1t contain conjidt1ttial
conjidmtial injorm.otfCmfrom
The pOfJSS
injorm.atfcmfrom ths
rhs Qjflce o/C/ark atui Peen"J'
Pee""y
tnrer'ld~d solal)i
solal)! for USI! by the tndividlUll entity named as the recipient hereof 1jyou
This friformatian is tnrer1d~d
)IOU (lr@
([r@ not the
tnt!mded recipient.
t'eaipient, b~ aware that (11'1)' discl(Mur~
disclwur~ copying, dtsrrt~uri()17
dtstrt~uri()17 or uM
ZlM a/the contlmts a/this trflrlwisslOl1
im!mded
tranwiSS/Ol1 Is
IS
prohibitl!ui, .'f/you
.ifyou h(;flle receiverithtJ
receivedthtJ transmisston tn
pleaSf1 notij)'TJs
prohibittui,
[n ~rror, pleaS(1
noti/),TJs by tal~phone
tal~phane immsdiate/y
immsdiately so we may arrange

.....w
.....w

orr"J~
or~"J~

QF

CLARK AND FEENEY
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The correct Interest rate and' method of calculation Wilf be selected by the program based on the
amount of jUdgment, award date anq jurisdlQtion,
ovarrldQ t~ aeleeted jnt~rast rate by
jurisdlotion, You mBy ovarridQ
field, Rates 6re believed accurate for judgments
entering e different rate in the "interest override" field.
am::urnee no
awarded from Q1/01/19S9
Q1/01/1SS9 to the current date, howevar, National Judgment Network ascurnee
responsibility
rnaCCllrlllcies, In order to LlSS
L(SS this calculator you must agree that YOI~
yOI~ are u,c;ins it at
responsibJllty for lnaCCtlnllcies.
your own risl<. rf an obvious error is encountered, please report it to National Judgment Network.
Want 6lCCG)ss
6lCCGlSS to morn tools like this?
Judgment Networkl
Join National JUdgment

1 of]

'711012009 11: 17 AM
'7110/2009
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The correct int.ersst rate and method of calculation will be selected by the program based on the
jurisdiction, You may override the selected Interest rate by
amount of Judgment,
JUdgment, award date and jurisdiction.
field, Rates are beUeved accurate for judgments
enterIng a different rate in the "Interest override" field.
aw~rded from 01/01/1989 to the current date, however,
however. National Judgment Network assurnes no
aw~rded
calculator you must agree that yc>1.J
yC>1.J are ~IEljt1g
~IEJjl1g it at
responsibftity for inaccuracIes, In order to use this cslculetor
risk. If a(J
IS encountered,
encountered. please report It to Natlon,,1
Nation,,' Judgment Network.
Network,
your own rIsk.
aT'! obVioUQ grror Ie
Waot.,agOess to mora tools
Waot.AAOess

IIklLtbI~?
IlklLtbl~?

JoIn National Judgment
JUdgment Networkl

I o( 1

7110/200911:16 AM
7/10/200911:16
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NINPoJUL, 10,
10. 2009!rI12;37P~ror
2009!rI12;37P~ror ;'L/,I.~,K & Fc~NH
FeeNH

AllY

.......

calcuration will
The correct Interest rate and ~thod of calculation
wl/r be selected by the program based on the
~wartl date and JuriSdiction. You ImY override the selected infE/rest
amount of judgment, ~ward
intElrest rate by
different nata In the "interest oV~lTjde"
oV~lTjde" field. Rates are believed accurate for jUdgments
entering a dlffsrent
judgments
award~d from 01/01/1989 to the 6urrem date, however, National Judgment Network assumes no
award~d
responsibility for inaccuraeies. In ordar to use this calculator you must agree that you are usrng
using it at
your own risk, If an obvIous error Is encountered, please report it to National JUdgment
Judgment Network.
Network,
~cess to more tools like
/Ike thIs?
~cess

Join National JUdgment Network/
Networkl

1 of 1
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RECEIVED

JAN 08 2010
CHRIST TROUPIS
Ada County Clerk
Address: PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 938-5584
FAX: (208) 938-5482
Attorney at Law
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Pro Se and Counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT
ENTERED JULY 20, 2009

fIkIa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G. Maile, IV, by and
through their attorneys of record, Christ Troupis and Thomas Maile, and pursuant to !.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P.
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Rule 54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order
filed July 2,2009 and the subsequent Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20,
2009.

The Plaintiffs Request That the Court Enter its Certification of the
Judgment entered July 20, 2009.
1.

The court is aware that the Plaintiffs' filed their Motion for Pennissive Appeal, which
was denied on November 6, 2009. The plaintiff') believe that a certification pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(B) is a sensible approach to the litigation. The defendants have filed their objection to the
request for certification, which indicated in part that the court would be requested to entertain the
issues of costs and attorneys fees. Judicial economy would be promoted by allowing the claims
for costs and attorney fees to be advanced before this court, to allow an appellate decision on the
issues raised in the plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. Significant issues have
developed since the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order filed July 2,2009.
L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs
The Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore 1.

Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case
Number CV OC 04-05656D entered his Order October 14,2009, affinning that the plaintiffs
have a continued right to assert a Vendee's Lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to
I.c. 45-804 (attachment to the Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification
I.e.
Pursuant to I.R.c.P.
I.R.e.P. Rule 54(b) Re: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009 filed December 3, 2009).
In addition, the plaintiffs have filed on November 5, 2009, their Verified Motion for Foreclosure

of Vendee's Lien. Judge Wilper has continued the matter for the submission of additional factual
issues surrounding the vendee's foreclosure of the lien.

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
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The court in addition has been provided with additional facts which were not submitted
as part of the record in the Court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
The Taylors, before Judge Wilper in 2007, requested that the court strike the Lis Pendens
filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper
entered his Order on March 1, 2007 denying the motion and pursuant to that order the Lis
Pendens was authorized to remain of record through the appeal (February 2009) (Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Certification Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 54(b) Re: Memorandum Decision
and Order/motion for Permissive Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12, filed July 13,2009).
The plaintiffs filed their release of Lis Pendens before this court on July 13,2009 and
released the lis pendens involved with Judge Wilper's case on August 3, 2009 and
simultaneously filed their vendee's lien. The real property is not encumbered by any Lis
Pendens. The pending claim is for lien enforcement oftheVendee's Lien to be determined by
Judge Wilper.
The Relevant portion of Idaho Code section 5-505, provides:
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or the right o(possession
of real property" the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant
at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer,
or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in
which the property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the
action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and
a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of
filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the
property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency
of the action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real
names. (emphasis added).
The present matter before the court requires this court to construe the plain meaning and
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intention of I. C. 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court
exercises free review. The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a Lis Pendens is
straightforward. The purchase price has not been returned and the plaintiff's have statutory rights
to a vendee's lien affecting the title of property, as with any other lien and/or foreclosure action.
The case of Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 1171d.
117 Id. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146,
1148 (Ct.App.1990),
(Ct.App.l990), provides:.
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain
ofldaho, N.A., 100
real property. See I.C. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho,
Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing of a lis
pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting the property, thereby
inducing an extra measure of caution by potential purchasers or lenders until the
litigation is concluded. But this does not mean that any underlying legal rights
have been altered.
The Joseph, supra, case authority, establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not
"change the legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the
world that litigation has been instituted which may affect the underlying property.
The defendants have not provided any appropriate authority or basis for the advancement
in support of their proposition that the filing of the lis pendens under these facts can give rise to a
valid claim for relief. The importance of such legal issues relate directly to the counter-claims
advanced by the counter-defendants which technically is the only claim before this court. Under
these facts, did the filing of the Lis Pendens and the ultimate release of the Lis Pendens by the
plaintiffs give rise to any actionable torts?
45-1302 DETERMINATION OF ALL RIGHTS UPON FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS.

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
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In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property or a
lien on or security interest in personal property, the plaintiff, cross-complainant or
plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action,
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or
appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the
real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to
granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as in the
action to quiet title.

The plaintiffs are lawfully pursuing their rights to foreclose the vendee's lien. The
plaintiffs have consistently asserted that the right to pursue the vendee's lien and the foreclosure
of the same, was part and parcel of the Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record.
The plaintiffs have released their lis pendens. On July 13,2009 after receipt of the
Court's Memorandum, the plaintiffs released the lis pendens relating to the current matter.
Although, technically, the plaintiffs could have maintained the lis pendens through any appeal in
the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the plaintiffs
voluntarily removed the same.
The case ofSuitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100 Id. 555, 602 P.2d 53 (1979)
provides further support ofthe appellants' right to maintain the lis pendens during the appeal
without the necessity of any bond. The Suitts court stated:
It seems clear that under the statutory law existing at the time of the original
action the lis pendens would continue to have effect until the final determination
of the action on appeal. See Petty v. Hall, 257 Ala. 145,57 So.2d 620 (1952);
Maedel v. Wies, 15 N.W.2d 692 (Mich.1944); 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens A§ 36. The
effect of filing a lis pendens is that a person who purchases or acquires rights in
the subject matter of the litigation during the pendency of the action (which
encompasses appeal) takes subject to the final disposition of the case.

Other jurisdictions are in accord, see generally, Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631 (Alaska
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1985), lis pendens remains in effect where appeal is taken, so that posting supersedeas bond or
moving to continue lis pendens pending appeal is not necessary; Kennedy v. Dawson, 989 P.2d
390,296 Mont. 430,(1999), notice of appeal and lis pendens, effectively preserves the status quo
pending appeal; Gardner v. Perry City, 994 P.2d 811, 2000 UT 1, (2000), ordering reinstatement
of the lis pendens because the appellant's interest in the subject property depended upon the
outcome of the case on remand; Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996),
holding lis pendens was proper during appeal, as outcome of case would be determined after
appeal. The plaintiffs could have continued their lis pendens in the current case pending any
appeal. However, they have chosen to release the same.
The Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the lis penden
in the prior proceeding was warranted during the appeal. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support
of Motion for CertificationIMotion for Permissive Appeal). There can be no prejudice to the
defendants in allowing an immediate appellate review as the defendants can do what they so
desire relative to the real property that has been the subject of these proceedings.
As stated in the case of Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Id. 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005):
The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to liberalize the appeals process by permitting
some partial judgments to be appealed earlier than they otherwise could have been
appealed. Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d
366 (1976). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the' single judicial unit theory'
which seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim
actions by forcing them to await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every
matter in controversy in it' before being allowed to appeal." Id. at 892,556 P.2d at
368.
The legal issues presented by the plaintiffs involve substantial issues involving the
integrity of our judicial system. The certification under Rule 54(b) will produce an efficient,
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orderly determination of rights of the parties which primarily centers on the doctrine of res
judicata, and the exceptions thereto as raised by the plaintiffs. The parties would be best served
by having the appellate court consider the issue which is central to this litigation, to wit: the
affects of the doctrine of Res Judicata. This one legal issue controls the remaining claims
contained in the counter-claims of the defendants. Our appellate court has not examined facts
similar to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs relating to the defendants' misrepresentations to
the court as to whether such facts are a "fraud upon the court". Our Supreme Court can provide
guidance as to whether the plaintiffs' allegations of peIjury, obtaining money by false pretenses,
and aiding and abetting peIjury constitute such facts amounting to ''tampering with the
of justice' as to suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
administration ofjustice'
safeguard the public.'" Campbell v. Kildew, 141 rd. 640, 115 P.3d 731, (2005), Compton v.
Compton, 101 rd. 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). The facts of this case warrant an
examination by our Supreme Court to determine the integrity of our judicial system.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have released any and all lis pendens filed which may affect the subject real
property. The defendants are free to deal with the subject real property in any manner they
choose. The Honorable Judge Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the Lis Pendens in
the prior case was warranted during the appeal process in the prior proceedings. Judge Wilper
has determined that the plaintiffs have a right to a vendee's lien and there is currently set before
his court a verified motion for the foreclosure of that lien. There remains a controlling issue of
Law, to wit: the affect of Res Judicata in light of the defendants' alleged wrongful behavior, that
can be addressed by the Supreme Court.
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DATED this 7th day of January, 2010.

(3h--1-) '7) ~

CHRIST TROU
TR~tt-o-m-e-Y-fl-or-B-er-k-sh-ir-e--CHRIST
S, attorney for BerkshIre
Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION- Pg 8~"""''''''''''''''''''-6-1O_
8~"""''''''''''''''''''-6-1O_

001487

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 7th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, (1) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
54 (B) RE:
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B)
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009, (2) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 to be
delivered, addressed as follows:
Mark Stephen Prusynski
( ) U. S. Mail
PO Box 829
Facsimile Transmission
(X)
Boise, ID 83701
( ) Hand Delivery
Phone: (208) 345-2000
( ) Overnight Delivery
Fax: (208) 385-5384
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Thomas Maile
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho
Facsimile: (208-939-1001)

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~1)LJ~===~

_

CHRIST TROUI1S,
TROUP S, attorney for BerkshIre
Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile
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JAN 082010
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV Ada County Clerk '
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State BarNo. 2378
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Co-counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants,

v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
AFFIDA VIT IN
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.
IoRoC.Po RULE
54 (B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED
JULY 20, 2009

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants-Counter-Claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO IoRoC.Po
I.R.C.P. RULE 54 (B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED
JULY 20, 2009 - Pg 1
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1.

Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen
Birch-Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts
set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and
can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the
trial of this matter.

2.

That annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Release of
Lis Pendens filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office on July 13,2009, relating to the
above captioned matter.

3.

That Berkshire Investments has pursued its Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's
Lien which was filed November 5, 2009 in the consolidated case Theodore L. Johnson

Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments,
LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County
Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. That your affiant is the managing member of
Berkshire Investments LLC, and in such capacity has pursued the return of the purchase
price as ordered by Judge Wilper, on behalf of Berkshire Investments LLC. There has
been no unconditional tender of the monies due and owing although requests have been
repeatedly made. That opposing counsel has filed pleadings indicating judicial estoppel
should apply because of Berkshire Investments' demand for the return of the monies
ordered by Judge Wilper. Berkshire Investments has requested the return of monies, and
if at any point in time any court orders the parties to be returned to the status quo prior to
the defendant's obtaining the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims, the monies will be

SUPPLEMENT
AL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
SUPPLEMENTAL
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED
JULY 20, 2009 - Pg 2
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returned and deposited into the appropriate court or trust account.

blcray

this
of December,
DATED thisbleJay

~

.d-,
d,

-T~H=O-M-A--S-G-.-M~A~~~'--~,p~r-o-s-e-a-nd----------
-T----'H=O-M-A-S-G-.-M....::A----t-~"--=---,-7,
p'-r-o-s-e-a-nd----
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen
Birch Maile
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
,!).;<
,!Jc;< day of December, 2009.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54 (B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED
JULY
JUL
Y 20, 2009 - Pg 3
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NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
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KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS:
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That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, N, on behalf of and as attorney for
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, COLLEEN BlRCH-:MAILE and Pro se, whose address is 380
W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, does hereby release and forever discharge that certain Notice of Us
Pendens, dated March 25, 2008 and recorded on March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598
at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real
property known described as follows:

=.

0

a:
a:

-«

:>-

~

The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

DATED This b y of July, 2009
2009...
(

~.~
,,/11
./11

,Vt"

~.t;
Lct;

.

THOMA 'G.
. O.
E, IV., Attorney for
BERKSHIRE
EST-MENTS, LLC, COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

Jl

On this
day of
July, 2009, before me, theundersigned,a Notary Public for said State,
ofJuly,
personally appeared THO:MAS G. MAILE, IV, known or acknowledged to me to be the attorney for
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS,LLC, COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se and the person w hose
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed said
document.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
sct my and affixed my official seal the day and
year tirst above written.
'-}'-,
~)"-1.-,
~)'
~/.r~f~L=·~~k_~~_d_
. ~~l~/7~i~~~.·~_·~~-_________________
/ /" f,-"t:='~'-="?c_;F-r=-,d_,-<---=l,-,/7,-"i-::~,-,»--,~--,-·
_
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014

RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS -]
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Telephone: 208/938-5584
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANTS'COUNTERCLAIMS

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
BIRTHIdaho Limited Liability Company, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRTH
MAILE, by and through their counsel of record, hereby move for Summary Judgment against
Defendants/Counterclaimants with respect to all of the Counterclaims, pursuant to Rule 56 of the

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1mdJ~f«wmmoryJ"''''''''''
mdJ~f«w","""J"''''''.''''
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is made on the grounds that there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute and Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw with respect to all of the Defendants' Counterclaims.
This motion is based upon the pleadings, files and record herein, the Affidavit of Thomas
G. Maile IV filed in support ofthis Motion, the Statement of Material Facts filed on October 8,
2008 as supplemented in the Memorandum filed in support of this Motion, and the Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment submitted herewith.
Oral Argument is requested.
Dated: March 2,2010.

Christ T. Troupis
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(X)

()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Ch ~ ~i£---C---=

S,
TRO~S,
CHRIST T. TROU
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

_
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

"~~'J.

MAR 03 2010
). DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By P. BOURNE
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.

_

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

The plaintiffs' have filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against all of the
defendants' counterclaims. The defendants assert claims of slander of title, intentional
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.........
interference with a prospective business advantage, and abuse of process.

STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS
The Plaintiffs have previously filed a Statement of Uncontested Facts on October 8, 2008
and the same is incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. Since the Statement of
Uncontested Facts was filed, additional facts have developed that warrant this motion for
summary judgment. Those facts are as follows:
Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs

Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case
Number CV OC 04-056560 entered his Order October 14,2009, affirming that the plaintiffs
have a continued right to assert a vendee's lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to
I.C.45-804. In addition, the plaintiffs filed on November 5,2009, their Verified Motion for
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien (attachments to the Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for
Certification filed December 3, 2009). The foreclosure motion with respect to the real property
titled in the name of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust is currently pending before Judge
Wilper.
In the litigation before Judge Wilper in 2007, the Taylors requested that the court strike

the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be posted during the appeal. On
March 1,2007, Judge Wilper entered his Order denying the Taylors' motion. Pursuant to that
order, the lis pendens was authorized to remain of record, (attachments to Affidavit in Support of
Motion for Certification filed July 13, 2009).
In an effort to obtain reimbursement of the purchase price of $400,000.00 which Judge
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Wilper ordered returned to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs filed a Release of Lis Pendens in this
litigation on July 13,2009. On August 3, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their Vendee's lien, which his
the subject of the pending action before Judge Wilper. The real property is not encumbered other
than lien enforcement to be determined vendee's lien foreclosure before Judge Wilper.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Com.
Corp.
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v.
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984).

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1. The Plaintiffs properly
filed two (2) Lis Pendens relating to litigation.
properlyfiled
Taylors' counterclaims allege that the filing of the Lis Pendens slandered their title to the
real property. However, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a slander of title claim based upon the
recording of a notice of lis pendens coupled with failure to reconvey a deed of trust in
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The Court

noted that" ... the publication of the notice of lis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the
public that the property is involved in litigation."
The counter-claimants' slander oftitle claim is based entirely on the filing of the notice of
lis pendens, and therefore fails as a matter of law to state a viable cause of action. The mere filing
of a notice of lis pendens cannot give rise to any actionable claim against the Plaintiffs.
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Moreover, the lis pendens filing was lawful and proper in this case. The relevant
portion of Idaho Code §5-505, provides:
a(fecting the title or the right ofpossession
of possession
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting
complaint, ... may file for
of real property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint,...
record with the· recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof
is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only
shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against parties designated by their real names. (emphasis added).
The application of this statute to the current litigation is clear. The original litigation
directly concerned the title to the real property. The Court ordered the return of title to the real
property to Taylors, but also ordered that the purchase price be returned to Berkshire, in order to
rescind the transaction. A party seeking to rescind a contract ordinarily must return any
consideration or the benefit received by the rescinding party before the rescission is valid.

Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173,181,45 P.3d 829, 837 (2002).
The Supreme Court made note of the order for repayment of the purchase price to Berkshire in

Taylor v. Maile, 145 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009):
"On June 7, 2006, the court entered judgment on that claim, quieting title to the Linder

Road property in the Trust and dismissing the Mailes' counterclaims and defenses. On
July 21, 2006, the court amended the judgment to clarify that the property is in a
constructive trust, that Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the purchase price, and
that the Mailes' counterclaim for unjust enrichment was the only remaining issue."
Notwithstanding this order, and although title to the real property has been quieted in the
Taylors, they have not returned any portion of the purchase price. On these facts, the Plaintiffs
have established rights to a vendee's lien to secure repayment of the purchase price. Those rights
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have been confirmed by Judge Wilper's order of October 14,2009.
Prior to entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because
the litigation concerned the disputed title to the real property. Following entry of the order
rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because rescission was not fully effected
until the consideration was repaid to Berkshire by Taylors, and by operation oflaw, Berkshire
retained a vendee's lien interest in the real property to secure the return of the consideration.
The lis pendens was properly filed and did not slander the Taylors' title to the real
property. In addition, the filing of a lis pendens did not alter any underlying legal rights to the
real property. Joseph CL. U Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Id. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 1148
(et.
(Ct. App.1990) states:

A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain
real property. See I.e.
ofldaho, N.A., 100
I.C. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho,
Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights."
Since the lis pendens simply gives notice to the world that litigation has been instituted
that may affect the underlying property, its filing cannot give rise to a cause of action for slander
of title, or any other tort claim unless it was filed without legal authority and for an ulterior
purpose.
As noted above, the plaintiffs had legal authority to file a notice of lis pendens, as well as
pursue foreclosure of their vendee's lien. The foreclosure of vendee's lien as with any lien
foreclosure is addressed in I.e.
I.C. § 45-1302, which provides:
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings.
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real properly...
properly...
the plaintiff
... , plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same
plaintiff...,
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cause of action, any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having,
claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any
part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in
addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or
interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect
as in the action to quiet title.
Since July 21, 2006, the Plaintiffs had a statutory right to a vendee's lien securing the
return of the purchase price as ordered by Judge Wilper. The entry of the Order by Judge Wilper
on March 1,2007 confirmed the Plaintiffs right to foreclose their vendee's lien to recover the
purchase price.
A vendee's lien is afforded the same right as any other lien foreclosure referenced in I.C.
§ 45-1302 and treated as a quiet title action. The specific language of the statute provides,
"determine the title, estate, or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same
extent and effect as in the action to quiet title". Determination of a vendee's lien is, according to
the statute, equivalent to a quiet title action.
There can be no dispute that the Plaintiffs lawfully were entitled to record a lis pendens
on their claim for return of the purchase price, as provided in I.C. § 45-1302. The Defendants
have admitted that they have not returned the purchase price, and would not return the purchase
price unless the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their potential right to an appeal (Affidavit of Connie
Taylor dated December 18,2009 filed 12/21109;
12/21/09; Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile,
IV., In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim,
filed concurrently herewith). The July 21, 2006 order cited in Taylor v. Maile,supra, at 1286
stating that "Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the purchase price" does not include any
condition that the Plaintiffs agree to waive or dismiss their appeal rights.
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A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that filing of a lis
pendens was proper until the vendee's lien has been foreclosed. The plaintiffs have consistently
asserted that the right to pursue the foreclosure of their vendee's lien was part and parcel of the
Lis Pendens that was previously filed of record. On July 13,2009, after receipt of the Court's
Memorandum Decision, the plaintiffs released the lis pendens relating to the current matter.
Until the purchase price was returned, pursuant to I.e. § 45-1302, the plaintiffs were entitled to
maintain their lis pendens. Although the plaintiffs could have maintained the lis pendens through
an appeal in the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile),
the plaintiffs voluntarily removed the same.

2. The Counter-Claimants' SlIlnder
or fact.
Slllnder of Title claim has no basis in law orfact.
A notice of lis pendens may be filed by an interested party in any action "affecting the
title to real property." See generally, Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188,677 P.2d SOl
501
(Cl. App.1984), wherein a claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained
(Ct.
by fraud allowed the filing of lis pendens. A constructive trust can be imposed where property
was obtained either fraudulently or through violation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy,
126 Idaho 467, 469,886 P.2d 772,774 (1994); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165,722 P.2d 474

(1986).
A slander of title claim requires proof of four elements:
"( 1) publication of a slanderous statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and (4)
damages...."
resulting special damages
.... " Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Id. 212, 192 P.3d 1036
(2008)
In the present case, the recording of a lis pendens is not actionable as a slander of title
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because there was no slanderous statement, no falsity, no malice, and no resulting special
damages. The counterclaimants have not suffered any special damages because they have not
paid back the purchase price and as a result are not entitled to the removal of the vendee's lien
from the property.
The other required elements for slander of title are also missing. Idaho courts have
defined malice as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. Weaver v. Stafford,
134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000). The 'statement' made by filing a lis pendens is
that the filer is an interested party in an action relating to the title ofthe real property. As noted
above, that 'statement' was and is true. However, even a false statement does not support a
slander of title claim, if the statement was made in good faith with probable cause for believing
it. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). Given the facts in this
case, the Plaintiffs certainly had probable cause to believe they had the right to file a notice of lis
pendens.
Moreover, as the Court declared in Clark v. Clark, 56 Idaho 6, 47 P.2d 914 (1935),
malice cannot be imputed to a lawful act done pursuant to a statutory right.
"It is quite generally held that what a person may lawfully do may be done with or
without malice. (Authorities cited.) In other words, there can be no legal malice in
contemplation of law where the thing done is lawful and the means employed are
lawful. Courts must judge the intent a man has in doing an act by the means he
employs and the thing to be accomplished, and if they all be lawful, courts cannot
impute malicious or unlawful motives to the actor."

In addition, the filing of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged as a filing in a judicial
proceeding. In Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 800, 654 P.2d 888 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed the breadth of immunity accorded statements in judicial proceedings, and with
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approval cited a California case according immunity to the filing of a notice oflis pendens.
"The cases cited usually involved verbal testimony, but the immunity or privilege attaches
to affidavits, as well as pleadings. Sacks v. Stecker, supra; Young v. Young, 18 F.2d 807
of North America,
Am erica, 112 F. 853 (5th Cir.l902).
(D.C.Cir.l927); McGehee v. Insurance Co. ofNorth
The immunity has been held to apply as to virtually any statement in documents which
have been filed in a judicial proceeding. Richeson v. Kessler, supra, (attorney's letter);
A.2d 245 (1964) (declaration in prior suit);
DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A2d
A. 518 (1889) (petition); Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23
Bartlett v. Christhi/f, 69 Md. 219,14 A
A.2d 423 (1974) (letter of complaint); Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F.Supp. 562
Md.App. 628, 329 A2d
(W.D.Ark.1966) (interrogatories); O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 296 So.2d 152 (1974)
(physician's letter); Toddv. Cox, 20 Ariz.App. 347, 512 P.2d 1234 (1973) (affidavit);
Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 46 Cal.2d 375 (1956) (notice oflis pendens);
McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355,461 P.2d 437 (1969) (criminal
information); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954) (affidavit); Resciniti
A.D.2d 557 (1979) (affidavit); Adams v. Peck, 288 Md.
v. Padilla, 420 N.Y.S.2d 759, 72 AD.2d
1, 415 A.2d
A2d 292 (1980) (psychiatric report, not filed in proceeding)"
Other states are in accord with the principle that a notice of lis pendens is subject to a
judicial privilege. See Powell v. Stevens, 449 Mass. 1109,873 N.E.2d 247 (2007); Zamarello v.
Yale, 514 P.2d 228,230-232 (Alaska, 1973); Procacci v. Zacco, 402 So. 2d 425,426-428 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Woodcourt II Ltd. v. McDonald Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 245, 249-251
(1981); Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 117-118 (Miss. 1987); Hauptman

v. Edwards, Inc. 170 Mont. 310, 317 (1976); Lone v. Brown, 199NJ. Super. 420, 427-429
(1985); Superior Constr., Inc. v. Linnerooth, 103 N.M. 716, 719-720 (1986) (majority opinion);

Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63, 66-68 (R.!. 1990); Kropp v. Prather, 526 S.W.2d 283, 286-287

(Tex. Civ. App. (1975); Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976).
None of the essential elements of a slander oftitle claim are present here.
Therefore, summary judgment is proper.

3. There is no valid claim ofAbuse
ofAbuse of Process.
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.........
"The essential elements of abuse of process are: (1)
(I) an ulterior, improper purpose;
and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of
the proceeding. Bird v. Rothman, [128 Ariz. 599] 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz.App.1981)
(Ariz.App.l98 I)
and Bull v. McCuskey, [96 Nev. 706] 615 P.2d 957 (Nev.1980)."
(Nev.l980)."

Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126(1988)
The Court in Badell, supra, upheld the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant on the abuse of process claim, noting:
" ... this court has concluded that the defendant attorney had probable cause for the filing
of the malpractice complaint against Dr. Badell. Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual
issue exists with regard to an ulterior, improper purpose, there is no evidence of
subsequent misuse of process after it was lawfully issued.
issued . ... This court, therefore,
concludes that the defendant attorney is also entitled to summary judgment on the abuse
of process claim." (emphasis added)
As in Badell, the 'process' in our case (the lis pendens) was properly filed in the regular
conduct of the proceeding, instituted with probable cause and there is no evidence of subsequent
misuse of process after it was lawfully issued. Therefore, the counterclaim for abuse of process
cannot be sustained.
The absence of a 'subsequent misuse of process' is fatal to the claim for abuse of process.
This was illustrated in a New York case, Wilderhomes v Zautner, 009-NY-0422.225 (2009 NY
Slip Op 50718), which dealt with the filing of a complaint and lis pendens. That Court noted:

"Here, defendants' claim the "process" plaintiffs allegedly abused consisted of instituting
this action and in filing a lis pendens. The institution of this action, with its summons and
complaint, does not form the basis for an abuse of process claim, as a matter of law...
law ...
Similarly, "even if it is assumed that the filing of a lis pendens can provide a basis for an
abuse of process claim, the critical fact remains that defendants do not assert that the lis
pendens was improperly used after its issuance, but only that plaintiff acted maliciously in
bringing the action." (Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Associates, 136 AD2d 222, 225 [3d
Dept. 1988]). An allegation of maliciousness alone is insufficient to state an abuse of
process claim. Accordingly, defendants' abuse of process claim is dismissed."
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......
Where it is alleged that the process "abused" is the very filing of a lawsuit, it is
incumbent upon the party asserting that claim to show that the other party's claim is "devoid of
factual support or if supportable in fact, has no cognizable basis in law". Yadon v. Lowry, 126
P.3d 332,336 (Colo.App. 2005).
Here, the Plaintiffs claims had factual support and a cognizable basis in law.
Counterclaimants made written admissions regarding their disclaimer to the trust as beneficiaries
(Connie Taylor letter to Bart Harwood on April 14,2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not
willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual
statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If
we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a
copy ofthe trust and estate tax returns".
returns", (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth
Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39). There was also a sworn statement under
oath verifying the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust as beneficiaries ("my mother
trust...Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in
is the beneficiary ofthe trusL.Their
the proceeding." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit
"A"). Testimony under oath verified that the Taylors were longer beneficiaries under the trust

(Verified Petition in the probate court on November 12, 2004...
2004 ... which stated under oath, "the

petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis
of this trust by
ofthe
ofa
the terms of
a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." (Affidavit of Thomas
virtue of
Maile Part Two Exhibit "I").
On March 9, 2006, a Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and prepared
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by the co-defendant attorneys. Page I of the Verified Amended Complaint stated under oath,
"Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident
of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L.
Johnson Trust." (The verified Amended Complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added) .
In addition, and most importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has established "law of the
case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust (Taylor v. Maile 2).
On all of these facts, the Plaintiffs had a factual and legal basis to bring their claims.
Filing of a lis pendens was authorized because the claims affected the real property and included
a specific request for a constructive trust based upon fraud. Constructive trusts are raised by
equity for the purpose of working out right and justice, where there was no intention of the party
to create such a relation, and often directly contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal
title....
title
.... If one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud...
fraud ... Bengoechea, supra.
An action to impress a constructive trust on realty affects title to that property, so that a notice of
lis pendens may be filed. Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 240 Wis.2d 23, 621 N.W.2d
669, 677 (Ct. App.2000).

Plaintiffs sought to set aside the judgment quieting title in the Taylors based upon a fraud
upon a court. The application of that legal theory was upheld in Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho
P.3d
640, 115 P
.3d 731 (2005), in which the Court stated:
"Kildew and Campbell argue that a motion to set aside a judgment is governed by
principles....
equitable principles
.... In seeking equitable relief, the Daltosos were required to
enter the court with clean hands. Daltoso previously entered into arbitration with
con finned by a court
Campbell which resulted in the subdivision of property confinned
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.......
decree. According to Campbell, the Daltosos may not now argue against
application of the very court exception they formerly relied on to their benefit.
The Daltosos are not estopped based on either the doctrine of unclean hands or
quasi-estoppel. The doctrine of unclean hands allows "a court to deny equitable
relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Sword v.
Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251,92 P.3d 492,501 (2004). Motions to set aside a
judgment are governed by equitable principles. See Compton, 101 Idaho at 334,
612 P.2d at 1181."
Since it was based on facts evidencing fraud in obtaining title to real property, there was
no abuse of process in filing a complaint and lis pendens in order to set aside a judgment
affecting that property. Nor was it an abuse of process to record a lis pendens since the plaintiffs
had a legitimate statutory right to pursue their vendee's lien for the return of their purchase price.
All of the elements of a claim for abuse of process are missing and summary judgment is proper.

ofIntentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage.
3. There is no valid claim ofIntentional
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage,
Taylors must show (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the
expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999).

This tort also requires a showing that the interference was wrongful beyond the fact of
interference itself. Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 286,92 P.3d
526, 536 (2004).
A claim of tortious interference is subject to a motion dismiss where the complaint shows
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-,
-the interference was justified or privileged. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C.
216,220,367 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1988). Interference of the contract must be without justification.
The interference is "without justification" if the defendants' motives ... were "not reasonably
related to the protection of a legitimate business interest' of the defendant." A complaint must
admit of no motive for interference other than malice. Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184
N.C. App. 597,601,646 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2007).
The undisputed facts show that the filing of the complaint and the lis pendens were not
wrongful. Judge Wilper ruled that the lis pendens could be maintained during the appeal.
Following the appeal, continuation of the lis pendens was clearly authorized since the Taylors
refused to repay the purchase price to Berkshire in accordance with the court order, but instead
imposed additional conditions on that payment. The Plaintiffs' right to maintain its vendee's lien
has likewise been established. I.C. § 45-1302 authorizes the foreclosure of a lien to the same
status as a quiet title action.
The counterdefendants have not exceeded their legal rights. They are entitled to the
protection of the vendee's lien and have a right to foreclosure on the real property to enforce their
right to reimbursement of the purchase price.

Statutory protection is a defense to any alleged wrongful recording of a notice of claim.
See generally, Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991).
Generally a right which stems from statutory protection is a defense to certain actions. See,

State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996).
generally, Rincover v. Slale,
There has been no conduct on the part of the counter-defendants other than filing the lis
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pendens. For the reasons above outlined, the lis pendens were valid and/or arguably valid based
upon fact and law. The counter-claimants have not alleged wrongful conduct beyond their
allegations relating to the lis pendens. The essential elements of a claim for intentional
interference with prospective business advantage are missing and summary judgment is proper

CONCLUSION
Berkshire has a right to maintain a vendee's lien foreclosure action against the real
property. A vendee's lien is afforded the same analysis as a quiet title action affecting real
property. The counter-claimants had a right to maintain their lis pendens in the current matter
even through an appeal. The continuation of the lis pendens through August 2009 was proper
because Taylors failed to reimburse Berkshire the purchase price after receiving back the
property. The necessary elements relating to all three (3) counts of the counterclaim are missing.
Counterdefendants are therefore entitled to Summary Judgment as to all counterclaims raised by
the defendants in this matter.
DATED this

Z.

day of March, 2010.

/!k2)~

TRo~o-counsel
TRo~o-counsel for

CHRIST T.
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS to be delivered, addressed
as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

( X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

fh?f)fJ __
Ch?VfJ___

CHRIST T.
CHRIST
T. TRO~'YS=,'-----------TRO~
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - Pg 16M_s""'""''''_
...... ,-,-IO_nf
16M_s""'""''''''''''''''......
,-,-lOnf
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T Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

MAR 03 2010

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
Plainti
ffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
TAYLOR,
f/k/a CONNIE
CONNIE WRIGHT T
AYLOR, f/kla
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual;
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho
revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X;
AND ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
DEFENDANTS'
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendants/Counter-claimants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1

001511

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is co-counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV OC
04-00473D. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's
personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters
asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a letter which was received
via facsimile from COllilie
Comlie Taylor dated July 28, 2009 and the same is made part hereof as
if set forth in full herein. Your affiant provided his reply to this letter which is contained
as a part of Exhibit "B" described below

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy ofthe Affidavit of Thomas
Maile filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed September
23, 2009 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein.
DATED this tb day of February, 201 .

----'"""--------"'--\"'--''-----l-------
------~~----~~~-+---------------

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this

U:; day of February, 2010.
U,;

(!//]~~
(!//]~~

for~

~

• I

Notary Public
Residing atb(;',
atb~. ~ ,,Idaho
Idaho
~
My Commission Expires: 1Z,j;:;
IZ,};;; ~--C;()
~7

....,.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 2

001512

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV. In Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim to be delivered, addressed
as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

CHRIST T. TROUPIS,
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
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JUL. 28. 2009 11: 26AM

CLARK

&FEENEY

NO. 228r-p. 1

AllY

LAW

OI"F'le~
OI"F'le~

OF

CLARK AND FEENEY

RON T. SL.EWe;TT
aL.EWe;TT
WILLIAM JE:RE:MY CARR

THE: TRAIN STATION, SUITE 106
loe

CLA~K
PAUL. THOMAS CLA~K
THOMAS W. F'E:E:NE:V
SCOTT O. GALLINA ••
HAL.l..V
,JONATHAN D. HA""'V
Qr. JUNES·
RUBE (;J.
Ke:~NAN ••
TINA L. Ke:~NAN
C. MITCHELL
JO""N e.
COUGLAS L MUSHWTZ
CHARlES M. STROSCHEIN ••
TAYL.OR CONNIE: TIIYL.OFl

Tf:L~F'HDNE;

I ~29 MAIN STREET

"743-95 I 6
(208) "743-9516
1365-951
(800) 1365.951

P.o. CAAWER
P.O.
CFlAWER 285

FAX

LEWISTON. IDAHO e3!501
LEWISTON,
e~!501

e

(209)
(20a)

~74G-e 160
~74G-e

';!law@IElwl~ton .com
';llaw@IElwl~ton

•- UCENSm IN WASHINGTON & O"~DN DNI"V
"W!\SHINGTQN
•• UCENSm IN. 'OAHQ
tOAHQ "WI\SHINGTON

July 28, 2009
Sent Via Facsimile To: (208) 939-1001

Total Pages:

2.
Z

Mr. Thomas Maile
380 West State Street
Eagle,ID 83616
Re:

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor et. al.

Dear Mr. Maile:
The fact that you have recently recorded a release of lis pendens in this matter does not change
property. As long as there is any
the fact that you have filed a quiet title action against the property,
possibility of an appeal of your claim to the Linder Road property, it will remain
unmarketable. Because you have filed a motion for permissive appeal, which will not even be
heard until September 9th, your demand for payment of the purchase price within 21 days is
Judge Wilper's most recent ruling.
ludicrous and flies in the face of JUdge
of the Linder Road property
As a realtor, you undoubtedly understand that the reduction in value ofthe
over the years you have pursued your baseless claims far exceeds the amount of the purchase
price, As the market continues to decline, the damages incurred by the Taylors will increase. In
addition, Judge Greenwood sent a very clear message that he is quite likely to order you to pay
additian,
costs and attorney fees in the present action.
You state that you are unable to settle this matter in full because there are motions pending. The
Yau
only motion pending is your request far
for a permissive appeal, and I am certain you lUlderstand
that the likelihood of the Supreme Court reversing the dismissal of your claims is extremely
remote,
You are the only one who has the ability to put an end to this insanity. The Taylors' offer tn
forth in my letter to you of July 15, 2009 will remain open
resolve this matter completely as set farth
only until August 15, 2009.

Exhibit R
f\
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JUL, 28, 2009 11: 26AM

CLARK

&F~~N~Y AllY

NO, 2284

p, 2

'-'
Mr. Thomas Maile

July 28, 2009
Page 2

Sincerely,
CLARK and FEENEY
Dictated by Ms.
Ms, Taylor and sent
without signature to avoid delay

By: Connie W. Taylor

CWT:tc
cc:

John Taylor w/encs. ~ Via US Mail
Dallan
DaHan Taylor w/encs,
w/encs. - Via US Mail
t')
Mark Prusynski w/encs. Sent Via Facsimile ONLY To: (208) 385~5384
385~5384 Total Pages:-=-=
Pages:-=-=-

The pages comprising this facsimile transmission contain confidential information from the
office of Clark and Feeney. This information is intended solely for use by the individual entity
recipient hereof If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any
named as the recIpient
ofthe
disclosure, copying, distribution or use of
the contents ofthis
ofthis transmission is prohibited. Ifyou
Ifyou
have received this transmission in error) please notify us by telephone immediately so we may
arrange to retrieve this transmission at no cost to you

LA W OFFICES OF'

CLARK AND FEENEY
l.EWISTON, IDAHO 1l;ji501
9:3501
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~
~

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

_.,._-,._....
.-

_.. .....~.....-_._--..._-
'---.-"--k..M.,~~==~ •..o ___...~~I~;~{,!
A.M."'~~==~
~~I}~~{,! ..
,

~

j, r.JAVID
OAVIO NAWU1f+",
NAW\f1f+'·
l':. HCiLrv1E'~,
HCiLrv1E'~,
Bv I':.
oEF:Jrr'
oEP:Jr'r'

Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR ORDER
RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,
v.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE
INVESTMENTS, LLC.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
5S.
)

AFFIDA
VIT OF THOMAS G" MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
AFFIDAVIT
C'Jl3lldybackbackl'serverlfiles\aIMMAILE
ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1 C'Jl3lldybackbackl'serverlfiles\a\MMAILE
: TA YlOR'atf.oppmtnreleasevendeeslien.v.'pd
YlOR\atf.oppmtnreleasevendeeslien.v.'pd

Exhibit B
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THOMAS G. MAILE.,
MAILE, IV, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants and
further appears Pro Se, and provides this Affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Order
Releasing Vendee's Lien. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon
your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of
the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Release ofNotiee of Lis
Pendens in the above captioned matter.

3.

That your affiant caused to be filed Exhibit "A" with the Ada County Recorder's Office
on behalf of Berkshire Investments, LLC. There still remains as outstanding the purchase
price which was fully paid in January 2004.

4.

fi·om
Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of an August 3, 2009 letter fi-om
your affiant to counsel for the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the above referenced
matter.
DATED this

-7 / day of September, 2009.
[

THOMAS G. MA~LE,
MA~LE, IV.,
Attorney for Defenclarits/Counter-Claimants

"7 f

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
day of September, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION
OPPOSIT]ON TO MOTION FOR
ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2 C,handybackbacU\serverifilesl3,M'MAILE
C\handybackbacU\serverifilesI3M·.MAILE
2\TAYLOR
2\TA
YLOR '4ff.oppmtnreleasevendeeslien.wpd
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Mary Sue Chose
NOTAHY PUBLIC
ST,L\TE OF IDAHC
ID,L;HC

t:

r.:
~.

~

t~~'<~'"''\-7''<'''~~",~~''-r~-~
t~~'<~'"',\-7"<'''~~'''~~''-r~-~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires July 30,2014
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/'J

•

I

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this{ day of September, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

(
)
()
(X)
(
)
()
(
)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~//.~)
--~/

(

1/ fP

,ttl
,ttl

~Jl

---'~-=-+--=---->'-.--'-----+-"--------~=--=~~~~~~-----------------

THOMAstfMAILE, ., Pro Se,
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
CbandybackbacklserverifileslalMMAILE
ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 3 Cbandybackbacklserverifiles\a\MMAILE
2',T
AYLOR I,aff,oppmtnreieasevendeeslien.
2',TAYLOR
\,aff,oppmtnreleasevendeeslien. \~l'd
wpd
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EXHIBIT "A"

001519

......,.

=
=
M

RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

f-

z
=>
0
:E

..:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., individually, and on behalf of and as
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that
certain Not~ of Lis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18,2006, as Instrument Number
106078472 at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain
parcel of real propeliy described as The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section
36, Township 5 NOlih, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.

0

a:
a:

....:
:>
....:

:z

DATED This 3rd clay of August, 2009.

THQMA:S/G. MAILE, IV., Individually and as
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada
'W'
'W

)
) ss:
)

On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersi.~,'11ed, a Notary Public for said
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known or acknowledged to me to be the
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company, Colleen Birch-Maile and by
himself.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day

and year first above written.

'--J:L
.'- .-

/1 "
'--]:L"',. /;.,-""
/~"
I I ",:: 1 'L
,. '/1
/~,r .·/.-veL"
,·/.-veL"~L=-~U~!·z~·~~
'L~!~~~~
.l-'--'....'------_------'L=---'-Ll~!·=·-'___·
=-- ________
_
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires July 30,2014
__
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EXHIBIT "B"

001521

'LAW OFFICE OF

-'

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, P.A.
380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616
939-lO00 / Fax (208) 939··1001
(208) 939-1000/
August 3, 2009

BY FACSIMILE TRANSM][SSION
TO (208) 746-9160
Clark and Feeney
Attn: Connie Taylor
1229 Main Street
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Re:

Johnson Trust, Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
Our File No. M04-51
M04-Sl 09.0

Dear Ms. Taylor:
In response to your most recent letter, the following should outline Berkshire Investment's
position relative to the pending litigation. As a preliminary issue, there is no Realtor involved in this
matter. The designation Realtor is a trade name for the National Association ofRealtors,
of Realtors, which none
of the parties are members.
First, in the claim regarding Berkshire Investment v Connie Taylor et. aI., we have filed a
Release of Lis Pendens with the County Recorder's Office which negates any issues regarding
marketability of the real propeliy. As you know, we have continued to assert that Berkshire
Investments has a Vendee's Lien on the subject real property and until the sums are paid that are due
and owing pursuant to the Order entered by Judge Wilper, it is Berkshire Investment's position tbat
the Vendee's Lien is covered by the Lis Pendens earlier filed. However, please note an executed
Release ofLis
of Lis Pendens and an executed Vendee's Lien which have been recorded today. Berkshire
Investments continues to maintain it is entitled to the repayment of the purchase plice minus any
costs. The payment is once again requested in a timely manner. An appropriate Release of the
Vendee's Lien can be exchanged simultaneously with the payment by certified funds.
Regarding the pending motion for an appeal, the claim for quiet title is not germane once
Berkshire Investment has filed the Release of Lis Pendens with the County Recorder's Office.
When the appeal is initiated and when an appellate court reverses the district court's decision
regarding the Berkshire Investments' claims, it is quite conceivable the only remedy available, at that
point in time, will be a suit for damages for the claims asserted by Berkshire Investment. By
releasing the Lis Pendens, Berkshire Investments no longer claims any interest in the real property
pursuant to counts set fort in the amended complaint. By the very nature of the recorded Releases
of Lis Pendens any claims pursued will be for damages. The Vendee Lien remains unsatisfied and

001522

· Page 2
August 3, 2009
Berkshire-J
ohnson trust
Berkshire-Johnson
Berkshire Investments continues to request payment as outlined in this letter.
The twenty-one (21) days requested should be more than sufficient for your client to obtain
what is due and owing Berkshire Investments. As in any real estate transaction and
funds to pay off
offwhat
as previously stated, an appropriate executed release of the vendee's lien will be recorded at such
time a certified check is issued from a closing company, mortgage company and/or from your client.
Finally, the Judgment that was entered awarding costs in the favor of Thomas Maile Real
Estate Company L.L.c., was for the amount of $932.75. The Judgment was entered October 3,
2005. Consequently, this amount, including interest should be used as an offset to any costs
outstanding and/or can be paid directly. I would appreciate your reply indicating when payment can
be received.

.......,

'

TGM/mp
enclosures
cc: Mark S. Prusynki/enclosures via fax (385-5384)
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ORIGINAL
APR 7. 7 20m
,to

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
and the Theodore Johnson Trust

C'.'-\\'!D
J~'

~~;,~\\fj\iiF1U,

E.

(;;C:':,

l-jGLi't~~:~.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 07 23232

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RlGHT
RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

AFFIDA VlT OF MARK PRUSYNSKI IN
AFFIDAVlT
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

AFFIDA VIT OF MARK PRUSYNSKI
AFFIDAVIT

{

001527

MARK PRUSYNSKI, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I was attorney for Defendants, Connie Taylor, Paul Thomas Clark, and Clark and Feeney.
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit "A" a true and correct copy of Moffatt Thomas' billing
statement for services provided to these Defendants in defense of this matter.
DATED this

L ~ay of April, 2010.

Mark Plpsynski
SUBSCRIBED AND S WORN to before me this

AFFIDA
VIT OF MARK PRUSYNSKI
AFFIDAVIT

~

of April, 2010.

2
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al

Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

4/25/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with G. Schmidt regarding
answer to complaint;

4/25/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence from insured regarding notice of
appearance;

4/25/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review complaint;

4/25/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding appearance;

4/28/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding substitution of attorney;

4/29/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Telephone conference with Christine Miller
regarding defense strategy;

4/29/2008 MSP

1.50

247.50 Analyze amended complaint;

4/29/2008 MSP

1.20

198.00 Research regarding previous case against same
parties;

4/29/2008 MSP

0.90

148.50 Telephone conference with Connie Taylor
regarding facts;

4/29/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review brief from insured;

4/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Prepare Notice of Appearance;

4/30/2008 MSP

1.50

4/30/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review retention letter;

4/30/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding
disqualification;

4/30/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding
disqualification;

4/30/2008 MSP

0040

66.00 Begin preparation of answer to complaint;

4/30/2008 MSP

0.80

5/2/2008 MSP

0.30

247.50 Receive and review amended complaint with
exhibits;

132.00 Research regarding corporate status of
Berkshire;
49.50 Prepare notice of substitution of counsel;

I
Exhibit A

Client:1611301.1
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al

Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

5/2/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Letters to clients regarding notice of
substitution of counsel;

5/2/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review response to correspondence
regarding notice of substitution of counsel;

5/2/2008 MSP

lAO

231.00 Analyze appeal brief to determine basis for
possible motion to dismiss;

5/2/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to co-counsel regarding
substitution;

5/6/2008 MSP

1.20

5/6/2008 MSP

0.50

5/612008 MSP

0.80

5/6/2008 MSP

0.50

5/712008 MSP
51712008

1.00

5/7/2008
517
/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding Supreme
Court brief and possible motion to dismiss;

5/7/2008
517
/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of substitution;

5/7/2008
517
/2008 MSP

0040

66.00 Telephone conference with insured regarding
motion to dismiss;

5/8/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Initial conference with claims handling
regarding case management;

5/8/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of intent to take
default;

5/8/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Telephone conference with insured regarding
notice of intent to take default and response
to motion to dismiss;

5/8/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to insured regarding
substitution of counsel;

198.00 Research waiver of defenses of other action
pending;
82.50 Draft affirmative defenses;
132.00 Continue analysis of complaint
comp laint and comparison
to pending case;
82.50 Research racketeering statutes cited in
complaint;
165.00 Receive and review Supreme Court brief;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
297.00 Draft answer;

5/8/2008 MSP

1.80

5/8/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Finalize substitution of counsel;

5/912008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Finalize answer;

5/9/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding filing
answer;

5/9/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding notice of substitution and answer;

5/13/2008 MSP

OAO
0040

66.00 Receive and review co-defendant's motion to
dismiss, affidavit and exhibits;

5113/2008 MSP
5/13/2008

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding
co-defendant's motion to dismiss;

5/13/2008 MSP

1.50

5/13/2008
5113/2008 MSP

0040
OAO

5113/2008 MSP
5/13/2008

0.70

5114/2008 MSP
5/14/2008

0.20

33.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion to
strike;

5114/2008 MSP
5/14/2008

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding possible recusal of judge;

5114/2008 MSP
5/14/2008

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding possible
recusal of judge and motion to dismiss;

5/2112008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review amended affidavit and
exhibits;

5/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Telephone conference with Zurich regarding case
management plan;

6112/2008
6/12/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Prepare case management plan;

6/24/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Conference with client regarding strategy for
status conference;

247.50 Research regarding dismissal of parties if
identical action;
66.00 Prepare motion to dismiss;
115.50 List claims decided by summary judgment to
compare to complaint;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

6/24/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Attend Court's status conference;

6/24/2008 MSP

0.40

66.00 Analyze pleadings to prepare for status
conference;

6/25/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding case
management plan;

6/25/2008 MSP

2.80

6/25/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Prepare budget;

6/26/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Finalize case management plan and budget;

7/24/2008 MSP

1.20

198.00 Receive and review discovery request from
plaintiff;

7/24/2008 MSP

1.00

165.00 Receive and review earlier deposition
transcript of Helen Taylor;

7/25/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to insured regarding preparing
discovery responses;

7/28/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Prepare responses to requests for admissions;

7/28/2008 MSP

1.50

247.50 Analyze pleadings from prior case to prepare
responses to requests for admissions;

7129/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Continue preparation of responses to Requests
for Admissions;

7/29/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence from insured regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

7/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding deposition (duplicate?);

7/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding deposition
of Helen Taylor;

7/30/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding depositions;

7/30/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding depositions;

7/3112008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence from client regarding responses

462.00 Prepare case management plan;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
to requests for admissions;
165.00 Continue analysis of pleadings from prior case
16S.00
to determine grounds for dismissal;

7/3 112008 MSP

1.00

8/4/2008 MSP

0.10

16.S0 Receive and review correspondence from client
16.50
regarding deposition;

8/4/2008 MSP

0.30

49.S0
49.50 Correspondence to client regarding deadlines
for requests for admissions and documents from
first case;

8/4/2008 MSP

0.10

16.S0 Correspondence to client regarding deposition;
16.50

8/4/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50
16.S0 Correspondence from client regarding documents;

8/4/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review pleading index from first
case;

8/4/2008 MSP

0.10

16.S0
16.50 Correspondence from client regarding discovery
from plaintiff;

8/4/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to clients regarding discovery
49.S0
from plaintiff's counsel;

8/S12008 MSP
8/5/2008

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding pleading
index and key documents;

8/S12008 MSP
8/5/2008

0.60

99.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of
Doug Crandall;

8/6/2008 MSP

0.80

132.00 Receive and review Tom Maile's deposition
transcript;

8/6/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
16.S0
regarding additional depositions;

8/6/2008 MSP

0.10

16.S0
16.50 Correspondence to client regarding additional
depositions to be taken;

81712008 MSP

0.70

I S.SO Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
I 15.50
Hardwood;

81712008 MSP

2.20

363.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
Rogers;

S
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

8/7/2008 MSP

1.50

247.50 Receive and review deposition transcript of8.
Knipe;

8/7/2008 MSP

0.80

132.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of S.
Sherer;

8/7
/2008 MSP
8/7/2008

0.30

49.50 Receive and review volume 2 of deposition
transcript ofT. Maile;

8/8/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review deposition transcript ofD.
Wishney;

8/8/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review deposition of S. Johnson;

8/8/2008 MSP

0.70

115.50 Receive and review deposition transcript of I.
Hetherington;

8/11/2008 MSP
8111/2008

0.30

49.50 Continue preparation of responses to requests
for admissions;

8112/2008
8/12/2008 MSP

2.50

412.50 Continue analysis of two volumes of deposition
transcripts ofT. Maile;

8/12/2008 MSP
8112/2008

OAO
0040

66.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of H.
Fisher;

8114/2008
8/14/2008 MSP

1.50

8/14/2008 MSP

0.20

8/21/2008 MSP

lAO

8/2112008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Telephone conference with C. Taylor regarding
discovery responses;

8/21/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review draft responses;

8/22/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Finalize discovery responses;

8/22/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Letters to client regarding approving and
signing discovery responses;

8/25/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding

247.50 Prepare responses to requests for admissions
and answers to interrogatories;
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding responses to
requests for admissions and answers to
interrogatories;
231.00 Continue preparation of discovery responses;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
Helen Taylor's deposition;

8/26/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding rescheduling
deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/2712008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Letters to client regarding Helen Taylor's
deposition;

8/27
12008 MSP
8/27/2008

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding deposition
of Helen Taylor;

9/2/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review amended notice and subpoena
for Helen Taylor;

9/2/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding amended
notice and subpoena for Helen Taylor;

9/2/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review responses from client
regarding amended notice and subpoena for Helen
Taylor;

9/8/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;

9116/2008
9/16/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding objections to
discovery and motion to compel;

9117/2008
9/17/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs
threat of motion to compel;

9117/2008
9/17/2008 MSP

2.50

412.50 Research regarding exceptions to
attorney-client privilege to defend objections
to discovery;

9/18/2008 AJS
9118/2008

0.30

39.00 Conference to discuss research assignment
regarding attorney as attesting witness and
possible waiver of attorney-client privilege;

9118/2008
9/18/2008 MSP

1.50

247.50 Continue research regarding plaintiffs claims

7

Client:l611301.1

001535

17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et a]

Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
of an exception to attorney-client privilege;

9/22/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding discovery responses;

9/22/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with plaintiff regarding
discovery responses;

9/22/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
discovery responses;

9/22/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding
res judicata;

9/22/2008 MSP

OAO
0040

66.00 Research regarding res judicata;

9/22/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding res
judicata;

9/22/2008 AJS

0.20

26.00 Research the rules of evidence with regard to
the attorney-as-witness exception to the
attorney-client privilege;

9/22/2008 AJS

0.20

26.00 Review letter correspondence from opposing
counsel asserting attorney-as-witness as waiver
of the attorney-client privilege;

9/23/2008 AJS

2.20

286.00 Continue to research state law from multiple
jurisdictions regarding scope and application
of attorney as attesting witness exception to
the attorney-client privilege;

9/23/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Research regarding attorney-client privilege;

9/24/2008 MSP

OAO
0040

66.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
plaintiffs threat of motion to compel;

9/24/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review brief in support of motion
for summary judgment;

9/26/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
motion to compel;

9/26/2008 MSP

OAO
0040

66.00 Continue analysis of co-defendant's brief on
res judicata;

8

Client: 161130 1.1

001536

17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al

Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

9/26/2008 MSP

0.50

9/26/2008 AJS

1.90

247.00 Continue to research state and federal law
regarding scope and application of attorney as
attesting witness exception to the
attorney-client privilege;

9/29/2008 AJS

1.10

143.00 Research state and federal law regarding fraud
as exception to attorney-client privilege in
preparation for drafting motion for summary
judgment;

9/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding
deposition;

9/30/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding deposition
and motion for protective order;

9/30/2008 AJS

1.80

234.00 Research state and federal law regarding issue
of res judicata, particularly with regard to
privies of party to prior suit, in preparation
for drafting motion for summary judgment;

9/30/2008 AJS

OAO
0.40

52.00 Review complaints as necessary to direct
research regarding issue of res judicata;

9/30/2008 AJS

0.30

39.00 Continue to research state and federal case law
regarding crime-fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege;

1011
10/1 12008
/2008 AJS

0.50

65.00 Continue to research Idaho and Ninth Circuit
law regarding crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege;

10/1/2008 AJS

1.30

169.00 Continue research regarding application of res
judicata, specifically with regard to parties
and their privies;

101
12008 AJS
10/ II/2008

0.20

26.00 Review co-defendants' summary judgment
memorandum in preparation for drafting own
summary judgment motion and memorandum;

1011/2008
10/1/2008 MSP

2.00

1011
10/1 12008
/2008 MSP

0.40

82.50 Research regarding res judicata;

330.00 Analyze first Helen Taylor deposition to
prepare for second deposition;
66.00 Review letters from client regarding deposition
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
of Helen Taylor and possible conflict;

101112008 MSP

1.20

198.00 Receive and review motion for summary judgment,
affidavit and brief from co-defendants;

1011/2008 MSP

0.80

132.00 Research regarding res judicata issues for
summary judgment;

10/2/2008 MSP

0040

66.00
66,00 Continue preparation of brief in support of
motion for summary judgment;

10/2/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Analyze complaint and decisions in prior case
to prepare motion for summary judgment;

10/2/2008 MSP

0040

66.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

10/2/2008 MSP

2.20

363.00 Continue analysis of prior deposition to
prepare for deposition of Helen Taylor;

10/2/2008 AJS

lAO

182.00 Continue to review plaintiffs complaint in
preparation for drafting memorandum in support
of motion for summary judgment;

10/2/2008 AJS

0040

10/2/2008 AJS

lAO

182.00 Review pleadings regarding prior summary
judgment proceedings in this matter;

10/2/2008 AJS

0.80

104.00 Continue research of case law regarding
attorney as in privity with client for purposes
of res judicata;

10/3/2008 AJS

0.80

104.00 Outline memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment;

10/3/2008 AJS

0.30

39.00 Review case law research and case file as
necessary to complete memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment;

10/3/2008 AJS

0,30
0.30

39.00 Review case law research and case file as
necessary to complete outline memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment;

52,00 Review Idaho Supreme Court case Taylor v. Maile
52.00
to further develop case understanding and
strategy in preparation for drafting memorandum
in support of summary judgment;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

10/3/2008 AJS

2.10

10/3/2008 MSP

0.40

66.00 Conference with client regarding Helen Taylor
deposition;

10/3/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Conference with Helen and DaHan Taylor
regarding deposition;

10/3/2008 MSP

2.60

10/3/2008 MSP

0.30

1015/2008 AJS

2.50

325.00 Continue to draft memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment in preparation for
review by supervising attorney;

10/6/2008 AJS

2.60

338.00 Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion
for summary judgment;

10/6/2008 AJS

0.30

39.00 Review complaint for additional facts relating
to plaintiffs' claims as necessary to complete
revisions to memorandum in support of summary
judgment;

10/6/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Revise brief in support of motion for summary
judgment;

10/612008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review amended motion for
appointment of trustees;

1017/2008 MSP

0.90

101712008 AJS

0.50

101712008 AJS

2.90

273.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment;

429.00 Attend deposition of Helen Taylor;
49.50 Conference with client regarding motion for
summary judgment and analysis of plaintiffs
strategy;

148.50 Receive and review redraft of brief in support
of motion for summary judgment;
65.00 Continue to review plaintiffs' complaint as
necessary to complete revisions to memorandum
in support of motion for summary judgment;
377.00 Continue to revise and edit memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment to
include additional references to plaintiffs'
complaint and revise and edit generally;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description

10/8/2008 MSP

3.30

544.50 Revise motion for summary judgment;

10/8/2008 MSP

0.70

115.50 Analyze brief filed by co-defendants;

10/8/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Research regarding dismissal while other action
is on appeal for brief;

10/8/2008 MSP

0.40

66.00 Analyze claims made in complaint for brief;

1019/2008
10/9/2008 MSP

1.20

198.00 Finalize brief and motion for summary judgment;

1019/2008
10/9/2008 MSP

1.50

247.50 Receive and review plaintiffs response to
motion to dismiss with affidavits and exhibits;

1019/2008
10/9/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding briefing in
previous case;

10110/2008
10/10/2008 MSP

3.30

544.50 Receive and review reply brief in opposition to
motion for summary judgment, supplemental memo
regarding motion for summary judgment and brief
in support of motion to reconsider;

10/10/2008 AJS

1.40

182.00 Research and review case law from state and
federal jurisdictions and secondary sources
regarding dismissal of fraud-based claims by
doctrine of res judicata in preparation for
drafting reply brief in support of motion for
summary judgment;

10/14/2008 AJS

0.30

39.00 Continue to research and review case law
discussing application of res judicata to fraud
based claims derived from prior litigation in
preparation for drafting reply brief in support
of motion for summary judgment;

10/20/2008 AJS

0.90

117.00 Research Idaho and other jurisdiction case law
regarding application of res judicata to
independent actions based on fraud in
preparation for drafting reply memorandum in
support of summary judgment;

10/20/2008 MSP

1.00

165.00 Receive and review motion to compel, brief and
affidavit;

10/20/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Letters to clients regarding motion to compel,
brief and affidavit;
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Initials

Hours

Amount Description

10/20/2008 MSP

0.20

10/22/2008 MSP

1.20

198.00 Analyze plaintiffs
plaintiff's brief in support of motion
to compel;

10/22/2008 MSP

0040

66.00 Conference with client regarding plaintiff's
plaintiffs
brief in support of motion to compel;

10/22/2008 MSP

2.40

396.00 Research regarding attorney-client privilege
and exceptions for fraud claim;

10/23/2008 MSP

3.50

577.50 Research regarding elements offraud for motion
for summary judgment
jUdgment and motion to compel;

10/23/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding plaintiff's
plaintiffs
arguments on motion to compel;

10/23/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Outline issues for objection to motion to
compel;

10/23/2008 MSP

1.30

10/23/2008 AJS

0.20

10/23/2008 AJS

1.10

10/23/2008 AJS

0.40

52.00 Review plaintiffs' summary judgment and motion
to compel briefing in preparation for
responding to same;

10/23/2008 AJS

0.30

39.00 Review secondary sources regarding crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege;

10/24/2008 AJS

1.70

33.00 Receive and review motion to continue motion
for summary judgment;

214.50 Review plaintiffs
plaintiff's brief regarding motion for
summary judgment;
26.00 Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to
determine when response to motion to compel
and/or motion for continuance due;
143.00 Research Idaho and Ninth Circuit case law
regarding crimelfraud exception to
attorney-client privilege in preparation for
responding to opposing counsel's motion to
compel and/or in support of our motion for
summary judgment;

221.00 Continue to research state and federal case law
on issue of whether allegation regarding status
as beneficiary is a legal conclusion and not a
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
material fact for purposes of evaluating
plaintiffs' fraud claim;

10/24/2008 AJS

0.20

26.00 Review correspondence from client regarding
prior probate proceedings and statements made
regarding the status of beneficiaries;

10/24/2008 AJS

0.60

78.00 Research state and federal case law regarding
the reliance element of fraud with respect to
an attorney's potential reliance on statements
made by opposing counsel;

10/24/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Review correspondence from client regarding
amended pleadings;

10/24/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Review amended petition for appointment of
beneficiary;

10/24/2008 MSP

1.50

10/27/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to plaintiffs attorney
regarding vacating hearings;

10/27/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding vacating
hearings;

10/27/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Review correspondence from client regarding
vacating hearings;

10/27/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding motion to
compel and vacating hearing regarding motions
for summary judgment;

247.50 Outline issues for response to plaintiffs
motion to compel and reply brief regarding
motion for summary judgment;

10/2712008 MSP

0.40

66.00 Outline brief regarding motion to compel;

10/27/2008 AJS

0.20

26.00 Analyze issues regarding content of plaintiffs'
motion to compel briefing response brief;

10/27/2008 AJS

0.70

91.00 Review plaintiffs' motion to compel briefing in
preparation for drafting response brief;

10/28/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Review correspondence from plaintiffs attorney
regarding postponing hearings;
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Initials

Hours

Amount Description

10/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notices of vacating motion
for summary judgment hearing;

10/29/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Prepare notice to vacate our motion for summary
judgment hearing;

10/29/2008
10129/2008 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of vacating motion to
compel hearing;

11/6/2008
11/612008 MSP

0040

66.00 Receive and review research regarding response
to motion to compel;

11118/2008
Il118/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Conference with client regarding postponement
of hearing on motion for summary judgment;

IlI1812008 MSP
11118/2008

0.30

49.50 Analyze pleadings regarding correction to case
management plan;

I 1/2 \12008 MSP
11/2112008

0.80

1211/2008
12/1/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding motion for summary judgment;

12/1/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding motion for
summary judgment;

12/1/2008 MSP

2.80

462.00 Research cases on res judicata for motion for
summary judgment;

12/2/2008 MSP

2.30

379.50 Continue research regarding fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege and elements of fraud
claim;

12/2/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Continue research regarding res judicata;

12/3/2008 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding motion for
summary judgment and motion to compel;

12/4/2008 MSP

1.80

297.00 Analyze plaintiff's
plaintiffs brief in opposition to
motion for summary judgment;

12/5/2008 MSP

1.60

264.00 Continue analysis of briefs on motion to compel
and motion for summary judgment;

12/8/2008 MSP

0.80

132.00 Continue research regarding motion for summary

132.00 Conference with client regarding outcome of
Idaho Supreme Court argument;
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount Description
judgment;

12/15/2008 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
motion for summary judgment;

12/24/2008 MSP

1.00

165.00 Receive and review recent decision on standing
to sue lawyers;

12/24/2008 MSP

0.50

82.50 Research regarding recent decision on standing
to sue lawyers;

12/24/2008 MSP

0.60

99.00 Letters to client regarding results of research
regarding standing to sue lawyers;

112/2009
1/2/2009 MSP

0.90

148.50 Research regarding allegations of fraud on
court as defense to res judicata claim;

118/2009
1/8/2009 MSP

2.20

363.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion for stay,
affidavit, exhibits and supplemental
memorandum;

1/8/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding response to
motion for stay;

1/8/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review response regarding motion to
stay;

1/12/2009 MSP
1112/2009

0.10

16.50 Correspondence from client regarding motion to
stay;

1/12/2009 MSP
1112/2009

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
motion to stay;

1/14/2009 MSP
1114/2009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
motion to stay;

1/ 19/2009 MSP
1119/2009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding motion to stay;

1/19/2009 MSP
1119/2009

0.30

49.50 Prepare notice of non-opposition to motion for
stay;

2/2/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review Supreme Court opinion in
v, Maile;
Taylor v.

2/3/2009 MSP

0040

66.00 Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision;
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Hours

Amount Description

2/3/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
Supreme Court decision;

2/3/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding summary
judgment strategy;

2/3/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review response from client
regarding summary judgment strategy;

2/5/2009 MSP

2.20

363.00 Analyze prior motion for summary judgment
briefing and pleadings regarding motion to lift
stay and obtain hearing on motion for summary
judgment;

2/5/2009 MSP

0.40

66.00 Correspondence to client regarding strategy for
summary judgment motion;

2/5/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review response from client
regarding strategy for summary judgment motion;

2/6/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review affidavit ofC. Taylor
regarding recent case in support of summary
judgment motion;

2/1
211 0/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review letters from client
regarding possible dismissal;

2/1
211 0/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding possible
dismissal;

2/13/2009
2113/2009 MSP

0.90

148.50 Receive and review supplemental memorandum
regarding Supreme Court Opinion;

2/13/2009
2113/2009 MSP

2.70

445.50 Receive and review affidavit in support of
supplemental memo and attachments to motion for
summary judgment;

2/17/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on motion for summary
judgment and counterclaim;

2/1812009
211812009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review answers and counterclaim;

2/18/2009
2118/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding
counterclaim;
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Amount Description

212312009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on motion for summary
judgment;

2/2312009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding hearing on
motion for summary judgment;

3/2/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Telephone conference with client regarding
counterclaim;

3/3/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding
counterclaim and answer to complaint;

3/3/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence from insured regarding
counterclaim and amending answer;

3/5/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding answer to
complaint;

3/5/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review plaintiffs reply to amended
answer and counterclaim;

3/6/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review counterclaim;

3/11/2009
311112009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Finalize amended complaint;

3/18/2009 MSP

1.80

3/18/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding response to
motion for partial summary judgment;

3118/2009
3/18/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on summary judgment motions;

3118/2009
3/18/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding hearings on
summary judgment motions;

4/2/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding response
brief;

4/8/2009 LCH

0.60

99.00 Review pleadings regarding joinder to objection
to summary judgment;

4/13/2009
4113/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client

297.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, brief and affidavit;
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Initials

Hours

Amount Description
regarding reply briefs;

4/13/2009 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review defendants' reply brief;

4/1312009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief
regarding counterclaim;

4/14/2009 MSP
4114/2009

0.70

4/14/2009 MSP
4114/2009

0.50

4114/2009
4/14/2009 MSP

lAO

231.00 Review plaintiffs' two other supplemental
briefs, five affidavits and brief in opposition
to summary judgment motion to prepare our reply
brief;

4/14/2009 MSP
4114/2009

1.00

165.00 Research regarding res judicata for our reply
brief;

4114/2009
4/14/2009 MSP

1.80

297.00 Draft reply brief in support of summary
judgment motion;

4115/2009
4/15/2009 MSP

lAO

231.00 Revise and finalize reply brief in support of
summary judgment motion;

4115/2009
4/15/2009 MSP

0.50

82.50 Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief and
motion to strike regarding counterclaim;

4115/2009
4/15/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for handling and argument on summary judgment
motion;

4/1612009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding strategy for hearing;

4/17/2009 MSP
4117/2009

1.60

264.00 Prepare argument for summary judgment motion
hearing;

4/20/2009 MSP

1.50

247.50 Analyze pleadings from prior case to locate
statements to be used as res judicata for
summary judgment motion;

4/20/2009 MSP

2.80

462.00 Analyze plaintiffs' motion to compel and brief;

115.50 Receive and review plaintiffs' supplemental
reply brief regarding summary judgment motion;
82.50 Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief
regarding counterclaim;
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Initials

Hours

Amount Description

4/20/2009 MSP

1.20

198.00 Draft response brief to motion to compel;

4/2112009 MSP

5.20

858.00 Analyze trial transcript filed by plaintiffs
and Supreme Court brief to identify issues
previously litigated;

4/21/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding strategy for
hearing;

4/22/2009 MSP

3.20

528.00 Analyze Supreme Court briefs to obtain proof of
claims barred by res judicata;

4/22/2009 MSP

1.50

247.50 Continue preparation for argument of three
motions for summary judgment;

4/22/2009 MSP

2.30

379.50 Attend hearing on motions for summary judgment
and motion to compel;

4/22/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Conference with client regarding hearing on
motions for summary judgment;

4/29/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding hearings on
motions for summary judgment;

4/29/2009 MSP

1.50

247.50 Research cases cited by plaintiffs at the
hearings on motions for summary judgment;

5/112009 MSP

2.30

379.50 Attend hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss
counterclaim;

5119/2009
5/19/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review Judge Wilper's order denying
of judgment and interest;
payment ofjudgment

611/2009
6/1/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding decision on motion for summary
judgment;

6/1/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding decision on
motion for summary judgment;

6/112009 MSP

0.50

82.50 Research regarding case alleging fraud on the
court;

71712009
7/7/2009 MSP

0.80

132.00 Receive and review memorandum decision on
summary judgment;
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71712009
7/7/2009 MSP

0.30

49.S0
49.50 Letters to clients regarding memorandum
decision received regarding summary judgment;

71712009
7/7/2009 MSP

0.70

7/8/2009 MSP

0.10

16.S0
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding the Court's memorandum decision on
our motion for summary judgment;

7/9/2009 MSP

0.30

49.S0
49.50 Receive and review settlement offer and
of judgment;
proposed satisfaction ofjudgment;

7/13/2009 MSP

0.10

16.S0
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement;

7113/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding settlement
amount;

7113/2009
7/13/2009 MSP

0.10

16.S0
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement and Bar complaint against
Maile.

7114/2009 MSP
711412009

1.20

7114/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs'
motion for permissive appeal and certified
order as final;

7/14/2009 MSP
7114/2009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
16.S0
regarding settlement;

7114/2009 MSP
711412009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
16.S0
to plaintiff regarding settlement;

7115/2009 MSP
7I1S12009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review proposed judgment and order;
16.S0

7115/2009 MSP
7I1S12009

0.90

7/1512009 MSP
7/1S12009

0.20

IIS.S0 Analyze issues regarding certifying decision as
115.50
final and dismissal of counterclaim;

198.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion to
certify order as final and for permissive
appeal, affidavit and brief in support of
motion;

148.50 Telephone conference with insured regarding
148.S0
costs and fees, permissive appeal and strategy
for response to motion for permissive appeal;
33.00 Receive and review notice of scheduling
conference;
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Hours
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7115/2009
7/15/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for response to motion for pennissive appeal;

7116/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of hearing on motion
for pennissive appeal;

7/16/2009 MSP

1.20

711612009
7/16/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding request for
costs;

7116/2009
7/16/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement offer;

7/21/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiff's counsel regarding settlement;

7/21/2009 MSP
7/2112009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review supplemental affidavit
regarding certification for appeal;

7/22/2009 MSP

0.40

66.00 Receive and review plaintiff's first and second
set of discovery to Connie Taylor;

7/24/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding discovery
responses;

7/27/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding discovery responses;

7/28/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding settlement;

8/3/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
co-counsel to plaintiff's counsel regarding
proposed litigation plan;

8/3/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review amended motion for
certification for appeal;

0.20

33.00 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiff's counsel regarding lis pendens;

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of lien;

8/3/2009 MSP

8/3/2009 MSP

,

198.00 Research regarding which costs should be
requested after partial summary judgment;
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8/5/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding litigation strategy;

8/5/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding
certification for appeal and withdrawal from
case;

8/5/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence from client regarding
certification for appeal and withdrawal from
case;

8/5/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client responding to client's
response regarding certification for appeal;

8/12/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review second supplemental
affidavit regarding permissive appeal;

8114/2009 MSP
8/14/2009

0.30

49.50 Attend status conference with Judge,
plaintiffs counsel and counsel for
co-defendant;

8/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding permissive appeal;

8/17/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding permissive
appeal;

8/2112009 MSP
8/21/2009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
certificate for appeal;

8/2112009 MSP
8/21/2009

0.10

16.50 Receive and review order governing proceedings;

8/28/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review discovery responses to
plaintiff;

8/31/2009
8/3112009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review responses to plaintiffs
discovery regarding counterclaim;

9/4/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiff regarding non-opposition to motion to
certify;

9/4/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to plaintiff regarding our
position concerning his motion to certify;

9/9/2009 MSP

0.60

99.00 Analyze pleadings regarding motion to certify
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appeal;

9/9/2009 MSP

1.30

214.50 Attend hearing on motion to certify appeal;

9/9/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding appeal;

9115/2009
9/15/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review proposed order certifying
appeal;

9116/2009
9/16/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Conference with client regarding proposed order
granting motion to appeal;

1011/2009
10/1/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review signed order authorizing
appeal;

101112009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding authorizing
appeal;

10/2/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Research regarding new Idaho Supreme Court
decision on res judicata;

10/2/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding new Idaho
Supreme Court decision on res judicata;

10/5/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding interlocutory appeal;

10/512009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding
interlocutory appeal;

10/6/2009 MSP

1.20

10/6/2009 MSP

0.50

82.50 Research regarding applicable appellate rules;

10/6/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiff's
plaintiffs
brief regarding permissive appeal and
applicable rules;

10/9/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
appeal;

10/9/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice from court regarding
handling of permissive appeal;

198.00 receive and review plaintiff's
plaintiffs motion for
permissive appeal with brief and affidavit
attaching relevant pleadings;
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11110/2009
11/10/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review order denying pennissive
appeal;

11110/2009
11/10/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding order
denying pennissive appeal;

1111112009
11/11/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding withdrawing;

11111/2009
11/11/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding probable
date of final judgment;

11116/2009
11/16/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review offer ofjudgment;
of judgment;

11117/2009
11/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review scheduling order;

11117/2009
11/17/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to client regarding stipulation
to withdraw or substitute counsel;

11/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review response from client
regarding stipulation to withdraw or substitute
counsel;

1111712009
11/17/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Draft notice of substitution of counsel;

12/3/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review motion to reconsider;

12/3/2009 MSP

0.40

66.00 Letters to insured regarding renewed motion to
reconsider;

12117/2009
12/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of appearance of
counsel;

12117/2009
12/17/2009 MSP

0.30

49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding request for
reconsideration, scheduling conference and
withdrawal;

12/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of scheduling
conference;

12117/2009
12/17/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs' counsel regarding new attorney;

12/21/2009 MSP

0.40

66.00 Receive and review objection to renewed motion
to certify with affidavit;
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12/22/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding court's scheduling conference;

12/22/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Analyze court's scheduling order;

12/22/2009 MSP
12/2212009

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to co-defendant regarding
court's scheduling order;

12/22/2009 MSP
12/2212009

0.30

49.50 Receive and review proposed stipulation
regarding scheduling order;

12/22/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review letters from insured
regarding proposed stipulation regarding
scheduling order;

12/23/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding scheduling stipulation;

12/28/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding revised stipulation;

12/29/2009 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding stipulation
for trial;

12/29/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for
trial;

12/30/2009 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for
scheduling and correspondence from other
counsel regarding vacating scheduling
conference;

1/5/2010
11512010 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding status
conference and hearing on second motion to
certify for appeal;

1/6/2010 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review court's scheduling order;

1/6/2010 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding court's
scheduling order;

11712010 MSP

0.30

49.50 Receive and review brief in support of renewed
motion to certify for appeal;

11712010 MSP

0.20

33.00 Receive and review supplemental affidavit
regarding renewed motion to certify for appeal;
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1112/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding response to renewed motion to certify
for appeal;

1112/2010 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to client regarding renewed
motion to certify for appeal;

1112/2010
1/12/2010 MSP

1.00

165.00 Analyze prior pleadings and orders to prepare
for hearing on renewed motion to certify for
appeal;

1112/2010
1/12/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review motion to disqualify judge;

1/25/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from counsel
for co-defendant regarding attending hearing by
telephone;

1/2712010
1/27/2010 MSP

0.50

82.50 Review pleadings on renewed motion to certify
case for appeal;

1/27/2010 MSP

0.30

49.50 Telephone conference with client regarding
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;

1/27/2010 MSP

1.00

165.00 Attend hearing on motion to certify case for
appeal;

1/27/2010
112712010 MSP

0.50

82.50 Letters to clients regarding status following
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;

1/27/2010 MSP
1/2712010

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to Zurich regarding denial of
motion, substitution of counsel and settlement;

2/12/2010 MSP
2112/2010

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitution
of counsel;

2/12/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review response from client
regarding substitution of counsel;

2/12/2010 MSP
211212010

0.10

16.50 Receive and review notice of substitution;

2/17/2010 MSP
2117/2010

0.10

16.50 Receive and review order of disqualification;

2/2512010
2/25120
I 0 MSP

0.10

16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding substitution of counsel;
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2/25/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitutlon
of counsel;

2/26/2010 MSP

0.20

33.00 Correspondence to co-counsel regarding
substitution of counsel and mediation;

2/26/2010 MSP

0.10

16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitution
of counsel and mediation;

--------
---------------228.70

36,521.00 TOTAL
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CONNIE W, TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

7

8

9
10

11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

12
13

14

Case No. CV OC 0723232

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'

SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.

15

Defendants.

16
17

The Defendants submit this supplemental memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs'

18

Second Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.

19

Presumptions and inferences of intentional interference

20

of intentional interference with
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that intent, as an element ofintentional

21

prospective economic advantage, can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's
22
23

intended purpose and desire, if the interference is known to him to be a necessary consequence of

24

his action.

25

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTlFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAfMS
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Inc, v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999), the Court stated
InHighlandEnterprises, Inc.

as follows:
1

2
3

4
5

6

In proving the element of intent, the plaintiff may show that the interference "with
if the actor desires to bring
the other's prospective contractual relation is intentional ifthe
it about or ifhe knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur
of his action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977).
as a result ofhis
Intent can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended
of his action."
purpose and desire "hut known to him to be a necessary consequence ofms
Id. at § 766.

Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho at 340.

7

The Supreme Court went on to approve of the trial court's notation that "[w)hat motivates
8
9

suscr:ptible ofdirect
of direct proof." Kalgaard v.
v, Lindo Mar Adventure Club,
Club, Ltd.,
a person to act seldom is susc!:ptible

10

P.2d 637', 640 (1997) (addressing whether the lower court should have granted
147 OLApp. 61, 934 P.2d

11

summary judgment for a claim of tortious interference with a potential business relationship).

12

13

The Highland court also cited with approval a California case addressing the intentional tort
of interference with contract (and noting that intentional interference with contract and intentional

14
15

Ildvantage do not differ with regard to intent). That case held that
interference with economic lldvantage

16

"[i]ntent, of course, may be established by inference as well as by direct proof," Highland, supra,

17

citing Savage

18

Ca1.3d 752, 206 Cal.Rptr.
Cal,Rptr.
(quoting Seaman's
seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.3d

19

11.

CaLRptr.2d 305,314 (1993)
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 21 Cal.AppAth 434,26 Cal.Rptr.2d

354,686 P.2d 1158, 1165 (1984)). Accordingly, the jury may infer culpable intent from conduct

20
substantially certain to interf<:re with the prospective economic relationship. Id.
21
22
23

offact as to whether Mr. Maile's interference
In the present matter, there is a genuine issue offact
with the lolmson
Jolmson Trust's right to sell the Linder Road property was intentional. There is evidence

24

25

26

SUPPLElvlENTAL
SUPPLE1vlENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS
2
U'lW
i-AlW OFFlce;s OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
L.E:WISTOIll,
L.E:WISTOIII, 101'11-10,,1:'''.01
101'11-10,,1:'''.0'
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C' 'K

MR. 29.2010 11: 19AM
MR,

&FEENEY

NO.4101

""-

ATTY

P.4

that Thomas Maile is licensed both' as an attorney and a realtor, and is it more than reasonabl~:
reasonabl~: to

infer that he was aware that interference with the Trust's ability to sell the Linder Road property was
1
2

certain Or substantially certain to occur as a result of his filing a lawsuit which was barred by res

3

judicata and recording a lis pendens. The inference that his interference with the Trust's prospective

4

economic advantage was intentional, taken together with the other issues raised in the Defendants'

5

initial briefing, precludes summary judgment on that issue.

6

DATED this

7

-..2qfi!.:y
~tt.y of April, 2010.
EY

8

9
BY-+-~_ _ _---""-=--r--_---'''--+-_ _ _ _ _
BY-+-~_---";:""""";::""":::---f---+-f----
Connle W. Taylor, a membe~ of the
Connie
Attorneys for Defendants.

10
11

12
13

14
15

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2q

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
I 0 I caused to be served n true and
Tfijday of April, 20 I0
correct copy of the foregoiIllg document by the method indicated below, and addressed to l:he
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street

17

Eagle, ID 83616

18

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
POBox 2408
1299 East Iron Eagle Drive, Ste. 130
Eagle, ID 83616

19

20

o

o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

o

Overnight Mail

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand ~rvered
Ov night Mail
lecopy FAX)(f08jbfJ-5482
FAX)(fOafbfJ-5482

f4
o

~

939..1001
Teleoopy (FAX) (208) 939..1001

~_I
~--

21

22
23
24

25
26

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS
3
LAW

CLARK

OFFI~~';;
OFFI(;~';;

OF

FEENEY. LLP
1iI;oI~O'
L.E:WISTON. IOAHO 1il;ol~O'
001559
AND

~

.......
.......

RECEIVED

.......

ft.PR 2 9 2010

?ntO
APR :l 9 ?TltO

Ada County Clerk

J. DAVID NAVARF:O. Clerk
By REOOIE TOWNLEY
f.'~:r·!n~·.r
f.'~:r·tn~·.r

1

2

3
4

5

.

NO'
~!!'I!~'~~~I-NO.-----!!""!!!"""'.~~r__t__
A.M
~.M ....~'1:_:
_I_
A.M ----~.M
~'1_:......._t_-

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
Attorneys for Defendants
ISBA No. 4837

6

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

8
9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

12
13

Plaintiffs,
vs.

14
15
16
17

18
19

20

f/k1a CONNIE
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
DALLANTAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTA
YLOR,
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. J0H1\1S0N REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

23

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR
TA YLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendants.

21
22

Case No. CV OC 0723232

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
) ss.
)

24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TA YLOR

1
LAW OFFICES OF

j

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501001560

R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am one of the Defendants, and the infornlation contained herein is of my own personal
1

knowledge.
2

2. I am attaching as Exhibit A a true and correct copy of a Real Estate Purchase and Sale

3

Agreement offering to purchase the Johnson Trust property for $1.8 million in September 2005.
2005, The
4

Trust was unable to accept this offer because of the lis pendens which had been filed by Mr. Maile
5

against the property, and the offer was ultimately withdrawn when the real estate market plummeted.
plummeted,
6

3. Before Thomas Maile acquired possession of my uncle Ted's property on Linder Road,
7

it was taxed as farm land at a very low rate. As a result of Maile's subdividing the property, the
8

taxes increased to the amounts set forth in the chart attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit. Since the
9

property was returned to the Trust in 2006, the Johnson Trust has incurred taxes, interest and late
10

fees in the amount of $99,279.76.

The litigation has prevented the Trust from either selling the

11

property or borrowing the money to pay these taxes and the $400,000 purchase price.
12

4.

From the filing of this Complaint to the date this Court denied the Plaintiffs' Renewed

13

Motion for Certification Pursuant to IRCP s4(b)
54(b) on January 27, 2010, the Johnson Trust incurred
14

attorney fees and costs in defending the Plaintiffs' claims in the approximate amount of$22,937.36,
15
I

as demonstrated by the billing statement of
Clark and Feeney attached as Exhibit C to this affidavit.
ofClark

16

5.

As one of the tmstees of the Johnson Trust, I requested that the Idaho State Bar

17

investigate Mr. Maile's purchase of the Linder Road property.

A true and correct copy of the

18

Complaint which the Bar has flIed is attached as Exhibit D.
19

~/r((
~/rt{

DATED this /-.J
L.J

day of April, 2010.

20
21
22
23

U

--++-+-..,....=.-=-----------,.l--if-+--------
----rr~~~--------~r_~+_----------------

R. Jo

24
25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

2
OFFICES OF
LAW OFFiCES

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83·501

001561

"'"'
r,)
r,l

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

"-~~I"l
"-~~J"l

t -:5

i
day of April, 2010.

1

2

Notary Public ip and for the State ofIdaho.
ofldaho.
therein.
Residing at / It II I It Jot Vi 1/('
II('
l.
c/Lj
l ill' v
tiL/My commission expires:

3

i/o.£;/2

4

5
6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day ofApril,
of April, 2010, I caused to be served a trm: and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

8

2:gth

9

10
11

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

12
13
14
15

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

g~
~.

o

16
17

Connie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

18

19

G
/

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR

3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

001562

LEWISTON. IDAHO a:;,501
LEWISTON,

REAL EST
ATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
ESTATE

This Agreement is made effective as of September _ , 2005, between Crandall
Law Office ("Buyer"), and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and John, Reedl and
Dallan Taylor, as co-trustees of the estate ("Sellers").
The parties agree as follows:

1.

PURCHASE AND SALE OF PROPERTY.

1.1
Property. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers
shall sell to Buyer and Buyer shall purchase the following real property and other assets (the
"Property"): The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North,
Range I West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho known as 3900 Linder Road. The size of the
property is approximately plus or minus 40 acres.
1.2
Purchase Price Amount. The purchase price for the Property is One Million
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00) (the "Purchase Price").
1.3
Purchase Price Payment. The Purchase Price shall be paid as follows: Earnest
Money Deposit. Upon the execution of this Agreement by the Buyer and the Sellers, the Buyer
shall deposit in escrow at Title One Title Insurance Company, Eagle, Idaho ("Closing Agent"),
earnest money in the amount ofTen
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be held for the benefit of
the Buyer and the Sellers. Such deposit shall be returned by the Closing Agent to the Buyer if
this Agreement does not close because of (i) the failure of a condition precedent, or (ii) any
reason not the fault of the Buyer. If this Agreement does not close because of any reason not
specified in the preceding sentence, all earnest money shall be paid by the Closing Agent to the
Sellers as the agreed liquidated damages which shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the
Sellers. The balance of the purchase price shall be paid in immediately available funds delivered
at Closing to Closing Agent.
1.4

Conveyance of Title. Title to the Real Property shall be conveyed by a General

Warranty Deed. Title to the Property shall be marketable and insurable and shall be free and
clear of all liens, encumbrances, and restrictions, exclusive of (i) real property taxes for the
current year which are not due and payable on or before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances,
and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on or before Closing.
1.5
Title Insuram:e.
Upon the acceptance of this Agreement by the Sellers, the
Buyer, for the account of the Sellers, shall order a Commitment for Title Insurance
("Commitment") issued by Title One ("Title Company"), covering the Property. If any
exceptions shown on the Commitment are not approved in writing by the Buyer prior to Closing
and cannot be removed by the Sellers by Closing, then the Buyer shall have the right to
terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money deposited shall be refunded to the
Buyer and each party shall be: fully released and discharged from any further obligations lmder
this Agreement.

At Closing, the Sellers shall purchase and deliver to the Buyer an ALTA
Owner's Policy title insurance policy ("Policy") satisfying the following specifications: The
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 1
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Policy shall name the Buyer as the insured in the amount of the Purchase Price. The Policy
shall insure the Buyer as the owner of the Property, subject only to the following special
exceptions: (i) real property taxes for the current year which are not due and payable on or
before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on
or before Closing. The Policy shall include the following endorsements: (I) an endorsement
deleting the general exceptions to the Policy, (ii) an endorsement insuring that each street
adjacent to the Real Property is a public street and there is direct and unencumbered pedestrian
and vehicular access to such street from the Property, and (iii) an endorsement insuring that
there are no encroachments by or onto the Property with respect to property, easement, or
setback lines.
1.6
Closing.

Possession. Sellers shall deliver actual possession of the Property to Buyer at

Risk of Loss. Until Closing, the Sellers shall assume all risk of loss or damage
1.7
with respect to the Property. In the event of any loss or damage to all or any part of the Property,
the, Buyer shall have the right to (i) terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money
deposited shall be refunded to the Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged
from any further obligations under this Agreement, (ii) close the purchase of the Property and
reduce the Purchase Price by an equitable amount equal to the loss or damage, such reduction to
be applied first to the cash payment at Closing to be delivered at Closing, or (iii) close the
purchase of the Property and elect to receive all insurance proceeds paid or payable by reason of
the loss or damage.
1.8
Prorated Items. The following items shall be prorated as of Closing: (i) taxes
and water assessments using the last assessments available prior to Closing; (ii) rents; and
(iii) utilities.
1.9
Time for Acceptance. This Agreement shall be null and void and of no force or
effect unless a fully executed original of this Agreement is delivered to and received by the
Buyer on or before September _,2005.
2.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND COVENANTS OF THE SELLER.
The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants with, the Buyer as follows:

2.1
Authority of the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of this
Agreement by the Sellers has been duly approved in accordance with applicable law and any
documents or instruments governing the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of
this Agreement by the Sellers will not cause the Sellers to be in violation or breach of any law,
regulation, contract, agreement, or other restriction to or by which the Sellers or the Property is
subject or bound. If the Sellers are a corporation, the Sellers, at Closing, shall provide to the
Buyer (i) a certificate from the State of Idaho dated not more than 45 days prior to Closing
indicating that the Sellers are in good standing and qualified to do business in Idaho" and
(ii) resolutions of the board of directors of the Sellers authorizing and approving this Agreement
and the transactions contemplated hereby. If the Sellers are a partnership, the Sellers, at Closing,
shall provide to the Buyer resolutions of the partners of the Sellers authorizing and approving
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby.
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 2
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2.2
Property Ownership. The Sellers own and possess all right, title, and interest in
and to the Property free and clear of all covenants, conditions, easements, liens, and
encumbrances.
2.3
Condition of Property. All of the Property, including, but not limited to,
parking areas, landscape areas, sprinkler system(s), structural components, electrical, plumbing,
heating and air conditioning systems, is in good operating condition and repair, subject only to
routine maintenance.
2.4
Material Misstatement or Omissions. No representation or warranty made by
the Sellers in this Agreement or in any document or agreement furnished in connection with this
Agreement contains or will contain any untrue statement ofmaterial
of material fact, or omits or will omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading.
2.5
No Default. The Sellers are not in default under the terms of any contract,
agreement, lease, license or other understanding, and no condition or event has occurred which,
after notice, the passage of time, or otherwise, would constitute a default under or breach of any
such terms. The Sellers are not aware of any condition that will result in a default under any
such terms.
2.6
Broker Fees. Except as disclosed in writing to the Buyer prior to Closing, the
Sellers are not obligated to pay any fee or commission to any broker, finder, or intermediary for
or on account of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
2.7
Information to be Provided. Within ten (10) business days after the date this
Agreement is accepted by the Sellers, the Sellers shall deliver to the Buyer the following: All
contracts of any kind or nature which shall survive the Closing and which relate to the Property;
A copy of all leases relating to the Property, together with any amendments to such leases; A
copy of any and all licenses, certificates, permits, approvals, conditions or similar items, in the
Sellers' possession relating to all or any portion of the Property.
2.8
Conduct Pending Closing. From the effective date of this Agreement to
Closing, the Sellers shall (i) maintain the Property in good repair and in a broom clean condition,
(ii) continue to operate the Property in the manner previously operated by the Sellers, (iii) not
enter into any contracts or purchase orders relating to the Property, and (iv) perform all acts
necessary to insure that the representations, warranties, and covenants of the Sellers shall be true,
complete, and accurate in alI respects on and as of the date of closing to the same force and
effect as if made at Closing.
2.9
Access to Property. After the Sellers' acceptance of this Agreement, the Buyer
and the Buyer's authorized representatives shall have reasonable access to the Property for
inspection.
3.
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES.
The terms "hazardous substance," "release," and
"removal" shall have the definition and meaning as set forth in Title 42 U.S. C. 9601 (or
corresponding provision of any future law); provided, however that the term "hazardous
substance" shall include "hazardous waste" as defined in Title 42 U.S.c. 6903 (or corresponding
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 3
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provision of any future law) and "petroleum" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6991 (or
corresponding provision of any future law). The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants
with, the Buyer that: the Property is not contaminated with any hazardous substance:, the
Sellers have not caused and will not cause the release of any hazardous substances on the
Property, there is no asbestos on the Property, and there is no underground storage tank on the
Property.
4.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING.
The obligations of the Buyer under
this Agreement are, at Buyer's option, subject to the satisfaction of the following conditions:

4.1
The representations and warranties of the Sellers are true, complete, and aCGurate
as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date of Closing as if made as of such date.
4.2
The Sellers have performed all obligations, covenants and agreements to be
performed prior to Closing as set forth in this Agreement.
4.3
The Title Company is prepared to issue a policy in accordance with this
agreement. The Sellers shaH have executed and delivered to the Closing Agent the Warranty
Deed and same is recorded.

£l·om a bank
4.4
The Buyer has obtained financing (effective to the date of Closing) £l'om
or other financial institution, for a loan of $1,500,000.00, bearing interest at a fixed rate of not
~ %) per annum, with a maximum of one (1) point
more than six and one-half percent (6 Y2
payable at funding. The loan shall be repayable in monthly installments of principal and interest
amortized over a thirty (30) year term.
4.5
The Buyer has obtained an appraisal of the Property indicating that the fair
market value of the Property is not less than the Purchase Price. The Buyer has obtained, at the
Buyer's sole cost, an inspection of the Property, including, without limitation, parking areas,
landscape areas, sprinkler systems, structural components, electrical, plumbing, heating and air
conditioning systems and roofs and has approved the condition of the Property, in Buyer's sole
discretion.

4.6
That the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust has been awarded through
successful negotiation, settlement or litigation, clear and unencumbered title to the property set
forth in paragraph 1.1 of this Agreement.
4.7
The Sellers deliver to the Buyer an affidavit executed by the Sellers under penalty
of perjury that provides the Sdlers' United States taxpayer identification number, and states that
the Sellers are not foreign persons.
5.
CLOSING. The Closing Agent for this Agreement shall be Title One Title Insurance
Company. ("Closing Agent"). Buyer and the Sellers shall each pay one-half of the Closing
Agent's Closing Fees at Closing.
Closing shall be at the offices of the Closing Agent on
Explorer Drive in Eagle, Idaho on November 3, 2005, or at such other time, date, and pla.ce as
may be mutually agreed between Sellers and Buyer. Buyer and Sellers shall execute and ddiver
d(~liver
to the Closing Agent instructions on the form generally provided by the Closing Agent with such
modifications as are reasonably made by the Buyer.
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT - 4
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6.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

All notices, claims, requests and other communications ("Notices") under this
Agreement (i) shall be in writing, and (ii) shall be addressed or delivered to the relevant address
set forth in Section 7 below or at such other address as shall be given in writing by a party 1:0 the
other. Notices complying with the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have been
delivered (1) upon the date of delivery if delivered in person, or (ii) on the date of the postmark
on the return receipt if deposited in the United States Mail, with postage prepaid for certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested.
6.1

The Parties agree that if a party is in default under this Agreement, then such
party shall pay to the other party (a) reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses
incurred by the other party after default and referral to an attorney, (b) reasonable attorney fees
and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in any settlement negotiations, and
© reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in preparing
for and prosecuting any suit or action. This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the courts of Idaho shall
have exclusive jurisdiction and agree that Ada County is the proper venue. Time is of the
essence with respect to the obligations to be performed under this Agreement. Except as
expressly provided in this Agreement, and to the extent permitted by law, any remedies
described in this Agreement are cumulative and not alternative to any other remedies available at
law or in equity.' The failure: or neglect of a party to enforce any remedy available by reason of
the failure of the other party to observe or perform a term or condition set forth in this
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of such term or condition. A waiver by a party (I) shall
not affect any term or condition other than the one specified in such waiver, and (ii) shall waive
a specified term or condition only for the time and in a manner specifically stated in the waiver.
6.2

6.3
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties and
their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives.
This Agreement,
together with the Exhibits, constitutes the entire agreement among the parties and supersedes all
prior correspondence, conversations and negotiations. The invalidity of any portion of this
Agreement, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall not affect the validity of

any other portion of this Agreement.
This Agreement may be executed in one or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall
constitute one and the same instruments. All representations, warranties, and covenants of the
Sellers set forth in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and shall survive the recording of
the Warranty Deed.
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7.

SIGNATURES.

Date<l;~ L

J-- , 2005

SELLER ACCEPTANCE

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

2005
Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , :W05
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)

(City, State and Zip)
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Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2005
(Signature)
(Print or Type Name)
(Street # and Name)
(City, State and Zip)
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Lot 2

Lot 1

Lot 3

Lot 4

Lot 5

Lot 6

a
J
a :l

Lot 7

Grand Totals

2006 taxes

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

2,252.56

$

15,767.92

Late Fees

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

45.02

$

315.14

Interest

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

737.34

$

5,161.38

3,034.92 I $

3,034.92

I$

3,034.92

I$

3,03:4.92
3,034.921 $

'
3' 034 ..92

ITotal 2006 I $

I

I

'

..

' .

J$-'·~.~··~204··s.···3,00*~1*~c··a1244 441
1$-'·13'.~·~20·1~·-·3,00*~4~~c-'·~1244
,,'~

'~'>"'"'"."
.~,>.".""

......
y_ ',

__

>__
,
Co,>

,9,·:"",.",_",
9":"""N'i<

';
';

. •,

c

,"'0.

",

'~'~''"~'',
'~~'''~',

,'0."

••

2007 taxes

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

3,285.82

$

23,000.74

Late Fees

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

65.68

$

459.76

Interest

$

709.18

$

709.18

$

709.18

$

709.18

$

709.18

$

709.18

$

937.12

$

5,192.20

4,060.68 I $

4,060.68 I $

4,060.68

I$

4,060.68

I$

4,060.68

II$$

4a06(),68
4,060,68

1$

4,288.621 $
4,283.621

28,652.70

ITota12007

1$

2008 taxes

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

3,393.26

$

23,752.82

Late fees

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

67.82

$

474.74

Interest

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

551.56

$

3,860.92

4,012.64 I $

4,012.64 1 $

4,012.64

I$

4,012.64

I$

4,012.641 $

4,012.64

Il $

I

I1Tota12008
Tota12008

1$

2009 taxes

$

2,953.14

$

2,953.14

$

2,953.14

$

2,953.14

$

2,953.14

$

2,953.14

Late Fees

$

29.51

$

29.51

$

29.51

$

29.51

$

29.51

$

Interest

$

59.37

$

59.37

$

59.37

$

59.37

$

59.37

1$

3,042.02

I$

3,042.02

I$

3,042.02

I$

3,042.02

1$$

14,150.26

I$

14,150.26

I$

14,150.26

I$

14,150.26

ITota12009
Grand Totals

I

I

I

~

I

4,012.64'1

$

28,088.481

$

2,953.14

$

20,671.98

29.51

$

29.51

$

206.57

$

59.37

$

59.37

$

415.59

I$

3,042.021 $

3,042.02

I$

3,042.02

I$

21,294.141

I$

14,150.26 $
14,150.261

14,150.26

I$

14,378.20 1$

99,279.761

Interest on unpaid taxes increases daily. Unpaid taxes for these properties include Lot 7 for year 2007 and all parcels for 2008 and
2009. These interest amounts are up-to-date as of 04/01110.
04/01/10.

001570

~:-c
:c

PROPERTY TAXES ON THE THEODORE JOHNSON TRUST PROPERTY

Detail Transaction File List

Date, 04/22/2010

CLARK and FEENEY

client

Trans
Date

11195.000

02/06/2008

H
'I'mkr

P

Tcode/ ''''''
Tcodel
Task Code

Stmt •
Rate

to Bill

190.00

0.50

Hours

Ref ff

A»Ount

Fees
20 P

95.00 Telephone conference with our insuran=e

adjuster at Zurich.

11195.000

02/06/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

04/08/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

04/16/2008

20 P

190.00

0.20

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr.
Theodore Johnson Trust

Blake.

Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Blake.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
38.00 Telephone conference with Chri.stine Y:)\.lIlg

zurich.

11195.000

04/22/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

04/22/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195.000

04/27/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114. 00

11195.000

04/29/2008

20 P

19

190.00

2.00

380. 00

11195.000

05/07/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195.000

05/07/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57. 00

11195.000

05/07/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

05/08/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00
57.
00

11195.000

05/08/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

05/13/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.50

95,00
95.
00

11195.000

05/13/2008

30 P

80.00

0.20

16.00

11195.000

05/14/2008

20 P

10

O. 00
0.00

190.00

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Appea~rance.
Preparation of Notice of Appea~rance.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of
the Court and to Da11an
Dallan Taylor.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Notice of Appearance f::>r John
Taylor and correspondence to t.he Clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Detailed review of Complaint ctnd Drafting
Answer.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Motion to Dismiss and
of the court.
Court.
correspondence to the Clerk of
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Dismiss.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Notice of Hearing.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the :lerk of
the court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Three Day Notice of Intent to Take
cli,~nts
Default and correspondence to the cli,~nts
same,
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Taylors'
Review of Motion to Strike Defendant Taylors
Motion to Dismiss and/or Consider the Same a
Judgment,
Motion for Summary JUdgment.
Preparation of
correspondence to the client e,nclosin;r
e'nclosin;r the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Telephone conference with the Judge'S Clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Ame~nded Affidavit
AfEidavi t
No Charge,
Preparation of Ame~nded

10

11

12

13

14

I

and correspondence

the cl.eJ::"k
c1eJ::"k of
to t.he

th~
t.h~

16

15

Court.
Court..

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
11195.000

05/14/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.50

190.00

0.20

38.00

80.00

0.20

16.00

19

190.00

0.60

114. 00

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57. 00

08/29/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.10

19.00

11195.000

09/03/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.70

133.00

11195.000

09/16/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

05/19/2008

20 P

11195.000

05/19/2008

30 P

11195.000

07/23/2008

20 P

11195.000

07/30/2008

11195.000

.__

.........
.......... _ _ .. .... _ - _ . _ - -

19

17

95,00 Review of Recusal and Notice clf Reass ignment.
95.00

Preparation of correspondence to the ,:lient
':lient
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Notice of Status Conference.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Clerk,
Telephone conference with the Judge's Clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Subpoena Duces Tecum for Helen Taylor
and Notice of Taking Depositicln Duces Tecum of
Taylor,
Helen Taylor.
Preparation of correspondence to
the client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
I~aile reo
re.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. I~aile
Helents
Helen's deposition.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile ,v.
Review of correspondence from Mr. Pru.,ynski to
Mr. Maile dated August 27, 20C8.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Amended Subpoena Duc:es Tecum for
Ta:lCing
Helen Taylor and Amended Notic:e of Ta:l(ing
l •or
HelE:nml,.or
.Deposition Duces Tecum of H
elE:n
m
correspondenc~
p:eparation of correspondenc~
w1th a copy of the same.
wlth
~
[)
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Associaticln of Co-Counsel
Review of Notice of Associatic,n
and Substitution of Counsel and preparation of

18

19

20

21

25

13bIT'.L
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26
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Thuz'sday 04/22/2010

24

1 45

pm

Date,

04/22/2010
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Detail Transaction File List
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CLARK and FEENEY

Trans
Client

Date

Tmkr

H

Teode/~'"
Teods/~'"

P

Task Code
Coda

Stmt
Stmt If"
Rate

Houre
to Bill

Ref'

Amount

Fees
correspondence to the clients enclosing the

same.
Theodore Johnson Trust

Thomas Maile v.
11195.000

09/22/2008

20 P

10

190.00

5.50

11195.000

09/24/2008

20 P

19

190.00

2.50

11195.000

09/26/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

11195.000

10/02/2008

20 P

19

190.00

1. 00

11195.000

10/03/2008

20 P

19

190.00

5.50

11195.000

10/03/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.25

11195.000

10/08/2008

20 P

19

190.00

0.40

11195.000

10/23/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

11195.000

10/24/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

10/24/2008

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

10/28/2008

20 P

19

190.00

1,045.00 Research for and preparation of Memorandum in
Support of Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
475.00 Review and revise Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
114.00 Preparation of Second Affidavit in Support of
Motion to Dismiss and correspondence to the
clerk of the court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
190.00 Deposition preparation.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
1,045.00 Travel from Boise after Helen's deposition.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Mai le
Ie v.
47.50 Attendance at deposition.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
76.00 Review of Amended Notice of Substitution of
Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
Preparation of correspondence to the client
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
114.00 Review of Motion to Continue Summary
114,00
Judgment/Motion to Dismiss Hearing Set for
November 6, 2008, Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile,
IV, and Notice of Hearing.
Pl::-eparation of
correspondence to the client enclosing the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of Notice VacatinH Hearing.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of
the Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
0.00 Review of Certificate of Mail:.ng , Statement of
Facts in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Rule :.1 Sanctions
Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion to
DismiSS/Summary Judgment and ~1otion
~1otion for Rule 11
Dismiss/Summary
Sanctions,
sanctions, Affidavit of ThomaB Maile Part One
and Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
247.00 Review of Motion for Stay and or Set for Jury
Trial, Affidavit in Support, Notice of Hearing,
Certificate of Mailing and Supplemental
Dj.spositive
Memorandum in Opposition to Dj_spositive
Motions.
Preparation of corresondence to
client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Non-Oppositi:m to
114.00 Preparation of Notice of Non-(~positi~n
Motion for Stay and correspondence to the Clerk
of the Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
76.00 Review of Notice of Reassignment filej by the
court.
Preparation of correspondence to the
client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the client
with a copy of the proposed Order.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
38.00 Review of correspondence and proposed order
from Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
19.00 Review of Order for stay entered by the court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the client
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of Affidavit of Connie Taylor.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the clerk of
the court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.

27

28

29

31

30

32

33

34

36

37

35

I

11195.000

01/09/2009

20 P

19

190.00

1. 30

11195.000

01/13/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

11195.000

01/14/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.40

11195.000

01/20/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

01/21/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.20

11195.000

01/26/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.10

11195.000

01/26/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

02/04/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

02/05/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

001572

38

40

39

42

41

43

44

45

46

Date, 04/22/2010

?age:
Page:
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CLARK and FEENEY

Stmt •
Rate

Hours
to Bill

10

190.00

0.60

P

19

190.00

0.10

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

Client

Trane
Date

11195,000
11195.000

02/13/2009

20 P

11195.000
11195,000

02/13/2009

20

11195,000
11195.000

02/17/2009

Tmkr

H

Tcode/

P

Ta Bk
iii k Code

''''''
'''''''

R.ef ..

Amount

Fees

114.00 Preparation of Motion for Order Removing Lis
Pendens and correspondence to the court.
cou,rt.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
19.00 Reviewed Mr. Maile's objection. to our costs.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
114.00 Preparation of Amended Answer of John Taylor,

47

50

48

Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Tn.:.st and

Counterclaim. Preparation of correspondence to
the Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
11195. 000
11195,

02/17/2009

20 P

19

190.00

1. 50

Bril~f and
285.00 Review of Supplemental Memorar..dum Bril:lf

11195,000
11195.000

02/18/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195,000
11195.000

02/23/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195. 000
11195,

03/03/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.70

133.00

11195,000
11195.000

03/05/2009

20 P

10

190 00

0.50

95.00

11195,000
11195.000

03/11/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.10

19.00

11195,000
11195.000

03/19/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.80

152.00

11195,000
11195.000

04/01/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195,000
11195.000

04/01/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000
11195,000

04/07/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195,000
11195.000

04/07/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195.000
11195,000

04/07/2009

20 P

10

190.00

8.00

1,520,00

11195.000
11195,000

04/08/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195,000
11195.000

04/08/2009

20 P

19

190.00

11.50

2,185.00

11195,000
11195.000

04/09/2009

20 P

19

190.00

7.50

1,425.00

11195.000

04/10/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

04/14/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.50

95,00
95.00

Affidavit.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Ada County
Recorder.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Mai Ie v.
Preparation of Notice of Hearing and
correspondence to the clerk of the CO'lrt.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Reviewed and responded to e-mail from Mark
Prusynski.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Reply to Amended Answer of ,John
Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Jotnson Trlst and
Counterclaim. Preparation of correspondence to
the client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of correspondence from Mr. Maile
regarding the Amended Motion to Dismiss.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV. in
Support of Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs'I Motion for Summary
Judgment & in Opposition to Defendant:3
Defendant:3'I Motion
Judgment; Plaintiffs' Motion for
for Summary JUdgment;
Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Cowlterclaim;
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for
':he
Partial Summary Judgment Relating to ":he
Defendants' Counter-Claim & and in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion for SumfI1ary Jud1jT11ent and
Notice of Hearing. Preparation of
correspondence to the client enclosinq the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Supplemental Affidavit of Connie
Summary
W. Taylor in support of Motion for Swnmary
Judgment.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the clerk of
the court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of
the Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of
the Court. Preparation of Affidavit of Cormie
Taylor.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Maile' s Motion for Summary .Judgment.
Review of Maile's
,Judgment.
Research and preparation of Memorandum in
Plaintiffs'r Motion for Summary
Opposition to Plaintiffs
Judgment on Counterclaims.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Third Supplemental Aff;Ldavit in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Affidavit of Connie Taylor in Opposition to
Judgment on the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary JUdgment
Counterclaims.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Reviewing the submissions by Mr. Maile,
research and working on Reply Memorandum.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Revising the Reply to Plaintiffs Oppol,ition
Oppol3ition to
Motion for Summary JUdgment.
Judgment.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Reply Memorandum Brief in Sllpport of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Relating to

001573
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52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

65

66

64
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Detail Transaction File List
CLARK and FEENEY

H

Traml

Client

Date

'l'mJtr
'I'mltr

P

Tcode/ '''-'"''
•.....,.
Tood./
Task Code

Stmt •

Hours

R.ate

to sill

Ref ,.

Amount

Pees

11195.000

04/22/2009

20 P

19

190.00

4.00

760.00

11195.000

04/22/2009

20 P

19

190.00

5.00

950.00

11195.000

05/04/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.70

133.00

11195.000

05/12/2009

20

P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/08/2009

20

P

10

190.00

1. 3 0

247,00
247.00

11195.000

07/09/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.70

133.00

11195.000

07/09/2009

20

190.00

1. 00

190.00

11195.000

07/10/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/10/2009

20

P

10

190.00

0.90

171 00

11195.000

07/13/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

10

190.00

1. 80

342.00

P

the Defendants' Counter-Claim & in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Jud9ment.
preparation of correspondence to the client
same,
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Travel time to and from Boise for hearings.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
preparation for and attendance at hearing.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Plaintiff's Request to Take Judicial
Review of Plaintifflg
Notice of Pleadings and Certificate oE Mailing.
Preparation of correspondence to John and
Dallan enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
preparation of correspondence to Jennifer
Kennedy, Judge Greenwood I s Clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Memorandum Decision and Ord,~r,
Ord·~r, Civil
9.nd Order
Case Order for Scheduling Conference :tnd
Re. Motion practice, and Civil Case Stipulation
Scheduling and Planning. Preparation of
for SchedUling
correspondence to the client enclosin3' the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Sending of emails to the clients re. the
correspondence, proposed Release, and
satisfaction received in the Taylor/M,:tile
'l'aylor/M.9.ile case.
Joml Taylor.
Telephone conference with JOml
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Office conference with John.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
l'-1aile.
preparation of correspondence to Mr. l'.1aile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
preparation of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, Judgment. Dismis3ing
plaintiffs
Plaintiffs'I Claims, and correE:pondenC'~
correspondenC'~ to the
Clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
v.
Thomas Maile v,
Mr. ~aile.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr,
Theodore Johnson Trust
v.
Thomas Maile v,
Review of Motion for Certification Pursuant to
Decisi·:m and
IRCP Rule 54 (8) re: Memorandum Decisi':m
Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal Pursuant to
the IAR Rule 12, Affidavit in Support of
Preparation of Motion for Cert.ificati:m
Memor9.ndum
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(B) re: Memor:tndum
Decision and Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal
Pursuant to the IAR Rule 12 fI and Memorandum
Brief in Support of Motion for Certification
PUrsuant to IRCP Rule 54 (5)
(B)
Pursuant

rl:':

68

69

70

71

72

76

77

73

74

75

78

Memor3.ndum

Decision and Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal

Prepar9.tion of
Pursuant to the IAR Rule 12 .. Prepar:ttion
correspondence to the client E'nclosin:r the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Notice of Hearing Re: Schejuling
Conference.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. ~ai1e.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Pl~synski.
Exchanged e-mails with Mark P]~synski.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Telephone conference with John Taylor.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Telephone conference with Mark Prusynski.
Theodore JohnBon Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Notice of Hearing reo Motion for
Certification and Preparation of correspondence
to the client.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.10

19.00

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

190.00

0.20

38.00

11195.000

07/15/2009

20 P

190.00

0.70

133.00

11195.000

07/16/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

07/27/2009

20

P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

07/28/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

07/29/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.10

57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
19.00 Review of correspondence from Mr. Maile
19,00
regarding access numbers for the telephonic

79

80

82

83

84

81

87

Thomas Maile v.

hearing 08/14.
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H
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P

Task: Code

Stmt It

Rate

Hours
to Bill

Amount

Fees

11195.000

07/30/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195.000

08/04/2009

32 P

10

175.00

0.30

11195.000

08/14/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.30

-

Page,

Ref"

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57,00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust

89

Thomas Maile v.
52.50 Preparation of correspondence to the client.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Review of Amended Motion for Certification and

correspondence from mr. Maile

91

90

reo access code

for telephonic hearing.

Theodore Johnson Trust
11195.000

08/14/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.40

Thomas Maile v.
76.00 Review of Second Supplemental Affidavit in
Support of Amended Motion for Certification and

92

preparation of correspondence to the clients
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
11195.000

08/20/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.90

11195.000

08/24/2009

20

19

190.00

5.50

P

Thomas Maile v.
171.00 Preparation of Notice of Non-Opposition,
correspondence to the Clerk and correspondence
to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Mai Ie v.
1,045.00 Review of pleading fi led by Mr. Maile.

11195.000

08/26/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.50

95.00

11195.000

08/27/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

08/27/2009

20

P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00
57,00

11195.000

08/27/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00
57,00

11195.000

09/27/2009

20 P

19

190.00

0.80

152.00
152,00

11195.000

09/30/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

10/07/2009

20 P

19

190.00

11195.000

10/07/2009

20

10

190.00

P

0.00

0.30

57.00

Communication with clients ancl co-counsel
regarding Motion for Rule 54(b) certification.
Research into Vendees lien statute. Review of
Affirmative Defenses to counsE!1 claims.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Answers to Interrogatories and
Requests for production.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Notice of Service.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of
the court,
court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Research into recent case law on attorney's
fees on appeal.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Mai Ie v.
Review of the Motion for Permissive Appeal
Pursuant to the I. A. R. Rule 1:£:, Memorandum
Brief in Support of Motion for Permissive
Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12., and
Affidavit of Thomas Maile in support of Motion
for permissive Appeal Pursuant. to The I. A. R.
Rule 12 directed to the Supreme Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Mai le
Ie v.
Preparation of correspondence to the clients
Permlssive Appeal
enclosing the Motion for Permissive
1:£: Memorandum
Pursuant to the I. A. R. Rule 1:£:,
Brief in Support of Motion for permissive
Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12., and
Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support :>f Motion
for Permissive Appeal Pursuant. to The I .A. R.
Rule 12 directed to the Supreme Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Notice of Non-Oppositi:>n.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to the Supreme
Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Order Denying Motion for Permissive
Appeal and preparation of correspondence to
the clients.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Request for Scheduling
Conference and Trial Setting.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
preparation of correspondence to the clerk.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v,
v.
Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to
Motion to Foreclose.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Renewed Motion for Certification

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

I

11195.000

10/07/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

10/07/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

11/12/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

11/13/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

11/13/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

11/30/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

12/03/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.80

152.00

Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54 (b)

rE',

rE"

001575
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104

105

106

107

108

109

Judgment
JUdgment

Entered July 20, 2009, Notice of Hearing, and
Thursday 04/22/2010

1:45 pm
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Trans
client

Date

Tmkr

H
•P

Tcode/
Tcodel

'-'

Task Code

Stmt •
Rate

Hours
to Bill

Amount

Pees
Fees

11195.000

12/17/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

11195 000

12/17/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.50

Page:

-

Ref"

Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motio::1 for
Certification.
Preparation of corres:;>ondence
to the client.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Troupis.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
95.00 Review of Notice of Associaticln and
correspondence from Mr. Maile to Mr. ~rusyn5ki
~rusyn5ki
dated December 17, 2009.
Preparation of
correspondence to the clients enclosi::1g the

110

111

same.

11195.000

12/18/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.90

11195.000

12/22/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.50

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
M<)tion for
171.00 Preparation of Objection to Renewed M<:>tion
Rule 54 (B) Certification, Affidavit i:o
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Certification
and correspondence to the Clerk of th: Court.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v,
95.00 Review of correspondence and proposed
stipulation received from Mr. Maile.

112

113

Preparation of correspondence to the ,:lient
same,
enclosing the same.

11195.000

12/22/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

12/22/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.20

38.00

11195.000

12/28/2009

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

12/28/2009

20

190.00

0.20

38.00

11195.000

01/04/2010

20 P

10

190.00

0.50

95.00

11195.000

01/07/2010

20 P

10

190.00

0.80

152.00

11195.000

01/11/2010

20

P

10

190.00

0.60

114.00

11195.000

01/12/2010

20 P

10

190.00

0.30

57.00

11195.000

01/12/2010

20

P

10

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

01/25/2010

20

P

10

190.00

0.30

57,00

11195.000

01/25/2010

20 P

10

190.00

0.40

76.00

11195.000

01/27/2010

20 P

19

190.00

1.50
1. 50

285.00

P

Billable

Total for Pees

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Troupis.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v,
v.
Review of additional correspondence from Mr.
Maile and his second proposed Stipula:ion
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. I"aile.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Telephone conference with Jenr:.ifer KelUledy of
Judge Greenwood's office.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of correspondence from Mr. Mail with a
copy of the final Civil Case Stipulation for
Scheduling and Planning.
prefaration of
correspondence to the client enc10sinq the
same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Memorandum Brief in Support of
Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to
IRCP Rule 54 (b) Re, Judgment Entered .July 20,
2009 and Supplemental Affidavit in Support of
the same.
preparation of correspondence to the
client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of Motion to Disqualify Alternate
Jud!le.
Judge and Order to Deny Al terna te Jud!,e.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
preparation of correspondence to the (:ourt.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Order Governing proceedings and
Setting Trial.
Preparation of correspondence
to the client enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. r1aile and
Troupis,
Mr. Troupis.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review of Order Disqualifying Alternate Judge.
JUdge.
Preparation of correspondence to the client
enclosing the same.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Review file. prepare for and attend hearing on
Renewed Motion for 54(b) Certificate.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
I

20,291.00

Expenses

11195.000

07/25/2008

20

P

37

11195.000

08/25/2008

20 P

37

11195.000

09/25/2008

20

P

37

11195.000

10/25/2008

20

P

29

0.250

1.00 Fax Transmission
June/July
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
15,00 Fax Transmission
15.00
July/August
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
6.00 Fax Transmission - August/September
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
4.25 Photocopies - September/October
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
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114

115

116

117

118

123

124

125

126

127

128

129
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Detail Transaction File List
CLARK and FEENEY

H
H

,"-"

Teod./ ,"-'
Tcode/
Task Code

Cl ient

Trans
Date

TrrJer
Tnlkr

•

Expenses
11195.000

11/18/2008

20

P

44

11195.000

11/25/2008

20 P

29

11195.000

02/18/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

02/25/2009

20

P

37

11195.000

02/25/2009

20 P

29

11195.000

03/06/2009

20

P

44

11195.000

03/25/2009

20 P

37

11195.000

03/25/2009

20

P

29

11195.000

04/10/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

04/25/2009

20 P

29

11195.000

04/25/2009

20 P

43

11195.000

04/25/2009

20 P

37

11195.000

05/13/2009

20

P

44

11195.000

OS/25/2009

20

P

29

11195.000

06/25/2009

20 P

45

11195.000

06/25/2009

20

P

29

11195.000

07/20/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

07/23/2009

20

P

45

11195.000

07/25/2009

20 P

37

11195.000

07/25/2009

20 P

29

11195.000

06/17/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

08/25/2009

20 P

29

11195.000

09/23/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

09/25/2009

20 P

29

11195.000

10/08/2009
10/06/2009

20

P

44

11195.000

10/19/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

10/25/2009

20 P

43

11195.000

10/25/2009

20 P

29

0.250

11195_000
11195.000

11/25/2009

20 P

29

0.250

11195.000

11/25/2009

20

P

37

11195.000

12/22/2009

20 P

44

11195.000

12/25/2009

20

29

P

P

Stmt •
Rate

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

0.250

Hours
to Bill

Amount

-

Page: 7

Ref'

0.76 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
/NovembelC
4.00 Photocopies - October
October/Novembe"
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
2.70 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
124.00 Fax Transmission -- January/February
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
19.75 Photocopies -- January/Februa~'
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
1.18
1.
18 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
25.00 Fax Transmission - February /MC:lrch
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
4.00 photocopies - February/March
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
21.85 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
112.50 Photocopies - March/April
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
5.00 Color Copies - March/April
Theodore Johnson Trust
Trus t
Thomas Maile v.
42.00 Fax Transmission -- March/April
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
1.22
1. 22 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
3.00 Photocopies - April/May
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
175.00 Westlaw Charges -- April 2009
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
3.00 Photocopies - May/June
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
9.39 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
33.33 Westlaw Charges - June, 2009
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
2.00 Fax Transmission - June/July
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
26.50 Photocopies - June/July
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
2.44 postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
6.00 Photocopies - July/August
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
0.61 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
77.50 Photocopies - August/September
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
9.26 Postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
1.83 postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
434.00 Color Copies - September/October
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
14.25 Photocopies - September/October
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
3.75 Photocopies -- October/November
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
6.00 Fax Transmission - October/November
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
22.49 postage
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
7.25 Photocopies -- November/December
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
52.00 Fax Transmission
November/December

10

11

12

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

26

27

30

29

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44
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12/25/2009

20 P

37

Thursday·

45
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TraIlS
Client

Date

H

Tmkr

p

'-'"

Tcode/
Task Code

Stmt •
Rate

Hours
to Bill
eill

Amount

Expenses

-

Page:

Ref #

Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.

Total for Expenses

Billable

Advances
11195. 000

04/22/2008
04/22/2006

20 P

21

11195.000

04/28/2008

20 P

21

11195.000

10/06/2008

20 P

27

11195.000

10/15/2008

20 P

26

11195.000

02/18/2009

20 P

20

11195.000

OS/25/2009

20 P

20

11195.000

06/15/2009

20 P

20

11195.000

07/22/2009

20 P

20

Total for Advances
,

-- ---

0.00

---
1,281.81
69.60 Filing Fee (Notice of Appearance) - #45332
Clerk of Ada County
Johnson Trust
Theodore Jolmson
Thomas Maile v.
69.60 Filing Fee (Notice of Appearance) - #45380
Clerk of Ada County
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
9/2-3/08) - #47240 Connie
163.62 Mileage (Boise on 9/2-3/061
Taylor
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
82.33 Deposition (Helen Taylor) - #47185 Burnham,
62.33
Habel & Associates, Inc.
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
2.40 #48429 Ada County Recorder - Copy of Lis
Pendens
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
533.60 Global Travel - Airfare for Connie Taylor on
4-22-09
Theodore Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
9.00 Connie Taylor - Reimbursement for Parking at
Civic Plaza Court House on 04/22/09
Theodore Jolmson
Johnson Trust
Thomas Maile v.
Travel
434.40 Global
- Airfare for Connie Taylor on
4/21/09 to Boise
Johnson Trust
Theodore Jolmson
Thomas Maile v.

Billable

0:00

14

13

24

25

28

1,364.55

GRAND TOTALS

_._------_.-_.~----------------,----_.
-.--------.--.--------~--------.------

---------~~-

----~--

Billable

107.05

22,937.36
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"ROFESSIONAL (..{)NDUGT BOARl·
SOARl·
IDAHO STATE B,t.,R
Si&,R

O. Andrews
Bradley G.
Bar Counsel
Idaho State Bar
P.o. Box 895
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-4500
ISB No. 2576

DEC 1 6 2009

BEFORE THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BOARD
OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR
)

)

IDAHO STATE BAR,

ISB File No. FC 09-04

)

Plaintiff,

)

COMPLAINT

)
)

v.

)

THOMAS G. MAlLEN,

)
)
)
)

Respondent.

)

O. Andrews, hereby
The Idaho State Bar ("ISB") by and through its counsel, Bradley G.
charges Thomas G. Maile N, an attorney at law admitted to practice before the courts of Idaho,
with professional misconduct as follows:

COMMON ALLEGATIONS
1.

Thomas O.
G. Maile IV (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") was admitted to

the practice of law in the State of Idaho in 1979, at which time he took the oath required for
admission, wherein he agreed to abide by the rules of professional conduct adopted by the [daho
Supreme Court. At all times mentioned herein, Respondent has continuously been under the
jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court as a member of the ISB on active status.
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2.

The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct

("LR.P.C."), governing the ethical conduct of attorneys licensed to practice in the State of Idaho,
which Rules were in effect at all times relevant herein.
3.

Pursuant to Rule SU(a)(1)
511(a)(l) of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules ("IBCR"), the

Board of Commissioners has approved the filing of these charges against the Respondent.
4.

Quotations throughout this Complaint are from deposition testimony or from the

documents being referred to.
5.

Respondent represented Theodore L. Johnson ("Ted") in various legal matters

between 1992 and Ted's death in September 2002.

In November 1997, Ted executed a

("TrusC).
Revocable Trust Agreement that created the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("Trust").
Respondent prepared the document, which designated Ted as trustee, and Ted's niece, Beth
Rogers ("Beth) and her husband, Andrew, as co-successor trustees.

Ted's nephews, Reed,

Dallan and John Taylor ("Taylors"), were residual beneficiaries of the Trust. The Trust owned
DaHan
approximately forty acres of undeveloped property on Linder Road in Ada County, Idaho
("Linder property").
6.

On or around May 19, 2002, Ted received an unsolicited offer from Franz Witte,

Jr., to purchase the Linder property for $400,000 ("Witte offer"). On May 22, 2002, Ted met
with Respondent to review the terms of the Witte offer. Ted informed Respondent during their
meeting that the Witte offer was for the same property that Respondent had previously indicated
he was interested in purchasing, and asked Respondent if he was still interested. Respondent
confirmed that he was still interested in the Linder property, and asked Ted whether that interest
caused Ted "any difficulty" in having him review the Witte offer.

Ted replied "no," and

COMPLAINT - 2
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indicated that he was not aware of the property's fair market value. Respondent and Ted then
discussed "the necessity of trying to determine what the [Linder] property was worth."
7.

Respondent advised Ted that there were a "variety of ways" to dete.rmine the

Linder property's fair market value, including obtaining "some appraisals" and asking "some
real estate agents to provide their opinions." Respondent advised Ted that the best approach was
to get an average from "three opinions from real estate agents" and, if possible, "extra opini.ons
from appraisers."

Respondent also informed Ted that the "best approach" was to retain a

licensed appraiser to establish the fair market value, and indicated that such an approach was
preferable to working with a realtor because the appraiser did not work for commissions.
Respondent advised Ted not to inform any real estate agent or appraiser about the Witte offer,
because a prospective purchase price could influence the appraiser's report.

Ted did not

comment further about the possible value of the property and they' then discussed the tax
consequences of selling the property.
8.

Thereafter, Respondent contacted Ted's accountant, Imajean Hetherington, to

discuss the tax implications of the Witte offer.

On May 24, 2002, Ms. Hetherington sent

Respondent a letter, in which she indicated that the $400,000 offer might be too low and
referenced another of her cIient's
dienl's sale of forty acres of undeveloped land in the area for $850,000
$850.,000
in 1996. Ms. Hetherington stated that if the properties were comparable, the Linder property
could be worth up to $1,000,000 to a developer. She recommended that Ted determine the
current fair market value based on the "highest and best use and on recent sales," and stated that
Ted could make a counteroffer once the market value was determined. Ms. Hetherington added
that if Ted carried a note on the sale, she recommended obtaining financial information from Mr.
Witte in order to review his "financial strength." Ms. Hetherington sent Ted a copy of her letter.

COMPUdNT- 3
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9.

On May 29, 2002, Respondent sent Ted a letter stating that he had completed his

review of the Witte offer and also discussed Ted's finances with Ms. Hetherington. Respondent
told Ted it would be "prudent" for Ted to contact him to discuss the possibility of a counteroffer
to Mr. Witte, to help determlne the fair market value of the Linder property. He told him that, as
recommended by Ms. Hetherington, they needed to "do some due diligence relative to the
buyers['] potential and fiscal responsibility," and asked Ted to schedule an appointment so
Respondent could "pursue tt~s matter more diligently on [Ted's] behalf."
10.

On May 31, 2002, Respondent met with Ted to discuss the Witte offer and a

possible counteroffer.

The only other property they discussed during that meeting was the

property referenced by Ms. Hetherington in her May 24, 2002 letter.
11.

On June 4, 2002, Respondent faxed Mr. Witte's attorney, Eric Haft, a letter

advising that he represented the Trust and Ted, individually, regarding the Witte offer.
Respondent stated that although Ted was willing to sell the Linder property, "based upon
comparable values in the are:a,
are,a, we feel your offer is extremely low." He added that because the
Witte offer would require Ted to carry a short-term mortgage on the property, he would need to
review Mr. Witte's "current financial statement, year-to-date profit and loss statements, and his
bis
federal and state income tax returns for the last three (3) years."
12.

Respondent has acknowledged that his statement to Mr. Haff that the Witte offer

was extremely low based on comparable values in the area was "slightly inaccurate." He
explained that "we" referred to himself, Ted and Ms. Hetherington, and that he referenced
"comparable values" because he was aware of only "one comparable" and "did not think it
would be to Ted's advantage to reference a singular comparable."

Respondent also
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acknowledged that he had no information about the property referenced by Ms. Hetherington,
and did not know whether that property was, in fact, comparable.
13.

On June 7,2002, Mr. Witte responded to Respondent's May 29, 2002 letter. With

respect to Respondent's statements about the property value, Mr. Witte stated that his research
showed that similar properties in the area had sold for 10% less than his offer, and added that he
had "concerns over high water tables and City of Eagle issues that make development costs
higher." With respect to

~is

financial strength, Mr. Witte referenced his $100,000 down payment

offer and the terms of the proposed loan. He concluded by extending the terms of his offer to
June 20, 2002.
14.

Sometime in June 2002, Beth contacted Knipe Janoush Knipe ("Knipe"), to

appraise the Linder property on behalf of the Trust. Beth sought the appraisal at Ted's request,
independent of any advice from Respondent, and believed that the Witte offer had expired at the
time she sought the appraisal. According to Beth, she obtained the appraisal because 'Ted was
curious what the [property] was worth." On June 13, 2002, Knipe sent Ted a letter confirming
its agreement to perform the appraisal.
15.

On June 17,2002, Respondent sent Ted a copy of Mr. Witte's letter. Ted did not

accept the Witte offer, or propose a counteroffer, before the June 20, 2002 deadline.
16.

On July 15, 2002, Knipe sent Ted a report appraising the Linder property at

$400,000.
17.

On or around July 19, 2002, Ted met with Respondent at his office. Ted informed

Respondent about the Knipe appraisal and asked if he was still interested in purchasing the
Linder property. Respondent told Ted that he had "always been interested" in purchasing the
property and asked Ted about the sale price. Ted responded that he "want[ed.] the appraif;ed
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value." When Respondent then asked about the possible terms of the purchase, Ted informed
Respondent that he "would like to have $100,000 down and the thing to be paid off in five
years." Respondent then advised Ted as follows:
'Because I have represented you in the past there may be a question of a conflict
of interest. So if you want, and it's your choice, if you want another attorney to
draw up the real estate agreement, you have the right to seek independent counsel
to do so, if you want to.' Ted replied, 'No, I trust you.'

After Respondent informed Ted about the potential conflict of interest and Ted indicated
that he still wanted Respondent to draft the purchase agreement, Respondent told Ted:
'You should, and it is your choice, seek independent counsel either to review the
contract or create the contract. Write the contract.' Ted replied, 'No, I trust you.'

Respondent and Ted then discussed Respondent's development plans for the property "in
great detail."

There was also some discussion about how Ted obtained the appraisal, and

Respondent asked Ted whether he had contacted other appraisers. Ted informed Respondent
that he did not want to "pay for any more opinions" and "felt comfortable with this appraisal."
Respondent told Ted that he would have the purchase contract ready in a few days.
18.

On July 22, 2002, Respondent and his wife, Colleen, signed an Earnest Money

Agreement ("EMA") to purchase the Linder property for $400,000.

In a section entitled

"Attorney Fees and Costs," the EMA included the following provisions: waiver of the right to a
jury trial, venue in Canyon County, and binding arbitration in lieu of court proceedings. The
EMA also reduced the statute of limitation period to one year, instead of the five-year limitation
generally applicable to written contracts. The last paragraph of the EMA stated:
The parties acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a! Thomas Maile Real Estate
Company, is a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and
Colleen Birch Maile, husband and wife, and/or their assigns in this transaction,
(hereinafter referred to collectively as Buyer).
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19.

An Addendum to EMA ("Addendum"), also signed by Respondent and Colleen

on July 22, 2002, provided payment tenns and stated that they would secure the payments for the
balance of the purchase price by executing a standard deed of trust, to be placed in escrow at
Alliance Title ("Alliance").

A copy of a Deed of Trust naming Alliance as Trustee ("First

Deed") was attached as Exhibit A-2 to the Addendum and incorporated by reference. Under the
Addendum, the Trust agreed to the assignment of the Mailes' interests in the Linder property
before or after closing, which was scheduled on or before September 15, 2002. The Addendum
also stated that the parties acknowledged that "Thomas Maile df'o/a1
dI'o/a/ Thomas Maile Real Estate is
a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and his wife," and provided that the
if not accepted by 5:00 o'clock p.m. on July 25,2002."
purchase offer "shall expire
expire:if
20.

Although Respondent had advised Ted to obtain the market value of the property

by taking the average of three appraisals or real estate brokers' estimations, Respondent
determined that $400,000 was an acceptable fair market value for the Linder property based on

the single Knipe appraisal. Respondent believed that the language providing that the parties
acknowledged that he was a licensed real estate broker and was representing only himself and

Colleen, "spell[ed] out" that he did not represent the Trust or Ted in the transaction.
21.

On July 25, 2002, the date the offer expired, Respondent met with Ted and B,~th

at Ted's house. Ted signed the EMA and Addendum on behalf of the Trust. The First Deed did
not include a signature line for Ted. According to Respondent, he "didn't read the contract" with
Ted, but instead "tried to explain to [Ted] the general provisions of the contract" and Addendum.
He stated that he also "gene;rally explained" the Attorney Fees and Costs provision to Ted, and
discussed his intention to create a limited liability company and assign his interests in the
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property to it.

Respondent stated that when he informed Ted about "being able to see an

independent attorney, if he wanted to," Ted indicated that he did not want to consult another
attorney. When deposed, Beth testified that Respondent simply asked her and Ted to read the
documents and asked if there were any questions. Ted requested a change to the Addendum to
provide for a current lessee's onion seed crop and then executed the documents. Respondent did
not have any further contact with Ted.
22.

On August 1, 2002, Respondent and Colleen formed Berkshire Investments, LLC

("Berkshire"), for the purpose of acquiring the Linder property from the Trust and developing
the property in a joint venture with Respondent's development company, Thomas Maile Real
Estate Company. On or around August 2, 2002, Respondent was informed that Ted suffered
another heart attack and had been placed in a nursing home.
23.

On August 15, 2002, pursuant to an Assignment of Earnest Money Agreement

(" Assignment") prepared by Respondent and executed on that date, Respondent and Colleen
assigned their rights under the EMA and Addendum to Berkshire. In return, Berkshire agreed to
liability."
pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price and released Respondent "from all future liability."
The Assignment was executed by Respondent and Colleen as assignors, Respondent as assignee
(manager of Berkshire), and Beth as Ted's attorney-in-fact.
24.

When the Assignment was executed, Berkshire had no assets other than

"$100,000 either through a line of credit or in cash." Although Respondent had recommended
that Ted conduct "due diligence" regarding Mr. Witte's financial strength, because the Witte
offer provided for the assignment of Mr. Witte's rights to a limited liability company and a
liability release, Respondent did not provide any financial information (including financial
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statements and tax returns) about himself, Colleen or Berkshire and Ted did not request that
information.
25.

Respondent did not inform Beth about any conflict of interest or explain that the

Assignment would release him and Colleen from all future liability regarding the transaction.
Respondent also did not inform Beth that she should seek independent counsel regarding the
transaction on behalf of Ted and/or the Trust.
26.

Sometime thereafter, Beth and Andrew contacted attorney David Wishney to

review the terms of the transaction. Beth testified that she sought Mr. Wishney's counsel based
on Andrew's suggestion, because Ted was in a nursing home at the time and she and Andrew
were "not familiar with lega.l reading."
reading." According to Beth, she simply wanted Mr. Wishney to
"make sure the paperwork was correct."
correct."
27.

Septembe:r 5, 2002, Mr. Wishney sent Andrew a letter stating that he had
On September

reviewed the EMA, Addendum, First Deed and Assignment. Mr. Wishney stated that because
the documents had already been executed, it was "really too late for [him] to provide any
substantive input."

He added, however, that if Respondent was "willing," Andrew should

substitute a "standard form deed of trust" for the First Deed attached to the EMA. Mr. Wishney
noted that the First Deed did not include standard language protecting the Trust's interests,
including a requirement that taxes be paid before they become delinquent. Later that day, Beth
left a message at Respondent's office, asking him to use the standard form deed of tmst
recommended by Mr. Wishney. Beth also sent Respondent a copy of Mr. Wishney's letter.
28.

Respondent did not make the requested changes to the deed of trusts. Respondent

Mr. Wishney's suggested modification to the deed of trust that taxes be
also failed to include MI.
paid before they became delinquent. According to Respondent, Mr. Wishney contacted him by

COMPLAINT - 9

001587

telephone in August 2002, but Beth never informed him about the concerns regarding the First
Deed and he did not receive a copy of Mr. Wishney's letter prior to closing.
29.

On September 14, 2002, Ted passed away, and Beth and Andrew becarne

successor co-trustees. Respondent did not have any conversation with Beth or Andrew about
any potential or actual conflict of interest after they became successor co-trustees.
30.

On September 16, 2002, Respondent closed the sale on the Linder property.

Under the terms of the sale, the Trust took a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of
the remainder of the $400,000 purchase price. Beth and Andrew signed a standard form Request
for Full Reconveyance ("Reconveyance") to Alliance.

On the day of the closing, however,

Respondent substituted a different Deed of Trust ("Second Deed") which named his friend,
attorney Stephen Sherer, as the Trustee.

Mr. Sherer had served as a trustee in several of

Respondent's prior real estate transactions. Respondent did not disclose to Beth or Andrew that
he changed the trustee from Alliance to Mr. Sherer. Beth never saw the Second Deed, which
was recorded on September 26, 2002.
31.

Thereafter, the Taylors' attorney, Connie Taylor, sent Respondent a letter

requesting information about the Trust's assets and indicated that the Taylors would challenge

the sale of the Linder property.
32.

On May 7, 2003, Beth sent Respondent a letter immediately terminating his

employment "in any capacity as attorney" for the Trust or Ted's estate because she did not want
the Trust involved in a lawsuit. Beth testified that until May 2003, she considered Respondent to
be the attorney for Ted andlor the Trust.
33.

Sometime thereafter, Respondent contacted Beth to ask if he could begin

developing the Linder property, before paying it off, if he gave the Trust an extra payment.
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Consistent with the EMA and Addendum, Beth told Respondent not to develop the property until
it was paid off.
34.

On May 19,2003, Respondent sent Beth a check for $32,357, for Berkshire's first

annual payment under the EMA. The Taylors instructed Beth not to cash the check because they
questioned the propriety of the transaction, intended to proceed with a lawsuit against
Respondent, and were concerned about his development of the property. Beth cashed the check
because she and Andrew "were not in favor of any lawsuit."
35.

On July 7, 2003, Ms. Taylor sent Respondent a letter stating that she represented

Beth, as successor trustee, and the Taylors, as Trust beneficiaries, with respect to Respondent's
purchase of the Linder property. Ms. Taylor asserted that Respondent had purchased the Linder
property for "far less than the fair market value," and indicated that she would file a civil
complaint by July 22, 2003, unless she received Respondent's written waiver of the one-year
statute of limitation provision. Beth did not consider Ms. Taylor to be her or the Trust's attorney
at that time. Sometime thereafter, Beth retained attorney Bart Harwood to represent the Trust.
36.

On July
july 10, 2003, Respondent sent Ms. Taylor a letter, in which he agreed to

waive the one-year statute of limitation. Respondent asserted that the "purchase price and tenus
tenns

were fully explored" by Ted and Beth, an appraisal was conducted, and the purchase price
represented the appraised value. He stated that the appraisal was conducted at Ted's request and
with no involvement from his office.

According to Respondent, Ted "honored his verbal

commitment to me made years ago that if he ever decided to sale [sic] his land he would afford
me first option to purchase the same." He added that "your client sought independent legal
counsel prior to the closing, and your client chose to close the transaction even after consulting
an attorney."

COMPUINT-ll

001589

37.

On July 22, 2003, Beth and Andrew sent Ms. Taylor a letter stating that, as coco

trustees, they wanted to "withdraw from all proceedings" against Respondent and Berkshire.
They wanted to "let the purchase of the Linder property proceed as in the current contract with
[Respondent]lBerkshire
[Respondent]/Berkshire Development until said property is paid off in full." Beth sent a copy of
her letter to Respondent, together with a note that indicated that she and Andrew "refused to sign
the paperwork" provided by Ms. Taylor.
38.

On September 5, 2003, Mr. Harwood sent Ms. Taylor a letter advising that he had

been retained by Beth and Andrew to represent the Trust. He stated that the Trust was not
interested in pursuing a claim against Respondent.
39.

On or around November 7, 2003, Idaho Independent Bank retained an

independent appraiser, Timothy Williams, to appraise the Linder property in connection with a
potential commercial loan to Respondent and/or Berkshire for development of a subdivision on
the property. On December 10, 2003, Mr. Williams completed his report, which valued the
property at $410,000.
40.

On or around December 10, 2003, at Respondent's request, Mr. Sherer contacted

Beth and asked her to consult her accountant about his calculation of the final payoff amount for

the property. Beth testified that she did not have any prior contact with Mr. Sherer and was
under the impression that he was simply handling the final payment of the property for
Respondent.
41.

On January 8, 2004, Respondent finalized a commercial loan for the development

of the subdivision. Also on that date, Mr. Sherer hand-delivered a cashier's check to Beth in the
amount of $293,848.03, representing Berkshire's final payment on the Linder property. Be:th
testified that Mr. Sherer explained to her that if she accepted the check, each party would be
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forever discharged from any further obligations or responsibilities.

Beth testified that she

understood that upon delivery and acceptance of the final payment, the Trust and Berkshire
would "go their separate ways" and release each other from any liability for alleged wrongdoing.
42.

On January 9,2004, Mr. Sherer, as trustee of the Second Deed, signed a Release

and Reconveyance ("First Release") prepared by Respondent. The First Release provided that
Mr. Sherer agreed to "remise, release and forever discharge" Respondent and the Trust from all

liability or causes of action relating to the Linder property. Beth was not consulted about, and
was not aware of, the First Release. Respondent was aware of possible litigation when he
prepared the First Release, but admitted that he did not provide a copy of the First Rdease to
Beth or Mr. Harwood and did not know if Mr. Sherer or anyone else suggested that Beth or Mr.
Harwood review the First Release.

Mr. Sherer testified that he did not have any "stated

authority" or good reason to execute the First Release and acknowledged that his duty as trustee
of the Second Deed was to "protect" the Trust and beneficiaries. He explained that Respondent
intended the First Release to bar any claim the Trust and/or beneficiaries may have against
Respondent personally and stated that he considered the First Release to be "surplusage'" becau.se
the transaction for the sale of the property had already been completed.

43.

On January 22, 2004, the Taylors filed a lis pendens against the Linder property.

On January 23, 2004, as residual beneficiaries of the Trust, they filed a civil complai.nt
("Complaint") against Respondent, Colleen and Berkshire, alleging breach of fiduciary duties
and negligence.

The Taylors alleged that Respondent breached his fiduciary duties as an

attorney and real estate broker by acquiring the Linder property for less than fair market value,
failing to disclose his conflict of interest, and failing to advise Ted andlor
and/or the Trust to seek
independent legal counsel regarding the transaction. The Taylors sought at least $600,000 in
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compensatory damages, disgorgement of profits, rescission of the transaction, imposition of a
constructive trust on the Linder property, and an order quieting title of the Linder property to the
Trust.
44.

On February 16, 2004, Respondent faxed Mr. Harwood a letter attaching copies

of the lis pendens and Comp:iaint.
Comp:laint. Respondent also attached a proposed mutual release regarding
the litigation for Mr. Harwood's consideration, based on Beth's statement that "the trust wanted
lawsuit."
no involvement with [the Taylors'] lawsuit."
45.

On February 18, 2004, Respondent prepared, and Mr. Sherer signed, a second

Release and Reconveyance ("Second Release"). The Second Release removed Respondent's
name from the Linder property transaction and substituted Berkshire in its place.

It also

provided that Mr. Sherer, as Trustee, agreed to "remise, release and forever discharge" Berkshire
from all liability or causes of action relating to the Linder property.
46.

Beth and Mr. Harwood were not consulted about, and were not aware of, the

Second Release.

Respondent also failed to inform Ms. Sherer that, at the time the Second

Release was executed, the Tmst was represented by other counsel, a lawsuit against Respondent
had been filed, Beth was not aware of either release, and Respondent had attempted, but failed,

to obtain a mutual release from the Trust. According to Mr. Sherer, he considered the Second
Release to be simply a "ministerial correction,"
correction," and therefore did not discuss the change with
Beth.
47.

On February 23, 2004, Respondent filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim,

asserting the following affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of action; (2) proper
venue was Canyon County based on the EMA and Addendum; (3) Plaintiffs lacked standing; (4)
the EMA required the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration; (5) the Taylors'
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demand for jury trial should be dismissed consistent with the EMA waiver; (6) lack of
consideration; (7) lack of contractual privity; (8) doctrine of laches because the lis pendens and
Complaint were not filed until after the purchase price was paid; (9) doctrines of e,quitable
estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel; (10) failure to mitigate alleged damages; (11) doctrine of unclean
hands; (12) the Release(s) were binding upon the Taylors; and (13) accord and satisfaction.
Respondent also asserted the following counterclaims: (1) tortious interference with contract; (2)
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity; (3) slander of
title; (4) wrongful cloud on title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7) equitable
estoppel; (8) quasi-estoppel; and (9) breach of good faith and fair dealing. Respondent also filed
a Motion for Change of Venue, Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Compel Arbitration Order and
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Demand for Jury Trial.
48.

On February 24, 2004, Respondent faxed Mr. Harwood a letter asking him to

coordinate a meeting with Mr. Harwood, himself, and Beth and Andrew, as co-trustees, to
discuss the Taylors' lawsuit and the proposed mutual release.

Mr. Harwood informed

Respondent that the mutual release would not be signed, that the Trust would attempt to
distribute all of the assets, and that Beth and Andrew planned to resign as co-trustees,

49.

On March 15" 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Taylors' action

based on lack of standing. On April 12, 2004, the district court advised the Taylors that their
case would be dismissed unless they joined the co-trustees in the lawsuit by Aplil19, 2004. ll1e
co-trustees were not joined by the deadline, and the district court dismissed the case in its
i:ts
entirety. The court's Order of Dismissal was subsequently amended to retain Respondent's
counterclaims against the Taylors. On June 4, 2004, the Taylors appealed the Order of Dismissal
to the Idaho Supreme Court.
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50.

On June 10, 2004, Beth and Andrew resigned as trustees, effective immediately,

and nominated the Taylors as co-successor trustees.
5l.
51.

On July 21, 2004, the Taylors, as trustees on behalf of the Trust, filed a new

action against Respondent, Berkshire, and Respondent's real estate company for breach of
fiduciary duties and negligence. On August 3, 2004, Respondent faxed Ms. Taylor and Mr.
MI.
SUbpoena Duces Tecum for Beth, and a notice setting her deposition on August 11,
Harwood a Subpoena
II,
2004. Ms. Taylor's firm requested that Respondent vacate and reschedule the depositions of
Beth and other trust beneficiaries because Ms. Taylor was unavailable until September 2, 2004.

Mr. Harwood informed Respondent that Beth would attend her scheduled dep·osition. After
Respondent refused to reschedule the depositions, Ms. Taylor's firm filed a Motion for
Protective Order and sent Respondent a letter contending that the depositions should be
rescheduled until after the August 16, 2004 hearing on the Motion for Protective Order.
52.

On August 11, 2004, Respondent deposed Beth on behalf of Berkshire and

Colleen. Attorney Phillip Collaer appeared for Respondent in his capacity as a realtorlbroker,
and attomey Jack Gjording appeared for Respondent in his capacity as attorney. Beth was not
represented by counsel at the deposition because, consistent with Beth's instruction, :Mr.

Harwood agreed not to attend. During the deposition, Respondent asked Beth about a number of
issues regarding the Linder property transaction and the ensuing lawsuit, including:
(1)

Questions about Beth's discussions with Mr. Wishney regarding the Linder

property sale. Respondent advised Beth that "all the detail" she could remember about
her discussions with Mr. Wishney "would be helpful for us on the record." Respondent
specifically asked Beth whether there was any discussion with Mr. Wishney about a
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breach of fiduciary duty or "any areas of unprofessionalism by the law offices of
[Respondent]";
(2)

Whether Beth believed that Respondent had breached any fiduciary duty owed to

the Trust or Ted during the time that Beth acted as co-trustee in August and September
2002;
(3)

Whether Ms. Taylor indicated to Beth during their conversations what areas of

malpractice or professional negligence Ms. Taylor believed were committed in the Linder
property transaction;
(4)

Beth's "understanding of how this lawsuit is going to be divided up" in the event

any wrongdoing was established; and
(5)

Whether Beth was aware of Respondent's counterclaim and whether there was

"ever any discussion between the beneficiaries" about that counterclaim. Respondent
specifically asked Beth whether the Taylors had made any statements about the "merits"
and "appropriateness" of his counterclaim.
53.

On August 12, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases.

54.

Order, the district
After the August 16. 2004 hearing on the Motion for Protective Order.

court vacated the remaining August depositions and ordered that Respondent coordinate with
Ms. Taylor to reschedule the depositions in September 2004.
55.

On or around September 6, 2004, Respondent filed an Amended Answer and

Counterclaim, asserting that the Taylors' action was barred by the Release and/or

th~:

Second

Release.
56.

On September 29, 2004, the district court entered an Order consolidating the two

cases against Respondent.
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57.

On October 20, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to DisrnissfMotion for Summary

Judgment and a supporting Memorandum and Affidavit. Respondent asserted that the Trust was
barred from pursuing the action because the Trust Agreement prohibited the assignment and/or
appointment of successor trustees and the co-trustees failed to follow the prescribed statutory
requirements for their appointments. Alternatively, Respondent asserted that he was entitled to
summary judgment on the negligence and breach of fiduciary duties claims because no duty was
owed and no breach of any standards of care could be established. According to Respondent, he
advised Ted to seek independent counsel, the Trust received independent legal counsel prior to
closing, and Respondent did not act as attorney for Ted and/or the Trust at any time after May
31, 2002. Respondent also sought summary judgment on the equitable claims of rescission and
constructive trust because the Trust accepted final payment for the Linder property and the
releases executed by Mr. Sherer "settled the rights and obligations of each party."
58.

On November 15,
IS, 2004, the Taylors filed a Petition for Appointment of Trustees

in Ada County, based on Beth and Andrew's June 10,2004 resignation. On November 17, 2004,
Magistrate Judge Bieter entered an Order appointing the Taylors as co-successor trustees for the
10,2004.
Trust, effective retroactively to June 10,
2004. Also on November 17, 2004, Respondent filed a
Demand for Notice & Verified Objection to Petition for Appointment of Trustees.

On

November 22, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside Order Dated November 17, 2004
and/or Motion to Re-Consider [sic] based on the Taylors' failure to provide notice of their
Petition for Appointment.
59.

On February 28, 2005, Respondent filed a second Demand for Notice & Verified

ofT~stees.
Objection to Petition for Appointment ofT~stees.
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60.

On April 18,.
18, 2005, Judge Bieter entered an Order Setting Aside Order for

Appointment of Trustees.

Also on that date, the Taylors filed an Amended Petition for

Appointment of Trustees.

On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter entered an Order appointing the

Taylors as co-successor trustees, but denied their request to be appointed retroactively.
61.

On May 13,
l3, 2005, the Taylors filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In a

suppOlting memorandum, they stated that Respondent had substituted the Reconveyance signed
by Beth and Andrew at closing with the Second Deed naming Mr. Sherer as trustee. The Taylors
noted that Beth was not aware of and had not been consulted about the Second Deed, which was
"drastically different" from the Reconveyance because it purported to release "all claims
whatsoever relating to the purchase." They stated that Beth was also not aware of nor consulted
about the Release or Second Release, which were executed without the Trust's knowledge or
permission and therefore could not be pled as an affirmative defense by Respondent.
62.

On June 6, 2005, Respondent filed a Reply Brief to the Motion for Summary

Judgment. He asserted that there was no attorney-client relationship between the Trust and him
after June 2002, and that any "irregularities" in the real estate documents were cured by Beth and
Andrew's acceptance of the full payment of the purchase price in January 2004.

63.

On July 28, 2005, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order

dismissing the Taylors' rescission claim and their claims against Maile as a real estate broker.
The constructive trust claim and the Taylors' claims against Respondent as an attorney survived.
The court noted that the Taylors alleged that Respondent had a conflict of interest because, as a
lawyer, he was "supposed to help the Trust get the best price for its land." However, as a
purchaser, Respondent "wanted to get the land for the lowest possible price."
price." With respect to
Respondent's claim that no attorney-client relationship existed between him and the Trust at the
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time of the purchase, the Court stated that Respondent "never did formally terminate the
attomeyrelationship" and therefore there was a material issue of fact about the existence of an attomey
client relationship. The court also found there was a material issue of fact regarding whether
Respondent properly advised Ted and/or the Trust to seek independent legal counsel and
breached the necessary standard of care.
64.

On September 7, 2005, Respondent filed a Verified Amended Answer and

Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial asserting the following affirmative defenses: (1) the
Taylors' claims were based on the EMA; (2) failure to join indispensable parties; (3) doctrine of
laches; (4) equitable estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel; (5) failure to mitigate; (6) doctrine of
unclean hands; (7) the binding releases barred the claims; (8) accord and satisfaction; and (9)
lack of standing. Respondent also asserted the following counterclaims: (1) tortious interference
with contract; (2) tortious interference of prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity;
(3) slander of title; (4) wrongful cloud of title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7)
equitable estoppel; (8) quasi·-estoppel; (9) breach of good faith and fair dealing; (10) fraudulent
conveyance; (11) unjust enrichment; (12) indemnification agreement among trustees; (13) breach
of peace and quiet enjoyment:; (14) breach of warranty deed; and (15) continuing tort.

65.

On September 28, 2005, the Taylors filed an Amended Complaint, asserting

negligence and breach of fiduciary duties and seeking the following relief: (1) judgment against
Respondent for compensatory damages for the difference between the $400,000 purchase price
and the fair market value of the Linder property; (2) disgorgement of profits; (3) rescission of
sale and return of the Linder property to the Trust beneficiaries; (4) imposition of a constructi ve
trust pending resolution of the litigation; (5) an order quieting title to the Linder property in the
Trust; (6) pre- and post- judgment interest; and (7) costs and attorney fees.
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66.

On October 3, 2005, the Taylors filed an Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment. On October 7, 2005, Respondent filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment,
seeking an order dismissing the professional malpractice claim.

67.

On November 7, 2005, the district court entered a Judgment granting summary

judgment in favor of Respondent on all claims brought against him in his capacity as a real estate
broker.
68.

On November 14, 2005, Respondent filed a Memorandum in support of his

Motion in Limine to exclude certain expert witness testimony regarding the terms of the EMA
and Addendum. He noted that he had waived the one-year statute of limitation and the case was
set for jury trial in Ada County. He added that he was "no longer asserting the defense of
Release and Reconveyance" and explained in a footnote that it was his position that the

anyway."
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction "achieves the same result anyway."
69.

On December 23, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed

in part, the district court's decision ("Taylor I"). In its Opinion, the Court stated that LR.C.P.

17(a) did not require dismissal, since the rule did not expressly prohibit trust beneficiaries from
bringing a cause of action against a third party, particularly where the trustee declined to protect.

the beneficiaries' interests.

The Court stated that the professional malpractice claim was

correctly dismissed, "because no attorney-client or broker-client relationship existed between the
Taylors and [Respondent]." The Court determined that the Complaint alleged sufficient support
to find standing "to pursue a claim against [Respondent] for acquisition of trust property with
knowledge of a potential breach of trust by, or conflict of interest on the part of, the tmstees."
The Court noted that Respondent purchased the Linder property for $400,000, despite
Respondent's advice to the Trust and Ted, as trustee, to reject the Witte offer for the same
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amount two months earlier. The Court stated that it was "reasonable to infer" that Ted was
aware that the Linder propelty was valued at over $400,000, and that Beth and Andrew were
aware of the Taylors' objections to the sale. The Court stated that as trustee, Ted had a fiduciary
duty to the Trust beneficiaries, and that his agreement to transfer the Linder property "for
substantially less than its fair market value" would violate that duty. The Court noted that there
was "no indication in the record" that Beth and Andrew "carefully examined the sale
transaction" to determine whether $400,000 was the property's fair market value, or that they
acted with "due regard to their obligations as fiduciaries in proceeding with and consummating
the sale." The Court further noted that there was no indication in the record that Beth and
Andrew obtained the necessary court approval for the transaction, and added that "one could
reasonably infer that they did not, since the sale occurred just one week after Mr. Johnson's
death." The Court held that because the Taylors alleged that Respondent was aware of "all of the
facts because of Respondent's position as attorney and realtor for both parties and purchaser of
the property," Respondent and his wife were not "bona fide purchasers for value." The Court
also held that the Taylors "sufficiently alleged a claim against Respondent for relief, including
imposition of a constructive trust, for aiding the trustees in disposing of trust property in

violation of their fiduciary responsibilities and receiving the property with knowledge of the
same."
70.

On February 13, 2006, the Taylors filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

Beneficiaries' Claim, seeking summary judgment on the constructive trust claim and

1m

order

quieting title in the Linder property. In a supporting memorandum, the Taylors asselted that
there was an "undisputed conflict of interest" between the Trust's residual beneficiaries and
Beth, since she was one of only a few beneficiaries entitled to receive her share of the Trust
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corpus immediately.

The Taylors stated that because Respondent drafted the initial Trust

agreement, he was aware that Beth was both a successor trustee and a beneficiary who would
benefit from the immediate sale of the Linder property.
71.

Also on February 13, 2006, the district court entered an Order regarding the

Taylors' Motion for Summary Judgment on Respondent's counterclaims and affirmative
defenses. The court granted summary judgment on the following counterclaims: (1) tortious
interference with contract; (2) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (3)
slander of title; (4) wrongful cloud of title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7) good
faith and fair dealing; (8) breach of peace and quiet enjoyment; (9) breach of warranty deed; and
(10) continuing tort. The court denied summary judgment on the following counterclaims: (1)
equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel; (2) fraudulent transfer of Trust corpus; and (3) unjust
enrichment. The court denied the Taylors' motion to strike the following affirmative defenses:
(1) laches; (2) failure to mitigate; and (3) unclean hands. With respect to Respondent's assertion

that the Release and/or Second Release barred any tort claims brought on behalf of the Trust, the
court stated that the terms of the purchase agreement did not bar the Taylors' claim that
Respondent breached his fiduciary duty.

72.

On March 9, 2006, the district court granted the Taylors' motion to amend their

Complaint in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. The Amended Complaint
contained a single cause of action alleging that Respondent aided the trustees in disposing of the
Linder property in violation of his fiduciary duties, and received the Linder property with
knowledge of such violation, including knowledge that the sale had not been court-approved as
required by I.e. § 18-108(b). According to the Taylors, Beth's decision as co-trustee to close the
sale of the Linder property involved a conflict of interest which required court approval of the
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transaction, because Beth (an income beneficiary) would benefit from the sale of the Trust
corpus (the Linder property), to the detriment of the Taylors (residual beneficiaries).
73.

On May 15, 2006, the district court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion

for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. The court found that Beth's "dual role as
trustee and beneficiary created a conflict of interest as a matter of law." The court further found
that the scope of Beth's

powl~r
powl~r

subject to judicial oversight included not only her power to enter

into a contract for the sale of the Linder property, "but also the power to close a sale of real
property." According to the court, Beth's conflict of interest "necessitated prior court approval
of the closing of the sale," and that, without such approval, the transaction was void as a matter
of law. The court found that Respondent had "actual knowledge that [Beth and Andrew] were
exceeding or improperly exercising their powers as a matter of law," and noted that Respondent
had prepared the trust agreement which created the conflict of interest. Accordingly, the court
granted the Taylors' motion for summary judgment, and ordered that the Linder property be held
in constructive trust for the benefit of the Trust.

The ruling did not decide Respondent's

counterclaim for unjust enrichment.
74.

On May 30, 2:006, Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider, on the ground that

the Taylors never raised the issue of whether the transaction was void and therefore the
evidentiary record was incomplete.
75.

On June 7, 2006, the district court entered its Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims

("Judgment"), which provid.ed
provided the following:

(1) the EMA and all subsequent documents

relating to the Linder property transaction were "void as a matter of law"; (2) title to the Linder
property was quieted to the Trust in fee simple; and (3) Respondent's remaining counterclaims
and affirmative defenses, all of which were based on eqUitable claims or assertions that the
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Taylors wrongfully interfered with Respondent's right to possess the Linder property, were
dismissed.
76.

Thereafter, Respondent filed a Motion to Amend Judgment and/or
andlor Motion 1.0

Reconsider and objections to the Judgment. On June 20, 2006, the district court denied that
motion. The court noted, however, that Respondent's objections to the Judgment were "well
taken," and found that the issue as to what offset, if any, Respondent was entitled to claim
against the $400,000 purchase price remained to be litigated.

Specifically, Respondent had

counterclaimed on the ground of unjust enrichment based upon his development of the Linder
property into seven lots during the litigation, which he estimated was now valued at
approximately $633,900 (determined by subtracting the current raw value from the current
developed value).
77.

On July 21, 2006, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order

clarifying that Respondent's unjust enrichment claim was not dismissed and that the constructive
trust returned the Linder property to the Trust, quieted title of the property in favor of the Trust,
and required the Trust beneficiaries to return the $400,000 purchase money less any amounts
Respondent may prove in his counterclaim for unjust eruichment.

78.

On

Novembl~r

29, 2006, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and

Order, denying Respondent's claim for damages based on the theory of unjust enrichment. The
court stated that it had previously ruled that the Linder property transaction was void:

[B]ased on the fact that [Respondent] himself had drafted the documents
effectuating the sale of the property to himself, and he had drafted the Trust
documents that creatled the conflict of interest between Beth Rogers as co-trustee
and beneficiary. [Respondent] was not a good faith purchaser without notice of
the Trustees' violation of her fiduciary duties to the Trust.

COMPLAINT - 25

001603

-

..

The court continued by stating:
[There was] evidence in the record to support [Respondent's] claim that the
property really was worth only $400,000 at the time he purchased it from the
Trust including the unsolicited offer to purchase the property for exactly that
amount and an independent appraisal obtained by Mr. Johnson which also said the
property was worth $400,000. On the other hand, [Respondent] also knew that
the property might be worth considerably more than $400,000 at the time he
offered to purchase it for this amount. In any event, [Respondent] apparently
thought it would be a good buy at $400,000. In hindsight, [Respondent's]
professional judgment.
judgment, which he had a duty to exercise for the benefit of his
client, may have been obscured by his personal desire to take advantage of what
he believed to be an attractive business transaction. [Respondent] should have
advised Mr. Johnson to seek independent advice about selling him the land for
$400,000. Indeed, [Respondent] testified at trial that he did exactly that. The
Court is not persuaded that [Respondent] so advised Mr. Johnson.

The court further stated:
[There was] also ample evidence in the record to support the contention that
[Respondent] engaged in sharp practices in drafting the documents connected to
the transaction. For example, [Respondent] included a clause in the contract that
would have barred any cause of action against himself after only one year. This is
an unusual deviation from the statutory limitation on causes of action in this type.
[Respondent] claimed that this was a scrivener's error; however, this claim is
belied by the fact that he pled it as an affirmative defense in this lawsuit. This is
the type of self-dealing that has led to the claim that [Respondent] has unclean
hands and should not be granted any equitable relief.

The court stated, however, that Respondent's counterclaim could be decided on its
merits, "without proclaiming that [Respondent] is barred from seeking equitable relief based on
the doctrine of unclean hands." The court found that the Trust was not unjustly enriched by
Respondent's expenditures after the transaction, since those expenditures did not increase the
value of the property or confer any benefit upon the Trust, the trustees or the beneficiaries. The
court found that the property's fair market value was the same regardless of the expenditures,
and again ordered the Trust to pay Respondent the $400,000 purchase price.
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79.

On December 11, 2006, the district court entered a Judgment denying

Respondent's counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Also on that date, Respondent filed a Motion
to Amend and/or Reconsider the November 29, 2006 Order because it did not address the issue
of approximately $80,000 in pre-judgment interest from September 2002 through October 2006.
80.

On December 21,2006, Respondent appealed from the district court's judgments.

81.

On April 6, 2007, the district court entered an Order denying RespDndent's

request for pre-judgment interest. Also on that date, the court granted the Taylors' request for
approximately $12,500 in costs. On May 7,2007, the July 1,2006 Order was amended to reduce
the purchase price by the assessed costs.
82.

On May 10, 2007, the district court entered a Second Amended Judgment on

Beneficiaries' Claims as follows: (1) the closing of the sale and the Linder property sale contract
as a whole were void as a matter of law; (2) the Linder property was currently being held in a
constructive trust for the benefit of the Trust; (3) title to the Linder property was quieted in favor
of the Trust; (4) Berkshire was entitled to repayment of the $400,000 purchase price less
assessed costs; and (5) Respondent's unjust enrichment counterclaim was denied.
83.

On December 31, 2007, Respondent and Berkshire filed a civil action against the

Trust, the Taylors, Connie Taylor and her law firm (hereinafter referred to as "the Berkshire
case") on the following grounds:

quiet title, constructive trust, tortious interference with

contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, abuse of process, negligence,
negligence per se, gross negligence, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, criminal racketeering,
and judicial estoppel.
84.

Thereafter, the Taylors and Connie Taylor's firm individually filed motions for

summary judgment in the Berkshire case based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. They also
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counterclaimed for slander of title, abuse of process, and intentional interference with a
prospecti ve economic advantage.
85.

On January 30, 2009, the Idaho Supreme COUlt issued its Opinion in Taylor II,

which affinned the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Taylors on the claim of
professional negligence against Respondent. The Idaho Supreme Court held that since Beth had
a conflict of interest because she was both a trustee and a beneficiary, the district court was
correct that the trustee's power to close a land sale was subject to judicial oversight pursuant to
Idaho Code §68-108(b) and Taylor 1.

The Idaho Supreme Court also held that it was

uncontroverted that Respondent had knowledge of that conflict of interest since Respondent,
acting as Ted's attorney, drafted the Trust that created the various classes of beneficiaries and
named Beth as a successor trustee.
86.

On July 2, 2009, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order in

the Berkshire case. The court detennined that Respondent's claims were identical to those
pleaded in the prior litigation and that Berkshire had "a full and fair opportunity to present" those
claims earlier.

Accordingly, Respondent's claims for quiet title, tortious interference with a

contract, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, equitable estoppel and

quasi estoppel were dismisse:d. Respondent's remaining claims were dismissed based on claim
preclusion, and his motion for summary judgment on the Taylors' counterclaims was denied. A
Judgment consistent with the Memorandum Decision and Order was entered on July 20,2009.
87.

References to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("1.R.P.C.") below are to

the rules of conduct effective on the date of the complained conduct.
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COUNT ONE

(Lack of Diligence)
88.

Paragraphs 1 through 87 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully

set forth herein.
89.

The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 88 above, including, but not

limited to, the EMA errors, the First and Second Deeds, the First and Second Releases, and

closing the sale of the Linder property without judicial approval, constitutes violations of Idaho
l.3 [Lack of diligence].
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3

COUNT TWO

(Conflict of Interest, Failure to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment
and Render Candid Advice)
90.

Paragraphs 1 through 89 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully

set forth herein.
9l.
91.

The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 90, including, but not limited to,

the Assignment of the EMA from Respondent to Berkshire and the First and Second Deeds,

constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) [Conflict of interest] and 2.1
[Failure to exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice].

COUNT THREE

(Conflict of Interest, Failure to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment
and Render Candid Advice)
92.

Paragraphs 1 through 91 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully

set forth herein.
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93.

The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 92, including, but not limited to,

the EMA between Respondent and Ted, Assignment of the EMA to Berkshire, and closing the
sale of the Linder property with Beth, constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.7(b) [Conflict of interest] and 2.1 [Failure to exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice].

COUNT FOUR
(prohibited Transactions)
94.

Paragraphs 1 through 93 above are hereby realleged
reaJleged and incorporated as if fully

set forth herein.
95.

The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 94, including, but not limited to,

the First and Second Releases, constitutes violations of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct
1.8(h) [A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice under certain conditions are satisfied].

COUNT FIVE
(Conflict of Interest - Former Client)
96.

Paragraphs 1 through 95 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully

set forth herein.
97.

to,
The conduct d.escribed in paragraphs 1 through 96, including, but not limited 10,

the First and Second Releases, Respondent's representation of Colleen and Berkshire in the
Taylor litigation, and Respondent's deposition of Beth constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.9 [Conflict of interest relating to former clients].
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WHEREFORE based on the matters alleged above, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Respondent as follows:
That Respondent

be~

suspended from the practice of law; placed upon an appropriate

probation; be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred in investigating and prosecuting this
matter; and such other relief as is deemed necessary and proper.

DATED this --,--(ro_(1_",,:, day of

_ _ _ , 2009.
_~

Br~6~

Bar Counsel

COMPLAINTCOMPLAINT - 31

001609

.....

-

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

(~
l (1.:--

J ¥'

~

day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2009, I served a true and

cOITect copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT upon the following by U.S. certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the Respondent's last known address as filed with the Idaho State Bar:

Thomas O.
G. Maile IV
O. Maile IV, PA
Law Offices of Thomas G.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

j1A~
Bradley G. Andrews
Bar Counsel
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P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants
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6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
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wife,
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Case No. CV OC 07 23232
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CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, f/kla
TAYLOR,
f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; R. JOI-IN TAYLOR, an
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS
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Defendants.
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STATE
ST
A TE OF IDAHO

23
24
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) ss.
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25
26
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AFFIDA
VIT OF COUNSEL
AFFIDAVIT
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
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LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of
1
2

3

Clark and Feeney, attorneys for all Defendants in the above entitled matter. The information

contained herein is of my own personal knowledge.

4

2. I am attaching hereto true and correct copies of the following documents:

5

a.

6

Exhibit A is the Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's
Lien and Denying Plaintiffs' Motionfor Sanctions entered by the trial cOUli on March

7

15,2010 in Taylor v. Maile, Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 004730, as well as the
8

Affidavit of Greg Charlton and the letter from Virgil Garland to which the Court

9

referred in its order.

10
11

b.

12

Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the testimony of John Woods at the October
11,
II, 2006 trial of Mailes' unjust emichment claim in Taylor v. Maile.

13

c.

Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision & Order elated

14

July 28,2005 filed in the Taylor v. Maile, Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D.

15
16
17

18

d.

Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the April 14,2004 correspondence from me
to Bart W. Harwood.
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DATED this ~ day of A:I, 201 ~

19
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LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _<1_ day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

9

10
11

o
o

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

/~r

o
o
o

12
13
14
15

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO
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3
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;AR 15 2010
5
6

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

w. TAYLOR
cONNIE W.
ATTORNEY
Case No. CVOC 04004730°8.743-9516

7

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
8
VS.

9

10

11

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF
VENDEE'S LIEN AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS

12

Defendants/Counter··Claimants.
13

14
15

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiff,

16
17

vs.

18

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

19

20

Defendants.
21
22
23

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's

24

Lien and on Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard oral argument on December 14,

25

2009. Connie Taylor appeared for the Plaintiffs and Christ Troupis appeared for the Defendants. At
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - Page I
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the hearing, the Court expressed approval that Defendants had obtained outside counsel and
1

2
3

provided time for Mr. Troupis to familiarize himself with this litigation. The Court allowed
Plaintiffs thirty days to suppl)') e..vidence in support of the argument that they are unable to secure a

4

loan against the Property and allowed Defendants thirty days to respond to such evidence. Finally,

5

the Court encouraged the parties to work together toward a resolution of this matter and ordered the

6

parties to meet and confer by February 19, 2010. The Court considered the mattt:r fully under

7

advisement on February 19, 2010.
8

Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included drafting
9

the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, overseeing the administration of
10
11

the trust, and representing the estate after Johnson's death. The underlying transaction in this case is

12

a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson

13

entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase of forty acres in Eagle, ID" which Maile

14

had previously advised Johnson not to convey to a third party. The purchase price was $400,000 and

15

the Property was conveyed by the successor trustee after Johnson passed away. Beneficiaries of the

16

trust brought suit.
17

On July 21, 2006, tht: Court held that the land sale was void pursuant to Idaho law and
18
19

ordered the land be returned to Plaintiffs and the purchase money be returned to Defendants. The

20

Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's judgment on January 30, 2009. On December 31,2007,

21

Maile filed a new complaint against the beneficiaries and their attorneys, once again contesting

22

ownership of the Property. Maile filed a second lis pendens on May 25, 2008. On July 2, 2009, the

23

Honorable Judge Richard Greenwood dismissed all of Maile's claims under the doctrines of issue

24

and claim preclusion. On November 6, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its Order Denying
2S
26
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Motion for Pennissive Appeal. In that litigation, the beneficiaries' counterclaims remain to be
1

2
3

resolved. Defendants have indicated an intention to appeal Judge Greenwood's ruling dismissing
Maile's claims at the conclusion of that litigation.

4

On May 7, 2009, th~: Court entered an Order Denying Motion to Compel Payment of

5

Judgment and Interest, holding that it was the intention of this Court in its July 21, 2006 order to

6

void the underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the

7

transaction and that because the Property had not been returned free of encumbrance, it was not the

8

time to order a return of the purchase money. On August 3, 2009, Defendants filed a release of the
9

May 2006 lis pendens and filed a notice of vendee's lien on the Property. Subsequently, Plaintiffs
10
11

sought an order releasing Defendants' vendee's lien. On October 14, 2009, the Court denied

12

Plaintiffs' motion for an order releasing Defendants' vendee's lien, holding that as a matter of

13

equity, Defendants are entitled to maintain a lien against the Property to secure the retUnl of the

14

purchase price.

15

At this time, Defendants seek an order foreclosing the vendee's lien, contending that

16

judgment has been entered in favor of Defendants but that Plaintiffs have made no effort to satisfy
that judgment. Plaintiffs counter that continuing litigation constitutes a cloud on the titk which
18

19

prevents Plaintiffs from obtaining a loan secured by the Property to satisfy the judgment.

20

Plaintiffs have provided evidence which indicates that Plaintiffs have contacted at least two

21

financial institutions with the intention of obtaining a $400,000 loan secured by the Property and

22

that Plaintiffs have been denied such a loan as a result of the pending motion to foreclose vendee's

23

lien and the pending suit before Judge Greenwood. The Court finds that it is Defendants' actions

24

which prevent Plaintiffs from satisfying the judgment at this time. Defendants' attempt to enforce
25

26
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this Court's judgment, while simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to c:hallenge that
1

2

judgment, is disingenuous. The Court has previously held that Defendants are entitled to a return of

3

the purchase price. Further, the Court finds that the continued existence of the vend(~e's lien filed

4

(;:nter an
August 3, 2009 is sufficient tQ
to secure the return of the purchase price. The Court will not t:nter

5

order foreclosing the vendee's lien while there is pending litigation between these parties

6

challenging the title of the Property. Defendants' Motion for Order Foreclosing Vendee's Lien is

7

DENIED.
8

Plaintiffs request that the Court sanction Defendants for bringing this motion to foreclose,
9

arguing that the motion is frivolous. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)( 1) states in pertinent part:
10
11

12
13

14

15
16
17
18

19

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, infonnation, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or- needless increase in the
litigation....
cost of litigation
.... If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court's decision whether to impose
sanctions is one of abuse of discretion. Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 112, 113-14, 867 P.2d 986,

20

987-88 (1994). "The power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on
21

discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the overalJl
overalll course of a
22
23

'''Rt~asonableness
lawsuit." Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22,23,773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1989). '''Rt:asonableness

24

under the circumstances' is the appropriate standard to apply under I.R.C.P. Rule 11." Riggins v.

25

Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). "When detennining whether Rule 11
II

26
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sanctions should be imposed, the trial court must only consider the attorney's conduct in the filing
1

2

3

of pleadings, motions or other papers." [d.
Defendants paid $400,000 for the Property in January 2004. The Court has voided the land

4

sale and ordered repayment of the purchase price. Defendants have made repeated requests for

5

satisfaction of judgment. Prior to this motion, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding

6

that Plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the judgment.
jUdgment. Plaintiffs' efforts to determine the value of the

7

Property and to obtain a lo<m against the Property appear to have resulted from this motion.

8

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants' motion to foreclose the vendee's lien is not without a
9

basis in law or fact and was reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is
10
11

DENIED.

12
13

IT IS SO ORDERED.
14
15

c.;r9r

Dated this _f_ day of March, 2010.

16

17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
2S
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1

1

I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lday
March, 2010, 1caused
I caused a true and correct copy
day of
ofMarch,
2

3

of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF
VENDEE'S LIEN AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

4

5
6
7
8
9

10

Connie Taylor
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

~)

Christ Troupis
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P.o. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

~

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

11

12
13

1. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Co
County.,4U~UjY"
Ada CountyyKllID9V

14

15
16
17

18
19

20

21
22

23
24
25

26
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Fror

Known

Page: 2/5

t~. . . ~

Date: 1/13/20108:15::

/I
...."
""-'III

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1229 Main Street

P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 4837

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,

)

and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

)

)
)
)
V5.
)
)
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
)
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
)
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
)
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
)
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
)

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG CHARLTON

)

)
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
TRUST,
mu~
))

)
Plaintiff,

)

)
)

VS.

)

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN,
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 55.

County of Ada
AFFIDAVIT OF Greg Charlton

'I

I

1

GFI FAX
FAXmaker
This fax was received by (;FI
maker fax server. For more information, visit: http://www.gfi.com
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Fror,

known

Date 1/13/20108:15

Page: 3/5

'-'

'-'

11

Greg Charlton, being flrst
fIrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1,
I, I am a Senior Vice President of Idaho Independent Bank, and have held that position
for _10
__ years. I have been engaged in the banking profession for _40__
_ 40__ years, fmd
fUld have
_10__
many years of experience in the processing of conunercial and real property loans.
2.

Idaho Independent Bank
Bank. has received an inquiry from John Taylor about the

possibility of extending a Imm
lmm for approximately $400,000.

In conjunction with that inquiry" I

was informed of the following:
A.

That the loan would be secured by 40 acres of unimproved real property

near E::l.gte,
E:igle, Idaho which is owned by the Johnson Trust.
B.

en(;wubered by a vendee's lien in the am.ount
That the property is en(;wnbered

()f

$400,000 less any costs and interest awarded, and that there is a pending
motion to foreclose on that lien.

C.

That there is a second lawsuit pending relating to the ownership of the
property.

3.

Based upon the facts as represented, Idaho Independent Bank would not considt::r

making a loan on this property.
DATED this _12
_ _ day of January, 2010.
_12_

Greg Ch

n

AFFIDAVIT OF Greg Charlton

This fax was received by e;FI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://VVINW.gficom
http://VVINW.gfLcom
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Frot.
Frat.
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Page: 4/5

Date: 1/13/20108:15:.
1/13/20108:15:,

'-'

"-'

1

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of January, 2010.

(:;iaw.4
(:;iGW-4 A

~J

Notary Public in and for the S~at9 of Idaho.
Residing at sf{o I U J oJ( ~ therein.
My commi
ssion expires:
",8:J1.Q
commission
'2 i./
t/// "2.01.Q

d

AFFlDA VTT OF Greg Charlton
AFFlDAVTT

'1 r/ (

3

This fax was received by C;FI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://Vv'VvW.gfi.com
http://Vv'V'fflgficom
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Date 1/13/2010 8: 15

Page: 5/5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13#1 day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a
tIUe
we and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State
Eagle, 10
lD 83616

Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
X 2
Y (F. AX)/
Eagle, ID 83616t3X
ec.oyYCF.
AX)//\.
8361 6 ?
ec.oy
/\.

,/ --j
&vt

.1

/

l

.'

e W. Taylot---Taylor .. _-- -,
'- Attorney for Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA
VIT OF Greg CbarUon

/
.I

J

4

This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://\NINWgfi.com
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January 11i\
ih, 2010
Mr. John Taylor
P.D.Box 538
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Dear John,
Thank you for your inquiry regarding acquisition and real estate development loans
with Sterling Savings Banle.
It is with regret that I inform you that, at the present time Sterling Savings Bank has a

moratorium on making real estate development loans ( commercial or residential real
estate), as well as bare land loans, or non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans,
given our portfolio mix and current economic conditions.
It is my understanding that the property discussed has been in litigation for a number

of years. That fact would cause additional concerns which would be an impediment to
obtaining financing.

Ir

.Pres.lCommercial Banker

· ~~~
~ff.~r~.
~h.~p""~.®
..... ~t\.~n~\J!
~t\.~n~\J! • ~
ST

.@

I

SAVINGS BANK
BANK~"
~

sterlingsavingsbank.com
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1
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13
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16
17
18
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Page 332

A. Yes.
Q. There is no indication, in the record, that
Mr. Maile said, wait Ted, you told me you would sell me
this property. So] want to purchase the property; and
you shouldn't sell it to Franz Witte?
No .. I don't recall :reading anything like
A. No..
that.
Q. So, in fact, the evidence would tend to
enforce. the
support the claim that he did not try to enforce.the
verbal discussion that they had had; correct?
A. I assume so.
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
THE COURT: All right. May the witness be
excused?
Yes, Your Honor.
MS. TAYLOR: YeS,YourHonor.
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grober.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.

1
2

3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

20
(The witness left the stand at 11:54 a.m.)
21
22
THE COURT: Are you ready to call your next
23 witness? We can take a five-minute break, if you like.
24
MS. TAYLOR: A break would be great.
25
THE COURT: Okay.. Let's take five, and then you

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR::
Q. Would you please state your name.
A. John Wood.
Q. Would you spell your last name.
A. W-O-O-D.
Q. Mr. Wood, where do you reside?
A. At 3390 Flint Drive, Eagle, Idaho.
Q. And how are you employed:'
A. I work for a corporation called Park Hampton
LLC.
Q. What position do you hold with Park Hampton?
A. Land acquisition and development services, in
bringing the projects through the cities.
Q. And what, specifically, are your duties at
Park Hampton LLC?
A. Coordinating with the engineers, the surveys,
the applications to the City, and also presenting to the
City, and getting the properties ready for development,
to be sold to the open market.
Q. And does Park Hampton own any properties in
the Eagle area?
A. It owns approximately -- about a hundred
and -- just shy of 100 acres.

Page 333

Page 331

1
Q. What stage of development is this land in?
2
A. All of them are in final plat. Some of them
3 have been sold over the last year, which was
4 Covenant Hill, off of Eagle. It was ajoint effort with
5 Hillview Development.
Q. How does the property Park Hampton already
6
7 owns compare geographically to the Linder Road property?
B
A. It's all within the -- as the City would call
9 it, is the mile - the expansion mile property.
10
l O WWe
e have -- currently we have the property --11 16 acres of commercial, right across from the new Eagle
12 Island State Park, that we've been working "vith
""ith the Parks
13 Department and the State ofldaho, with the Governor's
14 office, for the new entrance for Eagle Island State Park.
(Recess taken 11 :54 a.m. to. 12:02 p.m.)
15
This land continues, goes up. There's about
16 350 homes behind Eagle High School that is -- some has
THE COURT: Please be seated.
17 already been through preliminary plat, some is through
Ms. Taylor, are you ready to call your next
18 final plat.
witness?
19
And it's probably about less than a half mile
MS. TAYLOR: Weare, Your Honor. We call
20 away, this property.
John Wood.
21
Q. Mr. Wood, has your LLC made an offer to
JOHN WOOD,
22 purchase the Linder Road property from the Johnson Trust?
A. We've -- we've asked to -- to put in an
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
23
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified; 24 offer. But we have not put in an offer, because of the
pl:ndens and
as follows:
25 litigation, and where it stands with the lis pt:ndens

can call your next witness. Are we still on track to end
by 2:00, do you think?
Ms. Taylor?
4
MS. TAYLOR: Pardon?
THE COURT: Do you think we're still on track to
5
6 fmish by 2:00?
7
MS. TAYLOR: I believe so, yes.
S
THE COURT;
8
COURT: And, Mr. Charney, do you have a
9 rebuttal witness?
10
MR. 'CHARNEY;
'CHARNEY: Currently, yes. We'll discuss it.
THE COURT: Okay.
11
12
MR. CHARNEY: Thanks.
1
2
3

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

I!

81 (Pages 330 to 333)

Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
345·3704
www.etucker.net

EXHIBIT'

12.

~
001625

Taylor v. Maile

10/11/2006
Page 336

Page 334
1 the timing of the market of this property.
2
Q. Okay. Had you previously submitted an offer,
3 through Doug Crandall's office?
4
A. Yes, we have.
5
Q. What was the amount offered?
6
A. 1.8 million.
7
Q. And that offer did not disclose Park Hampton
8 as the purchaser, did it?
9
A. Normally, none of the properties that we buy
10 will ever disclose Park Hampton from its initial buying.
11
Q. Why is that?
12
A. Because of the price of the land. When we
13 bought it -- Flynn Estates, we had to buy ten 5-acre
14 parcels in order to own the CC and Rs. There was 14
15
lS pieces of property. And as people know who is buying it,
16 or actively looking at that, a lot of times the price
town--
17 will change. Whether it's a Wal-Mart coming to town
18 you'll never know it is a Wal-Mart until the property has
19 already been bought.
20
Q. SO it's not unusual to make the offer through
21 somebody else?
22
A. A lot oftimes. It's always done through
23 attorneys, as a client, attorney-clie:nt privilege to-to -
24 to be able to make the offer.
25
2S
Q. If you acquire this property, what would your

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the front, they're very narrow in the front and very wide
lots in the rear. And for long-term marketability, and
for the properties to hold their resale value with the
market, 5-acre pieces normally are a -- have to be a
square, long entrance.
When people drive up the driveway, they like
the feel -- of the marketing side is, they like to feel
that they have a large piece ofland, and a -- where
their home sits as a focal point of the land, and not a
narrow driveway with fences bordering each side.
Q. Is that the reason why you would have the
land replatted?
A. I would immediately have it replatt,!d,
replatt,~d, and I
would make a more of a grand entrance on the front. And
and -
redesign the road, and put a loop road in there, and·_
except a straight road back, for marketability and for
long-term value, to hold its value.
Q. SO, in making a determination to offer
$1.8 million for this property, did you take into
consideration the improvements that have been placed on
it up to this point?
A. Basically, the improvements that are on the
property right now - anytime that we buy a piece of
property, or if we buy something that has already been
preplatted, we take an accountability that we more than

Page 335
1

2
3

4
5
6

7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

plan be to do with it?
MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Well, no. I think it is relevant,
under this -- under the context
context. Go ahead. I'll
overrule the objection.
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can go ahead and answ
A. The plans with this property would be to -first, to go ahead and get it resurveyed, get the -- find
out the water rights and the land use. Right now, in the
City of Eagle and the county. this property is dedicated
to five acres and above. It's on what they call -- north
ofLind<:r, which will all be
of Beacon Light and East ofLind<:T,
staying 5-acre parcels.
Then, what we would do is, we would go in and
-- right now, the
redesign the property. We would .current plat is long, pinwheel, nan'ow lots.
Q. Okay. And there's a copy of that in the
notebook up there by you, if you would tum to Exhibit
No. 122.

Page 337
1

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19
19
20
20
21
(Witness complied.)
21
22
22
23
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you explain to the Court 23
24 what you mean by your reference to pinwheel lots.
24
25
A. If you look the way the lots are designed in
! 25
2S

improvemen;ts, as - so
likely will not use any of those improvemenits,
that we can know how to maximize our dollars and be able
to improve the best value for the land.
Q. SO does the offer, as it sits, include
additional value because of the improvements?
A. No. It does not.
Q. Is this offer any more than you would pay if
it were just raw land?
A. No. It would not.
Q. I would like to have you tum to the
photographs that are at Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 133.
To lay a foundation, have you been to this
property recently?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Can you just look through those photos and
tell me if they're a true and accurate depiction of the
condition of the property?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. Specifically, does the barn that's on the
property now add any value to it, for your purposes?
A. No. The preliminary look of the bam,
there's no value to it, nor would it be the type of
subdivision that would allow that type ofbaJll there.
Q. What is the problem with the bam, as you see
it?

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
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Page
11

11

1
A. The way it sits on the property and, also,
2 it's -- as we all can tell,
telI, it's been opened and
2
3 weathered. And it's just in the wrong placement of the
3
4 property.
property.
4
5
Q. SO is there any value to the bam at all?
5
6
A. No, there's not.
6
7
Q. Will you have to pay to have it removed?
7
8
A. Almost all -- like on Flynn Estates, on the
8
9 parcels down there, that we will put a sign out front and I 9
10
lOaa lot oftimes we can get people to get the stuff moved 110
11 off. They'll come in and move the stuff ofHoI'
off for
11
12 materials.
12
13
Q. And would you have any objection to Mr. Maile 13
14 removing this bam?
14
15
A. No objection.
15
16
Q. Okay. I would like to go back to the road.
16
17 Is it Park Hamilton's intention to leave the road where
17
18 it is located?
118
19
A. No. We were -- had a tentative with
19
20 Toothman-Orton, have done an initial sketch. It would
20
21 be a loop road.
21
22
Q. This may be obvious; but if you're
22
23 replatting, will the existing lateral lines for power and
23
24 gas, telephone, things likc~ that, be left in place?
24
25
wi\! be -- ny to be, on the new plat.
A. They will
25

11

Page 340
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: Mr: Charney, you may cross-examine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHARNEY:
Q. Good afternoon, sir. How are you?
A. Good afternoon.
Park'Hampton?
Q. How long have you worked -for Park'
Hampton?
A. For two years.
Q. Where were you prior to that?
A. My family owned -- we still do -- we own
17 body shops in California.
California.
Q. SO you have only moved to Idaho in the past
two years?
A. Three years.
sorry,
Q. Three years. I'm sorry.
When this property was sold to Mr. Maile,
then, you didn't even live in this area, did you?
A. 2003 is when we first moved up, yes.
Q. Since you have moved here, you have become
somewhat familiar with the value of property in this
particular area; correct?
A. 90percent of this area; correct.
Q. The property, as it exits now, is split into
lots that are slightly larger than five acres each;

Page 339
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1
We'll by
try to keep them, if we can. But more than likely,
2
with new lot lines drawn and new roads, that they will
3
have to be moved, maybe 30 feet one way or 30 feet the
other way.
4
5
Q. Is -- is your pending offer, will it remain
6
indefinitely?
open i
ndefinitely?6
A. It will. The only thing that I am worried -7
pe{)ple in this Valley, in
8
and I believe that most pe<lple
Park Hampton, or Capital Development, or anybody, is
9
that, especially in Eagle, like Correnta Bello and
10
Covenant Hill, that the buyers are backing out faster
11
than -- you know, the lots were reserved -- a lot of the
12
lots in the new subdivisions that are on line were
13
reserved nine months, a year ago.
14
15
Now that these projects are finished,
16
Covenant Hill's only had five close and Brentabello,
I believe had about 20 more builders walk away last week. 17
So, the market is changing fast. It wasn't like it was
18
nine months or a year ago, when you had a piece of
19
property and somebody would come in and buy it.
20
Q. Is there any possibility that this offer will
21
be withdrawn if the litigation isn't concluded so you can
22
buy it?
23
A. It depends on the length of the litigation
24
and the -- the climate of the market.
25

correct?
A. Correct.
Q. That is consistent with the zoning
requirements in this particular area; correct?
A. That's -- yes.
Q. To tum these 40 acres -- it's a little less
than 40 acres, but let's call it 40 -- to tum these
40 acres into almost track housing, if you will, would be
next to impossible under current zoning laws?
A.. It's -- it's totally impossible, yeah.
A
Q. SO the best use that you could make of this
5-aere lots?
parcel, in that area currently, would be 5-acre
A. That -- at this point in time:, that's the
only thing that is -- and the City of Eagle has been
through two cornp plan changes, and it's stilI
still there.
Q. What steps have you taken to check into the
septic requirements that are in this particular area?
A. The septic, I have not checked into.
Q. You have no idea about the septic?
A. I do know that it's 1.8 acres and above, in
the City of Eagle.
Q. For a requirement; correct?
A. For a requirement.
Q. You also know that there is not sewer that
has been brought out to this particular-property yet?
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A. I'm very aware of that.
Q. You don't know anything about the wa~er table
problems that currently exist on this 40 acres, do you?
A. The water table that I do have, I hav!!
hav~
actually -- the water table on State Street, which is
down the road from this -Q. I'm talking about this particular area.
A. Right. This particular area, no.
Q. Okay. You weren't aware of the fact that
Mr. Maile actually designed this pinwheel pattern because
of the septic requirements and the water table in this
area; correct?
A. I -- from my knowledge, }, don't believe that
there is a water table problem up there.
Q. But you don't know this, do you?
A. No. But a friend of mine owns the property
across the street.
Q. SO, you are speculating" now, on what some
friend of yours told you about tbe property; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. So, your knowledge -A. And he's a professional.
Q. SO, your knowledge, sir, is you don't know
anything about the septic requirements or the water table
issues on this particular parcel of property, do you?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

a
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to do that as opposed to selling it in its current
condition.
THE COlJRT: l'1\
l'II overrule the objection.
. THE WITNESS: The -- the target market would be
about 350 to 450, depending on -- on the lot. The
problem, now, anytime that you do a subdivision, say down
Beacon'Light, now Osprey or any of the others, is your
resale.
Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
A. Right now, the resale value, the way these
are designed, would be very, very tough sa]es at the
current design of it.
don't know whether or not somebody
Q. But you .don't
would or would not purchase these lots currently, do you?
A. Right now it would be a very tough sale.
Q. You're saying that once you have replatted
it, that the lots would be worth anywhere from $350- to
$450,000?
A. Correct.
Q. What's the current value of the lots?
A. At the current value, we're probably looking
about -- probably the 250, 275. But that is also with
improvements which, if you look how long the celtain
ce!tain
properties are, the fencing and the buffering
requirements would eat a ton of that to start
sta"rt out.

Page 343
1
1
A. No. I do not.
2
Q. You don't know that Mr. Maile chose the
2
3 pinwheel design to accommodate the high water table and 3
4 the septic requirements for this area; correct?
4
5
5
A. No. I do not.
6
Q. You also don't have any guarantee, from the
6
7 City, that you, in fact, would be: successful in
7
B replatting this property to fit the 5-acre lots that you
8
9 envision would be more saleable?
9
10
A. That's false. I've spoken to the City many
10
11 times on this property.
11
12
12
Q. And they've guaranteed you you could replat
13 it that way?
13
14
14
A. Correct.
15
15
Q. Okay. And you've got documentation to back
16 that up?
16
17
17
A. No. But I -- I'm at the City on a biweekly
18 basis.
18
19
19
Q. Okay. Once you replatted this, what would be
20 the value of the lots?
20
21
MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance, beyond the
1 21
!
22 scope of direct.
I122
22
23
corot 23
MR. CHARNEY: He's talking about he wants to comt
24 in and rip this whole thing apart and start from scratch.
i 24
25 So, I would like to know why this individual would choos~ 25

PagE~
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Q. But, nevertheless, you're saying current
value of these lots is 250 to 275,000. And if you were
successful in replatting, you could sell them for 350 to
450?
A. Correct.
Q. SO, roughly about 100,000 mow per lot, give
or take?
A. Well, the main thing here is -- I think what
you're missing is, it's the resale value. You can buy
something, but it's to have the people that can build the
c.ould get the proper
estate home on the property, so they could
value down the road.
Q. You've made no application, though, to the
City, to actually have this replatted; correct?
A. No.
Q. And you don't know where, if you wen~ to
replat this into these lots that you envision, the septic
would have to be required on each lot; correct?
A. The septic will be required on each
eaeh lot.
Q. Right. But you don't where, on each lot, the
conect?
septic would wind up having to go; coneet?
A. Well, I've -- I've spent --I don't want to
get exact, but huge amounts of dollars with
firm here in
Toothman-Orton, which is an engineering finn
town, and all the way up to Floating Feather.
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1

2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9
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14
15
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23
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25

And just with doing Covenant Hill, next to
the middle school up there, we have had no seepage or
water issues, anything, from about the high school up
north.
Q. Okay. So your vi,~w is, you could replat this
into squares, as.opposed to a pinwheel, and you could ge
a septic permit for each lot?
A. Unless there was something out there that we
did not know.
We'n talk about that later.
Q. We'll
you, No further questions.
MR. CHARNEY: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Now, hang on a second sir.
Do you have any Tl~direct
TI~direct examination?
MS. TAYLOR: I don't.
THE COURT: May (ae
the witness be excused?
MS. TAYLOR: Hernay.
AIl right, sir. You are excused.
THE COURT: AII
Thank you.
Thalllk you very much.
THE WITNESS: ThalIlk
THE COURT: And you can just leave those right
there. Thanks.
Th11llk you.
THE WITNESS: Th11Ilk
(The witness left the stand at 12:21 p.m.)

1

2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

another partner and worked, in the '70s, on lands
throughout the Idaho, Washington, Idaho, Montana area,
area.
Obtained an MAl designation. Kept appraising counties
all across the United States; Tennessee, Nashville,
Mobile, Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho.
Then sold that business, in 1988, and w(~nt
into appraising, with myself and my son, which I've been
Clarkston,
doing ever since out of my home in Clarkston.
Q. And during the course of that, have you had
continuing education?
A. Oh, l'vetaken
I've taken 15 to 20 classes.
classes, They
require -- well, the initial education for the MAl
designation was about 200 hours of classroom education,
plus demonstration reports and exams. And then, since
then, I have been obtaining about 16 to 20 hours per
education,
year, as required by all three states, for education.
Q. And what states are you certified in,
presently?
A. Idaho, Washington, and Oregon.
Q. Have you also taught continuing education
classes?
different courses;
A. Well, I've taught three differerlt
one at the University ofIdaho, another for Lewis Clark
State College. And the other was a private course that I
gave on bell curve appraising.

Page 347
1
2
3
4
5

Page 349
1
2

THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, you may call your
witness,
next witness.
MS. TAYLOR: Call Terry Rudd.

3
4

5
6
TERRY RUDD,
7 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff,
7
8 having been fIrst
first duly sworn, was examined and testified
testifIed 8
B
9
9 as follows:
10
10
11
11
DIRECT EXAMINATION
12
12 BY MS. TAYLOR:
13
13
Q. Would you state your name, please.
14
14
A. Terry Rudd, R-U-D-D.
15
15
Q. Mr. Rudd, how are you employed?
16
16
A. A real estate app:raiser.
17
Q. Can you give the Court the background on your 17
18
18 real estate appraisal expetience.
19
19
A. Well, I started in 1957 for the Forest
20
20 Service. And, in 1963, I went into business with
21
21 Mr. Tom Clifton, here in Boise. We had an office here
21
22
22 on State Street and one iTl Lewiston. And we started
1
23
23 appraising timberlands, highways, right of ways, power )23
1
24
24 lines.
124
1
25
25
And, eventually, he retired and I took on
1
6

!

Q. Mr. Rudd, are you familiar with the property
located on Linder Road that is currently owned by the
Johnson Trust?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you first become familiar with that
property?
A. Someone from your firm, either yourself or
Tom, asked me to appraise the property, which involved a
trip to Boise. I went out and inspect(~d the property,
with Dallan Taylor. And I contacted realtors, went to
the MLS and looked at comparable sales, and then came up
with a value determination.
Q. And are -- is the contact with realtors and
looking at comparable sales in the MLS the type of
normally rely on in forming
information that appraisers normaIly
their opinions?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you prepare an appraisal report as a
result of your review of the property?
A. I completed the appraisal. And then I
verbally relayed the information to your fiml. And then
it was requested that I produce a minimal report, which
is a restricted use report.
Q. Okay. Do you have that report with you
today?
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~JL,""D-"-'L'-O.

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

F ADA

3
4

REED TAYLOR, DALLAl-J" TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

5

7

8

9

10
11

Case No. CVOC0400473D

Plaintiffs,! Counter
..Defendants,
Counter··Defendants,

6

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER

vs.
THOMAS MAlLE,
MAILE, N and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants.

12

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to DismissIMotion
DismisslMotion for
13

Summary Judgment, the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to
14
15

Amend, Defendants' Motions: to Strike, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. On June 13,2005, the Court

16

heard oral arguments regarding the motions. After considering the briefs and arguments of the

17

parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES Defendants' Motion to

18

Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment,

19

DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants' Motions to Strike.

20

I. BACKGROUND
21

Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included
22
23
24
25

26

drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the
administration ofthe trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate.
The underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Page 1
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-of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest
1

2

money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, ID. The purchase price was $400,000.

3

Maile later assigned his interest in the purchase money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC.

4

The assignment was approved by Beth Rogers acting for Theodore Johnson through a power of

5

attorney. Johnson died of cancer before title was conveyed. After Johnson's death, co-trustees Beth

6

Rogers and Andrew Rogers conveyed title to Berkshire Investments and executed a warranty deed on

7

behalf of the trust as seller. The title was subject to a deed of trust, which was paid in full on January
8

04,2004.
9

10

On January 22, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson

11

Trust, filed a lis pendens against the 40 acres in Eagle. On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a

12

lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the sale. Plaintiffs

13

claimed the property at the time Maile entered into the earnest money agreement with Johnson was

14

worth at least $1.2 million.

Plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Maile,

15

arguing Maile owed Theodore Johnson a fiduciary duty by virtue of their attorney client relationship
16

and that Maile breached this duty by not dealing fairly with Johnson, not advising Johnson to consult
17
18

independent counsel, paying less than fair market value for the property, and offering to purchase the

19

property on tenns unfavorable to Johnson. Plaintiffs also asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim

20

realtor/broker, alleging he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
against Maile in his capacity as a realtorlbroker,

21

deal honestly with Johnson and by purchasing the property for less than fair market value. Finally,

22

Plaintiffs asserted professional negligence claims against Maile in his capacity as attorney and as real

23

estate broker.

24
25

26
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Maile answered the complaint and then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the residual
1

2

beneficiaries lacked standing to bring every asserted cause of action. On April 23, 2004, the Co

3

th{: Plaintiffs based upon a lack of standing. The Court found that th
dismissed the claims of tht:

4

Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust and only the trustee could bring a claim. The Plaintiffs hav

5

appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. However, a Counterclaim filed by Defendants is stil

6

ongoing on that case.

7

On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants. Plaintiffs were believed t
8

be the new co-trustees of the trust. The original trustees supposedly transferred their status as trustee
9

10

to the Plaintiffs.

11

On September 29, 2004 the Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated.

12

On November 17, 2004, the Honorable Christopher Bieter entered an order appointing th

13
14

Plaintiffs as co-successor trustees of the Trust.

On April 13, 2005, Judge Bieter set aside th

November 17, 2004 order. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter allowed the Plaintiffs to be appointed a

15

successor trustees, but denied their request to be appointed retroactively.
16

II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND
17

18

Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to clarify their status as trustees.

19

amendments to relate back to the time of the filing of the complaint. Basically, Plaintiffs seeks t

20

have their status as trustees applied retroactively to the time of the filing of the complaint.

21
22
23

The trial court has the discretion to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to amend.
Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195, 196 (2000). Motions to amend a pleading under IRCP Rul
15(a)
IS(a) should be liberally granted by the court. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342

24

345 (2001). Rule 15(a) states that motions to amend at this stage in a case should be "freely give
25
26
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when justice so requires." LRCP Rule 15(a).
l5(a). The Court must consider the potential prejudice to th
1

2
3

opposing party when deciding on a motion to amend. Jordan v. Cnty of Los Angele~, 669 F.2d 1311
(9th Cir. 1982).

4

Plaintiffs argue that IRCP 15(c) and 17(a) allow for the amendment to relate back to the tim

5

15(c) allows amendments to relate back to the time of the filin
of the filing of the complaint. IRCP 15(c)

6

of the complaint if they arose out of the same conduct set forth in the complaint. IRCP 17(a) provide

7

that all actions shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
8

In Hayward, the Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to change the representativ
9

10

capacity in which he brought the suit. The plaintiff had sued as a personal representative of

11

decedent's estate and he wanted to sue as an heir of the estate. The court allowed him to make thi

12

change.

13

14

, The Hayward court noted that "the good faith of the plaintiff and prejudice experienced by the
defendant are factors to consider .... Ru1e 17(a) is not intended to validate claims filed without any

15

real basis but with the hope that a proper party will eventually materialize in order to benefit from
16

suspended statutes of limitation. However, this principle has no application to cases in which
17

18
19
20

substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid injustice." Id. at 348 (citing Conda
Co.. Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 922 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).
Partnership, Inc. v. M.D. Constr. Co..
The Hayward court also noted "that courts from other jurisdictions have applied a more

21

lenient standard to the relation back of a motion to amend that primarily centers around the capacity

22

in which the plaintiff brings the action." Id.

23

Defendants argue that the suit was not filed in good faith, but they do not claim any prejudice.
24

Because Title 68 of the Idaho Code specifically provides that a trustee may not delegate his office and
25
26
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mandates that a court must a appoint a trustee, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should have known
1
2
3

that they were not legal trustt::es when they filed suit on June 21, 2004.
The Court finds no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. It appears that they were

4

not aware of their error until receiving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in October. Plaintiffs then

5

applied to the court to be appointed as trustees. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs'

6

Motion to Amend. The Court finds that the amendments relate back to the time of the filing of the

7

complaint.
8

Ill. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
9
10

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is based on the failure of the Plaintiffs to file suit as trustees.

11

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs were not properly appointed trustees when they filed suit,

12

the case should be dismissed. However, due to the Court's granting of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend,

13

this argument fails. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.

14

IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

15

Defendants have also filed motions for partial summary judgment seeking the dismissal of (1)
16

Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as a real estate broker; (2) Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an
17
18

attorney; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief.

A. MAILE AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER

19
20

21
22

23

24

Maile argues that there was no relationship between himself as a broker and Plaintiffs. Idaho
Code §54-2084 provides:
(1) A buyer or seller is not represented by a brokerage in a regulated real estate

transaction unless the buyer or seller and the brokerage agree, in a separate written
document, to such reprt::sentation. No type of agency representation may be asswned
by a brokerage, buyer or seller or created orally or by implication.
IC 54-2084.

25
26
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There was no written representation agreement in this case. As a result, The Court finds that
1

there was no broker-client re:lationship, and thus no claims against Maile in his capac:ity as a broker

2

can survive.

3

Plaintiffs also argue that Maile violated Idaho law by acting as a realtor and failing to

4
5

obtain a written representation agreement in violation ofIdaho Code §54-2085. However, the

6

Court finds that while Maile could be subject to discipline for violating Idaho Code §54-2085,

7

the disciplinary sections provided for in this section do not allow for clients suing the broker.

8

The Idaho Real Estate Commission handles disciplinary matters in this area.
9

Plaintiffs further argue that because Maile did not disclose to the Trust that the appraisal
10
I

11

conducted was defective and the property was worth more, he violated his Idaho Code §54-2086

12

duties as a customer. However, as Maile points out, a customer owes "no duty to independently

13

verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation made by the seller or any

14

source reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable." IC §54-2086(2). Maile also argues that the

15

appraisal was an opinion, not a material fact that required disclosure. The Court agrees with Maile's

16

arguments and consequently finds that no issue of material fact exists with respect to this claim.
17

NUULEASANATTORNEY
B. MAILE
AS AN ATTORNEY
18
19

20
21

To establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action, the plaintiff
must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard of care by the
lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause ofthe
damages suffered by the plaintiff.
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590 (2001).

22
23

. Plaintiffs have provided the affidavit of Richard MoBerup,
Mollerup, their legal expert, who claims that

24

Maile violated his fiduciary duties, violated his ethical duties and was negligent, all of which were the

25

proximate cause of damages to the Plaintiffs.

26
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Plaintiffs claim that Maile had a conflict of interest. On one hand, as a lawyer" he was
1

2

3

supposed to help the Trust get the best price for its land, on the other hand, as a purchaser, he wanted
get the land for the lowest possible price.

4

1. Attorney-Client Relationship
5
6

Defendants argue that no attorney-client relationship existed between Maile and the Trust at

7

the time Maile purchased the: property. Maile had represented 10hnson
Johnson in various matters in the ten

8

years prior to the land purchase. Maile represented 10hnson
Johnson with respect to an offer (the Witte offer)

9

that was made in May 2002 on the same property that Maile later bought. Maile claims his

10

representation ended after his work dealing with this offer because he performed no further work for

11

the Trust. Beth Rogers wrote Maile a letter in May 2003 declining further representation by him.
12

Maile never did formally tenninate the relationship. The Court finds that Rogers did terminate the
13

14
15
16

relationship in May 2003. The Comment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states:
If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the
client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing
basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client
clientlawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing,

17
18

so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's
affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so.
IRPC 1.3 cmt.

19

Maile had served the Trust in various matters for the past ten years. The Cowt finds that
20

there is a material issue of fact about the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
21
22

2. Breach of the Standard of Care

23

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show that Maile breached the standard of care for an
24

attorney. Plaintiffs' legal expert, Richard Mollerup, states that he felt that Maile breached his
25

26
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fiduciary obligations to the Trust because the tenns of the transaction under which Maile purchased
1

2

the subject property from the trust were not fair and reasonable.

3

Mollerup notes that se:veral provisions in the Purchase Agreement and Deed of Trust were

4

irregular and favorable to Maile. Defendants contend that these irregularities are irrelevant to the

5

issue of whether the deal was fair. However, Mollerup also states that the purchase price itself was

6

unfair, considering it was identical to an offer previously rejected by Maile.

7

Additionally, Defendcmts argue that Maile complied with Rules 1.8 and 1.9 of the Idaho Rules
8

of Professional Conduct because Maile told Johnson of his right of seek independent counsel at least
9
10

twice. Plaintiffs claim that Maile made no such representations. Based on the above, the Court finds

11

that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the representations were made and as to whether a

12

breach of the standard of care occurred.

13

3. Damages
14

15

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot prove any damages because Maile paid the market

16

value for the property. However, Plaintiffs have submitted appraisals and affidavits stlting that the

17

$400,000 price was far too low and that others were ready, willing and able to pay for the property.

18

Also, Maile himself had previously stated that the $400,000 price was too low. Based on these

19

assertions, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' have adequately demonstrated damages.
20

Based on the above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
21

22

Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an attorney.

C. EQUITABLE RELIEF

23
24

1. Rescission

25
26
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1

2

3

Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to
restore the parties to their original positions. It is normally granted only in those
circumstances in which one of the parties has committed a breach so material that it
destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the contract.
Blinzlerv. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971).
The Rogers, as trustees, were informed by the Taylors that the purchase price was unfair

4

5
6

The:: Rogers chose to ignore the Taylors and to accept the payment for the
before the deal was done. Tht:
property. Maile argues that the Plaintiffs are bound by the decision made by the trustees. On July 22,

7

2003, Beth Rogers told Maile that no legal action would be pursued by the Trust. "Under the
8

common law, it is well established that the party seeking rescission must act promptly once the
9

10

grounds for rescission arise. Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts

11

givin~

12

888 (2004).

rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is waived." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,

13

14

Maile argues that he relied on the Rogers' assurances in obtaining financing to develop the
subject property. Plaintiffs argue that Maile was on notice in July 2003 that they were upset about the

15

sale and that legal action was imminent. Maile argues that he did not worry about the Plaintiffs at tha
16

time because they were not trustees and had no standing to sue. Their fIrst lawsuit was dismissed due
17

18
19

20

to a lack of standing. Maile relied on the assertions of the trustees, at that time, Beth and Andy
Rogers.
, The Court finds that the Plaintiffs, now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to

21

pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants'

22

motion with respect to this claim.

23

24

2. Constructive: Trust

25
26
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1

2
3
4

5
6
7

Constructive trusts are: raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and
justice, where there was no intention of the party to create such a relation, and often
.... If one party
title....
directly contrary to th(~ intention of the one holding the legal title
obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of
fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot
equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity carries out its
theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust
upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, and who
is considered in equity as the beneficial owner.
Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930).
In this case, it is allege:d that Maile obtained the property by violating his fiduciary obligations.

8

The Court finds that there is an issue of fact about that claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES

9

Defendants' motion with respect to the Plaintiffs' constructive trust claim.

10

3. Estoppel

11
12

13
14

Maile asserts the equitable defenses of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel against the
Plaintiffs. He argues that he rdied on the trustees' July 2003 assertions that litigation would not be
pursued when he obtained fimmcing for the development of the property. He argues that the trustees

15

cannot now change their position. The Plaintiffs argue that Maile has unclean hands because of his
16

alleged misconduct and thus cannot assert equitable remedies.
17
18
19

Because the Court finds that there is an issue of fact about Maile's unclean hands, it will not
consider estoppel as a defense at this time.

v.

20
21

22

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Defendants seek to strike Richard White's affidavit and portions of Richard Mollerup's
affidavit. Richard White is Plaintiffs' expert real estate broker. Mollerup is Plaintiffs' expert on lega

23

malpractice.
24

25
26
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'-'
Plaintiffs have objected to even hearing Defendants' motions to strike at the June 13,2005
1
2

hearing because Defendants did not comply with IRCP 7(b)(3) in filing the motions. IRCP 7(b)(3)

3

requires that motions be filed at least 14 days before the hearing. In this case, the motions to strike

4

were filed on June 6, 2005 for a June 13,2005
13, 2005 hearing. No motions to shorten time were filed.

5

Plaintiffs claimed that they did not have enough time to respond to the motions. At the hearing both

6

parties rested on the record regarding the motions to strike and no arguments were presented.

7

Because IRCP 7(b)(3) was not complied with, the Court will not entertain Defendants'
8

Motions to Strike.
9

VI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE

10

11

Plaintiffs seek to strike the testimony of Maile as it relates to any unwritten communication or
su~ject

matter of

12

agreement with the decedent, Ted Johnson, relating to the property which forms the

13

this litigation because they argue that it be inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs do not articulate exactly

14

what they wish to exclude.

15

Defendants argue that as a trustee of the Trust which is now suing Maile, Johnson's
16

statements are admissions of a party-opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). The
17

18
19

Coourt finds that Johnson's statements are admissions of a party-opponent and thus DENIES
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike

VII. CONCLUSION

20

21
22

23

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants'

24

Motions to Strike.
25
26
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''1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

2

Dated

lfa;of _~ (V
thiJ ld;of

3

2005.

/

4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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''CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8

L HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Paul Thomas Clark
CLARK & FEENEY
P.O. 'Drawer 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
P.O. Box 7426
ID 83707-7426
Boise, ill

9

10

11

Thomas G. Maile
ATTORNEY AT LAW
380 W. State Street
Eagle,ID 83616

12
13
14

:J~ day of tLtl~

correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION
indicated below, and address1ed to the following:

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO Box 2837
Boise, ill
ID 83702

,2005, I caused a true and
ORDER to be served by the method
/

(1 u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

(Iu.s.
(~.S.

Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

(~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

(ju.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(iu.s.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

15

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
_______
Ada Coun
COUll Idaho
~

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

26
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April 14, 2004
SENT VIA FACSIMILE TO: 208-395-8585
Bart W. Harwood .
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
8370 I
Boise, ill 83701
Re:

Taylor v. Maile

Dear Mr. Harwood:
My clients have reviewed the documents you e-mailed to me, and have a number of concerns.
of the trust should be distributed to her at this time. They realize they
First, Helen's Taylor's share ofthe
could make that distribution as soon as the current trustees have resigned, but they would like to
avoid the incorrect impression that the funds are going to Helen's children rather than to her.
Second, they are quite concerned with the demand that all of the Taylors release the trustees from
any potential claims and waive their right to an accounting of the trust as a precondition to them
being allowed to pursue the suit against Mr. Maile on behalf of the trust. It is extremely irregular
for a trustee to refuse to provide any accounting, but none' has been provided in this case.
of this lawsuit, as there is
Third, they need assurances that both Beth and Andy will be supportive ofthis
no getting around the fact that :at least Beth will be an essential witness. This suit was filed based
on Beth's totally unequivocal r1epresentations
r,epresentations that Mr. Maile had never informed Ted Johnson that
it was a conflict of interest for
fo:r him to enter into a business transaction with a client, had never
informed Mr. Johnson that he should seek independent counsel, had never advised he obtain an
of the property at devdopment value, and had never informed her or Andy of any ofthose
of those
appraisal ofthe
facts. In fact, she reported that she felt Mr. Maile had treated her quite unfairly, putting pressure on
her and demanding that the reall estate transaction be closed right when she was planning a funeral
for Ted, who had been like a father to her. She made these unequivocal statements at a meeting
attended by a number offamily
of family members on July 5, 2003, and acknowledged that it was the trustees'
fiduciary duty to bring an action against Mr. Maile. She repeated these statements to Reed Taylor

EXHIBIT D

.::<.r\
HIBITNO.~
EXHIBITNO.~

r.J
r,;
r\)~. '"_
.
J;;.......f:::£..%f;9.
J;;.......f:::£..%f;.9
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Bart W. Harwood
April 14, 2004
Page 2

and his son Jud when they met with her in Boise on several occasions.
concerning to us are as follows:

The events which are

1.

On July 22, 2003, I received a letter informing me that the Rogers had decided the
suit "has not thl~ merit to benefit the trust." We have never received an explanation
of the basis for this conclusion, which was entirely contrary to Beth's previous
statements. TIle letter did, however, follow a request for an accounting made by
DaHan Taylor. When I talked to Beth about the letter, she made overt threats against
Dallan
Dallan
DaHan ifhe didn't "back off."

2.

On February 23,2004, we received Mr. Maile's Answer and Counterclaim, which
attached the Jully
JuJly 22, 2003 letter to me as an Exhibit. We most certainly did not
provide him with a copy of that letter, and must assume he received it from Beth.

3.

Beth attended the hearing on Monday with Mr. Maile and his attorneys. She
appeared to be on very good tenns with all of them, and made comments in the
hallway which have caused grave concerns about where her loyalties lie"

4.

After the hearing, Beth told me unequivocally that it will not be possible to obtain all
of the signatures ofthe
of the beneficiaries by the Monday deadline the court has given us.
ofthe
Because nearly all of the beneficiaries have already assigned their rights as
beneficiaries under the Maile lawsuit to Reed Taylor and any other beneficiaries who
wish to pursue it, there is no valid basis for her insistence on obtaining all
al1 the
signatures before she and Andy resign.

My clients recognize Beth and the sisters' concerns that this action must not in any way put Ted
physicE~ state at the time of the Maile transaction in an unfavorable light.
Johnson's reputation or physicE~
Theyabsolutely share that view and have agreed to prosecute this case in a manner which will fi)cus
filCUS
on Mr. Maile's conduct only. Beth has agreed to this strategy, but now attempts to frustrate.
of the trust unless Beth will affirm
The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries ofthe
her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against
Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the
trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns. They will also require an accounting of all
distributions from the estate and nontestamentary transfers, including copies of all records relating
of his sisters. No explanation has
to the annuities which Mr. Johnson had established for the benefit ofhis

001644

'-'-
Bart W. Harwood
April 14, 2004
Page 3

ever been given on where that money has gone. We will need records establishing whether the
beneficiaries on the annuities were changed, when, by whom, and who received the funds. We also
need a copy of the power of attorney given to Beth and a summary of the actions taken pursuant to
that power of attorney.
if Beth executes an affidavit and expedites the
My clients will waive their right to these records only ifBeth
signing of the docwnents so they may proceed with the suit against Mr. Maile.
Judge Wilpur has given us only until close of business on Monday, April 19th, to either join or
substitute the trust as a plaintiff in the pending lawsuit. We would of course be able to refile, but
of opportunity to dispose of the real
deem it extremely unwise to provide Mr. Maile with a window ofopportunity
property, which may well be our only potential source of collecting on ajudgment.
Time is very critical. Dallan Taylor is in Boise and is willing to meet with you and Beth to review
and copy the changes to the docwnents described above.

Sincerely,
CLARK.
CLARK and FEENEY

By: Connie W. Taylor
CWT:st
cc:
John Taylor
Dallan Taylor
Reed Taylor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

7

8
9

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

10
11
11
12

Plaintiffs,

13

vs.

14

Case No. CV OC 0723232

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIMS

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
15

Defendants.

16
17

The Defendants submit this memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Second Motion for
18
19

•, Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.
Because the Plaintiffs in this case were the Defendants in Taylor v. Maile, the use of the

20

21 I designations "Plaintiff' and "Defendant" becomes very confusing. For the sake of clarity, we will
I

22

23

refer to the parties by name, with the Plaintiffs collectively identified as "Mailes" and the Defendants
collectively identified as "Taylors."

24

25
26
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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Mailes filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating to the Taylors'
1

counterclaims on March 17,2009. This Court denied that motion in its Memorandum Decision and

2
3

Order dated July 7, 2009, holding that there are factual issues to be determined which preclude

4

summary judgment on the Taylors' claims of slander oftitle,
of title, abuse ofprocess,
of process, and interference with

5

prospective economic adv,mtage.

6

The Mailes filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on the counterclaims on March 2,
7

2010. The brief in support of this second motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims

8
9

contains a "Statement of Uncontested Facts" which relate solely to filings and decisions in the initial

10

lawsuit relating to the Linder Road property, Taylor v. Maile. The present motion appears to be

11

premised primarily on theMailles.filingofavendee.slien and efforts to foreclose on that lien. See

12

13

Motion for foreclosure of Vendee's Lien which is attached as Exhibit B to Thomas Maile's
I

December 3,2009 Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification.
14

While titled as a motion to foreclose, rather than simply seeking repayment ofthe purchase

15

16 I price, that motion in actuality sought an order returning title to the Linder Road property to Mailes'

17

LLC. 1I

18

On March 15, 2010, Judge Wilper entered an Order Denying Defendants' Motion for

Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien. 2 In the most recent order, Judge Wilper noted that on May 7,2009,

19

20
21
21

22

I

I Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien, Exhibit B to December 3, 2009 Affidavit in Support
of Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(b). Prayer, paragraph 6, page 5, asks "that a decree
be entered adjudging and decreeing the Berkshire Investments LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the
subject property, and further ordering that the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has no right, title or interest
or claim in and to the subject real property
... "
property..."

23
24
25

26

2 A copy of that order and the bankers' statements upon which it was based are attached as Exhibit A to the
April 28, 2009 Affidavit of Counsel.
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he had entered an Order Denying Mailes' Motion to Compel Payment of Judgment and Interest,
holding that it was the intention of the court in its July 21, 2006 order "to void the underlying
1

transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction and that

2

3

because the Property had not b(:en returned free ofencumbrance,
of encumbrance, it was not the time to order a return

4

of the purchase money."

5

On the Motion to Foreclose the Vendee's lien, Judge Wilper ruled:

6

12

The Court finds that it is Defendants' [Mailes'] actions which prevent Plaintiffs
[Taylors] from satisfying the judgment at this time. Defendants' attempt to enforce
this Court's judgment, while simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to
challenge that judgment, is disingenuous. The Court has previously held that
of the purchase price. Further, the Court finds that
Defendants are entitled to a return ofthe
the continued existence of the vendee's lien filed August 3, 2009 is sufficient to
secure the return ofthe purchase price. The Court will not enter an order foreclosing
the vendee's lien while there is pending litigation between these parties challenging
the title of the Property. Defendants' Motion for Order Foreclosing Vendee's Lien
is DENIED.

13 :i

At the trial of Mailes' unjust enrichment claim in October of 2006, local developer John

7

8
9

10
11

14

Wood testified that Park Hampton, LLC (though Boise attorney Doug Crandall) had offered to

15

purchase the Linder Road property (which consists of seven lots of five acres or more) for

16

$1,800,000,3 but that the offer could be withdrawn, depending on "the length of the litigation and
17

market."4 The offer was ultimately withdrawn. 5
the - the climate of the market.,,4

18

Coldwell Banker prepared a market evaluation which indicates that in the 2005-2006 time frame,

19
20
20

21
22

Connie Shannahan of

:1
1

_

3 A copy of the written Purchase and Sale Agreement is Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor dated
April 23, 2010.

23

4

Pages 334, 339 of trial transcript, Exhibit B to Affidavit of Counsel dated April 28, 2010.

24

5

I 0 Affidavit ofR. John Taylor
April 23, 20 I0

25
26
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'-'
comparable five acre lots were selling for between $325,000 and $699,000; in contrast, between
January 2009 and 2010 a single comparable five acre lot sold for only $149,900. She suggested that
1

2

the five-acre lots on Linder Road be listed for between $125,000 and $150,000. 6 During the time

3

this property has been in litigation following Judge Wilper's order voiding the Mailes' purchase, the

4

Johnson Trust has incurred real property taxes, interest and late fees in the amount of$99,279.76.

5

The litigation has prevented the Trust from either selling the property or borrowing the money to

6

pay these taxes and the $400,000 purchase price. 7 The Defendants incurred $59,458.36 in attorneys
7

8
9

fees for defending Mailes' claims against them in this case. 8
The Idaho Supreme Court affinned the lower court ruling which returned the Linder Road

10

property to the Johnson Trust on January 30, 2009.

11

released the lis pendens he had filed in the Taylor v. Maile case on August 3, 2009. That was the

12

Maile waited over six months before he

date he recorded the Notice of Vendee's Lien. On December 16,2009, the Idaho State Bar counsel

13

filed a five count Complaint against Thomas Maile based upon his conduct relating to the purchase
14
15

of the property and during the litigation. 9

16
17

18
19

20
6

22, 2010.
Affidavit of Connie Shannahan dated April 22.

7

Paragraph 3, Affidavit ofR. John Taylor dated April 23, 2010.

8

I O.
Affidavit of Mark Prusynski; Exhibit C to Affidavit of R. John Taylor dated April 23, 20
2010.

21
22
23
24

25
26

9

Exhibit D to Affidavit orR. John Taylor dated April 23, 2010.
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ARGUMENT
1.

SLANDER Oli' TITLE

1

In Weaver v, Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P,3d 1234, 1244 (2000), the Idaho Supreme

2
3

Court ruled that an assertion in a pleading claiming an interest in real property satisfies the

4

publication element of slander of title.

5

This holding supported the Taylors' counterclaim for

slander of title, for two reasons: (1) the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed in this action

6

claimed an interest in the Lindc:r Road property and asked that title be quieted to the Mailes; and (2)
7

the Mailes maintained a lis pendens against the real property in Taylorv. Maile for over six months

8

after the Supreme Court affirrned Judge Wilper's judgment returning title to the property to the

9

Johnson Trust.

10
11

However, on April 2, 2010 the Idaho Supreme Court in Weitz v. Green, 040210 IDSCCI,

12

33696, overruled Weaver, finding that defamatory statements as to the title to property published

13

in a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. In light ofthis reversal, the Taylors have filed
14

a Motion for Leave to Amend their Counterclaims to eliminate the slander of title claim. Because

15

the conduct within both lawsuits is still relevant to the abuse of process and intentional interference

16
I

17

18

I

claims, the Amended Counterclaim also clarifies that those claims are based on Mailes' conduct in
both this case and the underlying case.

19

2.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

20
21

of proving the absence ofa
of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.
party,
The burden ofproving

22

a/Health, 123 Idaho 295, 298,847 P.2d 1156 (1992). This burden is onerous
Harris v. State Dept. ofHealth,

23

because even circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. Harris, supra,

24

25
26
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'_.
citing McCoy v, Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). This Court is required to
liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor ofthe Defendants on this motion, and to draw
1

2

3
4

all reasonable inferences from the record in their favor. Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho
322,326,48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002).

3.

5

THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT ON THE ABUSE OF PROCESS
CLAIM

6

When this issue was last briefed, the Defendants argued that there was a genuine issue offact

7

as to whether Maile had a colorable claim to ownership of the Linder Road property. That question

8

has been answered, twice: once by this Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims, and again by

9

Judge Wilper's order denying the Mailes' request that they be allowed to foreclose on the lien which
10
11

secures the repayment of the $400,000 purchase price.

12

On the abuse of process claims, there remain a genuine issues of material fact as to whether

13

the Plaintiffs have engaged in willful acts in the use of process for an ulterior or improper purposes,

14

which precludes summary judgment.

15

A.

Law of the Case.

16
17

18

The majority of the Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment simply repeats Mailes' unsuccessful arguments that the Taylor beneficiaries did not have

19

standing to object to his purchase ofthe Linder Road property from his client, Ted Johnson. There

20

is no legal basis for this argument, as it has been decided repeatedly.

21

The law of the case doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case

22

presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
23
24
25
26

pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
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progress, both in the district court and upon subsequent appeal." Swanson v, Swanson, 134 Idaho
512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
1

The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled, twice, that the Taylor beneficiaries have standing to

2

3

challengeMailes.purchaseofthisproperty.Taylorv.Maile I, 142 Idaho 253,261, 127 P.3d 156,

4

164 (2005) ; Taylor v. Maile II, 146 Idaho 705, 708, 201 P.3d 1282, 1285 (2009). The law ofthe

5

case doctrine precludes Mailes' attempts to revisit that issue at this point, and his attempt to use

6

them raises an inference that he is improperly attempting to mislead this court for an improper
7

purpose; i.e. to avoid responsibility for his actions and deprive the Taylors of their right to seek

8

redress for his conduct.

9

10

B.

11

TheMailes.briefing incorrectly presumes that the sole basis for the abuse of process claim

12

Wrongful conduct in addition to the recording of the lis pendens

was their filing of the lis pende:ns. This view is simplistic and inaccurate.

13

The Taylors assert that the Plaintiffs, by their conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present

14

lawsuit, have affirmatively used the legal process primarily to accomplish an improper purpose

15

outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was not

16
17

18

I

designed. The specific acts ofthe
of the Plaintiffs which support this claim include, but are not necessarily
limited to, the following:

19

20

a.

totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata

21
22

23

Filing the second lawsuit in spite of the fact that the claims contained therein were

b.

Filing the second lawsuit even though the Plaintiffs' claims were devoid of factual
support or if supportable in fact, had no cognizable basis in law

24

25
26
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..
c.

During the litigation of both cases, repeatedly asserting claims which have been
rejected by the: Idaho Supreme Court and misrepresenting the decisions of the

1

Supreme Court in pleadings

2
3

d.

4

Presenting

fals(;~

and misleading affidavits and pleadings to the district court in tihs

action

5
6

e.

Asserting claims (both in the Complaint and in the briefing which has been submitted

7

since) which were not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good

8

faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law

9

f.

Asserting claims (both in the Complaint and in the briefing which has been submitted

10

since) which were interposed for a improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause

11

unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase in the cost of litigation

12

13

g.

14

Asserting baseless claims for the purpose of delay, in an attempt to forestall
disciplinary proceedings by the Idaho State Bar.

15
16

h.

Failing to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the

17

Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the Linder

18

Road prope11y to the Johnson Trust

19
1.

Attempting to n:gain title to the Linder Road property through improper means, by

20

seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the

21

judgment upon which that lien was based

22

23

J.

Repeatedly filing duplicate motions and/or seeking reconsideration of rulings.

24
25

26
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The Taylors allege that the Plaintiffs' actions were taken for ulterior, improp(;:r purposes
including but not limited to the following: to delay, stall, and subverting the Johnson Trust's right
1

2

to the Linder Road property; to needlessly increase the cost oflitigation, to gain collateral advantage

3

in the proceeding not authorize:d by law; to delay the resolution of these matters for the purpose of

4

keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the initial lawsuit in which the

5

property was ordered returned to the Johnson Trust; and to attempt to forestall disciplinary

6

proceedings by the Idaho State Bar.
7

8

An abuse of process claim can be based on the entire range of procedures incident to the

9

litigation process,
F.3d297 (3rd
process. See, e,g"
e.g., General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co., 337 F,3d297

10

Cir. 2003) (use of discovery proceedings, making misrepresentations to opposing counsel and the

11

v, Drysdale, 524 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Mont. 1981) (filing notice of
court and filing motions); Hopper v.

12
13

deposition can be the basis for an abuse of process claim); Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882

14

of process while merely defending an underlying
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (a litigant may commit abuse ofprocess

15

action through conduct such as serving an unreasonable offer in bad faith, asserting bogus defenses,

16

exercising procedural rights, engaging in misconduct at mandatory settlement conferences);

17

of court procedures incident
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (the entire range ofcourt

18

to litigation, including the noticing of depositions, entry of defaults and the utilizations of various
19

20

motions, could be the basis for an abuse of process claim); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food &

21

Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 567 S.E.2d 251,253 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (process embraces full

22

range of activities and procedures attendant to litigation including taking discovery and filing

23

motions).

24
25
26
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""C.

Misrepresentations and bogus defenses

Mailes entire lawsuit, and his attempt to justifY the filing of the lawsuit to avoid liability for

1
2

abuse of process and intentional interference with prospective advantage, are based on repeated

3

misrepresentations. Those include the following:

4

1.

Taylors' standing to seek the return ofthe
of the property.

5
6

In their Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at page 4, Mailes state

7

"In addition, and most importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has established "law ofth<;:
oftht;: case" that

8

the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust (Taylor v. Maile 2)."10
2).,,10 This statement is a

9
i

blatant misrepresentation. In actuality, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile II acknowledged that

10

the Taylor beneficiaries had retained their right to pursue the lawsuit against Mailes:
11

12
13
14
15

16

While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the beneficiaries of the Trust
executed the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer) in June
2004. In the Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Tavlors, disclaimed any
interest in the lawsuit against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their
interest in all other Trust property in favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed
to an immediate distribution to beneficiaries, the Rogers resigned as trustees, the
named successor trustee declined to serve as trustee, and the beneficiaries nominated
and appointed the Taylors as trustees.

17

18

Taylor v. Maile 11, 146 Idaho 705, 708, 201 P.3d 1282, 1285 (2009) (emphasis added).

Misstatements of this type have occurred with alarming frequency during the litigation over
19

20

of process counterclaim. As the person who
the Linder Road property, and are relevant to the abuse ofprocess

21

drafted the Theodore Johnson trust documents, Mr. Maile knows that under the terms of the trust

22

Helen Taylor had the right to receive interest only, with the entire principal being distributed to her

23
24

25
26

10

Page 12, March 2, 2010 Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS

10
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
001655
LEWISTON.
LEWISTON, IDAHO 8350 I

children upon her death. He received a copy ofthe Disclaimer agreement referred to in the Supreme
Court opinion, and therefore knew that the Taylor beneficiaries had retained their interest in the
1

2

lawsuit against him.

There is no scenario which will justify this misrepresentation as to the facts,

3

and those misrepresentations are sufficient to create the inference that his continued attempts to

4

relitigate that issue are improper acts for an ulterior or improper purpose.

5

the Maile / Johnson Trust purchase contract
2. Rescission of
o/the
6

7

In this Motion, the Mailes put a great deal of weight on their argument that they retained an

8

colorable interest in the property because there was a rescission oftheir purchase contract which will

9

not be effective until the purchase price is returned. This is a total misrepresentation of the

10

proceedings in Taylor v. Maile. They state "The original litigation directly concerned th~: title to the

11

12

real property. The Court ordered the return of title to the real property to Taylors, but also ordered

13

"lIOn the
that the purchase price be returned to Berkshire, in order to rescind the transaction. "liOn

14

following page, they assert:

15
16
17

18

Prior to entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper
because the litigation concerned the disputed title to the real property. Following
entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because
rescission was not fully effected until the consideraiton was repaid to erkshire by
Taylors ... ,,12
Taylors...

19

20
21
22

II
II Page 4 of Mailes' March 2, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
Counterclaims

23
24
25
26

12 Page 5 ofMailes' March 2, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
Counterc laims
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of Judge Wilper' s ruling. The purchase was found to be void, not
This is a misrepresentation ofJudge
rescinded. As noted in the Supreme Court decision in Taylor II, the trial court ruled that the initial
1

2

contract for Mailes' purchase of the property was void.

Judge Wilper's May 7, 2009 order

3

reiterated the fact that it was the intention of the court in its July 21, 2006 order "to void the

4

... "
underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction
transaction..."

5

This no simple error. It was obvious that the Taylor v. Maile trial court did not order a

6

rescission ofthe contract; in fact, Maile had obtained an order granting summary judgment on the
7

8
9

rescission.1313 For him to now misrepresent that fact to this court in an attempt
Taylors' claim for rescission.
to avoid liability is further evidence of improper acts for an ulterior or improper purpose.

10

3. Misrepresentation as to negotiations on the Disclaimer

11

12

Another example of misrepresenting facts in order to try to create the appearance that there

13

was a factual basis for the now-dismissed claim is Maile's repeated references to a letter between

14

Connie Taylor and Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004.14
2004. 14 Maile points to this letter to supp0l1 his

15

argument that the Taylor beneficiaries lacked standing, ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme

16

Court has ruled twice that they do. Maile points to a single sentence and takes it out of context.

17

When the letter is read in full, it is clear that the "rights as beneficiaries" which the Taylors did not
18

19
20

want to give up was the right to require an accounting from the prior trustee and a copy of the trust
and estate tax records.

21
22
13

Memorandum Decision and Order, pages 8-9, Exhibit C to April 27, 2010 Affidavit of Counsel.

23
14 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One; for each of reference, an additional copy is attached as Exhibit D
24 III to the Affidavit of Counsel dated April 28, 2010.

25
26
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.......

Maile knows that the Taylors all retained the right to pursue the lawsuit against him, and
filing documents with the court which misrepresent those facts support an inference that he had an
1

2

ulterior, improper purpose and engaged in willful acts not proper in the regular conduct of the

3

proceeding. There can be no argument that to misrepresent facts and attempt to mislead the court

4

is "regular conduct of the proceeding."

5

4. Misleading statements as to Taylors' duty to repay the purchase money
6

7

Mailes argue (p. 4) that notwithstanding Judge Wilper's order for return of the purchase

8

price, the Taylors "have not returned any portion of the purchase price."

9

misleading, as it fails to acknowledge that Judge Wilper has repeatedly ruled that as long as the

10

This statement is

Mailes pursue litigation over title to the property, they are not entitled to repayment of the purchase

11

12
13

price and their attempts to force payment are "disingenuous."

5. Asserting that the vendee's lien creates an interest in real property

14

The Mailes' argument is difficult to follow, but they appear to claim that there is no
15
16

distinction between a vendee's lien, an action to foreclose a vendee's lien, and a quiet title action.

17

They argue this leads to the conclusion that a lis pendens was appropriate from the time of Judge

18

Wilper's July 21, 2006 order returning the property to the Trust and ordering the return of the

19

purchase money.

20
21

ofproblems
There are a number of
problems with this argument. First, it ignores the fact that the Mailes

22

did not file a vendee's lien in the underlying suit until August 3, 2009, which was over three years

23

after the District Court's order returning the property, over a year and a half after they filed the

24

25
26
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Complaint in this matter, six months after the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision
returning the property, and a full month after this court had dismissed their claims in this case. They
1

cannot use the August 2009 vtmdee's lien to legitimize their conduct prior to that time.

2
3

4

Second, this argument is now baseless because Judge Wilper has denied their motion to
I

foreclose on the vendee's lien, noting that MaBes' "attempt to enforce this Court's judgment, while

5

simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to challenge that judgment, is disingenuous."
6
7

This is not a new development; Judge Wilper has ruled repeatedly that MaBes
Mailes are not entitled to the

8

return of the purchase price as long as they are continuing to litigate the ownership of the Linder

9

Road property.

10

Most importantly, the argument that the vendee's lien supports a lis pendens has no legal

11

12

merit.

The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a lien creates a personal property right, not an
Under Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon property to secure payment of

13

interest in real property.

14

subjectto
a debt and transfers no title to the property subject
to the lien. I.C. § 45-109; I.C. § 45-10 1. Chavez

15

v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 221,,192 P.3d 1036, 1045 (2008), citing Middlekau.fJv.
MiddlekaujJv. Lake Cascade,

16

Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 834, 654 lP.2d
JP.2d 1385, 1387 (1982); 51 AmJur.2d
Am.Jur.2d Liens § 2 (stating that a lien

17

confers no ownership interest).
18
19

himselfin
Thomas Maile often represented himself
in the underlying litigation, and even when he hired

20

other counsel, he was present at all hearings. He cannot claim to be unaware ofthe
of the fact that he had

21

raised the issue of whether the Taylor beneficiaries had standing repeatedly and lost on that issue

22

every time, including two trips to the Supreme Court. It is reasonable to infer that, as a licensed
23
24

25

26

attorney, he was well aware of the doctrine of res judicata and the fact that it would act as a
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..."

complete bar to these efforts to relitigate the claims to the Linder Road property. A thirty second
research session on Casemaker reveals that res judicata has been addressed by the Idaho appellate
1

courts 494 times, beginning with People ex reI. Attorney General v. Alturas County, 6 Idaho 418,

2

o/Idaho, ISCCRNo. 35823, March 17,2010.
55 P. 1067 (1899) and ending with Ridgleyv. State ofIdaho,

3
4

4.

5
6

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH A PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
ADVANTAGE.

There are also genuine issues of material fact as to the counterclaim for intentional

7

interference with a prospective economic advantage.
8

The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage

9

10

I

of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4)
on the part ofthe

11
12
I

13

are as follows: 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2) knowledge of the {~xpectancy

the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that

I

the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to

14

the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley

15
II

16
17

Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-85, 824 P.2d 841,859-60 (1991).
Mailes' do not dispute the first three elements; their sole argument on this claim is that the

18

interference was "justified or privileged" and that the Taylors were not damaged.

They cite to a

19

20

North Carolina case which states that "a complaint must admit of no motive for interference other

21

than malice," but malice is not a required element under Idaho law. Their argument is based entirely

22

on their position that the complaint in this case and lis pendens weren't wrongful, ignoring the fact

23

that they maintained the lis pendens in Taylor v. Maile for six months following the decision ofthe

24

25
26
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appeal. They also rely heavily on the fact that the Taylors have not repaid the purchase money,
ignoring Judge Wilpers' orders stating that they are not entitled to repayment as long as they
1
2

continue to litigate the ownership of the property.

In support of a nebulous argument about

3

"statutory protection," they cite two Idaho cases which have no relevance whatsoever to the facts of

4

this case. Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop15 deals with the question of whether an injured employee

5

l6
may tape record an evaluation by a workers' compensation panel, and Rincover v. State 16
addresses

6

state officials' qualified immunity for discretionary functions.
7

8

The July 21,2006 trial court ruling in Taylor v. Maile, as affirmed by the Supreme Court,

9

establish the validity of the Taylors' ownership of the land, and the offer from Park Hampton LLC

10

establishes their economic expectancy to sell the land. Mr. Maile has been aware ofthese rulings,

11

was present during testimony about the pending offer to purchase, and has intentionally and

12

13

successfully prevented the Taylors from selling the land.

14

On a claim for tortious interference with contract, the improper conduct may be shown

15

through evidence of (among other things) fraud, misrepresentation, or abusive civil suits. Fortson

16

v. Brown, 690 S.E.2d 239 (Ga.App. 2010); Anesthesia Associates ofMount
ofMount Kisco, LLP v. Northern

17

Westchester Hosp. Center, 873 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y.App.Div.2.Dept.,2009). Unfounded litigation
18

19
20

may form the basis for a tortious interference with business relationship. Overstock. com, Inc. v.
SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah, 2008).

21
22

23

15

120 Idaho 164,167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991)

24

16

128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996)

25
26
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The misrepresentations which have been and continue to be made were addressed in the
preceding section. This court's dismissal ofthe Plaintiffs' claims on summary judgment raises the
1

inference that there was no legal merit to the second lawsuit. Judge Wilper's denial of their

2

3

"disingenuous" attempt to regain possession of
the property by foreclosing on a vendee's lien raises
ofthe

4

the same inference as to their continued attempts to force the Taylors to pay them $400,000 while

5

they continue to allege that the property should be returned to them.

6

These rulings establish an inference that the filing of this suit and the foreclosure motion

7

8

were the use of
"wrongful means" or "wrongful conduct" to interfere with the Johnson Trust's right
of"wrongful

9

to sell the real property.

10

This inference, when taken in the light most favorable to the Taylors,

creates an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment on this counterclaim.

11

As an alternative to establishing an improper purpose, the plaintiff alleging intentional
12

interference with prospective contractual relations may prove that the defendant's method of

13

interference was improper under the circumstances.

14

15

Santoro v.
v, Schulthess, 681 S.E.2d 897

(S.C.App.,2009). The Taylors have alleged thatMr. Maile's interference is for an improper purpose

i

16

and through improper means, which included but is not limited to wrongfully filing a second lawsuit

17

relitigate issues which he has already raised repeatedly and lost on, repeatedly. As
in an effort to re1itigate
18

an attorney, he must be held to the highest ethical standards, and required to comply with Rule 11,

19
20

which requires that pleadings be filed only when they are well grounded in fact, warranted by

21

existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting
of existing law, and

22 . not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
I

23

I

increase in the cost of litigation.

24
25
26

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS

17
LAW OFFICES
OFF'CES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
001662
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

Wrongful motive may be inferred from Mailes' continued attempts to get title to the property
repeat(~dly argued
back, by any means, whether it be duplicative lawsuits, continued appeals of issues repeatt!dly

1

unsuccessfully, or "disingenuous" attempts to foreclose on the vendee's lien while also challenging

2

the very judgment upon which the lien is based.

3
4

DAMAGES. The Plaintiffs argue that there has been no damage to the Defendants because

5

they have not returned the $400,000 purchase price.

This argument ignores the following facts:

6

a.

7

Judge Wilper has ruled that Mailes' continued litigation over the title to the property

8

is the reason the Taylors have not been able to borrow money to return the purchase

9

price to him;

10

b.

Had the Taylors been able to accept the offer from Park Hampton, they could have

11

$400,0100 and still had $1,400,000;
paid the $400,000

12
13 '

c.

14
15
16

Because of the precipitous decline in the real estate market since 2006, the property
is now valued at no more than $1,050,000, for a loss of at least $750,000.

I

d.

Because of its inability to either sell the property or borrow against it, the Johnson

17

Trust has incurred incurred real property taxes, interest and late fees in the amount

18

of $99,279.76.

19

e.

The Defendants have incurred $59,458.36 in attorneys fees for defending Mailes'

20
21
22
23

claims against them.
There are many issues of fact which remain to be decided by the jury in this case, making
summary judgment improper at this time.

24

25
26

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS

18
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

001663

'-'
CONCLUSION

1

2
3

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants request that this court deny the Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.
DATED this

~ay of April, 2010.

4

CLARK and FEENEY
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Thomas G.
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380 West State Street
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

>

DAVID NAVAHRO, Clerk
8yA. GARDEN
ByA.
r;EFtIT '

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IBERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, flk/a
CONNIE I'AYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-·claimants..
Defendants/Counter-·claimants
. _ _ _ _ _ _.J-...1--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. ____ _

The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through co-counsel of record, Christ Troupis,
hereby moves this Court to strike certain attachments to Affidavit of Counsel and Affidavit ofR.
John Taylor relating to Plainitffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein, and moves this

001665

Court to enter it's Order striking the attachments described in the Affidavit of Christ Troupis,
filed contemporaneously herewith, as the same have no relevancy in this matter.
This motion is based on the records, papers, pleadings, and files of this action, and
I.R.C.P. Rules 12(F) & 56(c), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is further
made and based upon the record and files in this action. Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants request
timely oral argument on the matters contained herein.
ORAL ARGUMENT 'WILL BE REQUESTED.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2010.

CH~]&
CH~]R&

Co-counsel for

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
:I Lewiston, Idaho 83501
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

.(
( ))
(X)
(
( ))
i (
( ))

1

I

i

--1--
I

I Thomas G. Maile, IV.

---l

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

( )

(X)

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

C~,

Co-counsel for

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants

MOTION TO STRIKE - Pg :2
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

J. DAYIP N,fWARflO. Gleri'\
6Afifit;/II
tty i\~ 6i\flfit::/Il
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
i

I

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
f/kJa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkJa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
• CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
!
!

Defendants/Counter-claimants.
L....-..

--I------------

_

~----------------------------~------------------------------

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:

County of Ada)
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CHRIST TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Your Affiant is co-counsel for the above-named Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, and as
such, is well familiar with the facts contained in the record herein and provides this
affidavit in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendant's Motion to Strike portions of the
attachments to the Affidavit of Counsel and the Affidavit of R. John Taylor filed in
opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein. That the
information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge
and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called
upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.

2.

That your affiant received the affidavits referenced above and the affidavits contain
bill1ings
improper, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, to wit: any and all billings

relating to this litigation and the copy of the Idaho State Bar Complaint filed on
December 16,2009. That such material has no relevance to the motion for summary
judgment.

3.

That said attachments to the affidavit are inadmissible as the same are not relevant for
consideration by the court.

Wherefore, your affiant prays that the court enter its order striking from the record, those
allegations and/or documents which lack any foundation the court's consideration relating to the
pending motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2010.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE - Pg 2
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State,
this 3rd day of May, 2010.

(~~==+-p~-/.
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, Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/COlmter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

Ii

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV -OC-0723232

i Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
I

MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION
TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS
MOTION TO AMEND TID:
COUNTER-CLAIM

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kJa
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

The plaintiffs provide the following Reply Memorandum Brief in support oftheir Motion
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIElr IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS MOTION TO AMEND THE
COUNTER-CLAIM
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for Summary Judgment against all of the defendants' counterclaims.
LEGAL ARGUMENT

1. The Counter-claimants have
havejailed
jailed to adequately Reply with Evidence and/or Briefing to
rebut the Plaintiffs' Contentions on Summary Judgment.
There are significant developments established in the record, which the CounterClaimants have failed to address in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion. The Honorable Judge
Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore 1.
L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D
entered his Order October 14,2009, affirming that the plaintiffs have a continued right to assert a
vendee's lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to I.C. 45-804. The decision of
March 11, 2010, only suspends the foreclosure until there is a resolution in the current
proceedings.
A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that a lis pendens was
proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The plaintiffs have consistently asserted that
the right to pursue the vendee"s lien and the foreclosure of the same, was part and parcel of the
Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record. Judge Wilper has validated the counterdefendants' right to file the vendee's lien. I.C. § 45-1302 authorizes the foreclosure of a lien to
the same status as a quiet title action. Although Taylors argue that the vendee's lien does not
create an interest in the real property, they admit that "Under Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon
property to secure payment of a debt..."
debt ... " Def. Memo, pg. 14. Moreover, the Taylors' claim that
the contract was declared void, but not rescinded, is merely semantic, since the July 21,2006
... "
order mandated "returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction
transaction...
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAJMANTS
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which is the substantive effect of the rescission remedy. See Def. Memo, p. 12.
The Counter-claimants have failed to argue any position relating to the interplay between
I.C. § 45-1302 & I.C. 45-804. As stated in the opening brief, a foreclosure of a vendel~'s lien is
treated as an action to quiet title. An action to quiet title affects the legal and equitable claims
affecting real property. A filing of Lis Pendens is proper to give notice of the competing claims
in any quiet-title action.
In addition the counter-claimants failed to address the plaintiffs' good faith equitable
claims asserted by the plaintiffs for quieting title based upon a "fraud upon the court". The
counter-claimants failed to argue against the clear basis for equitable relief afforded under the
case of Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005), which provided that actions to
set aside a judgment are governed by equitable principles. This court ruled that the doctrine of
Res Judicata applied to bar the plaintiffs' requested relief. The plaintiffs respectively disagree
with the court's ruling, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the defendants filed verified
pleadings asserting they were beneficiaries when in truth and established fact they were not. The
plaintiffs are supported in their proposition by the Idaho Supreme Court which has established
"law of the case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust. Consequently the

Taylors were not beneficiaries as they submitted in their verified pleading in January 2006 which
gave rise to the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (Taylor v. Maile 2). The plaintiffs have
alleged there was a "fraud upon the court" which was sought to be corrected by seeking equitable
relief, consistent with the Campbell case. In any case alleging an independent basis for equitable
relief based upon fraud upon the court, there will always be a previous judicial proceeding that
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSIT][ON TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS MOTION TO AMEND THE
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gave rise to the judgment sought to be set aside. That in and of itself does not make the filing for
equitable relief wrongful conduct that will give rise to a civil remedy.
Nor have the counter-claimants argued against the established law relating to a
constructive trust remedy. The plaintiffs alleged fraud upon the court as one of the bases to set
aside the Judgment and quiet title to the real property in Berkshire Investments. Any action
"affecting the title to real property" clearly allows the filing of a lis pendens by an interested
party in order to protect their interest in the property subject to the litigation. Such actions
include actions attempting to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property; actions to
establish a constructive trust over real estate which may have been obtained by fraud. See
generally, Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App.l984),
App.1984), wherein a
claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained by fraud allowed the
filing oflis pendens. A constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either
fraudulently or through violation ofa fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469,
886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). The counterclaimants have failed to argue or provide any law in opposition to these basic principll~s oflaw.
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Levinger

v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003); I.R.c.P.
56(c).
56(
c). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue by sufficiently raising
the issue as to an element of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. Id.
The party opposing summary judgment, therefore, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
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denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). This rule
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for triaL"
facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. Venters v. Sorn::nto
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005).
Idaho appellate courts will not consider any issue when a party fails to support it with
argument or authority. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187, 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003),
United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007). Assignments of
error are deemed waived and should not be considered by an appellate court. State v. Creech,
132 Idaho 1,966 P.2d 1 (1998). Appellate courts need not address an issue when an appellant
has made only conclusory assertions and has failed to cite any legal authority. Such conduct
amounts to a waiver by an appellant of issues to be reviewed. Suitts V. Nix 141 Id. 706, 117
P.3d 120 (2005), Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Co., Inc., 134 Id. 626, 7' P.3d 1103
(2000).
The granting of Summary Judgment against all ofthe claims set forth in the
counterclaims is proper in the current case.
2. The Supreme Court has provided recent authority to support the Plaintiffs' Right to a
Summary Judgment on all claims raised in the Counter-Claim.

The Idaho Supreme Court on April 2, 2010, issued a decision in the case of Weitz v.
Green, 33696 (IDSCCI) which provided:
"Slander of title requires proof of four elements: (1) publication
pUblication of a
slanderous statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and (4) resulting special
damages."" Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,405, 195 P.3d 1212, 1218 (2008)
(quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003)).
Slander is "[a] defamatory assertion expressed in a transitory form." Black"s Law
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Dictionary 660 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). A "defamatory" statement is one "tending
to harm a person"s reputation, [usually] by subjecting the person to public
contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, or by adversely affecting the person"s business."
Id. at 188. ""Malice has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. An action will not lie where a
statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with probable
cause for believing it."" Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 P.3d 1087,
1095 (2006) (internal dtation omitted) (quoting Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho
691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234" 1244 (2000)). Attorney fees and legal expenses incurred in
removing a cloud from title constitute special damages for purposes of a slander
oftitle claim. Rayl v. Shull Enters., Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573
(1984).
The district court concluded that Appellants made assertions in their
Amended Complaint that satisfied the first two elements of publication of a
slanderous and false statement. The Amended Complaint contains allegations that
Appellants, and not R{!spondents,
R{:spondents, are the title-holders of the property, and that
Respondents trespassed on Appellants" land and caused damages. The district
court found that the Amended Complaint constituted the publication of a
defamatory and false statement. As to malice, the district court made the factual
finding that Appellants had recklessly made numerous false statements in their
Amended Complaint, including a statement that a hogwire fence on the eastern
portion of the disputed. property extended to intersect with another fence, when
they knew that it did not.
The district court"s finding as to the publication element was erroneous as a
law. As this Court noted in Richeson v. Kessler, "[w]ith certain
oflaw.
matter of
exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due course of a
judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely
privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although made
maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity." 73 Idaho 548, 551-52,255 P.2d

707,709 (1953). If the defamatory statement was made in the course ofa
proceeding and had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding,
that statement may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defamation.
Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 393-94, 114 P. 42, 45
(1911). A cause of action for defamation in Idaho has very similar elements to a
cause of action for slander of title; a plaintiff suing for defamation must show that
the defendant: "(1) communicated information concerning the plaintiffto others;
(2) that the information was defamatory; and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged
because of the communication." Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427,
430, 163 P.3d 216,219 (2007). The public policy behind granting immunity from
civil defamation actions holds also for actions alleging slander oftitle, as has been
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recognized by several other jurisdictions. See Conservative Club of Washington
v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6, 13-14 (D. D.C. 1990); Wilton v. Mountain Wood
Homeowners Ass'n, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 473 (Cal.Ct.App. 1993).
Respondents cite to our decision in Weaver v. Stafford, in support of their
argument that the publication requirement may be satisfied through statements
made in a pleading. 134 Idaho 691, 701,8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) (stating
"[h]ere, Stafford"s pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the
publication element of slander of title. "). We find no compelling reason why the
public policy granting civil immunity for statements made in judicial proceedings
as applied to defamation actions should not also apply to slander of title actions.
Therefore, to the extent Weaver conflicts with the general rule articulated in
Richeson, 73 Idaho at 551-52,255 P.2d at 709, and quoted above, we overrule it.
As the finding of slander of title in this case was premised upon a statement
made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where such statement
was related to the underlying claim against Respondents, that statement is deemed
immune. Therefore, this Court reverses the district court"s determination that
Appellants committed slander of title against Respondents. Accordingly, the
award of $40,000 in attorney fees as special damages under the slander of title
claim was improperly granted and is reversed.
The Weitz, supra, caSt: has important implications relating to established Idaho Law to
the present proceedings. All ofthe counter-claimants' contentions relate to an alleged improper
ofjudicial
filing of Lis Pendens and the alleged misuse of
judicial process relating to allegations contained
in the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff. As the Weitz case holds such statements
whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a complaint are
judicially immune from liability if they "had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that
proceeding". In both cases whether protected under a vendee's lien or a claim for a constructive
trust, the pleadings and the Lis Pendens were reasonably related to the claims for relief in both
cases.
Such judicial statements may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defmnation,
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whether it be a slander of title, abuse of process, or a claim for intentional interference with a
prospective economic advantage. The plaintiffs alleged the Taylors committed a "fraud upon
the court" and prayed for equitable relief to set aside the judgment and quiet title in Berkshire
Investments. The plaintiffs are supported in their proposition by the Idaho Supreme Court which
has established "law of the case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust. Every
claim advanced by the counter-claimants is premised upon a general principle that such
statements were defamatory or false. Such can not be the case under Weitz, supra, as these
allegations and Lis Pendens had a reasonably relation to the cause of actions. Summary
Judgment for the plaintiff.,
plaintiff') is proper on all counts. of the defendants' counterclaims.

3. The March yn
yJr 2010 Order Affirms That the Plainti/ft
Plaintifft Have Not Improperly Pursued
Litigation Su"ounding Any Filings to Secure Their Vendee's Lien on the Real Property.
The Honorable Judge Wilper has currently denied the plaintiffs' right to seek
enforcement of their vendee's lien, in essence ruling that while this litigation is pending it would
be inappropriate to

foreclosun~

the vendee's lien. The Court however, denied sanctions against

the plaintiffs. The denial of the sanctions provides the basis for this court to determine that there
are legitimate factual and legal issues surrounding the plaintiffs' right to seek the enforcement of

a vendee's lien. The Decision and Order relating to the defendants' request for sanctions
provides additional basis for summary judgment. First, if the district court failed to assess
sanctions it is a finding that establishes that there are meritorious issues raised by the plaintiffs.
The case of Cunningham, et aL v. Jensen, et aI., 31332 (IDSCCI), illustrates the available
remedies in civil litigation relating to alleged wrongful conduct.
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There are troubling concerns in adopting a broader definition for the tort of abuse
of process. There is clearly the potential for litigants to abuse this cause of action,
filing lawsuits outside the main litigation to obtain undue advantage in the
underlying suit, or burdening the courts with claims of improper litigation tactics
for every perceived slight by their opponents. Further, there are remedies within
the litigation itself, such as court-ordered sanctions, which can compensate
litigants for abusive tactics by the opposing party. Allowing recovery of damages
in an abuse of process action that could be recoverable and addressed by the court
in the underlying litigation would be inefficient and could create the possibility
that a disappointed litigant would seek a "second opinion" ifthe litigant didn't feel
the sanctions were sufficient in the first case. As one court has noted: Attorneys
have a relatively swift mechanism for redressing careless, slick, underhanded, or
tacky conduct: court-imposed sanctions. Once imposed, sanctions may be
reviewed by an appellate court. They may not, however, be tried de novo under
guise...
end
the guise
... of a tort action. [Such would] represent[] an intolerable attempt to endrun and abuse the judicial system and could lead to a geometric proliferation of
litigation. Pollack v. Superior Court, 279 Cal.Rptr. 634, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
The fact that the Honorable Judge Wilper did not find a basis for an award of sanctions
relating to the filing and/or attempt to enforce the vendee's lien, establishes that the plaintiffs did
not commit wrongful conduct. If they had arguably Judge Wilper would have so found. The
counterclaim cannot advance as Judge Wilper has ruled that there were meritorious issues and
facts which are to be resolved.
Second, the detemlination by Judge Wilper serves as Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel relating to the current counter-claim. There are five factors required for collateral
estoppel to bar re-litigation of an issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against
whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the
prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the
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party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.
Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. The determination made by Judge Wilper
satisfies all the elements under Ticor case. The plaintiffs unless they committed fraud, cannot be
held accountable under the counter-claim for alleged wrongful conduct. The plaintiffs have
properly asserted that they have a valid vendee's lien as the same has been litigated and resolved
in the plaintiffs' favor.
5. The plaintitTs in good faith advanced their colorable claim for a constructive trust.
The plaintiffs filed suit seeking equitable relief. Relative hereto 49 C.J.S. Judgments §
310 provides:
.... In order for a party to obtain relief under such a rule, the party seeking relic~f
must prove the most egregious conduct involving corruption of the judicial
process itself by establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that there was
perjured testimony which influenced the judgment of the court..,.
court....
In any event, some courts hold that a judgment may be vacated for perjury under
certain conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that party's own willful
perjury, or by the use of false testimony, which the party knows at the time to be
false.
The district court entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim", solely upon the direct
material misrepresentations of the Taylors and their counsel of record. A colorable cllaim was
advanced by the plaintiffs in the present matter. All the allegations against the plaintiffs stem
from a "reasonable relation" to the allegations surrounding the "fraud upon the court".
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128,212 P.2d 1031,1034 (1949)
provides the initial standards of application of Res Judicata. Commencing at page 128 of 70 Id.
Reports, the Supreme Court declared:
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One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that
offraUil or collusion a
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud
judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies on all issues which
were (or should have been) litigated in the action
action....
....
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be
extrinsic or collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. It is not sufficient to charge only
intrinsic fraud, or that which is involved in the issues tried, such as the
perjun::d testimony. (citation omitted).
presentation of peIjun::d
Our Supreme Court has confirmed the principle that a party committing fraud will not be
afforded the protection of res judicata. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 P.2d 329 (1995),
Stoddard V. the Hagadone Corporation (2009-ID-04l6.l58 Docket No. 34335). The plaintiffs
have legitimately and properly advanced sound legal and factual argument relating to the
defendants' alleged misconduct in obtaining their "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims".
Summary Judgment is proper.

4. Certain Attachment to John R. Taylor's should be stricken and not considered relevant to
the Summary Judgement.
The attachment relating to the Idaho State Bar Complaint filed on December 16, 2009 is
improper. R. John Taylor has provided the attachment to the record which is improper and
serves no purpose to the present proceeding and must be stricken for lack of foundation.

l2(F) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 12(F)
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pl{:ading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or
upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the evidence submitted in
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opposition must be admissible evidence. The complaint serves no purpose to the court in its
detennination of the legal issues involved in the motion for summary judgment. The recent case
of Homes Corp. v. R. Herr, 2005 Idaho 30667, provides:

In order to be considered on a summary judgment motion, affidavits must be
based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence
at trial, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the stated matters.
I.R.C.P. 56(e). In determining the admissibility of evidence, trial courts are given
broad discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. State, Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Altman, 122 Idaho
1004, 1007, 842 P.2d 683,686 (1992); Baker v. Shavers, Inc., 117 Idaho 696,
698, 791 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1990).
The court exercises free review of the standards of the admissibility of evidence on
summary judgment motions, and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of
discretion. The complaint must be stricken from the record and should not be considered as

legitimate fact in support of the motion for summary judgment.

6. The Court should deny thf~ Counte,.-claimants
Counter-claimants motion to amend its counte,.-claim.
counter-claim.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, once a responsive pleading has been
filed, a pleading may only be amended by "leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires...."
requires .... " An abuse-of-discretion
standard is employed in reviewing a district court"s denial of a motion to amend a complaint to
add an additional cause of action. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 193, 125 P.3d

1067, 1069 (2005). If the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing
party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim ... it is not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint." Black Canyon
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Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991).
The motion to

am(~nd

the counter-claim does not alter the underlying facts established in

the record to create any additional basis for any claims. The proposed amendment does not alter
the underlying facts that the allegations contained in the plaintiffs' amended complaint and the
filing ofthe Lis Pendens were: not reasonably related to the cause of actions involving the real
property subject the plaintiffs' claims for a constructive trust and/or the judicially authorized and
established claim for the foreclosure of a vendee's lien.
CONCLUSION

There are ample undisputed facts supporting the continued right to maintain a vendee's
lien foreclosure action against the real property. A vendee's lien is afforded the same analysis as
a quiet title action affecting re:al property. The counter-claimants had a legitimate right to
maintain their lis pendens in the current matter even through an appeal. The continuation of the
lis pendens through August 2009 were proper. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Summary
Judgment as to all counter-claims raised in this matter.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2010.

CH~o-counsel

for

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER
COUNTERCLAIMANTS MOTION TO AMEND THE COUNTER-CLAIM to be delivered, addressed as
follows:
l

I

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
I
II 380 W. State Street
! Eagle, Idaho 83616
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
I

( )

~~

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(
(
(
(

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I ( )

I

)
)
)
)

__J'--------

I

_

~/)/

TRO~

CHRIST T.
co-counsd for
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

8
9

10

vs.

Case No. CV OC 0723232

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT ON THE DEFENDANTS'
COUNTERCLAIMS

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
a1.
Defendants.

11

12
13

This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.

14

Based upon and for the reasons stated on the record, the court finds there are genuine

15

material fact that pr,event it from granting a Motion for Summary Judgement at this time.
ofmaterial
issues of

16

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaim is

17

18

therefore DENIED.
DATED this

7%y of June, 2010.

19
20
21

I

4

/~ N{t~ ~.~.
~". WJt1~(f)
~fJ?1/(f}
I

____
~____________________~J
By-=----=-_
_----:
----:,LJ
(~}-IL--Judge
(~}-IL-Judge Greenwood
By~~
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24
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3
4
5

6
7

8
9
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Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
ID 83616
Eagle, 10

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, 1D
ID 83616

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Connie Taylor
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Main Street, Ste 201
Lewiston, 1D
ID 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF [DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,
8
9

10
11

Case No. CV OC 0723232

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS

vs.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

12

This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the

13

Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims. Following Defendants' counsel's agreement to

14

redact references made in thl~ proposed Amended Counterclaim to disciplinary proceedings by

15

the Idaho State Bar against Mr. Maile, the Plaintiffs had no further objection thereto.

16
17

The Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims is hereby GRANTED.
DATED thi,6l;;l day OfJune,;o.
OfJune,,;o,

18
19

20

. ~ ./

_._,

'h~ JJ-&~ ~. ~j 11
Pl

I

/
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JJpo/sl

By.,---_
_ _-.::::...._ _ _ _ _ ___
By"....----,_ _ ---,,----_-"=Judge Greenwood
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9
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Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

o
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o
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Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

o

[J

o
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Connie Taylor
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Main Street, Ste 201
Lewiston, ID 83501

o

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Te1ecopy
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 746-9160
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1
2

3
4

5

CON1'IIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8

9

10
11

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

12
13

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

vs.

14
15

16
17

18
19
20

CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; and R. JOI-IN TAYLOR, an
individual, CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION
Defendants.

21
22

23

As an amended counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, the Defendants allege as follows:

1.

The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Answer are

24

incorporated herein by reference.
25
26

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

1
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 8'3501
8:3501
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2.

Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, by their conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present

lawsuit, have affirmatively engaged in willful acts in the use of the legal process primarily to
1

2

accomplish an improper purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation

3

for which the process was not designed. The specific acts of the Plaintiffs which support this claim

4

include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

5

a.

Filing the instant lawsuit in spite of the fact that the claims contained therein were

6

totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata

7

8

b.

9

Filing the instant lawsuit even though the Plaintiffs' claims were devoid of factual
support or if supportable in fact, had no cognizable basis in law

10
11

c.

misrepresenting the decisions of the Supreme Court in pleadings

12

13

Asserting claims which had previously been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court and

d.

Presenting false and misleading affidavits and pleadings to the district court

e.

Asserting claims which were not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or

14

15

a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law

16
17

f.

18

Asserting claims which were interposed for a improper purpose, such as to harass,
to cause unnecessary delay, to needlessly increase in the cost of litigation

19
20

g.

Asserting baseless claims for the purpose of delay.

21

h.

Failing to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the

22

Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the Linder

23

Road property to the Johnson Trust
24
25
26

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

2
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1.

Attempting to regain title to the Linder Road property through improper means, by
seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the

1

judgment upon which that lien was based

2
3

J.

Repeatedly filing duplicate motions and/or seeking reconsideration of rulings.

4

Plaintiffs' actions were taken for ulterior, improper purposes including but not limited to:
5
6

to delay, stall, and subverting the Johnson Trust's right to the Linder Road property; to needlessly

7

increase the cost of litigation, to gain collateral advantages in the proceeding not authorized by law;

8

to delay the resolution of these matters for the purpose of keeping the real property tied up beyond

9

the time of
the appeal of
the initial lawsuit in which the property was ordered returned to the Johnson
ofthe
ofthe

10

trust.
11

12

As a result of these acts by the Plaintiffs, they have prevented and significantly delayed the

13

Defendants from selling the Linder Road property, which has precipitously declined in value since

14

the filing of this action, damaging the Defendants by misuse of the process external to th(~ litigation

15

that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding.

16
17

3.

Intentional interference with a prospective economic advanta2e. By wrongfully

18

continuing to assert an ownership interest in the Linder Road property, the Plaintiffs have committed

19

the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have lost

20

opportunities to sell the property because of the Plaintiffs' ongoing litigation over the title to the

21

property, including but not limited to the loss of an offer to purchase the property for $1.8 million
22
23
24

dollars of which the Plaintiffs had knowledge. The Plaintiffs' interference was for an improper
purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust.

25
26

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
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4.

Attorney fees: As a result ofthe actions ofPlaintiffs
of Plaintiffs in this matter, Defendants have

been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Clark and Feeney, and are entitled
1

2
3
4

to recover their attorneys fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP 11 and Idaho Code sections
12-121 and 12-123.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the following relief:

5

6

1.

for abuse of process.

7

8

That j udgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial

2.

That j udgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial

9

for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
10
11

12
13

3.

That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
bringing their counterclaim pursuant to I.C. 12-121, 12-123 and I.R.C.P 11.

28'"

DATED this _ _ day of May, 2010.
14

CLARK and FEENEY

15

,,'

16
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By ._\,~::""
(':,.".e~"J--·
Connie W. Taylor, a member of the firm.
I

17

18

Attorneys for Defendants.

19

U

20

21
22
23
24
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LEWISTON.
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-'
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.

1

County of Ada

)

2

R. John Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
3
4

5

That I am the one of the trustees for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, the Plaintiff
in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing Amended Counterclaim and know the
contents thereof and believe the same to be true.

6
7

8
9

10

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

L t;:1

day of June, 2010.

11

12
13

?

14

Not~: Public

15

(-lrt<-r I $<J,IIIIe..
ResIdmg at (-lrt<..F1$<J/IIIe..

~nd for th~/State of Idaho

My Commission expires:

16

therein.

()jfOlp/2-O/
()jfOlp!
2JJ/ i
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21
22
23
24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

2
3
4
5

6
7

Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616
Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

8

o
o
[]

)Q-

o
o
o
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jPjP

r-7'
r7'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telccopy (fAX) (208) 938-5482
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ofthetiI1rl..
Connie W. Taylor, a member ofthefiI1ri.
Attorneys for Defendants
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AUG 04
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RAI\IDALL
DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
r
I
II

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH.
MAILE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, ,m
,ill Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
iI ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
I CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

I
I

I

'--_
D_efl_e_n_dan_ts_/C_oun
__te_r_-C_I_ai_m_an_ts_._ _. . I - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-_ _ _ _ . _ _
'-- _ _
D_efl_e_n_dan_ts_/C_ounte_r_-C_I_ai_m_an_ts_._

J

The above named Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through attorney, Christ Troupis
Maile hereby provide their Reply to Defendants/Counter-claimants' Amended Counterclaim and
in reply to the same allege as follows:

001694

1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Counterclaim
which is not specifically admitted herein.
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim.
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2, 3, & 4 of the Counter-Claim.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid,
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Cod€::
Codt: section
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior
proceedings which remained of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property ,md as
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. That the court in
pt:ndens
the prior proceeding captioned Taylor v. Maile, allowed the filing of the notice oflis p€::ndens
and as such the claims are barred.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but
not limited to:
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or
REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- Pg 2

001695

the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
Whoever violates this ,Subsection is guilty of a felony.
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES.
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
((c)
c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a d<::termination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this section as it deems proper.
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise;
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the
present action.

TmRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the
action above referenced.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
REPL Y TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- Pg 3
REPLY
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Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their Counter
CounterClaim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided
by the counter-claimants.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants/Counter-claimants were alleged to commit a fraud upon the court giving
rising to a colorable claim for the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counter
counterdefendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this
matter progresses.
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL
DE~FORJURYT~
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV., and Christ Troupis to
defend this action and reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the
Defendants and Idaho Code 12-120; 12-121; 12-123.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs.

REPL
Y TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- Pg 4
REPLY
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2

For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs.

3

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premises.

DATED this 1L day of July, 2010.

(}L:;f)-,/'I
(jL:;f)-,/'I
CHRIST T. TR~

Attorney for counter-defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of August, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing REPL
Y TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as
REPLY
follows:
U. S. Mail
'Iconnie
'I?onnie W. TaylorFacsimile Transmission
CLARK and FEENEY
: (X)
Hand Delivery
P.O. Drawer 785
I ( )
I ((
)
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 .
Overnight Delivery
)
II
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
I

IT)
1<)

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
, 380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
• Facsimile: (208) 939-100 I

!

:

( )

I

(X)

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Attorney for Counter-defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # -4549
LA W OFFICE
TROUPIS LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

-'
-'

'"",

~.,'

1

••••• J

J,
J. OAVlt: ;",

(

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
----------,------------------,
I

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
I Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHI MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
, MAILE, husband and wife,
i

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

v.

I
I

T AYLOR, file/a
f/kla
CONNIE WRIGHT l'
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, ~m Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

I

_
_

~

~

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - J - - - - - 
-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'-

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for its reconsideration of
the following, to wit: (1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2, 2009, (2) Order

001699

Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment entered July 20, 2009, (3) the Judgment Dismissing
Plaintiffs Claims entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009.
The motion is brought pursuant to LR.C.P.
I.R.c.P. Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), on the grounds that the
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI), decided
on September 3,2010, significantly alters the legal positions of the parties to this action with
respect to the Plaintiffs' dismissed claims.
This Motion is further made based upon the record and file contained herein, Affidavit in
Support of the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend, and the Memorandum Brief in Support
of the Motion, filed concurrently herewith.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants requests this Honorable Court to amend
said Orders, Memorandum Decision, and Judgments above referenced.
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
DATED
DA
TED this 28 th day of September, 2010.

&:VI)
&:V/7

CHRIST T. TRO@iS7
TROfdfrS7
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-,
Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28 th day of September, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3)
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
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(X)
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I

( )
( )
(X)
( X)

( )

u. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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Tbk-IS-'- 

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter··

Defendants
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